

AN
ORDINANCE
OF THE
LORDS and COMMONS
Assembled in
PARLIAMENT:

For the relieving of all persons over rated by
the Ordinance for Weekly Assessments.

*Ordered by the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament, That
this Ordinance be forthwith printed and published:*

H: Elsyng, Cler. Parl. D. Com.

ALSO,
An ORDER of the Commons in
Parliament, Prohibiting the Printing or
publishing of any lying Pamphlet
scandalous to His Majestie, or to the
proceedings of both or either Hou-
ses of Parliament.

*Ordered by the Commons assembled in Parliament, That this Order
be forthwith printed and published:*


H: Elsyng, Cler. Parl. D. Com.

March 10. 1642.

London, Printed for Edw. Husbands, and are to be sold at
his shop in the Middle-Temple.

J n E over Sunday





Die Sabathi 4^o Martii, 1642.



Hereas it is ordained in the Ordinance for the weekly assessment, That if any person or persons shall find him, or themselves aggrieved, that he, or they is, or are over rated, such person or persons at any time, before distresse taken of his, or their goods, may complain to the respective Committees, who have executed this Ordinance within the Division or Limit, where any such person or persons over rated shall be assessed, which sayd respective Committees, or any two of them, shall have power upon Examination to

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relieve such person or persons as they shall see cause; yet the true intent and meaning of the sayd Ordinance is, And it is further ordered by the Lords and Commons, that if any person or persons so finding themselves agrieved, be such as have not formerly contributed upon the Propositions, or not proportionably to others of their estates, nor have bin rated and payd upon the Ordinance of assessment, Entituled, an Ordinance for the assessing and rating of such as have not contributed at all, or not contributed according to the proportions of their Estates: Then the sayd parties if they be not assess'd above a proportionable part of such sum or sums as other men of their abilitiy have paid upon the Propositions, or have bin assess'd, and have payd upon the sayd Ordinance of not exceeding the


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twentieth part; The sayd Rates to stand, and not to be altered, Provided neverthelesse, that no person be assessed above the summe of Ten pounds the Week.

Ordered by the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament, That this Ordinance be forthwith printed and published.

H: Elsyng, Cler. Parl. D. Com.



Die Jovis 9^o Martii, 1642,



Is this day Ordered by the
Commons House of Parli-
ament, That the Committee
for examinations, or any four
of them, have power to appoint such per-
sons as they thinke fit, to search in a-
ny house or place where there is just
cause of suspicion, that Presses are kept
and employed in the printing of Scanda-
lous and lying Pamphlets, and that they
do demollish and take away such Presses
and their materials, & the Printers Nuts
and Spindles which they find so employ-
ed, and bring the Master-Printers, and
VWork-

Work-men Printers before the sayd
 Committee; And that the Committee
 or any four of them, have power to com-
 mit to prison any of the sayd Printers, or
 any other persons that do contrive, or
 publikely or privately vend, sell, or pub-
 lish any Pamphlet, scandalous to his Ma-
 jesty or the proceedings of both or either
 Houses of Parliament, or that shall re-
 fuse to suffer any Houses or Shops to be
 searched, where such Presses or Pam-
 phlets as aforesayd are kept: And that
 the persons imployed by the sayd Com-
 mittee, shall have power to seize such
 scandalous and lying Pamphlets as they
 find upon search, to be in any Shop or
 Warehouse, fold, or dispersed by any
 person whomsoever, and to bring the
 persons that so kept, published, or sold
 the same, before the Committee; And that
 such:

such persons as the Committee shall commit for any of the offences aforesayd, shall not be released till the parties employed for the apprehending of the sayd persons, and seizing their Presses & materials, be satisfied for their paines and charges. And all Iustices of the peace, Captains, Officers, and Constables, are required to be assisting in the apprehending of any the persons aforesayd, And in searching of their Shops, Houses, and Warehouses, And likewise all Iustices of peace, Officers, and Constables, are hereby required from time to time to apprehend such persons as shall publish, vend, or sell the sayd Pamphlets. And it is further ordered, That this Order be forthwith printed and published, to the end that notice may be taken hereof, that the contemnors of this Order may be left inexcusable for their offence.

F I N I S.

K Henrietta Maria (app)
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Queens proceedings
IN
YORKSHIRE.

BEEING

A true Relation of these following particulars,

- 1 *Of the proceedings of the Earl of Newcastle's Army.*
- 2 *Of the Forces with the Queen.*
- 3 *Information brought to the Parliament concerning her Majesties proceedings.*
- 4 *Proceedings in the Parliament touching her Attendants.*
- 5 *The Parliaments Resolution concerning her Majesty.*
- 6 *The Petition of the States of Scotland, to his Majesty at Oxford.*
- 7 *A Letter from the States in Scotland to the Parliament certifying that they resolved to raise an Army of 10000. men, to come against the Earl of Newcastle, for their own security.*

with

The Committee who are to treat with his Majesty concerning Accommodation.

And a Vindication of the Lord Say, made in a Speech before the Lords, concerning false aspersions cast upon him.

1642
Printed for T. Wright, and are to be sold in the
Old-Baily. 1643. *Small* - 11

THE Queens proceedings IN YORKSHIRE BEING

A true Relation of the following

1. Of the proceedings of the Earl of Newcastle &c.
2. Of the Forces with the Queen
3. Information brought to the King's Council touching the
4. Matters thereof.
5. Things in the Parliament touching the attendance
6. of the said Earl of Newcastle &c.
7. The Testimony of the said Earl of Newcastle &c.
8. at Oxford.
9. Letter from the Earl of Newcastle to the King
10. touching the said Earl of Newcastle &c.
11. men to come against the Earl of Newcastle &c.
12. own security.

The Committee who are to meet with
the Majesty concerning Accommodation.

And a Vindication of the Lord &c. made in answer
before the said Committee touching the said Earl of Newcastle &c.

Printed for T. Widdowes, and are to be sold at
Old Bailey, 1643.

The Queens Majesties proceedings in York-shire.



TH- Earle of *Newcastles* popish Army in the North, were in great distresse at the time of her Majesties landing there, for divers letters came from York intimating the luckey and good successe of the Parliaments forces against them, particularly against the Earle of *Newcastle*, and Generall *King*, and their malignant Army, and inforced them for their refuge to flie into York, and there they were besieged. & there is a great noise up and down thereabouts: that the Earle of *Newcastle* hath not been lately seen, some conceiving him to be hurt, others that he is gone from York, the truth whereof is not yet manifest, so that at her Majesties first landing, she had but a small Army to guard her, but she hath since augmented her guard, and was brought to York with 10000 men.

Letters being brought to the House of Commons concerning the same, it was put to the question, whether the Queen should be permitted to march with the said Army, or traine, or whether she should be opposed in her march, and meanes wrought to conduct her Majestie to London.

Resolved upon the Question.

It was voted that a message should be sent to her Maiestie, by a Herald at Armes.

The message voted to be sent from the Parliament to the Queen.

I. To demand the reason of her raising forces in this Kingdome.

II. To desire her to reparty to London, where she should be Royally and lovingly entertained.

III. That if her Maiestie should refuse the same then the Parliaments forces in these parts to use all the meanes they could by open force of Arms to hinder her Maiesties proceedings, and oppose her March.

The Lord Fairfax hath been very carefull and noble in the discharge of his place, and having first appointed one of his sonnes with some forces to go in to the west parts of York-shire, to ioyne there to Lincoln-shire forces, and with them to march up to the Earl of Newcastle's forces at Newark upon Trent; but afterwards taking into consideration the advantage that the Earl of Newcastle might gain thereby to quarter his forces, the Queenes Maiestie being there he is commanded to ioyne with the Parliaments forces in the East part of York-shire the better to prevent the Earl of Newcastle's quartering that part of his forces in those parts.

The petition of the States in Scotland to the King.

THe States in Scotland being sensible of the bleeding miseries of this Kingdome, and the danger that we are in, by a popish and malign

nant party who seek the ruin and overthrow of Parliaments, Religion and law, sent a petition to the King Majesty.

I. Declaring therein their judgment and resolution concerning the same wherein their grievances were expressed, and desiring the sitting of a Parliament there for redress thereof.

II. Shewing the sense they have of the troubles in England, for which they are grieved.

III. Desiring his Majesty to hearken to the advice of his Parliament for the composing of the differences, that have produced the troubles of England.

Letters from the States in Scotland to the High Court of Parliament in England.

THere were letters sent from the States in Scotland to the Parliament in England, Declaring that they having sent a petition to his Majesty by way of a Remonstrance, wherein their grievances were expressed, and received no Answer thereof, and in respect that they are in danger in their own Country if the Earl of Newcastle should prevail in the North, they to prevent the same; and obtaine their just desires, are resolved once again to come into England with an Army of 10000 men, under conduct of the Earle of Argile, with which to their powers they will be assistant to the Parliament.

These letters being brought to the Parliament were thankfully received by the House, and Committee nominated to draw up an Answer thereunto, which was done accordingly.

His Majesty accepting of a Treaty with the Earl of Northumberland, Sir John Holland, Sir William An-
 ming,

mine, M. Whitlocke, and M. Perrepoint, but excepting against the Lord Say, it was taken into consideration by the high Court of Parliament, who being sensible that in such a case of a Treaty, the persons appointed for the Treaty ought not to be excepted against, yet to give his Majesty satisfaction, they would not send the Lord Say, and Propositions were made for the choyse of an other in his Lordships stead.

The Vindication of the Right Honourable the Lord Say and Seale, declared in a Speech by him made before the Lords, touching a scandalous imputation cast upon him.

My Lords, let me presume upon your patience so farre further, as to give me leave to speake to the imputation laid upon me, that I am a Separatist, and the greatest in England; and first I shall say of this word Separatist, as that learned man Mr. Hales of Eton saith in a little Manuscript of his which I have seen.

That where it may be rightly fixed and deservedly charged, it is certainly a great offence; But in common use now among us it is no other then a Theologicall Scar-Crow, wherewith the potent and prevalent party useth to fright and enforce those who are not of their opinions to subscribe to their Dictates, without daring to question them, or bring them to any rule or examination either of Scripture or reason, and he observeth that this was too usuall, even in ancient times as well as now.

Secondly, I say that there is a twofold separation, one from the Universall or Catholike Church, which can no other wise be made but by denying the faith, for faith and love are the requisites unto that Communion,

alone, the other is a separation from this or that particular Church or Congregation, and that not in respect of difference with them in matter of faith or love, but in dislike onely of such corruptions in their externall worships and Liturgies as they do admit of, and would enioyne upon others. This is a separation not from their persons as they are Christians, but from their corruptions in matter of worship as they are therewith defiled. And this separation every man that will keepe his own conscience pure from other mens sins, must make. And I ingeniously confesse, that there are many things in many Churches and Congregations in England practised and enjoyned upon all to be practised and suffered, which I cannot practise, nor admit of, except I should sinne against the light of my own conscience, untill I may out of the word of God be convinced of the lawfullnesse of them, which hitherto I could never see sufficient ground for. But my Lord, this is so farre from making me the greatest Separatist in England, that it cannot argue me any at all; for my Lords, the Bishops do know that those whom they usually apply this terme unto, are the Brownists, and they know their Tenents. The truth is, they differ in no fundamentall point of Doctrine or saving truth, (with us) as I know.

Their falling is in this, they hold that there is no true Church in England, no true Ministry, no true Worship; which depend the one upon the other, they say all is Antichristian: here is their errour, they distinguish not between the *being* or the purity of a true Church, and the *esse* or true being of it, though
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with many defects and grosse corruptions, but conclude
 that because such things are wanting, which are indeed
 necessary to the well being of a true Church, and to be
 desired, therefore there is none at all in being. I hold
 no such opinion, but do believe to the contrary, that
 there are in England many true Churches, and a true
 Ministrie which I do heare; and with which Church-
 es I could joyne in communion, were those yokes of
 bondage which are laid upon them taken off, and those
 corruptions removed, which they do (contrary as I
 thinke to their duty) yeeld unto, and admit of, and I
 am sure no Separatist in England holdeth this, that de-
 serveth that name. Therefore I hope your Lordships
 will in that respect let me stand right in your opinions. I
 shall now end with this request, that where you know
 there is one and the same God worshipped, one and the
 same faith imbraced, one and the same spirit working
 Love, and causing an unblameable conversation, with-
 out any offence to the State, in your bretheren, that in
 all these concur with you, you will not suffer them
 (for Ceremonies, and things to you indifferent, but not
 to them but burthens, which without offence to the
 State, or prejudice to the Churches, you may take off
 if you will) to be thrust out of the Land, and cut off
 from their native Country, for if you thus shall wound
 the consciences of your Bretheren, you will certainly
 offend, and sinne against Christ.

F. P. N. I. S.

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A brieſe
RELATION,

Abstracted out of ſeverall Letters,
OF
A moſt Hellish, Cruell, and Bloudy
PLOT against the City of
BRISTOLL,

Hatched and contrived by the *Malignants*
of the ſaid City, Prince *Rupert*, *George Lord Digby*,
and their fellow Cavalliers, to have maſſacred, mur-
dered, plundered, and deſtroyed, not only the well affected
in the ſaid City, but all others, that had not the
mark of the Beaſt upon them; happily diſcovered
and prevented by the goodneſſe and mercy of
God, upon Tueſday the 7th this inſtant *March*,
a few houres before it ſhould have been
put in Execution.

March 13. 1642.

Ordered by the Houſe of Commons, That this Relation
be forthwith Printed.

H. Elſynge Cler. Parl. D. Com.

LONDON,
Printed by *Richard Biſhop* for *Lawrence Blaiklock*, at the Signe of the
Sugar loafe, neere Temple Barre, 1642.

RELATION

A true and full Relation
of a PLOT against the City of

BRISTOL

Hatched and contrived by the Malicious
of the City, to have the same
and there to have the same
dered plundered, and destroyed, not only the well affected
in the said City, but all others, that had not the
mark of the Beast upon them, happily affected
and preserved by the goodness and mercy of
God, upon the 11th of the said Month of
a few hours before it should have been
in Execution.

Ordered by the House of Commons, That this Relation
be forthwith Printed.
W. K. J. G. C. L. P. A. D. C. C.

LONDON,

Printed by Richard Bishop for Lawrence Aylmer, at the Signe
Sugar-loaf, neere Temple-Barre, 1642.



A breife Relation, abstracted out of severall Letters, of a most hellish, cruell, and bloody Plot, against the City of

BRISTOLL.

SIR,

I Shall acquaint you of the happy discovery and prevention (by the wonderfull mercy and goodnesse of God) of a most hellish, cruell and bloody plot (very little before it should have been put in execution, hatched and contrived by and between the Malignants of this City, Prince Rupert and his brother Maurice, George Lord Digby, their fellow Cavalliers, sonnes of Beliall and others of that accursed crew, who with an Army of ten thousand of horse and foot, of their own forces and Malignants, they routed up in their march, advanced almost to the very walls of this City: upon Monday the sixth of this instant Month, they came to Chippingfoldbury, from thence upon Tuesday, the next day they marched to Westbury, Horvill, and Durdon-hill, which is within a mile of this Town, who could not be so ignorant, as to promise themselves any hopes of Entrance by sudden assault, but by surprisall and trechery, confidently presuming on the malignant party within, that first invited them hither; a designe more damnable then the Powder

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Treason,

Treason, and more barbarous and Cruell then the Massacre of *France*, being destroyers of their own liberties, and supplanters and overthrowers of the same Religion that they themselves pretend to professe. The Agreement betwixt the Chavaliers and the Malignants here in this City was, that about eleven of the clock on the Tuesday night, a house neere unto *Froome* Gate was to be blowne up, which was to give warning to the Chavaliers to make their onset; who against that hour were to draw downe unto the City, and Prince *Robert* with his Army came so nigh as the gallows: a bell at *St. Johns Church* on a hill above the gates was to rouse, another bell at *St. Michaels Church* upon the hill above the *Green* was to ring, to give notice to the Malignants of this Towne to rise in an instant, sufficient parties were made to have forced all the Courts of Guards, thereby to have let the Cavalliers in without opposition; for that purpose there were in readinesse in the house of Master *George Butcher* of *Christmasse street*, a new made Captaine for this designe, about 160 armed men, and in the house of Master *Robert Teemans* (who was one of the Sheriffes of this City the last yeere, foure and twenty men ready to put themselves in armes which there they had; the one to surprize the maine Guard, the other, the Guard at *Froomegate*, and to let in these bloud sucking Chavaliers; two other Bells were to rouse at the same time to give notice to the Malignants to rise in all parts of the City. Both Monday and Tuesday, white peeces of Inkle were given to divers, and to the better sort of people Ribbins, who did weare them in their bosoms and hats for distinction, and all that had not the word *Charles*, or those Marks, were to be put to the sword, murdered and destroyed, besides divers houses in many places of the City were marked with white chalk, who were designed to utter ruine and destruction. The businesse is not,

as yet fully examined, but this and much more is confessed by the principle and maine plotters of this wicked designe. I want time to give you a perfect Relation, you shall speedily have a fuller and better account, as soone as we have a little recovered our selves out of these distractions; for the present, there is enough to stirre you up to joyne with us in the admiration of Gods infinite goodnesse and mercy to us, and to give God his glory and prayse for this wonderfull and gracious deliverance, that hath preserved so many thousands of us that were innocent, and sold, and almost given up into the hands of these cruell and bloud-thirsty men.

The Chief actors of this mischievous designe were the aforesaid Robert Tomants, and George Butcher, Mr. John Taylor, Mr. Colestone, and his brother, Mr. Fitzherbert, two Colsons, and two Herberts, N. Cule, E. Arundle, Mr. Cople, and Captain Cole of St. Augustins, who with at least one hundred more Actors and Accessories, are already taken and imptisoned in the Castle, and hourly more are discovered and sectred, many of them upon examination have confessed the plot to be in manner as before is described; and that threescore families of men, women, and children were to be put to the sword, without quarter, given in upon a note. Two goods house was searched and therein were found many papers that did discover the whole plot, and between three and four thousand pounds in money and plate, and twenty muskets charged with bullets, besides divers instruments to murder and destroy with cruelty, such as we never saw before.

A Postscript.
Prince Rupert and that Army marched away as soone as their Plot was discovered.

*The Copy of another Letter written by a Cap-
taine in the City of Bristol, to a friend in London.*

Sir,
I

Received yours, dated the 7 present, &c. I shall
now relate unto you the unspeakable mercy of
the Lord to this City, in preserving it this last
week from the Cavaliers without, but above
all from a most damned Conspiracy of Malign-
nants who had designed us all to slaughter and massacre. On
Sunday last, hearing of the Cavaliers marching from *Wes-
tmoreland*, or thereabouts, and making their course towards us,
Colonel *Finch* our Governour (whose diligence is indefa-
tigable, and his success prosperous) made all the prepara-
tions that could be to entertain them with powder and bul-
lets, mounted Ordnance good store everywhere was ordered,
whereof two upon a new mount or fort made upon the hill
about a mile from the heart of the City, and there hath kept
a good strong Court of Guard. The same night the Gover-
nour gave us a false alarme about one of the clock in the
night, to try our readinesse to be in armes, and in a short
space our men were all at their Colours, and remained there
all monday, and at night all guards were doubled, and some
trebled. On Tuesday we heard of the enemies approaching
within five or six miles about us on Gloucestershire side; but
on Somersetshire none, by reason *Kensome* bridge was by
order of a Councell of war broken down. On wednesday to-
ward the evening we did descry the from the Castle to draw
to *Durdum Down* (about half a mile from our new Fort) and
we had intelligence of hey and provisions brought thither,
and there they remained and made fires upon the Down till
the morning, expecting the Malignants in the Town to play
their exploit, and cut the throats of the maine Guard, and
the

the guard at Frome gate, and there to let them in, who should have notice by the ringing of the bells at *S. Peter* and *S. Michael*. But see Gods infinite mercy, how it was prevented but a little before the time of execution. We were many of us at a Councel of war, with the Governour, and about one of the clock one brought us intelligence, that there were many met together at Mr. *Robert Teomans* house in Consultation, and immediately was sent Captain *Bark* with forty muskettiers to surprize them, who coming to the doore, *Teomans* hearing of it, came to him and swore deeply there were none in the house, but his own family, but they pressing to search were encountered with men upon the stairs that stood upon their guard, and threatened the death of any man that offered to come up: the other charged them to lay down their armes and submit, or they would give fire upon them, who seeing themselves over-powered, immediately submitted, and there they apprehended twenty and four of them: more there were certainly, but they got away over the gutters of the house: these 24 were prepared for slaughter of the maine guard, and were provided with pistols and other weapons for present surprize: and immediately upon their taking, they were sent by a strong guard to the Castle, where they now are in irons, and 21 more of the great Malignants, many whereof are found to have a hand in this plot. One amongst the rest is one *Butcher* who was designed for Frome gate (neere to which his house is) but all the men that he had provided were not found, in regard that his house was not searched a good while after *Teomans*, but yet they found there 60 men and muskets hidden, one whereof was charged with 22 peeces of iron, of about three quarters of an inch long. This *Butcher* hath since confessed much of the plot, viz. the casting upon the guards, and the ringing of the bells; others confesse the wearing of white tape, for they intended

intended when they came in to massacre all the Roundheads here, and all that had not the word, *Charles*, and those white Tapes tied to their breasts and hats. This plot being spoiled, and the gates kept close, that none could goe out to give Prince *Rupert* and his forces notice, made them expect till the morning, when our Gunner from the Fort let fly at them and killed a horse, which was found dead there the next day by our scouts: immediately upon this, they all marched away, and were heard to curse the Seamen that had betrayed them.

On Thursday Prince *Robert* trumpeter came to towne, but as a spy, his errand was to demand two dead bodies that we killed upon the *Donne*, one whereof was one *Stroud*, as he said. The trumpeter enquired for mee and said, my Lord of *Cleveland* desired me to send him a pound of tobacco, but I being out of the way, Colonell *Pines* sent him one pound, and Colonell *Popham* another. We expected to heare of them again last night, but they came not, and since they are marched quite away towards *Cirencester* and *Oxford*. Thus the Lord hath wrought our salvation, for which let us abundantly blesse his holy name: declare this comfortable newes to all our friends, that they may praise the Lord with us.

Bristol this 11th of March 1642.

I. H.

The Country came in to us very strong, and we are very courageous (God be praised) and when that Sr. *William Waller* comes, we shall be so strong as to drive them out of these parts. He is not above 10 or 14 miles from us, and we expect him on Monday at the farthest, but he doth much good service as he comes along.

FINIS.

CERTAINE
INFORMATIONS

From severall parts of the Kingdome, for
the better satisfaction of all such who desire to be
truly Informed of every weekes Passage.

From the 6. of March, to the 13. of March, 1643. 1642

Monday, March 6.

SOME while since there was a rumour, that the Malevolents in London had contrived a Plot, to break open all the prisons in and about the City, and to set all the Prisoners in them at liberty, and to arme them, and joyne with them to cut the throats of the Parliament, and of the well-affected people, in and about the City, which designe of theirs, as it appeareth, was now brought to maturity, and neere upon the point of being put in execution, for on Saturday last, Master Hudson one of the Captaines of the Burrough of Southwarke, seized upon 20. dozen of sword-blades that were carrying to the Kings-Bench Prison in Southwarke, the Hilles belonging to them were carried thither before, as it is reported, and that there they should have been fitted and made up for the purpose aforesaid: whereupon the said prison was searched, but to little purpose, for nothing could be found there, so subtile and cunning are all this party, both in contriving and concealing their mischievous devices.

For the better defence and safety of the City of London, and the Suburbs thereof, the Parliament hath sent an Order to my Lord Major, Aldermen and Common Councell, whereby power is given to them, to Associate themselves with such of the circumjacent Counties, as they shall best like of, and most firmly confide in, for the mutuall support and strengthening of each other in these times of imminent danger, wherein Popish Armies without, and maliciously dis-affected people within it, threaten the totall ruine & subversion

K. P. P. London (157) 4
Numb. 8.
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INFORMATIONS

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From the 6. of March, to the 13. of March, 1642

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these that refuse to comply with such as aime at nothing but the utter destruction of the true reformed Protestant Religion, Lawes, Liberties, and Parliaments, and the peace and safety both of the said City and of the whole Kingdome.

From *Oxford* it is informed, that the *Scottish* Commissioners daily attend the King for an Answer to the Petition they brought from the State of *Scotland* unto him, and that they have faire words given them, but no dispatch; neither is it certaine when they shall obaine any. And some affirme, that, though they are neither imprisoned nor confined, yet they may not be suffered to depart from thence, either to returne home, or to come to *London*, and although they have no guard over them, but are permitted to walke the streets, yet they are so narrowly watched, that they cannot get away, and that they are not allowed to have pen and inke to certifie this their detention.

From *Liechfield* they write, that Sir *John Gell* came thither with 1000. men out of *Derbshire*, upon the same day that the Lord *Brooke* was slaine, whose lamentable losse he infinitely bewaileth, and that he vowed to revenge his death, or else to leave his bones in that place, and that he hath promised the sum of 100. li. to any that shall bring him the Earl of *Chessterfield*, either alive or dead, and that he hath also promised 40 li. a peece to those that shall bring him any of the other Commanders; that they have gotten a great peece of Ordnance from *Coventry* to batter the close, and that three Sea-men that were Cannoneers to that Army are there slaine, and that the Army is commanded for the present by the said Sir *John Gell*.

From *Bristol* they write, that Colonell *Essex* hath so ill demeaned himselfe there, that they were both afraid and weary of him, for he spent his time in nothing but drinking, feasting and gaming, to uphold which Rior, he detained his souldiers pay, and spent their falleries, and that in one night he lost 800 li. at Dice, wherefore to rid themselves of him, they caused him to bee invited to dance and feast in a house out of the City, where he was apprehended by Colonell *Fines* & his troop of horse, & caried prisoner from thence, first to *Berkely* Castle, and afterwards to the City of *Gloucester*, where he remaineth in durance.

From *Plimouth* they write, that the Gentry of *Cornwall* fearing to be overcome by the Earle, of *Stamford*s Army, if they should once set footing in their Countrey, desired a treaty for 6. dayes with the said Earle, wherupon three and twenty Commissioners were elected on both sides to treat about a Composition betweene them, wherein the Earle demanded the surrendring up of *Pendennis* Castle, and other things of great moment, which are not yet perfectly

fectly related, but the next Post from thence will no doubt bring the certaine conclusion.

The Lord Grey of Warks, being Commander in chiefe of the Counties of Essex, Suffolke, Norfolke, Cambridge and Hartford, hearing of divers Malevolents in the City of Norwich, went thither to bereave them of all meanes from doing of mischief, and having gotten possession of the City, he presently disarmed them all, and seized upon all their horses, and at his departure from thence, being accompanied to his Coach by the Maior, and Aldermen, after thanks given them for their kind entertainment of him, he desired the Maior onely to accompany him in his Coach a little way out of the City, and being gone about a quarter of a mile, the Maior would have taken his leave of him, and departed, but his Lordship told him, that he could not permit him to go, because he had order from the Parliament to apprehend him, for his disaffection to them, in refusing to obey their Orders and Warrants, and so he brought the Maior to Cambridge, and put him into safe custody.

Tuesday, March 7.

From Hamburg they write, that the King of Denmark hath raised many men, and is rigging of a great Fleete of Ships, and that he sent Commanders to raise men in that Towne, who openly declared that they were raised to go into England, to serve the King against the Parliament. And further they write, that the King of Denmark caused a collection of monies throughout his Dominions to be made, towards the maintenance of this designe, and that the whole collected summe amounted to 60000. li. or thereabouts, some of his Subjects freely contributing towards it, and others refusing to give any thing to foment so unnaturall a war.

Sir William Waller was advanced as far as Salisbury at the latter end of the last week, with about 2000. Horse, where many in that Countrey came to his aide, and that he got in his passage through the farther parts of Hampshire, and the hither parts of Wilshire, about three thousand horse more, by demanding of them for Prince Ruperts, which the people afterwards perceiving to be a stratagem, requested the restitution of their Horses, but Sir William answered, that in regard they had hitherto done nothing for the Parliament, they might now well afford them the use of their horses, which should be either restored unto them again, or they should be paid for them when the war was happily concluded. And by this time it is supposed that he is gotten to Gloucester.

Out of Somersetshire it is Informed, that one Master Phillips, a younger sonne unto Sir Robert Phillips, had gotten a partie of Malevolents at Bruton

in that County, but finding himselfe unsafe in that Towne, and wanting Gunpowder and other provisions, he left it and went to *Ilchester*; where his numbers are increased to about 500. who may doe great mischief in that County, if they be not speedily suppressed, which how it yet can be effected is somewhat doubtfull, because Master *Strode*, and divers of the well-affected Captaines there, are now in service under the Earle of *Stamford* against the Lord *Hopton* and his *Cornish* complices in *Devonshire*, which *Phillips* observing, and thereupon hoping to find little resistance in that County for the present, hath taken this opportunity to raise distempers and combustions amongst them.

From *Gloucester* they write, that the *Welshmen* which were brought on by the Lord *Herbert*, to besiege that City on the west side of the River of *Severn*, have received a great defeat, for the Blew-coates which were left there to defend it, by the Earle of *Stamford*, sallied out upon them, and slew one hundred and fiftie of them, and have driven the residue of them from thence, whereby they are freed from those despicable and obnoxious assailants.

The Parliament hath sent a Committee of Lords and Commons, to his Excellency the Lo: Generall at *Windsor*, to advise with him about the Treaty & Cessation of Arms, which made them defer the debate of the Kings Answer to their Vote, this day untill they have received his Councell what is fittest to be done thereupon. And the House of Commons Voted this day, that all the rents and profits of the Lands belonging to the Bishops, Deanes, Prebends, Cathedralls, and to such as have taken up armes against them, shall be sequestered, and that the Tenants of them shall be allowed the third part of the said Rents, upon payment thereof to the Parliament.

Wendsday March the 8.

Out of *Lancashire* it is Informed, that the Parliaments forces there, have only been employed in receiving the contribution monies of the Inhabitants of that County, for the defence of the King and Parliament, and that the Earle of *Derby* is much straitned, having now but few Townes there at his Command, which in all probability he cannot long keep, because his party is much fallen off from him, for feare of the Parliaments forces, and also because he is overpowred by their greater strength against him.

And it is further Informed from thence, that a Spanisli ship was lately driven upon shore at the mouth of the River *Wyrr*, with 300. souldiers, 20. peeces of Ordnance, and much Amunition in her, and that they pretend they were bound for *Dunkirk*, but by Tempests forced in thither, and that divers of the souldiers comming to Land were apprehended, and are the e detained, untill the Parliament shall give further Order.

From *Cheshire* they write, that Sir *William Bireton* is well and safe at *Namptwich*, notwithstanding all the false Reports of his being either taken or slaine, and that nothing hath been done betweene him and his Opponents, neither have the two Armies so much as seene one another since their first encounter neere *Namptwich*. And that the Commissioners of Array sent some of their forces out of *Chester*, to assault the House of *Maister Brookes* at *Nor-ton*, but he being well provided for them, slew about forty of them, and forced the residue to retireate back againe, who threaten to make another onfet upon him with great Ordnance from *Chester*.

A Proclamation is published at *Oxford* in the Kings name, wherein all the Officers of the Navy are Commanded to desert their places in the shippes, and not to adhere to the Earle of *Warwicke*, or obey the Orders of the Parliament, which if they doe not speedily performe, they must expect to be deprived of their places, and never enjoy them more, and if they persist to disobey the said Proclamation, then they shall be proceeded against as persons guilty of Rebellion and High Treason; whereunto adde the Kings late demand in Answer to the Parliaments Votes, that such shippes as shall be set forth, be commanded by such persons, as the King shall approve of, and any man may easily perceiue what good service the Fleete will doe the Parliament and Kingdome this Summer.

Thursday, March. the 9.

From *Burdeaux* in *Gascoigne* it is Informed, that the French King hath imposed a Tax of 5. pound *per centum*, upon all wares and Marchandises imported & exported there, and because they refuse to pay it, he hath fixe great ships to block up the River at *Blay* to hinder their trading, whereupon, as a shipmaster lately come from thence reporteth, the Townsmen have made ready many shippes, shallops, and fire bottomes to remove them.

This day the Newes came, that the Cavaliers in the Close at *Lychfeld*, had craved Quarter, and yeilded themselves to Sir *John Gell* on Monday last, and that the Earle of *Chesterfield* who was taken there, hath offered 90000. li. for his Ransome, that he may be set at Liberty, and that the Parliaments forces have gotten all the wealth which was brought in thither, by the Papists and Malignants in that County.

The particulars of the late affaires in *Devonshire*, as appeareth by credible Letters from thence, are thus, the Earle of *Stamford* intending to march toward *Tavestock* with his Army, the Lord *Hopton* desired a Parly, the Earle returned Answer that he would not treat with him untill he had withdrawne all his forces out of that County, whereupon they quitted the Towne, so that

the Earls souldiers got it without blowes, and then both parties agreed upon 5. Articles, as first, that there should be a Treaty held by the commissioners under named, to conclude (if it be possible) a firme peace betwene both the Counties. Secondly, that the Commissioners should meete at *Moun-edgcomb* to treat. Thirdly, that the *Cornish* Army should abandon all the places they held in *Devon*. Fourthly, that all plundring and other acts of hostility be forborne by both armies untill the time expired, which was munday last at 6. a clocke. Fifthly, that if the souldiers of either Army breake the truce, they to be severely punished, and restitution to be made by the Commander in chiefe of that army that offendeth. The *Devon* Commissioners were these, Earle of *Stamford*, *Northcot*, *Chudleigh*, *Pole*, *Cary*, *Fortescue*, *Buller*, *Chudleigh*, *Martin*, *Fowell*, *Bamsfeld*. The *Cornish* Commissioners were, Lord *Hopton*, Lord *Mohun*, *Arundell*, *Trevarian*, *Basset*, *Corison*, *Trefusis*, *Berkely*, *Digby*, *Slanning*, *Grenfeld*, *Godolphin*.

This Cession much grieved many of the *Devonians*, because the *Cornish* men began to grow weary of *Hopton*, for Colonell *Trevarian* left him with his whole Regiment, and would have served the Earle, & many other *Cornish* men complained, that they had bin misled by *Hopton*, which was like to bring much misery upon them. As for the issue of this Treaty, the next weeks Post is expected to bring the certainty thereof.

Friday, March 10.

Out of *Darbyshire* they write, that Mr. *Hastings* still continueth to rob the Carriers, for they tooke the *Nottingham* Waggon neer *Loughborough* in *Leicestershire*, and forced him to drive it to *Asby de la Zouch*. Sir *John Gell* sent some forces both of horse and foot to *Burton* upon *Trent* to secure it, against whom came Mr. *Hastings* with 4. or 500. horse, but durst not offer to enter it. The Townesmen of *Derby* have received from *Hull*, Armes for 300. Horse and foote, with some Match and Gunpowder, which they are glad of, because they can have none brought them safe from *London*.

At *Chesterfield* in that County, they have also received from *Hull* fifty Muskets, with proportionable Match and Gunpowder, from whence it is related by credible persons, that on the 21. day of Febr. last, about an houre before Sun-set, three Suns were plainly seen in the skie, which *Omen* cannot but preface some strange events to ensue in this Kingdome, according to the opinions of such as are learned in the liberall art of *Astronomy*. From thence they also write, that they are extreemly pestered with the Earle of *Newcastles* forces that lie in *Boulsover*, who in the night came out of that Towne, and took 30. horses from the adiacent people, wherenpon the Inhabitants of *Chesterfield*,

sterfield, to secure their Towne, have taken *Wingfield* Mannor, and placed there 30. souldiers to guard it, and they have also put 40. Musketeers into *Chatsworth*, under the Command of Lieutenant *Bagshaw* to defend it.

From *Plimpton Mary* in *Devonshire* they write, that the *Cornish* Cavaliers demeaned themselves so nastily and beast-like in that Towne, that they made the very Streets to stink like to unfavoury Hogsties, and that they kept their Horses in the Church, and left it full of their dung, and which is more abominable, that they made the Pulpit the ordinary place of easment for the excrements of their bellies, inso much that the Inhabitants after their departure, could make no use of the Church, but were faine to have Sermons in the Streets, and out of the windows of houses, and that those prophane *Cornish* Cavaliers made the Church their common Dicing and Carding place, such excellent Reformers they intend to be.

This day a Common Councell was holden in the *Guildhall* of *London*, whither came a Committee from the Parliament, who declared unto them, that the Lord Generall and his Army were willing to rise, and to doe the Commonwealth service, if they would take a course to gather in the residue of the 60000 li. arreer, which they promised to do their best endeavors in, and at the Committees departure, many Citizens requested, that the Association betweene the Parliament and the City might be speedily effected, which was promised to be done.

Saturday March 11.

Out of the County of *Sussex* they write, that the Inhabitants of *Petworth* and *Pulborow*, refused to contribute any moneyes for the defence of the King and Parliament, whereupon Colonell *Morley* with some Troopes of horse went thither to know the reasons of their refusall, whither being come, they stood upon their guard, and would not admit of his entrance, which notwithstanding their opposition he forced, with the losse of one of his men, and so he hath disarmed them, and brought them under contribution.

The *Scots* have sent a Messenger to their Commissioners at *Oxford*, to know the reason of their long stay there, and to charge them to return home speedily, whether they have any answer or not: but the Messenger is somewhat afraid to goe from hence thither, because he heareth that the Armies begin to be in motion, and yet he hath adventured to goe.

Out of *Dorsetshire* they write, that Sir *John Strangways* had gotten to his house at *Abbotsbury*, some two or three hundred Malignants, where they search all Passengers, and keepe some of them in custody, so that there is no travailing from the Westerne parts to *Weymouth*, whereupon the Marriners
that

that are in the Kings ship there, to guard that harbour, intended to have battered downe the house about their eares, had not Sir *Thomas Trenchard* requested them to forbear it.

The currant report for these two or three dayes is, that Prince *Rupert* is gone from *Oxford*, with an Army of 6. or 7000. men towards *Bristol* to besiege it, and that therupon his Excellency the Lord *Generall* intended to advance towards *Oxford* with his army, because there is scarce 1000. men left in it to defend it.

Out of *Somersetshire* it is certified, that Colonell *Strode*, Captaine *Popham*, Captaine *Pyne*, and the rest of the Captaines which went with their Companies to assist the Earle of *Stamford* in *Devonshire*, are returned home againe, and that they reside at *Pederton*, which lyeth neere to *Ilchester*, to keepe the high Sheriffe and his Company of Malignants from doing of mischief, who without that curbe would gather a stronger head to endamage and overrunne that County.

Out of *Norfolke* they write, that Master *Holl*, a disaffected Justice of Peace in that County, had gotten Sir *Thomas Richardson*, Master *Denny*, and other Malevolents to his house, to raise combustions in that shire, and that they stood all there upon their guard, and would not lay downe their Armes, untill the Countrey had planted great Ordnance against the house, which forced them to yeeld and submit, and by that means they were all taken and committed to custody.

THE
SCOTS
K. Scotland, Nobility
Declaration to the Earle
OF
C V M B E R L A N D.

Wherein is declared their Resolution to
raife Forces to oppose the said Earle, and to endeavour
the removall of his Maiesties evill Councell now at-
tending his Royall Person.

Subscribed by the earles of

{ Argile.	{ Leshgoc.
{ Arth.	{ Dunfarlin.
{ Buckham.	{ Roxbrough.

*In the name of the rest of the generall As-
sembly of that Kingdome.*

L O N D O N. *March*
Printed for T. Wright, 1642.

THE
SCOTS

Declaration to the Estates

OF PARLIAMENT

Wherein is declared their Resolution to
raise Forces to suppress the Rebels, and to recover
the Remains of the Ministers evil Council, now
residing in Royal Prison.

Published by the Estates of

Edinburgh
Printed by
James Ballantyne
in the Year 1645.

For the name of the rest of the General As-
sembly of that Kingdom.

LONDON. Printed by
J. D. O. N. M. A. S.

Printed for T. W. 1645.

A Copie of a Letter sent from the Nobillity of
Scotland, for the Right Honourable: the Earle of
C V M B E R L A N D.

Our most noble Lord:



Sin all these great Affaires
which have been much
noysed abroad, our chiefest
care hath been to walke
warrantably according to
the Lawes that are still in
fotce for that effect, so wee
are certainly perswaded
that amongst our selves
there are none, who can justly complain of what hath
passed, and for those of our countrymen who are now
in England, if they be of that number as they are evill
Subjects to our gracious Sovereigne, and worse com-
patriots to us, so of all other the worst Guests among
you, whilst they endeavour the Remedy of their e-
vills, and the escape of their deserved punishment, the
begining of an incurable disease betwixt the two Na-
tions, to whom the quarrell should no way extend;
If the Informations and Protestations, made by us for

this end, and the Bond of our Covenant, sworn to God
and Man, have not cleared all scruples in the mind of
our gracious Sovereign hitherto, and of all good Sub-
jects, it is not our fault, but rather our joynd misfor-
tune, that there are too many among you also in great-
est place and credit, whose private Byas runnes quite
contrary to the publike good, and who are those wick-
ed ones rising early to poyson the publike Fountain,
and to sowe the teares of unhappy Jealousie and dis-
cord, betwixt you and us, before the good seed of our
Love, and respect to our Neighbour Nation can take
place in your hearts, among all the evils of this kind
which dayly overtakes us, next to the present undeser-
ved displeasure of our Prince against us, (which God
in his mercy to both, will take off in his good time)
there could nothing be fallen so strange and unexpected
to us, as the drawing together of your Forces upon
our Borders, which whether to defend your selfe, or
annoy us, and so prepare and gather those Clouds
which threaten a sore tempest to both, wee for our
parts wish they may first perish in the Shipwracke, who
began first to dash the one side against the other.

As for you my Lord, although your Place, Person,
and quality, the Honour, and Reputation of your for-
mer Life, may gain us some assurance that your Lord-
ship will be wary to begin the quarrell, whereat onely
Enemies to both Nations will rejoyce, and catch ad-
vantage.

Yet give us leave to doubt the feares that makes us
thus strengthen our Borders, or rather suspect those
preg-

pregnant presumptions of a further project intended
against this Nation by your power, which needs must
make us bestir our selves betimes at all hands for our
safety, God is our witnesse that we desire no Nationall
quarrell to arise betwixt us, or to taste of that bitter
fruit which may set both ours and your Childrens
teeth on edge, but rather hold our selves obliged in
conscience of our duties to God, our Prince, and all
your Nation, our Bretheren, to try all Just and Lawfull
meanes for the removall of all causes of difference
betwixt his Majesty and the Parliament, who are yet
linked together, and should be still in all the bonds
of a second and common interest, and to be alwaies
ready to offer the occasion of greater satisfaction by
this kind of clearing our loyall intentions to all which
it may concerne, and namely your Lordship, in regard
of your place, and command at this time, by any
meanes whatsoever would be thought expedient on
both sides, thus farre we thought good to represent to
your Lordship, being occasionally together so few as
in this place, for our selves, and in the name of the rest
of our number, who altogether with us will endeavour
our selves to raise a considerable Force, for removing
his Maiesties ill Councell now attending his Royall
Person, seeking the ruine of his Maiesties Kingdomes,
we whose names are under written, expect your Lord-
ships answer, and rest,

Your Lordships affectionate
Friends, *Argill, &c.*

A List of the Names of the Nobility
of the Kingdome of SCOTLAND, which
have subscribed, and stand affected to the
King and Parliament.

The Names of the Earles.

E. of Argile

E. of Arth

E. of Buckham

E. of Letbgoe

E. of Pearch

E. of Dunfarlin

E. of Haddington

E. of Carricke

E. of Lowthiem

E. of Dalhousie

E. of Castils

E. of Glencarne

E. of Murray

E. of Moreton

E. of Gatnes

E. of Nechesdale

E. of Abercorne

E. of Tillibarne

E. of Roxbrough

E. of Mar

E. of Marshall

E. of Eglenton

E. of Arbol

E. of Dunfres

E. of Wems

E. of Mountrosse

Viscounts

The Names of the Viscounts.

Viscounts

Viscount *Aboyne*

Viscount *Kenmore*

Viscount *Dunbar*

Viscount *Bethaven*

Viscount *Thormand*

The Names of the Barons.

Baron *Lowdon*

Baron *Lindsey*

Baron *Forbes*

Baron *Semple*

Baron *Sinckleere*

Baron *Harris*

Baron *Horet*

Baron *Ogleby*

Baron *Rosse*

Baron *Thorpbicken*

Baron *Londore*

Bar. *Halliradbouse*

Baron *Camyer*

Baron *Grey*

Baron *Ockletry*

Baron *Oliphant*

Baron *Burleigh.*

The

The Horse and Foot ready rayſed for
the aſſiſting of his Maieſty and the Par-
liament, are neer upontwelve thouſand
under the command of the *Earl of Dun-
farlin*; Generall of the Regiments of
Foot, and the *Earle of Roxbrough*, Ge-
nerall of the Horſe, the *Earles of More-
ton*, and *Mountroſſe*, chiefe Comman-
ders of the five thouſand Souldiers to
lye upon the Borders of *Northumber-
land*, *Cumberland*, and *Westmerland*, to
hinder the proceedings of the Lord
Clifford, and the *Earl of Newcaſtl*, who
hath a great Army in the North parts
pillaging and plundering the Country
thereabouts, with other miſdemeanors.

FINIS

ne Designes.

173.

(81)

K. P. P. L. L. L.

Numb. 11.

THE KINGDOMES Weekly Intelligencer :

SENT ABROAD
To prevent mis-information.

From Tuesday the 7. of March, to Tuesday the 14. of March. 1643.

IT is certified this weeke out of the North, that the Lord Fairfax (to testify his dutifull respect to the Queenes Majestie, and as a congratulation for Her safe arrivall) sent Coloneil Sir William Fairfax, with a Letter to Her Majestie, presently after Her landing, to this effect :

Madam,

Your Majesties safe and happy arrivall doth infinitely rejoyce the hearts of all men, that wish and hope by Your Majesty, to procure a speedy ending of these great distractions, and that by the powerfull influence of Your Majesties presence and mediation with His Majesty, this Kingdome (that hath tasted nothing but warre and misery, since Your departure) shall now be restored to the happy condition of Peace, which in humane reason is the onely meane to make Your Majesty, and your Posterity beloved and honoured,

Madam, The Parliament (the Scepter) by which all the glorious and happy Princes of this Land have governed) and have thereby made themselves honoured at home, and terrible to their enemies abroad) hath commanded me to serve the King, and (in him) your Majesty, in securing the peace of these Northern parts : My highest ambition, and humblest suit is, that your Majesty (refusing the attendance and service of those, who by the highest Court have been declared Enemies of the Peace and State) you will be pleased to admit me, and the forces with me to guard your Majesty, wherein I, and this Army shall all of us more willingly sacrifice our lives, then suffer any danger to invade the trust reposed in. Madam,

Your Majesties most humble Servant,

L

And

And as a further testimony of all dutifull respect to Her Majesty, his Lordship released Master *Progers*, her Majesties servaunt, whom he had lately before taken prisoner, and sent him back to her Majesty by Sir *William Fairfax*, who had a safe conduct granted him by the Earle of *Newcastle*, notwithstanding which, he was detained prisoner by her Majesties Forces, and the Lord *Fairfax* heares the Queenes Army is resolved to keep him still, which is but an ill requitall of the Lord *Fairfax*, who hath testified so much honour, duty and respect to her Majesty.

The Committees of Lords and Commons that were sent to the Lord Generall at *Windsor*, to desire his opinion, and the opinion of his Councill of War, touching the Kings exception to the Cessation propounded by the Parliament, on Thursday last they returned with their opinions, which (in effect) doth make manifest, That if the Parliament should condescend to a free Trade (as it is limited by his Majesty) or to grant liberty to persons to passe to and free, as his Majesty propounds, it would prove destructive to the Parliament and their Army, and no advantage to the Trade for that time, considering the severall stops and stayes, and searches which would be made, to the great prejudice of the parties trading but for twenty dayes; yet submitted it to the further judgement of the Parliament: The resolution which the Lord Generall and Counsell of War (as to themselves) took upon the exceptions (taken at *Oxford*) to the Cessation propounded to the Parliament, was, that whatever the pretence was at *Oxford* to have a peace by a Cessation and Treaty, nothing lesse was intended; and they were the rather induced to believe it, for as they were in debate of the matter, certain Intelligence came, that Prince *Rupert* (so speedy was his March) was the Evening before within foure miles of *Bristol*, with 6000. Horse and Dragoons, and twelve pieces of Ordnance, and six Carriages, with Ammunition and Fire-works; whereupon the Lord Generall and Councill of War tooke a further resolution; That since by these Propositions from *Oxford*, nothing but delay and advantage is sought by them: That whole Army of the Lord Generall should forthwith march from their Quarters neerer to the Enemy, And the Lord Generall, and some few more of the Councill of War, were induced the more to this Resolution to march (whereby to bring things to a short period) for that Letters were intercepted at *Coventry*, going to a person of great note, lately arrived in the Northern parts of the Kingdome, to whom (it seemes) the limitation of the Cessation of Armes, or Articles to undeceive the people, whose fault it is peace ensues not, was to be presented, and

and before a returne could come, and since the Army of Cavaliers is in motion, it was held dishonour to be longer out of action, especially since the interruption of a Treaty proceeds from the other side, whereupon the Lord Generall, with his Forces at *Windfor*, and parts thereabouts, intended to march towards the Enemy upon Friday and Saturday last.

Another reason which moved the Lord Generall to March was, that in the Letter intercepted at *Coventry*, It was writ (with such confidence, that they made no doubt of successe) that the Rebels (meaning the Parliament) were in such distraction, that (at *Oxford*) they had so many *several* designs upon them, they could not agree which of them to put in execution first, and told Her, &c. further, that [173] was surely theirs: The Letter being writ from a hand, whom the Lord Generall knew, would not write it without grounds: His Excellency by way of prevention of their designs (which while the Cavaliers at *Oxford* had cast a rub to delay the Treaty and Cessation by a delatory answer to the Parliaments Propositions for a Cessation and Treaty) advanced as aforesaid, and it is hoped that the Cavaliers with misse of their ayne (if [173] be in His Excellencies Army) for His Excellency is so sensible of that Information, and so vigilant are the inferiour officers and Common Souldiers resolved to be (knowing how false *Pratt*, and some of the Commanders have been, in giving exact intelligence to the adverse party) that he which in that Army hereafter endeavours to betray them, will be sure to suffer punishment amongst them, worse then death: It is concluded by all the Commanders in the Lord Generals Army, that by [173] is meant either some great Officer in their Army, or some great Person, Castle, Tower, Fort, or Towne in the Kingdome, by some perfidious and treacherous action to be betrayed, or to betray the Parliament, or some Forces employed by them, into the hands of the Cavaliers.

This great discovery was strangely made, and the disguised Prince (as he was tearmed) about whom the Letters were found, in safe custody at *Coventry* (being a person of great quality) and the Kingdome may see in what a condition the Parliament is, whilst they with cleernesse of heart seek Peace by a Treaty, the evill Councillors seek nothing thereby, but ruine and destruction, and have prevailed that one answer (amongst others to the Parliaments desires of a Cessation) is to have a free Trade, except Armes, &c. which they did, with a specious pretence of the Subjects advantage to Trade, that if the Parliament should refuse it, then the people might be out with them for being a hinderance of their Trade, but this will not miserie the People.

1. They that have had no Trade this twelve moneth almost, can yet well forbear it for twenty dayes.

2. They that perhaps would Trade those twenty dayes, would be only such as are Malignants to the Parliament.

3. And how easily may these Malignants convey away all the Estate that they have (as some have done already) under the pretence of carrying goods to be sold.

4. And though neither money nor Armes go, these Commodities will maintaine men in armes.

5. It is a free Trade that is desired, and yet it is admitted searches must be made for Armes, moneyes, &c. this limitation destroyes the freedome of Trade, for he that carries a firkin of butter or sope must be stayed till all be thoroughly searched, least it have gold stuck therein, and the like of Barrells of wine, and other commodities, and to be thus searched at every Court of Guard, and thus stopt (for so they must be, least in the interim while they passe one Guard, before they come to another, they may take in Gunpowder, gold, silver, &c.) And then for these 20. dayes, whether they had not better omit to Trade, then undergo these hazards and troubles.

6. It were unequall in the Parliament to grant it, for from thence they can expect nothing, but eggs and Poultrey &c. which they may be supplied with from other parts, but from hence what may they not have, if once a free Trade should be condiscended unto.

7. And for persons to Trade, it is limited no souldier shall passe, he may perhaps be Cashiered for the purpose, and received againe afterwards when he or they have performed the designe, or given the intelligence they came for, he may be a souldier and come as a Butcher (as Captaine *Crispe* did) betwene a payre of Paniards, so that the permission of persons to passe, and a Trade for 20. dayes would be destructive to the Parliament, and no advantage to the people to Trade for so short a time.

By all which it may easily be perceived that the Cavaliers really asyre not at any advantage to the publique by so short a time of Trade, but have some particular end to bring some destructive designe upon the Parliaments Cause, and Conclusions which tend only at the Common good, and have no particular ends or interests.

No marvell though the Letters from *Oxford* intercepted at *Coventry* did speak of *five* designs, when at *Bristol* a most bloody and horrid plot was ripe for execution, and discovered but two hewres before it should have bin performed: on Thursday Prince *Rupers* came before *Bristol* with 7000 horse

at least, he lay that night at *Downham Green* within a mile of *Bristol* with his whole Army all night long without shelter, with hope of the plot taking effect, at foure of the clock in the morning the Court of Guard and outworks should have been surpris'd by the Butchers and Slead-men, and some of the *Morriners*, and at 4. Churches in the city, the bells should have been rung to have given *P. Ruperts* notice to fall on with his Forces, and all to be put to the sword who had not a piece of white Tape or Incke in his hat, or about his wrist, or in his breast: This being miraculously discovered about two of the clock in the morning, there were 400 desperate men in one house armed and surpris'd by the Parliaments Forces, and six y in another house. The persons active in this designe were one *Butcher*, *Yeoman*, *Creswicke*, *Colson*, and others, who were all taken, with divers hundreds more; and before the houre that horrid treachery should have been executed, were put in hold, and at the time that bloody Prince *Rupert* expected to heare the Bells to give him notice that the massacre of the Protestants was begunne, God in his mercie diverted it, and the next day this Prince perceiving the damnable and Jesuiticall plot did not take effect, retreated immediatly to *Oxford* without doing any honorable action, being too much stained in honour in the hopes of this; and he that had a hand in this bloody villanous plot, how great soever, deserves not a charitable thought otherwise, then God forgive him: The Earle of *Bristol* is still at Court, and so is the Lord *Cottingham*, Sir *John Heale*, Mr. *Rogers*, Generall King the Lawyer, and the rest of the Malignants in *Dorsetshire*, that went *Strange-Wayes*, are retreated thence with great speed to *Oxford*, being not able to withstand Sir *John Horner* and his Clubbe men; and in their retreat Sir *William Waller* in his March from *Salisbury*, gave them such a Wilde Goose Chase that put them all in a sweating feare to make haste away; though they were in the *Devizes*, as the *Glocesterians* did to the *Welch*, many of them being cut off. The last use we can make of these hellish and devillish plots of the Cavaliers, who are steered by the advice of the *English* and *Irish* Jesuits and Papists at Court, to looke well to the City of *London*; for as sure as we are alive, the like plot that was at *Bristol*, is concluded of to be in *London*, notwithstanding the faire pretence of a Treatie and Cessation of Armes: hath the Parliament cause to be beleve that *Plaine English* is meant by the Propositions from the Councell at *Oxford*, when as so many innocent soules should have suffered a massacre at *Bristol*? and shall we still expect their sugred expreSSIONS are without a Serpent at the end, while we know whom we have to deale withall, expect no faith from them, I mean the popish party at Court: though the truth of this plot be never so appar-

rant, and the Letter intercepted at *Coventry* be declared whose Letter it was, yet so wilfully blinde are the Malignants in *London* (God open their eyes in time) that they will sweare, and damne themselves, all these things are fained: Let the City of *London* timely look to themselves, for the Kings souldiers that are in prison here, are designed first to be set at liberty by force, and some of them doe not forbear to say, they shall be very suddenly at liberty in despite of the Parliament. Let an eye be had to the Malignants about Beerd binder Lane, their Sugar Chests perhaps convey good quantities of Ammunition.

Since the last letter at *Coventry* was intercepted, another also was taken by Colonell *Brown*, of the same hand-writing, directed not to a bosome friend, but to a Jesuiticall Papist, viz. to *Wat Mountaine* beyond Sea, it seems it was of that secrecy, that the Protestant Parliament party might not be privy to it, but God that knowes it will in due time bring it to light, and I am confident, will deliver this Kingdom from all the hellish plots against it, if wee but continue to feare and serve him, and doe our endeavours: God loves truth in the inward parts, and will confound the devices of the wicked in favour quem faciunt, and God so deale with the Parliament, as they with singleness of heart proceed in their matters: This last letter was found about a Porter, who had other letters of great consequence.

The next advantage that the city may make of the letter of so many *finde* designs, and this bloody designe at *Bristol*, is to presse on with earnestnesse the Parliament to make good their promise: To enter into an oath and covenant with God, the King and Parliament, and one with another, to maintain the Gospell, and consequently the Protestant Religion, the Kings honour and our Lawes and Liberty, and that all such as refuse it, may be expelled or so severely proceeded against, as they may have small contentment to stay.

From the North it is further certified, that the Queen came to *Torke* on Wednesday last: That the Recorder of *Torke*, who was lately imprisoned by the Cavaliers for his fidelity to the King and Parliament, made a Speech to her Majesty, which (as it was full of Loyalty to his Majesty, so) it was plain English to her Majesty: That if she did not bend her selfe, with all her faculties to a peace, (great distractions having been in *England* since her departure, occasioned by the great supplies from *Holland*) greater would ensue, to the prejudice (he feared) of her Majesty, and hoped, to the utter extirpation of Idolatry, for nothing was more against the Knowne Lawes of *England*, Then for Papists to be in Armes: especially against the Law-makers. There are left garrisons in the Towne of *Manslon* and *Stamford Bridge* by that

the Popish Army, to awe the East Riding; and the Queen (the head of that Popish Army) resolves to force her passage Southward very suddenly. The Lord *Fairfax* is resolved to make use of the Club-men, to stop the passage of the Popish Army: But with all readinesse and fidelity to attend her Majesty, if she please to accept of the forces under his Command, to be a guard to her person. One unhappy accident fell out since her Majesties arrival, that within one mile of *Birdlington*, where she landed, Sir *William Strickland*, a Parliament man, could not receive her Protection for his two houses, for he and all his Tenants were plundered and robbed, and goods to the value of 3000. li. at least were carryed away, and disposed of. The like hath Prince *Rupert* done to another faithfull servant of the Common-wealth, Sir *Fra: Popham*, and taken away goods from him in *Somersetshire*, to the value of 4000. li. at least: and yet, if the Parliament by Ordinance of the Lords as well as the Commons, doe take 3. Sugar Chests, as the twentieth part of a mans estate, and leave him 57. bebinde, it is said presently, they Plunder a man of all he hath: whereas, if these mercilesse Cavaliers take all a man hath in the world, the Malignants in *London* reioyce at it, and account it acts of Justice. The demolishing of Sir *Robert Cookes* house by Prince *Maurice* his Cavaliers is not to be forgotten. For the proceedings at *Lichfield* it is sufficiently certified by divers Letters in those parts, in which action the Parliament Souldiers were much to be commended, that when in passion and heat of blood, they had taken thoughts of resolution to revenge the death of the Lord *Brooke*, by putting to the sword the Lord *Chesterfield* and his adherents, yet in cold blood, two dayes after, gave those Cavaliers quarter for their lives, who rendred themselves prisoners, (seizing on all their Horses, Armes, Money, Plate; and all other goods in the Prebendary at *Lichfield*) where those Cavaliers had taken Sanctuary. Not two houres after the surrender, *Hastings* came, and retreated; since that time, both *Hastings*, and the unsuccessfull Earle of *Northampton* came against the Towne, with intention to besiege it, but being faced by five troopes of the Parliaments Souldiers, and afterwards charged with the losse of 57. Horse, raised their siege, and so retreated.

The West hath produced the worst newes this week: An indifferer Treaty, to the ruine and destruction of the *Devonshire* men, if not prevented: for while the *Hoptonians* held them in treaty, they (having sent before to Saint *Malloes* in *France* for Armes and Ammunition) received a Ship loaden with the same, and prepared all the forces they could, while the *Devonians* disbanded; and yet to colour their designs the more, tooke the Sacrament to be

be cordiall in the Treaty: Sir Nick: Slany, Master Corridon, and others are the Treason for the Cornish men. The place of treaty is at Exeter, but it is hoped, some that are gone downe will prevent their treaty there. Never was the wise men of Devonshire so overseene in the pursuait of a victory from Modbury to Taustock, as they were by being stopp in the mouth with a pretence of a treaty, till the defeated partie had got Armes and men. The example at Brissoll shewes, that neither God, Relig: on, or humanity is the rule of their actions, especially if one consider, that of 600. lately released at Oxford of the Gloucestershire men, not 40. have hope of life, so low and weake are they brought by that cruell villanous fellow Smith the Provost-Marshal, by connivence of the superior Officers.

On Friday the Earle of Essex his Forces advanced from Windsor towards Oxford under the command of Colonell Hurrey, and Colonell Middleton, and Colonell Goodwin, with twelve peeces of Ordinance: (The Resolution being taken on wednesday before) but so timely notice of this designe had the Adverse party that Prince Rupert had command to come with all speed to save Oxford: and on friday night, and next morning all his Forces that were employed on that bloody designe at Brissoll came into Oxford: so the Lord Generall had his designe: to call him back from annoying the West; or else he had without doubt taken Oxford; wherein there was no difficulty; when the 6000 horse and foot that marched from Windsor on the designe, diverse Common soldiers that staid behind offered money to others that were to goe, that they might goe in their Roomes: so desirous were they of Action. The Lord Generall hath since recalled the said Forces, and is at his Quarter at Windsor.

For the Cessation of Arms and Treaty, it stands thus: the Commons differ from the Lords: especially in the point of trade and shipping; but so tender has each House been of other, to have a good concurrence, that no doubt, on the 14 of this moneth it will be agreed unto, and Sir Peter Killigrew be then dispatched: that by the next you will heare a Treaty is in hand: for the Parliament will enforce the Cavaliers unto it, and that speedily: for they fear nothing on earth so much as a Treaty, the Parliament heartily desires it, the other pretends it in hopes their plots will take effect, while the Treaty is in agitation.

K. p. R. London

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Numb. 31

SPECIAL

PASSAGES

And certain Informations, from severall
places, Collected for the use of all that
desire to be truly Informed.

From Tuesday the 7. of March, to Tuesday the 14. of March, 1643.

From the North.

WHats become of the great fight at Sea between the
Ships of her Majestie, and those that were sent to
prevent her landing, is not commonly knowne;
you may happen heare of it next Spring; onely
thus much we have from *Oxford*, that some of our Shippes shot the
house through, in which her Majestie was at *Burlington*, and that
shee was constrained to remove her lodging. His Majestie its said
when he heard of the escape said, the Ship-men did not shoote at
her, but onely cryed how neere they could goe and misse, as good
marks-men use to doe. The Lord of *New-Castle* is yet in the East
Riding; and likewise Master *Horsham* with 2000. Horse, who hath
sent to my Lord *Fax* for 1000. more, and by especiall order my
Lord is to send so many, and to goe himselte also in person. How
happy would it be to this Kingdome, that that Popish body were
ruined, and sent to *Rome*, and so the measure they intended to mete,
might be mered to them: That this may be done the better and
quicker, the Forces of *Lincolne-shire* and *Nottinghamshire* are to hast
to them.

From the West.

There are 4000. if not more, of the Kings Forces that are drawne
neere to *Bristol*, and some say, Prince *Rupert* is with them: had
they knowne Collonell *Essex* to have been in a cage, they would
not have advanced so farre, but its beleevd, Sir *William Waller* will

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ere long be with him with a formidable Armie; for he was neere 3000. when he left *Salisbury*, and is now gone into *Dorset-shire*, where wedoubt not but he will augment his Armie much; for that is a notable Countie for Round-heads, who when alls done, must doe the worke. As for the great preparations in *Somerset-shire*, and the 500. gathered there together, they are banished by the diligent and valiant hand of Collonell *Stroud*, and his friends.

The long threatned Citie of *Gloster* is not yet begirt, onely the enemy lies scattered here and there in the Villages. The *Welsh* quarter would needs visit their neighbours, and approached somewhat too neere: for an Ambush of blew Coates charged them so hoely, that they were constrained to turne her backe, neere a hundred horse were killed and taken.

The wise and valiant Sir *John Gell*, hath at last taken the Castle-like *Cloffe* or Cathedrall yard of *Litchfield*; in which action since the death of that valiant and never enough lamented Lord *Brooke*, little or no blood hath been spilt on the besiegers side: they had their Mines readie to blow up the wall, and threw their Granadoes into the Cloffe, and made them crie quarter, quarter: which at last was granted them, and all of them had mercy, it being cold blood the Souldiers thought it not good to revenge their Generals death by putting them to the sword. All their money, bag and baggage was prey for the Souldiers, and of that there was good store. My Lord *Chesterfeild* with his sonne, and its said Sir *Edw. Dering*, and divers Gentlemen of qualitie are taken; about 1000. Arms, the Souldiers though they were mercifull to the men, yet were unmercifull to the Organs, Copes, Surplices, and the like, going contrary to the *French* in their warre against the Protestants, and our Cavaliers, who use to kill living Images, but preserve dead ones.

My Lord Generall the Earl of *Essex*, is advanced from *Windsore*, by that he is come with his next quarter he will be 9000. foot and 2000. horse; Some are of opinion that he will fall upon *Reading*, others upon *Oxford*, and some hope his Excellencie will not advance against the Enemy and leave these Towns behind them untaken. Others are of opinion that they will not now set upon either *Reading* or *Oxford*, the season being yet too cold; and so not good for Souldiers to lie in the field; and besides its not good to fight upon disadvantage if it can be helped: and to fight against men in
works

works is five to one oddes, and there is no fear of them if you be as many of the Parliament Souldiers left in *Henley, Ockingham, and Alesbury*, cannot then advance to *London*, but we shall be readie to encounter them : and for *London*, let none fear but the friends of the Parliament will be hard enough for their enemies. Therefore some desire that 3. or 4000. of the civillest and stoutest Souldiers of my Lord of *Essex* may be horst, and advance against the enemy; and so Sir *William Waller* on the one side, and these on the other will keep them in such continuall alarums that they may happen come short of returning to *Oxford* and *Reading*.

They in *Scotland* are for present rid of their back friends, and long may it be so : The Marquesse *Hambleton, Traquir, Humes, Murray*, and *Montros*, are now with her Majestie. We have good store in *England* and *Scotland* of the *Persian* Religion : but let them gather together, and in time they may be scattered again.

There was a Letter this week intercepted sent to the Queen from His Majestie, its said to this effect : That he had not much news to commend to her, but that he had received some Articles, and returned such an Answer as might undeceive the people (but they are now too old to be catcht with chaffe) that very many fine designs did open themselves, whereof he did not doubt of the successe, but yet in the first place His care should be to secure her, and that 171. was not to be feared.

The Letters from *Ireland* say that that Army that hath so exhausted the treasure of this Kingdome, and done nothing but lye still and spend money, have offered themselves to come for *England* to serve His Majestie against the Parliament, these are of my Lord of *Leicesters* chusing; but withall, they say, they are refused, not out of disaffection but out of State policie. My Lord of B. hath repented the filling his Majesties Armie with Papists, that he dares not on these yet untill the former be a little more forgot, but would they were all here by *May* day, for by that time there's no doubt but the Parliament will have Armies enough, if they please, to encounter them all.

The *Devonshire* and *Cornish* men have as good as agreed in their intended association, the matter of the agreement is to have free commerce by Sea and Land, and they joyntly to oppose any power that shall come against them. This the Lord of *Stamford* is said to

have protested against; and the Commons House have sent Mr. *Psider* and Mr. *Nicholes* to protest against it in their name: it were to be wished that Gentlemen, who's estates are greatest, did see the plague a farre off, and put to their helping hand, and not erect such rotten Neutralities, and is not fit they share in the blessings, that will not first assist their brethren to drive out their *Cananites*.

The House of Commons on Saturday took into consideration the Kings Propositions added about a Cessation, and upon the matter have confirmed their former Resolutions; for they denie that any Captain of Ships shall have His Majesties approbation before their admission into that service: neither will they have any free trade at all; but will have all examined and stayed that have safe conduct from Authority.

Certain brave clothes of Captain *Pennington* (whose valour at Sea was never heard of) and Captain *Gartwright* (of equall fame) was seized on that were in all haste going to them, but their place was not there (as was supposed.) They say Captain *Pennington* hath a Fleet of 20. sailes, expect famous actions from him, but never against a man of Warre: its like he may take a Merchant man if he have no gunnes.

The City moved the Lords and Commons this week to have them enter into an Association or Covenant, as was promised when they parted with 10000. l. to the Armie; God grant the Covenant may be full and plain to these particulars following. First, for the extirpation of all Papists out of *England* and *Ireland*. Secondly, for the rooting out of Episcopacie root and branch. Thirdly, to bring to condigne punishment all transgressours of the known Law before this Parliament, and all that have leaved actuall warre against the Parliament, and voluntarily contributed to it. And lastly, to settle about His Majestie, and in places of trust and Judicature, such as will studie the advancement of the Protestant Religion at home and abroad. Priviledge of Parliament, and Libertie of the Subject.

There is a Letter come that tell us that some great action hath been about *Glouster*, and that 4000. of the Cavaliers have been put to the worst, and 500. slain, with other particulars to that effect. But because as yet uncertain, I referre it to further information.

There is great noise of the increase of Sir *William Walters* Army,
and

(1655)

and how he got store of horses of the Countrey people, who fearing and apprehending the approach of Prince *Robert*, were content to part with them: But others who were the friends of *P. Robert*, (who never was friend to any, hid their horses in woods and by-places) and those he lighted on also, so that he is now said to be 3500. strong, and that he is upon his advance towards *Bristol* or *Gloucester*, as occasion shall call him.

Exon. March 11.

As for news, here is very little, onely my Lord *Gray* came to our Citie on Wednesday, and some of our troops of horse came home on Thursday under the command of Captain *Gault*, who safely have brought home our godly Ministers without any harme; for which we desire to be thankfull to our gracious God. The chief of the Gentry of *Cornwell* have taken the oath of laying down of arms for 20. dayes, and they with our men took the Sacrament on it at *Plimouth* the last Lords day, which was the 3. of *March*; but it was done in the Earle of *Stamford*s absence, and he would not agree to it. I hope there will be a firme Peace made betweene us and the *Cornish*, we heare that there is great hopes betweene *Wiltshire* and *Dorset*, *Somerset*, and *Devon* with *Cornwell*, to make an Association, which if it take effect, I hope it will make much for our peace in our Westerne Countreies. Our Trained Bands are all come home, onely the Volunteers yet remaine, 3. thousand are quartered in *Faversham*, and 3000. and odd hundreds are about *Plimouth*. We heare that *Hopton* and *Sturminster* are as yet fortifying of themselves in *Salt-Ash*, where they now are. They we heare are utterly unwilling to have any Association, but I hope the Lord will come and make peace for us.

Bristol 11. March.

We had on Tuesday night last a desperate plot against the Citie, by some of the Inhabitants, which was to have let in the Kings forces, Prince *Robert* and Prince *Maurice*, with about ten thousand horse and foot, which lay within a mile of the Town on *Derham* downe; for which there was great preparations, in Mr. *Robert Tadmans* and Mr. *George Buchers* house, there being found 40. persons

in the first, and 60. in the other, with divers sorts of Ammunition, who with their confederates should have seized on the Guard, at Froome gate, and so forced the gate; and by the ringing of St. Michaels Bell they should have known when to come away. But this plot was discovered by the providence of God, I hope as an earnest of his future favours; I wish we may give him the praise: for doubtlesse many an honest mans life was thereby preserved. The distinction to know themselves and their partie, was by wearing a white Ribban in their hats, and the word *Charles* in their mouthes: There are at least sixtie in prison, and many escaped, they are now on their examination, and what the sequell will be by my next I shall advise you. Prince *Roberts* hath plundered all the Countrey, and carried away with him at the least a thousand horse. The chiefe names of those in this confederacie followeth.

Thomas and William Coulstons.

Roberts and William Yeatmans.

Edward Arendall.

Mr. Criswicke.

Mr. Caple.

Mr. Cole.

} Now prisoners in the Castle with
fiftie two more.

This week came forth an Ordinance, That if any person or persons shall find him, or themselves agrieved, that he, or they is, or are over rated; such person or persons at any time, before distresse taken of his, or their goods, may complain to the respective Committees, who have executed this Ordinance within the Division or Limit, where any such person or persons over rated shall be assessed, which said respective Committees, or any two of them, shall have power upon Examination to relieve such person or persons as they shall see cause; yet the true intent and meaning of the said Ordinance is, And it is further ordered by the Lords and Commons, that if any person or persons so finding themselves agrieved, be such as have not formerly contributed upon the Propositions, or not proportionably to others of their estates, nor have been rated and payd upon the Ordinance of assessment, Entituled, An Ordinance for the assessing and rating of such as have not contributed at all, or not contributed according to the proportions of their

their Estates: Then the said parties if they be not assessed above a proportionable part of such sum or sums as other men of their abilitie have paid upon the Propositions, or have been assessed, and have paid upon the said Ordinance of not exceeding the twentieth part; The said Rates to stand, and not to be altered, Provided nevertheless, that no person be assessed above the sum of ten pounds the week.

From the North.

I told you in my last that we had my Lord of *New Castle* and master *Hotham* with two Armies are neere one the other, and that they are not like suddenly to fight; Now I certifie you that her Majestie is come safe to *Yorke*, but must say no more, onely that if the war be protracted you may happen here of revolts good store.

The numerus multitude that were come to *Cambridge* are thanked and sent away all but a thousand, they stay for safety of the towne, and a list is given in of 23000. that at three dayes warning will be ready to march. Thus see wee the hearts of the people if the Parliament please to command them.

There was this week Lettets intercepted very considerable, some to the Agent in *France*, some to Dutch men and others; one was from a Cavalier, who writes, that the Round-heads were now dropping, and he hoped in Jesus Christ that before Midsummer, or within a yeer there should not be one left in *England*; the whole Army of the Parliament, and the Parliament, and all that voluntarily assist the Parliament are termed at *Oxford* Round-heads, and all these the designe is to destroy: And here he speaks the true Jesuites designe, which is to destroy all but those that are Papists, or may with some small preferment be drawn to it.

P. Rupert is returned from *Bristol* to *Oxford*, with a sad heart; as they say, for he was disappoynted of his Plott, which was to surprize the Citie of *Bristol* by trechery, the manner according to an eye witnesse is thus related.

Sir I cannot but give you a touch of Gods infinite mercy, and our miraculous deliverance, the crueltie of barbarous enemies without, and hellish treachery and massacring by most inhumaine Vipers within, both which had conspired our ruine and destruction, and with us what in them lay both of Church and Commonwealth, but by

by Gods mercy and the vigilancie of the gevernour. Col. Fines and others found out and disapoynted : for it was vpon Tuesday last at night Prince Rupert Prince Moris the Lord Digby and divers others of note, with four thousand or five thousand (invited and brought by our malignant partie, some being gone to conduct them, others acting their part at home) came within a mile and halfe of our Citie, still expecting a call to our powder plotters, who were assembled privately in severall houses in great numbers with their fire-works and weapons of all sorts, while multitudes of others expected their call and watch-word : having provided themselves with white tape to tye about their armes for distinction, King Charles being the watch-word, were about 3. of the clock in the morning upon to'cing the bells in two severall Churches to issue out from their two maine quarters, the one being the house of Mr. Robert Yeomans, the other Mr. George Buchers, the Seamen Butchers and others, whom they had corrupted were in this bloodie business to rise with them, some to surprise the maine gard and put them to death, vpon which 100. other bells were to ring out, which was to give notice the gates were open, and the enemy might come in, and so all that had not the white Tape on was to be massacared, which plot was thus discovered. A little boy declaring about a quarter of an houre before that divers muskets were caried into mallee Yeomans house, search being made found the house full of men, ready to put the designe in execution, which apprehended them at Buchers house, some fled into the water and went to the Armie, others were taken to the number of foure-score and two, and are imprisoned. many of them being of our Common Counsell and richest Merchants, the next morning two peeces of Ordnance was shot off from one of our Forts within out the Town, and did some execution upon the enemy, who in great rage (being disappointed) rose and left the siege; divers are gone along with the Prince of the Tradersmen. There are more and more apprehended daily, for the business is still in examination. The town is now in a good posture, 3. of the Captains, of our Trained Bands are put out, and better in their roome.

Sir William Waler was sure willing to come to our help, had he had strength enough; he is now at Barb coming towards us. We took a prisoner as a Spie in canvas, who we beleeve is of great qualitye, for he speaks all Languages.

HIS
MAIESTIES
LETTER

To the
MAIOR
OF
BRISTOL.

Together with an humble Remonstrance

AND
PROTESTATION

TO HIS
MAIESTIE
From the County of Nottingham.

OXFORD,
Printed by Leonard Lichfield, Printer to
the Vniversity. 1642. March. 15.

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MAILED

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1944



from the County of Montgomery.

OXFORD

Printed by Leonard Litch, 14, Printer to

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HIS MAIESTIES LETTER TO THE Maio^r of *Bristol*.

Doubt not but that you the Citizens of Bristol doe resent these many indignities offered unto Us; which Wee had rather forget then mention; did not the daily leuying of forces, and prosecution of warre against Us force a condescending in Us for the good of Our subjects, to make Our intentions knowne what the method of some hath beene, and whither it hath led and brought this Kingdome; all men see what Ours would have beene, if seasonably and timely apply'd unto, let all men judge: We have written enough of that: that which doth move Us now to signifie Our desires unto you, is to undeceive you from the faire blandishments and false pretences which are endeavoured to be imposed on you, as on other Cities and Townes, who in stead of obedience, which is onely acceptable unto Kings, make rebellion the daily sacrifice which they offer unto Us in a hostile manner. But I doubt not but that you are as vigilant of Our person and safety, as We are carefull of your good and preservation: for albeit Wee

have beene tempted to high indignation, yet Wee had rather
 perswade then compell the affections of Our loyall subjects,
 and since such an urgent necessity lyes upon you, that you are
 forced to declare your selves my friends or foes, under a strange
 distraction of Us your King, and Our Parliament, I cannot
 conceive that the rebellious instigation of some malevolents to
 Our person, shall be powerfull to writhe and bend your incli-
 nations to oppose Me in standing as supporters of those ayery
 pillars that have led this nation into a wilderness of rebellion.
 Can you finde more faire dealing then in the true candor of
 your King? Or are the plundering your houses, with all the
 characters written in blood by too many swords, better argu-
 ments to thrust you forward to destructions, then my words
 can be to stay the fury of an unlawfull groundlesse warre? Is
 misery better then a peaceable government? Upstart Sects
 more prevalent then the true Religion? and the Defender of
 the Faith of no higher esteeme then the confounders of all
 Christian piety? Wee should then thinke that there were no
 God, and beleve with the new-found world of Atheists
 your King is to be forsaken and neglected even by the votes of
 Heaven. But all knowing men doe acknowledge Our power,
 and God hath confirm'd their judgements in adhering to Us
 in all fortunes, and will carry on all Our just designs, to the
 shame and terror of Our enemies. Wee therefore out of Our
 Royall love and care to this City, doe exhort you and all other
 Our good subjects, to stand fixed in their movings, and not to
 run contrary to Law, Loyalty, and Religion, in banding forces
 against Us, since the effusion of blood cannot bee imputed un-
 to Me, but to such voluntary causes as desire nothing but to see
 this Land converted into an Anarchy, deceiving the people
 with the false colours of Religion, whereof Wee are and will
 continue the principall defender, and therefore unblinde your
 selves,

selves, and learne at last to see that God doth not suffer Princes
 though much injured, to be oppressed, for he in his own cause
 will be their vindicator. And therefore as you set a high price
 and estimation of Gods favour, and the favour of your Sovere-
 raigne, let your hearts make a generall association to stand as
 you are bound in allegiance for your King, and hereof faile
 not, as you will answer it at your perils before the Tribunall of
 God; We are but his Vicegerent, yet offences committed a-
 gainst Us shall by his divine Justice be hereafter punished. But
 if Our present Letters doe worke you to a constant loyall obe-
 dience, you may expect heavens blessings and my favour,
 which shall never be wanting to all my true loving subjects.

A 3 THE

A 3 THE



THE
HUMBLE REMONSTRANCE
of the COUNTY of
NOTINGHAM.

SHEWETH,



That whereas in the late Printed Booke, Intituled
A Declaration of the Lords and Commons
of the six and twentieth of *May* (besides ma-
ny Expressions which our Duty and Loyalty
to your Majesty, forceth us to say are unfit to
be used by Subjects, a power without and a-
bove your Majesty, is challenged under the name of *Both Hou-
ses of Parliaments.*) That they may dispose of whatsoever be-
longs to the Subject for the publique good (of which they
are the only Judges) without your Majesties consent, and that
the Subject is to bee bound by their Votes and Ordinances,
~~though your Majesty agree not therunto.~~ That your Majesty
hath no Negative Voyce and care, a person only trusted for the
good of the Kingdome, and themselves to have a superinten-
dency to see that trust discharged. That the Sovereigne power
is in them, with diverse dangerous expressions of diminution
from your Royall Person. All which is pretended to be said in
discharge of the trust reposed in them by all the Subjects in
this

this Kingdome whom they represent. Wee Your Majesties most dutifull Subjects of this County, doe hold our selves bound in Duty and Conscience, to declare to Your Majesty, and to all the World, That as we do for our selves disavow the committing of any such trust unto them, So we do from our Soules, abhor the said Doctrine and Propositions : And do as well for the known Interest in the Lawes of the Land (to which we are born, as for our Allegiance to Your Majesty) protest against the same, and that we will alwaies defend Your Majesties Person, and Obey Your Majesties Lawfull Commands, and acknowledge Your Majesties Supremacy, with our Lives and Fortunes. And we most humbly beseech Your Majesty to protect us in these Resolutions, & not to suffer us to be Governed, but by the known established Lawes of the Land, or to be oppressed by any arbitrary power whatsoever. We Your Majesties Loyall Subjects being abundantly satisfied with Your Majesties Declaration of Your care of the Protestant Religion and property of the Subject, and of the Lawes of the Land, and of the just freedome of Parliament, especially, with that Royall expression of Your Majesty, That You would no longer looke for our Obedience, then you keepe those Promises, and doe conceive our selves bound, not only by our Oath of Allegiance and Supremacy, but by the late Protestation, to run the utmost hazzard with our Lives and Fortunes in Defence of Your Majesties Person, Your Honour, and Your just Rites. Which we do again in the presence of Almighty God, and as we hope for his mercy (promise to do) against any power, and any false Interpretation whatsoever.

And we shall Pray, &c.

F I N I S,

the Kingdome without any impediment, *WITNESSE* Your Majesty
 that the said Subjects of this County, doe hold our selves
 bound in Duty and Conscience, to declare to Your Majesty,
 and to all the World, That as we doe for our selves disavow the
 continuing of any such thing unto them, So we do for our
 selves, and for the said Land, and Proprietors: And do as
 well for the known Lawe of the Land, as for the
 we are bound, as for our Allegiance to Your Majesty, protest
 against the same, and that we will & will defend Your Ma-
 jesties Person, and Office, Your Majesty's Lawe, & Government,
 and acknowledge Your Majesty's right, and our own
 and Liberties, And we will & will defend Your Majesty's
 right of us in these Liberties, & not consent to be gover-
 ned by the known established Lawe of the Land, in so far
 as it shall be contrary to the same, which Lawe, We Your Ma-
 jesties, do hold to be the Christian Religion,
 and property of the subject, and of the Lawe of the Land,
 and of the just freedom of Parliament, which this
 Protestation only, in Majesty, That You would no longer
 look for our Obedience, then you have made the Promise, and
 doe contrary our selves bound, not only by our Oath of Alle-
 giance and Supremacy, but by the late Protestation, to main-
 tain, & stand with our Lives and Fortunes in Defence of
 Your Majesty's Person, Your Honour, and Your just Lines,
 Which we do again in the presence of Almighty God, and as
 we hope for his mercy (promise to do) against any power, and
 any false Interpretation whatsoever.

FINIS

And witness they, &c.

Report of Prince R. THE ²
HUMEROUS
TRICKS AND CONCEITS OF
Prince Roberts Malignant She-Monkey, dis-
covered to the world before her marriage.

Also the manner of her marriage to a Cavaleer and how
within three dayes space, she called him Cuckold to his face.



1642 London, printed for T. Cornish. *Mac-h. 15*

HUMEROUS

TRICKS AND CONCEITS OF
 Prince Robert Malignant the Monkey
 covered to the world before his death


Also the manner of his death to a Cavalier and how
 he was buried in the Church of St. James



London, Printed for T. Currier. 1665.

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**Humorous Tricks and Conceits of Prince
ROBERTS Malignant She-Monkey.**

 Very maid, nay every whore, in expectation by her good carriage to obtain a husband, will behave themselves in a very demure manner, and couzen the Devil with hypocritical modesty; But Prince *Roberts* Monkey having not so much policy as her Master, said her self so open to the view of the world; that every one without peeping might look upon, nay into the Monkey, so that her bad looks and deformed visage, and the mad malignant tricks which she plaid in the flower of her youth made her despaire of a husband, and to remaine uncourtied, much more unmarried in regard of her vicious malignity of her tricks and qualities, she having no portion to guild over these faults or tricks following: First, she was alwayes unconstant changing her affection, oftner then her nock, and it is supposed that she learnt her giddy actions either from townists, or her halfe cosins, which are Baboones: And when as maids would simper and dissemble there desires, this Monkey had a licorish tongue and a licorish taile, she would eat no oatmeal nor lome of walls to cure her green infirmities, but the longest whitest sugar plums she could get in her mouth were most delightfull to her taste, and had such a ravenous appetite to fruit that she would swallow all but the stones, and having gotten a delectable bit in her mouth (according to the manner of monkeys) she would onely suck the juice out of it and then spit out the rest, as if she had had no more teeth then are in the gums of an old parish Midwife. And because she was alwayes a loose bodied thing, and desirous to have been trailing all maid to have lost her maiden-head, therefore she was tied to the nave of a wheel, so fast that an Italian padlock could not keep a Monkey more safe and close from others handling; moreover this Monkey was and is by nature a notable plunderer not onely of studdes and closets, to which if she got she would teare the books, spill the ink, and eat the sweetmeats, but many times under the colour of love or rather lust, this Monkey in familiar manner sitting by her sweet hearts would plunder

and

HUMEROUS

TRICKS AND CONCEITS OF

Prince Robert Malignant the Monkey

covered as the world before the monkey

Who has the monkey in a Cavalier and how

TIGHTLY

BOUND



Printed by J. Smith, London, 1666.

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humorous Tricks and Conceits of Prince
ROBERTS Malignant She-Monkey.



Very maid, nay every whore, in expectation by her good carriage to obtain a husband, will behave themselves in a very demure manner, and couzen the Devil with hypocriticall modesty; But Prince Roberts Monkey having not so much policy as her Master, laid her self so open to the view of the world; that every one without peeping might look upon, nay into the Monkey, so that her bad looks and deformed visage, and the mad malignant tricks which she plaid in the flower of her youth made her despaire of a husband, and to remaine uncourted, much more unmarried in regard of her vicious malignity of her tricks and quackes, she having no portion to guild over these faults or tricks following: First, she was alwayes unconstant changing her affection, oftner then her lock, and it is supposed that she learnt her giddy actions either from townists, or her halfe cosins, which are Baboones: And when as maids would simper and dissemble there desires, this Monkey had a licorish tongue and a licorish taile, she would eat no oatmeal nor lome of walls to cure her green infirmities, but the longest whitest sugar plums she could get in her mouth were most delightfull to her taste, and had such a ravenous appetite to fruit that she would swallow all but the stones, and having gotten a delectable bit in her mouth (according to the manner of monkeys) she would onely suck the juice out of it and then spit out the rest; as if she had no more teeth then are in the gums of an old parish Midwife. And because she was alwayes a loose bodied thing, and desirous to have been hanging all mad to have lost her maiden-head, therefore she was tied to the nave of a wheel, so fast that an Italian padlock could not keep a Monkey more safe and close from others handling; moreover this Monkey was and is by nature a notable plunderer not onely of studdes and closets to which if she got she would teare the books, spill the ink, and eat the sweetmeats, but many times under the colour of love or rather lust, this Monkey in familiar manner sitting by her sweet hearts would plunder

and pick their pockets, which was indeed a very base fault, and a whole
trick: when she was not above fifteen years old, an old man that was
wrinkled and deformed as her self came wooing to her, and this
Monkey (having learnt to plunder from Prince *Robert*) plundered the poor
old Gentleman of all his Rings, of his Watch and of his Purse that was
in his pocket, and would never so much as open her mouth to give him
any satisfaction or thanks for it, so that the old Gentleman paid daily
for his wooing, and had onely a sensible feeling of the Monkey, and
her malignaut tricks, this Monkey also hath plundred many a young man
that stood for the Cause, and hath got from them scarfs, gloves, bodkins,
Rings and other commodities, and is more insatiate then the city *Lotten*
for bring in what you will if this Monkey once get hold of it, she will not
part with a pin-till till her own turne be satisfied, which was a greedy hum-
mour and a trick that a long time spoild this Monkeys marriage, moreover
this Monkey was alwayes a cunning Jugler, so that when Souldiers had
received their pay, when there hands were in her placket, her hands would
be in there pockets, and though they felt the Monkey at the very same in-
stant, yet they had not the power to take such sure hold of her as to carry
her before a Magistrate, but she would cunningly slip away from them,
and leave them no money in their pockets, nor any thing in their hands
but a rusty musket or a pike, for she would get away to bed and laugh next
day with open mouth to think how she had gulld the souldiers, so that the
souldiers cried a pox on this Monney, we can never keep any money in
this She Monney. If she went to Church she was alwayes close vaild like
a Nun, and when she was in the most holy picture of praying, though her
mouth many times opened, yet she could not pray by the spirit but would
hold her peace or else the desires of her mumping minde were that such
or such a young man were preaching in her pulpit, and indeed many
Schollers and preachers after service was done did love to handle the
Monkey better then they did their text, and it is thought that some of
them would never have married if it had not been for love of the Monkey.

But amongst other tricks that hindered this Monkeys marriage, this
was one chief matter, she could never keep her legs together, but would
throw them abroad in such an obscene manner, that any of the Cavaliers
with a Carbine charged with two bullets might easily enter her maiden

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port, rife all the treasures of her virginity, and come off safe and found
 with a pox to them, and so she would be revenged of her enemies; for
 many of the Cavaleers that were malignant to the Parliament, were
 more beaten and foiled by this Monkey then by all their forces, so that
 their bones in the language of diseases cryed *peccavi*, or a pox of Prince
Roberts malignant Monkey. Her last trick was a very bad quality, and
 that was, when she was drunk she would let any one take up her smock,
 if she la it, and so discover her Monkey. Well, every dog hath his day,
 and every Monkey may get her match. It fortun'd, that *Cupid*, to be re-
 venged of the Cavaleers in *Oxford*, made him cast his eye, and with it
 his affection upon this Monkey, and though he could not finde any parti-
 cular good quality in her, yet he loved her exceedingly in the whole, and
 most especially he doated upon her Monkey, after this, woo'd her he did,
 and still when he was on horseback, or on on footback, he still thought
 upon his Monkey; once he drew out his sword at *Grifes Taverne* in *Ox-*
ford, and the clofe shutting of the Oyster, and the opening of it alterward,
 made him think of his beloved Monkey; then he would drink healths,
 and swear (God damme) you shall pledge my Monkey, she is my Mi-
 strisse, fill it all out Sir: But one day the Cavaleer having with too much
 familiarity angered the Monkey, she bit him very shrewdly, to that the
 Cavaleer grew exceeding sick, and after ward when he was recovered, he
 made this conceit on his Monkeys displeasure, and biting bitterness:

<i>Monkey, nay fie, Why dost thou frown on me?</i> <i>And wilt thy countenance never better be.</i>	<i>A pox upon thee and thy false fair looks,</i> <i>In stead of favours thou givest me Frowns.</i> <i>(Quacks.)</i>
--	---

But love is a fire not to be quenched, for as soon as the hot Cavaleere
 was grown coole and healthfull, he desired again to be dealing with his
 Monkey, and draw a long Letter, the Contents whereof pleaded her ex-
 ceeding well, so that she resolv'd to be fast joyned in Matrimony
 to the Cavaleere, and the Cavaleere thought to cock his Car-
 bine, and match his Monkey. The wedding day was appointed to
 be kept in *Nullibi Colledge* or *Broadgates Hall*, a Dinner was provided,
 but the Monkey sat all dinner time very demure, and was so posselt with
 the strong imagination of what shall be done at night, so that she could
 not eat a bit, but smiled inwardly to her self, to think how the Cavaleere
 would.

would tickle her Monkey; when dinner was done the Monkey & the Cavaleers dance to the tune of *Jump to thy Confin and kisse*, and the Monkey was so heated with dancing, that she was ready to have dropped her head upon the rushes: Well, the Cavaleers rested, and toyed with the Monkey, that sat simpering, with a watering mouth, to think of the pleasures she should enjoy at night. At last night, being looked for, came and the Cavaleer, and the Monkey were with great Ceremony brought into their chamber, and when they were in bed all the company left them. And now the Cavaleer like a blushing Scholar did his acts in his chamber, and what they were you must imagine, suppose them now at there morning night sport, which be done over and under again; they were early in the morning saluted by this song composed by a Scholar of *Oxford* on the marriage of the Monkey and the Cavaleer.

*No blushing sayre, nor morning red,
Peep through your curtains closely spread,
Prince Roberts Monkey that long caried,
Is to a Cavaleer married:
So wrinkled, so wondrous wrinkled,
And of such a comely grace,
When she is naked, I dare be bared
If the Devil himself have such a face.*

*She: le gaze widely and moop and morne,
And is hairy above and below,
And if she get a bit dorb like her
The Monkey is an errant friker,
So wrinkled, so wondrous wrinkled,
And of such a comely grace,
When she is naked, I dare be bared
If the Devil have such a face.*

The next day the Scholars of *Oxford* made many Epithalamions in praise of the Monkey. And after they had made this song they gave it to the Cavaleers, who sung it to a merry new tune cald the Monkey.

*Prince Roberts Monkey is a toy,
That dash exceed his dog call'd Boy,
Which though dogged folly,
Both barker and biter,
But this delights
The Prince when's melancholy.*

*He puts Sweetmeats and sugar plumbs,
Into his Monkey's toothlesse Gums,
Which open like an Oyster,*

For he doth esteem

A wench I mean

More than a Nun in Cloyster.

*And tell his Cavaleers hold
That live at Oxford uncontrold,
When as they are halfe drunkish,
Their beas to quench,
Wells have a wench
That lassy is and Monkeyish.*

*All happynesse and joy betide,
Unto the Monkey now a Bride,
Whose Mayden head was wofull,
Her boy now is
Was wofull also,*

Till she married a Cavaleer lassy.

in this same Cavalier did traine her,
And with his Penne did bounte her,
And when he was halfe drunke,
Then lusty was endur'd.

After the wedding night had been spent in the sweet contents of love, the Cavalcere rose out of his bed from his hellish *Penn*, being worse beaten, and more sore and weak in his back and joynts, then ever he was when he was beaten at *Warwick*, or any other Town from whence the Cavaleers were repulsed: he thought the Devill had been in the Monkey, that could make him so weak, so wondrous weak, as if he had lost all the bloud in his body; whereupon he resolved to favour himselfe hereafter, and not to come on in such a furious manner, and endanger the breaking of his Carbine, or fiering it in the Monkeys touchole: so he went poore Cavalcere to get a Caudle made, and took many restoratives to fortifie his back again, intending to keep a good while out of his Monkeys mouth, having been so shrewdly bitten on his wedding night. Now while the Cavalcere endeavoured to recover his strength again, the Monkey after she was married, began to play the second part of malignant tricks: And first, she began to straggle abroad, and when she got loose, she would run to one Taverne or other with her Gossips, and there they would sit and drink, and condemne their husbands for being too slack in pleasing their Monkeys. For you must now suppose the Monkey was mad, because the Cavalcere did forbear to come on as he was wont to do; and because she would make the Cavalcere mad, she set a Cullender by her bed side, when she had occasion to make water, she took it and made her distillations therein, so that all her urine ran about the bed, and the Cavalcere lay souced in the Monkey salt pickle, so that her husband being extremely vexed after he had sworne two or three oaths, and let many farts he leaped out of bed, and left the Monkey to coole her selfe in the empty bed, but her bed was not long empty, for after the Cavalier was gone, a Scholar of *Oxford* had a great desire to leave off porring on his book, and instead of plodding on the deep liberrall Sciences, he had a minde to peep into the Monkeys black Art or Art, and in accord to former appointment the Scholar thought to have shown with the Monkeys *Nunquam Jash*, and thereupon slit of his breeches and slipped into bed.

and so the Scholar perfectly performed his Acts, and came off with
 and so betimes in the morning tooke his vale of the Monkey. But
 behold the last and most diuillish malignant trick that the Monkey
 which she performed in this manner. It chanced that after the Cav
 had a long time forborne the Monkeys bed, (as was formerly related
 young Scholar of *Oxford* make him *Carnatus*, and afterward the new
 that they fell out, she discharged her malice against him in many
 which flew as thick as hail shot, and and at last she discharged a bullet
 that hit the Cavaleer in the heart, telling him that although they had
 married but three days, she had not been idle but had made him as
 a Cuckold as any in *Oxford* or in *London*, when the Cavaleer heard
 he swore Dumme, Dumme, Dumme this Monkey is a Devil, she also
 broke my back in the wedding night, and now she hath turned a Cuck
 into a Cuckold, I am home mad, I am worse now then a Roundhead
 I will be revenged upon her for making me a City Cavaleer or Cuck
 I will therefore go to the Taverne, be drunk, and write verses against
 whole generation of Shee Monkeys.

*This Monkey married me in 3 dayes space
 She calld her husband Cuckold to his face,
 The Cavaleer was vexed, and thus he sayes
 Ha Drab, miscall thy husband in 3 dayes,
 A Cuckold (quoth she) may be Cavaleer
 Made in 3 dayes as well as in 3 year, (well)
 For many have been Cuckolds, tis known
 Twenty years, yet their wives dare not shew
 If every wife would so kind hearted be (tell)
 Husbands would nere be troubled with*

jealousie.
 The Cavaleers reply to his whorish
 Monkey.

*Monkey since thou dost prove unkind
 And false, maist thou still be blinde;
 And have no eyes, but at noon day
 Crepe and see others find thy way,
 Alay thy mouth for danger gets*

*When thou growest wiser for sin
 And at last when as thou haire
 Dath for sake it grows stark bare
 A wretched thing, and only good for
 That thou canst use it with them*

The Monkeys excuse to her Husband
 the abused Cavaleer.

*Good Cavaleer, if this I have offend
 Pardon my fault which cannot now be
 For in my chamber or else in my bed
 He kept close till my grief be dead
 And even now I know her fault
 And in a white smock she will prance
 Little Sir Roger never more shall be
 In my doock, nor attain the best
 Of favours then good Cavaleer be
 With your paw. He also well thou wilt*

FINIS.

AN
EXTRAORDINARY
DELIVERANCE,

From a Cruell Plot, and bloudy
Massacre contrived by the Malignants in
Bristol, for the delivering up the said City to Prince
Rupert and his Forces ; But discovered by Gods
goodnesse two houres before it should have bene
acted, The chiefe Conspirators taken, and
Imprisoned in the Castle:

A. Fines
Fully and exactly related in a Letter from
Colonell *Fines* Commander in chiefe there, to the
Right Honorable the Lord *Say*; and three Letters
more, read at a Conference of the Lords and
Commons on Tuesday, *March 14. 1642.*

Die Martis, 14 Martii. 1642.

*Ordered by the Lords and Commons Assembled in Par-
liament, that these Letters shall be forthwith printed
and published.*

Io. Browne Cler. Parliamentorum.

LONDON,

Printed for *L. Wright* in the Old Bailey, *March 15. 1642.*

EXTRAORDINARY
DELIVERANCE

From a Church, blood and bloody
Massacre conceived by the malignancy in
England, and in the year 1641, the
goodness of the Lord is made manifest in the
affliction of the Church, and the deliverance of the
remnant of the Church.

Fully and exactly related in a letter from
Colonel Peter Cornwallis in which there is the
Right Honorable that Lord says and the letters
most read in a Conference of the Lord and
the remnant of the Church, and the deliverance of the
remnant of the Church.

Die Martis 14 Martii 1641.
Ordered that the Lord and remnant of the Church
be sent to the Lord and remnant of the Church
and the deliverance of the remnant of the Church.
- John Brown of the Parliamentum.

LONDON
Printed for the Author in the Old Bath Street, 1641.



My Lord,



I Am so full of businesse, that I cannot write to your Lordship but very briefly. It hath pleased God to give us an extraordinary deliberance from a cruell conspiracie and massacre, from malignants within the City, and from a powerful invasion from without by Prince Rupert and all his forces. God discovered unto us the conspiracie some two houres before it was to be acted; we tooke the chief actors with their Armes and preparations in severall houses by threescores and forties in a house; we have layed them safe in the Castle, and the Enemy, after two or three Cannon shot, perceiuing that the plot within the Cowbe (whereon they depended) was discovered, wheeled about and left us in some haste

haste; fearing we should fall upon their
 reare; and indeed foure of my Troopers
 chased seven of theirs, tooke foure of their
 horses, their Armes and Cloakes, and
 forced them into a River to save their lives.
 Whosoever shall consider the condition this
 Colou was in, in respect of the townsmen,
 and in respect of the Garrison (one Regiment,
 viz. Col. Essex's something ~~determined~~ by
 their Colonels resolution, especially the Of-
 ficers, although they did very good service,
 with great diligence; and the other Regi-
 ments being rawe Soldiers, and hardly ha-
 ving one old souldier for an Officer amongst
 them all, and how I was without money,
 without counsell, and without experience in
 my owne particular (for matters of this na-
 ture) must upon these and many other con-
 siderations conclude, that though, as I wrote
 in my last to your Lordship, that it is not to
 be expected that I should do miracles; yet
 God hath been pleased to preserve me almost
 by a miracle, the praise and glory of this good
 successe being only due to him. And it is very
 probable that Prince Rupert will make ano-
 ther attempt upon this City, which is of in-
 finite

finite consequence to them, and without a good proportion of men, it cannot be defended: it will require 1500 or 2000 men to be upon the guard constantly, to make a sufficient guard: there is no better way then to have here a body of an Army of four or five thousand men at the least, which when the Enemy approaches may have recourse to the City, and at other times may disperse it self to the defence of the adjacent Countie. My Lord, never did man make such Gifts for money as I doe, my Regiment of Horse, Col. Essex his Regiment of Foot, Col. Hungerfords Regiment, and part of Col. Pophams lieth upon me, besides many great incident charges which in this case must needs be borne by him that commands in chiefe. I beseech your Lordship to consider me, and let us have money at least, if we cannot have both money and men, both which we want. I shall shortly send your Lordship and my Lord Generall (to whom I humbly beseech your Lordship to excuse me that I do not write at this time, for I am not willing to make an imperfect Relation, and I have hardly time to eat, drinke, or sleepe, or scarce
to

to turne my selfe) and I will also send the
 examinations of the prisoners in the Castle,
 which are wellneere 60, With all the passa-
 ges of this great deliberance, from a most
 bloody massacre, for which the Major and
 Aldermen and Councell of this City are very
 desirous to joyne with me in a day of publike
 thanksgiving in this City.

Your Lordships

March 11.

1642.



most obedient sonne,

Nath. Fiennes.

S I R,


I Cannot omit to giue you a hint of our condition, and what hath passed among us this weeke: on Sunday night last we had an Alarm, Prince Rupert with a force was come against the City, with fouer thousand Horse, as is reported, accompanied with his Brother Prince Maurice, and Lord George Digby, and other Noblemen: they came with confidence of an easy entrance, and therefore brought no great Guns, they expected supply from our Maligants, which it seemed long promised on Monday they faced our workes, where Colonel Fines sounded a Trumpet, having with him onely a Troope of Horse, at night they retreated, and next day being Tuesday they appeared againe, waiting the issue of a Treasonable Plot which some of our Watched Citizens had assured to performe. This, and Sir William Wallers not coming, together with the advantage of a good part of our forces gone to Sherborne, and our workes not finished, of all which they had a daily account made them build upon an easy conquest: On Tuesday night, whilst the City was in a continued Alarm, it pleased God so to bleesse the painfull watchfull diligence of Colonel Fines that the Treason was discovered, and the chief Actors taken, with all their preparation, which is one Robert Yeomons, one of the Sheriffes the last yeere, and George Butcher, both Merchants, who are now imprisoned in the Castle, with many more; others are fled, and since scene in the Kings Army, and some are hid,

hid, and every day new ones discovered and leaked, I cannot write you now at large, they being this day in examination, but in brieft it was thus, they had concealed many Armed-men in Houses, and fitted them with all things necessary to the worke, there is found with one of them a Coppy of the Artoys Names, which was sent the Army and such others as must bee protected; All others were to be left unto the spoile, the first two sorts were to have a white Jule in their Bolomen, and upon their Armes; The Plot it selfe was to set up on the Senthells, and the Court of Guard at Frome-Gate and the Pitty-Gate and to doe it quietly, they had the conserance of the backside of a Houlers bring on their men, who must come together at the tolling of a Bell in thre Churches, St Nicholas Bell for the Butchers, Saint Johns Bell for the Baylors, and Saint Michaels Bell to bring downe the Cavaliers; My House must be the first to be forced for the Keyes, which at that time I was without upon speciall occasion, which when it came to the hearing of the Kings Army they were not a little angry, and are now withdrawing from us, how farre, we yet know not, but the share is broken, and we are escaped, blessed be the Lord. This doth require a day set apart for Thanksgiving, and we have now resolved upon it, I am sorry my Son remaines so weak, yet I hope wee shall enjoy him longer amongst us, I must conclude and take my leave resting.

Bristol this of March,

1642.


Yours assured, R.A.



From the Fort at BRANDANHILL,

March II. 1642.

SIR,

 Ours by the Post I have received with my Bill of exchange, for which I give you many thanks for your paines therein; as for your businesse with the Alderman, I must intreat your patience till the next conbance, it is so that my Captaine, my selfe, and all our Company, have bin here to keepe this Fort this three dayes and two nights without reliefe, it is somewhat hard duty for fresh water Souldiers, but wee are all willing to doe it, because the time doth necessarily require it.

Upon Tuesday the seventh of this moneth, Prince Robert, Prince Maurice, and my Lord George Digbie, with 4000. Horse and 2000. foot, came and presented themselves with their forces upon Durdam downe, within Cannon shot of this fort, and now I shall give you a Relation of a Treason as horrible, as detestable, (and setting aside but the greatnesse of Persons) as bloody as the Gunpowder Treason, and ought especially by us of this place to be taken notice of, and yearly to be celebrated with praise and thanksgiving to the Great Protector unto eternity, the Plot was thus: Our grand Malignants to God and their Country, had combined with the forces aforesaid, to draw neere the City, and had promised them to assist

them with 16. peeces of Ordnance, or more, as occasion should serue, these Guns were to be brought unto them by 500. Seamen from our Pill where the Ships ly, and these men were to joyne with them for our confusion. And within the City Master Robert Ycomans that night had gotten into his house privately betwene 50. or 60. men, some Merchants like himselfe, others Seamen, and all Rogues, their number I beleue was to be greater, but God did discover the Plot ere it came to the height; these men in the night were, upon the towele of a Bell at Saint Nicholas, to come out of his house and joyne with a Regiment of butchers and mechanicks, that would come up to the high Crosse, and they to kill the Centinell, and goe possesse themselves of the main guard, and so to hinder at that side of the City over the Bridge, from coming to their succor, then at Froome gate Master George Boucher he had another crew of like Uermine, that upon the towele of Saint Johns Bell (which was to be at the same instant of time) they were to joyne with a Company of Seamen, and set upon the guard at Froome gate, and all to be put to the Sword that came within their reach, they having possession of these two Guards, a Bell was to towele at Milchill, to giue notice that the Cavaliers should draba downe to Froome gate, and ere they should come, some from the Guard should goe and breake open the Mayors doore and kill him and his, take away the Citie keyes, and let in these Destroyers, so that now by this Post you might haue heard of the Tragical end of all your acquaintance, for we found in some of the actors possession white linke strings about; of an ell long, and every one that was to lye should wear one in his hat before, and

and another in his bosome, those that wanted it were to be massacred by Pistols or Swords without mercy. The discovery of this was miraculous, some poore body or other came to our Company which guarded the Bridge that night, and acquainted us that they saw some men goe into Master Yeomans house at ten or neer eleven a clock at night. Whereupon halfe our Company with a Troope of Horse, went to the house and found the men as I have formerly related, with many Pistols and Muskets ready charged, these men were presently sent away to the Castle, and that night the Company at Buchers house were taken, which hindered the towing of our Knel, and the next day we fell to work roundly, and have clapt up all our Defendants we know.

On Wednesday the Enemy had notice of the Plots Discovery, which made them retreat, and as I am informed, Prince Robert went away weeping, for certain he was so incensed against the parties that moulded assistance and failed him, that he would speedily return with Ordnance and be revenged on altogether: he is retreated towards Cicester, I pray God convert him (but not turne him.)

Upon Thursday last in the afternone, Prince Roberts Trumpetter came to Totone, and wee all thought it was to Summon the City, but proved otherwise. I was present with Colonell Fynes when he came in, and his message was from the Prince to the Colonell to enquire after two Gentlemen, which he said a partie of Horsemen had set upon, and either taken or killed, the ones name was Weston, the other Wheton, both Gentlemen of qualitie, the Colonells

answer was, he had no such prisoners of that name, but told him that on Tuesday night 3. of his Troope set upon seven of their Company, and took foure of their Horses, two Cloakes and some Pistols, and that the men swinned for their lives, no man ever seeing them after they entred the river, so that its probable they are drowned. I have beene tedious in this Relation, and all because I would truly possesse you withall the passages; and now what remaines but to crabe your thankfulnessse to the Almighty for this our great Deliverance, and the Lord grant wee may never be unmindfull to render unto him praise and thankfulnessse for it; All your friends are in good health heere, your father I heare not of, so for the present I take leave, and rest

Your assured loving Friend

Pray acquaint my Brother
with what I write to you.

E. H.

A Letter written by a Reverend Minister
now residing in *Bristol*, to a Friend of
his in *LONDON*.


Loving Friend,

I Could doe no lesse then impart to you the wonderfull and miraculous goodnesse of our gracious God, in preserving this Citie of Bristol from a most bloudy Plot to be put in execution upon the souldiers and well-affectèd in the City, which was on this manner: Your Brother, the Captaine, being appointed to Watch with his whole Band of souldiers at a Gate in Bristol, called Froome Gate, on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday, Nights and Dayes, and being diligent to see all his men in readinesse, Walkes up and downe within his Guard, as well to prevent the Enemies without, approaching neerer and neerer the Citie, even to a place called Durdome Downe, within two Miles of the Citie (as the Malignants within the Citie, from effecting their Plots, which wee did alwayes feare, but now were perswaded were neerer to be put in execution, by reason of the Enemies so neere approach towards the Walls of the Citie) and bending toward that very Gate, it happened through

the mightie Providence of Almighty God, that when the Captaine commanded all the Inhabitants of that Street to hang out their Lights, by reason of the Darknesse of the Night, and his souldiers were beating at their Doores to that purpose, that one Buchers House, a Merchant of great Wealth was without Light: at whose Dooze when they knocked, they would make no answer, as if there were no person at all in the House: Upon which, is pleased God to put it into the Captaines minde, (finding by inquirie, that there had bene some that entered in the day before) to suspect those persons that were in the House to be Malignants, because they would not hang out their Lights. Whereupon the Captaine commanded his Men to breake up their Doores; and when hee and his Men were entered into the House, they found about threescore men readie with their Armes: of whom, they apprehended twentie three, and the rest ran out at a Water-Gate, on the back-side of the House, and went away through the Water, it being a low Tyde, and made an Escape: and searching afterwards, they found great store of Armes, Bullets readie charged, with some Leven, and some ten Bullets apiece, their Pannies pruned with Gunstone and Bolle-

der mingled together, that they might not misse
 Fire, their Linkes readie by them, their powder
 papered out, and all things readie for the De-
 signe, which should have bene put in execution
 within an houre after this time of their apprehen-
 sion, and the Method of their plot was
 this: They having many dayes before kept in
 pay great numbers of Armed men in severall
 parts of the Citie, which men consisted for the
 most part of Saylers, Butchers, Halliers, and
 such like, that upon the Tounding of the Bell of
 Saint Johns, and other certaine Bells appointed
 by the Conspirators, the Malignants of Bristol
 at a certaine houre appointed that very Mor-
 ning should issue forth at Froome Gate in spe-
 cial, and at divers other Gates of the Citie,
 upon all the souldiers, at their severall Centu-
 ries, to murder them, and then seize upon the
 Ordnance, and make good Froome Gate for the
 entrance of the Enemie into the Citie (at the
 Ringing of a Bell) who lay within a mile and
 an halfe of the Citie, expecting every Minute
 when they should have been let in, and as soone
 as they had entred the Citie, they were to cut
 the Throats of all persons in the Citie, which
 had not the Marke and Word secretly dispersed
 through the Citie, to save some that the En-
 mie:

mie favoured: the Marke was a White Ribon
 or White Iacle on their Best, and the Word was
 King Charles. The Captaine the next Morning
 tooke Bucher himselfe, and tooke Herbert a Mer-
 chant, a Malignant, and divers other chief
 Merchants of the Citie: Herberts Boy, and
 others Maid being taken at Buchers House, ha-
 fully confessed the Plot, and about an hundred
 of the Conplotters are taken, and in close Prison.
 Now, when the Enemy found that the Plot
 was discovered and prevented, though they had
 drawne their Forces so neere the Citie, immedi-
 ately they withdrew, and rettyred toward Cicero.
 And now we hope we shall settle the Citie in a
 very safe Way. Thus much I thought good to
 impart to you, that you may know the certaintie
 of the Businesse, and thus in haste desiring your
 prayers, I remaine your loving friend.



FINIS.

THE
NECESSITY
O · F
Christian Subjection.

Demonstrated, and proved by the Doctrine of Christ, and the Apostles; the practice of Primitive Christians, the rules of Religion, cases of conscience, and consent of latter Orthodox Divines,

That the power of the King is not of Humane, but of Divine Right; and that God onely is the efficient cause thereof.

Whereunto is added,

An Appendix of all the chief *Objections* that malice it selfe could lay upon His Majestie, with a full Answer to every particular *Objection*.

Also a Tract intituled, CHRISTVS DEI, Wherein is proved that our Sovereign Lord the King is not onely Major singularis, but Major universis.

1 PET. 2. 17.

Feare God, Honour the King. 17.

O X F O R D 1642
Printed in the Yeere. 1643. *March.*

THE
NECESSITY
OF

Christian Subjection

Demonstrated, and proved by the Do-

ctrine of the Church, and the
principles of common sense and reason.

The the power of the King is not
absolute, but limited by the laws of God and man.

An Appendix of the chief objections
to the doctrine of Christian subjection.

Also a list of the names of the
persons who have given their names to the cause.

Printed by J. B. Smith, at the
press of the King, in the year 1790.

THE NECESSITY OF CHRISTIAN SUBJECTION.

ROM. 13. 5.

Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not onely for wrath, but also for conscience sake.



Would men but meditate, or were they perswaded of the truth of the Prophets speech, (1 Sam. 15. 22. 23.) Behold to obey is better then Sacrifice, & to hearken then the fat of Rams; for Rebellion is as the sinne of Witchcraft, and stubbornnesse is as Iniquity and Idolatry. (Were they I say perswaded of this truth) there would not be so little hearkening to the commands of Authority, nor so little obeying what they heare; nor would men runne so fiercely into the fearefull sin of Rebellion, onely to maintaine and iustifie their owne sacrifice of fooles; which is indeed no other then their foolish imaginations have devised, and their vaine thoughts have set up as an Idoll to themselves. Or were wee not fallen into those last and worst of times prophesied of by the Apostle (2 Tim. 3. 1. 5.) wherein men that make shew of godlinesse (yea many that most shew of it) have onely a shew, but deny the power of it, being proud, cursed speakers, disobedient to parents: Proud indeed, when they dare exalt themselves against Gods Vicegerent; Cursed speakers, when they dare libell and slander Prince and Prelate; Disobedient to Parents, Naturall, Ecclesiasticall, and Politicall; were we not I say fallen into such times, I should not need to urge the Apottles inference, which the unseasonable sins of these seasons make so seasonable: [*Wherefore ye must needs be subject, &c.*]

Eccle. 5. 1.
Olympio.
dor. in loc.

His Majesties large
Declaration
on p. 12.
13 229.
156. 257.
&c.

In which words, *Insert conclusionem Principaliter intentam, Aq. wherein, Conclusio Parenesin subjectionis ipsiusque necessitatem.* Rol. shewing that we must obey the Magistrate, not onely for feare of punishment, but much more because that (although the

Magistrate hath no power over the conscience of man, yet seeing he is Gods Minister) he cannot be resisted by any good conscience, *Gen: Notes, ex Calv. & Bez. In qua duas potissimum arguit causas ob quas potestatibus necessario obediendum, Marlor.* First their power to cause feare of wrath. Secondly our conscience to obey Gods ordinance; In respect of both which we must be subject not onely for wrath, but also for conscience sake:

Wherein I shall consider these 5 particulars.

1. The Illation, [*Wherefore,*]
2. The Duty, [*subject*]
3. The Necessity, [*must needs*]
4. The persons obliged, [*Ye*]

5. The Reasons perswading, and those twofold:

1. From feare of wrath, although [*not onely for wrath.*]
2. For conscience, [*But also for conscience sake.*]

*Aquin.
l.y.
Calv.
Bez.
Marlor.
Roler.*

1. The Illation and inference in this word [*Wherefore*] being a conclusion, wherein *Quod in initio praeceperat de praestanda Magistratibus obedientia, nunc per modum collectionis repetitur, sed cum expositione: Calv.* It will be convenient for conceiving fully the Apostles meaning, and the force of his Arguments, and the drift of this conclusion, that we reflect back as farre as the beginning of this Chapter; where (besides those two mentioned, *verse. 4.* Of 1. Terror to the ill, which I reserve to be handled under that of wrath. 2. And Reward to the good, which I referre to that of conscience.) We shall finde foure Reasons premised to inforce this conclusion, [*Wherefore ye must needs be subject, &c.*]

1. First, *ὅτι ὁ θεὸς ἐξουσίαν ἔχει ἐπὶ πάντων ὑμῶν.* (v. 1.) for there is no power but of God. How much soever we may perhaps dislike them, and how ill soever they may sometimes use their power; As Pilate did his, in crucifying him whom he should have loosed, and loosing him whom he should have crucified; yet our Saviour himself acknowledged, that even this abused power was *ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀυρανοῦ*, given him from above; (*Iob. 19. 11.*) For misery comes not out of the dust, neither doth affliction spring out of the earth: (*Iob. 5. 6.*) But as *Omne bonum desuper*, Every good gift is from above, (*Iam. 1. 17.*) so is there no evil in the City, and the Lord hath not done it, (*Amos 3. 6.*) (i.e.) *Magnum pœna*, no evil of punishment.

*Jo. 19. 20.
Matth. 27.
26.*

*August. de
Civitat.
Ori. l. 5.
c. 21.*

Per

Per me Reges regnant, By me Kings raigne, is the generall ground of the Charter, both of good and evil Princes, and Nobles, and all the Judges of the earth, (*Prov. 8.15.16.*) He it is that raifeth unto *David* a righteous branch, a King who shal raigne & prosper, and execute judgement and justice upon the earth, in whose dayes the people shal be safe; And he it is that gives an evil King in his anger, & takes a good King away in his wrath: *Qui regnare facit hominem hypocritam propter peccata populi.* (*Iob. 34.30.*) vulg. So that whether they be good or evil, we must be subject, sithence there is no power but of God; *Memento quod tu es pulvis & cinis*, lest we will be found fighters against God, whose power none is able to resist, whether it bee for protecting or for punishing; [*Wherefore we must needs be subject.*]

Jer. 33.
5, 6.
Hof. 13.
11.

Act. 5. 39.

2. Secondly, they are not onely not without God, *non sine Deo*, and so of him *permissive*; but they are the ordinance of God himself, and so of him *positive*, *secundum Deum constituti*, ordained of God (*v. 1.*) whereupon they worthily use in their stile, not onely *Permissione Divina*, or *Providentia Divina*, although those be good titles taken in a good sense; (yet they imply some intermediate meanes betwixt God and those who beare them:) But Princes write *Dei Gratia*: for by the Grace of God (no favour of man) they are what they are; so that I may say of their government, as Saint Paul said of his Apostleship, It is not of man, nor by man, but by Jesus Christ, & God the Father, For, *Cujus jussu homines nascuntur, hujus jussu & Reges constituuntur; apud hunc, qui in illo tempore ab ipsis regantur.* (*Iren. lib 5. cap. 24.*) Which may be demonstratively evidenced, if we shall take a survey of the *Series*, and succession of Governours, from the first man that was placed upon the earth, whom we finde created with an intention to make him Gods Vicegerent; (*Gen. 1. 26.*) and at his very first setting foot upon the earth, actually invested with Monarchicall government; (*ver. 27. 28.*) That government being indeed the speciall forme, whereby he could resemble the image of God who is in Heaven, as he made him upon Earth the sole unequalled Monarch, from whom alone *Quicquid est ab uno est, & est id quod est*; and therefore he is worthy to receive glory, and honour, and power, for of him, and for him, and through him are all things.

Citat.

Gal. 1. 1.

Ecc. de
unit. &
non.
Apoc. 4.
11.
Rom. 12.
36.

Nor was it his intention that hee should onely governe the Beasts already created, But also he made him to be the Monarch,

Theophil.
l. 2.
Chryso.
Hec. 24.
in 1 cor.

Apoc. 12.

Theophil.
Chryso.
ubi supr.

Gen 10.
9, 10.

Man. A-
pho. 15. Pa-
lit. p. 402.
24.

Marth. 6.
10.

And confirmed his Authority *Iure naturali, Potestate patris*, over all mankind, which should be propagated after him; who as the Angels and those of Heaven, had their beginning from God by Creation, and therefore were subject to him; so all the Armies upon earth were to deduce their off-spring from that one Adam by Generation, and so to owe to him subjection; whereas had not God intended to have Principality, depended onely upon his own institution and not upon the subordinate Nobles, nor the multitudes of popular election, It had beene as easie for him, to have Created a Company, a Colony, a Countrey, a Nation, a World of men upon earth, with his own *faciamus*, As it was, and as he did, so many Legions of Angels in the Heavens; that fount of those choice Colonies themselves might have made choice of a Commander. But he, who found the Heavens not free from mutiny, when he produced a multitude of inhabitants there, although all were his off-spring, would not give the least colour to contention, for superiority or equality, nor pretext of disobedience against his Monarch upon earth, whilst he suffers no Subject to be set by him but such as owed the Subjection and duty of a Sonne in Descending from him; Thereby teaching all posterity, how the power of a Prince over his Subjects is, and ought to bee acknowledged, as naturall, as the power of a Father is over his sonne; yea, and also thereby signifying, That as Naturally there can bee but one Father of one Childe, So Politiquely there should be but one Prince and Monarch of one People and Nation. Whereupon God did not create two men (no nor Eve, but out of the rib of Adam) that so from them all others should issue, and they might rule promiscuously, or that each of them should rule such as would make choice to be under his government, rather then under the others, (although perhaps propagated of the other) Nor that the mightiest Humer, he, that could get most, should governe most, as afterwards it fell out in the degenerating dayes of *Nymrod*. But he created onely one, thereby to intimate, How far Monarchicall government is to be preferred before any other, Aristocraticall, Democraticall, Oligarchicall, or the like. This and this alone of man on earth, being an Idea or resemblance of Gods government in Heaven; and we pray daily, that his will may be done on earth as it is in heaven; And how can it be so, if we reject or resist that forme of government? As also, thereby he implies, that

that all other formes of government are against the course of nature, different from the patterne of heaven, diverse from divine institution, and indeed punishments rather then blest governments, If they be compared with Monarchie; Which made the wisest of Kings affirm, that many Princes are imposed for the transgression of a Land, But that Realme onely indures long which is ruled by one man of understanding and knowledge (*Prov. 28. 2.*) Which Doctrine seemes to bee squared to Gods own practice throughout all ages, whensoever he designed any government over his people the Jews (after they were taken notice of for his peculiar) although for a long time he retained the royall supreme Title of King to himselfe, (during which time, he oft times immediately delivered his Regall mandates by Urin, Thumamim, Visions, Oracles, Propheties, &c.) Yet hee appointed one Supreme Vicegerent over them, and not many (for as for the *Sanhedrim* they were but as *Moses* or the High priests Privie Councell; Or as delegated Judges because of the multiplicity of businesses) One I say and not many, witnesse *Moses* 40 yeares betwixt *Egypt* and *Canaan*, *Ioshua* neere 40 yeeres settling them in *Canaan*, after them *Judab*, after him *Othniell*, then *Ehud*, then *Shamgar*, then *Deborah*, then *Gideon*, then *Tolah*, then *Lair*, then *Iephthah*, then *Sampson*. But never above one at one time. And how lamentable the times were when there was not one Supreme, but the multitude tooke power into their own hands; that hideous story of the licentious *Danites*, and the ravished *Levites* wife, and the revenge of one upon another may serve to astonish all posterity, and affright them from affecting Anarchie; yea & when God, after that he had in mercie looked upon their misery, sent them new Judges, *Hely*, and *Samuel* successively, and they not therewith satisfied would have a King like other Nations, he doth not set several Kings over them, as *Ioshua* found 31. over the land at their enterance, but hee appointed them onely one King (*1 Sam. 8. 22.*) As being safest for his people, best resembling his government and most agreeable to his Ordinance; Wherefore wee must needes bee subject to such form of government, for it is the Ordinance of God.

Oh! how much therefore are those too blame who goe about to alter this forme of government, and to introduce a new deformed device of their own ambitious invention, wherein they are not

1 Sam. 8.

*Judg. c. 10
c. 15.*

*Judg. 19,
& 20.*

*1 Sam. 8. 5
Joth. 12.*

not agreed, whether they shall be stiled, 1. The States of England as some of their Preachers (forgetting the King in their prayers) have sycophantically phrased them; 2. Or whether they shall be entituled, The perpetuall Senate, or Assesours of the kingdom, as some have endeavoured to derive their stile, as the Impresse of a Republick; 3. Or whether they shall be dignified with the Princely Attribute of Gentlemen of the Crowne of England (to which should be annexed the power of electing their King although hereditary) as some of themselves have ambitiously expressed their affectation in assimilation to that of Poland; only to the end that themselves might be sharers in Supremacy. A Government which admitting a Monarch whom yet they dare not deny, is neither Monarchie, Aristocracy, Democracy, nor Oligarchie; and Anarchie, I dare say, they would not have it intituled; A Government which if Aristotle himself were to sit in Councel at their close Committees, he could not yet resolve what to call it, a government never grounded on the Ordinance of God, nor practised in any established Common-weale. And what fearful effects must necessarily follow it, Besides, that it is to conjecture when men leave the fountaines of the living waters, and take themselves to Cisterns of their own digging. It may also be apparent to any indifferent understanding who reads or hears the story of *Hen. 3.* when there was an attempt of 24. Assesours and a trayterous appointing *Les Douze Pierr*, far short of this confused insolvency, what Robberies, what Rapes, what Murthers, what Burglaries, what Extortions, what Exactions followed, (every one shrouding himself under that Assesour, which he followed, yea and every one of the Assesours after a little time, bandying himself against another, either for their own faction, or favouring of their followers) is rather to be imagined then reported, yet those times too really felt it, and all must necessarily taste the like bitter fruit, who wil plant & nurse the tree of popular faction.

And alas how foolish and fond of flitting (to use King James his Scottish Proverbe in another case) are those people which will be bewitched to follow these many-headed *Hydras*, before the voice of the Lambe, and never consider that old Adage *Citium impletur unus saccus, quam plures?* hath there been so much paines bestowed in vaine, if it be in vain, (As the apostle speaks in another case) to bring this Kingdome from an Heptarchie to a Monarchie;

Speed H.
3.p.635.
ex. Mat.
Westmo-
nast. May-
tia. H. 3. p.
66, 67, 70,
71, 73, 74.

Vpon the
Lords
Prayer.

narchie; that now one part of this Island should be turned from a Monarchie to a *Roman Decemvirate*, a *Venetian Senate*, a *Low-countrie State*, nay to the government without a name, God forbid: *Vix unita fortior*, but a Kingdome divided cannot stand. I beseech you therefore brethren marke them diligently which cause divisions amongst you, and avoid them: (*Rom. 16. 17.*) for those who at first cause divisions, in Opinion, in Doctrine, and in Religion, will at the length attempt divisions in Government, in Policie, in Countries and Kingdomes. Let us in the feare of God consider with our selves, That if there be no power but of God, even the punishing and persecuting power, and if we must be subject even to that, lest we should fight against God, Oh how much more then, where Kings are nursing fathers, ought we to shew our subjection with all readinesse and chearfulnesse? If Saint *Paul* in force obedience to the Prince with so many forcible arguments, when that Tyrant *Nero* (who devoured Christians like a Lyon) rained and raged. Oh how should we urge & presse this point, when a *Constantine*, a Patron of the Church, and pattern of piety is our president in religious exercises, as well as president over us with righteous government: for certainly, [*They that resist, Resist the Ordinance of God*] which is the third reason whereupon our Apostle grounds this inference, *Wherefore ye must needs be subject.*

For as in his Church Christ gave some to be Apostles, some Prophets, some Evangelists, some Pastors and Teachers, for the gathering together of the Saints, and for the worke of the Ministry: so God in the Common-weale appointed some to bee Kings *reges*, most eminent and excellent above all other, some to be Governours under them *hierarchy si autem magnificos*, sent by Commission from them: Amongst whom some are Nobles, some Judges, (*Prov. 8. 16.*) some Priests (for those howsoever some conceive of them, were not incapable of government in the Common-weale: yea, some things there are which could not be decided without them. (*Deut. 17. 8. to 12.*) some are Governours of Cities, (*Deut. 21. 3, 4.*) some Rulers of thousands, some of hundreds, some of tens, (*Exod. 18. 25, 26.*) and some live meere-ly in subjection, as the inferior poore servant, &c. whom *Aristotle* that *Lincus* of Nature affirmeth, Nature it selfe framed onely to that use, and every man bound in conscience by the law of

Mat. 12.

Esay 49.
23.2 Tim. 4.
17.

3.

Ephes. 4.
11, 12.
1 Pet. 2.
13.
ver. 14.Exod. 40.
15.
Heb. 7. 8.Polit. l. 1.
c. 3. 4.

God to abide in that state wherein God hath placed him, and to be contented, with his Vocation, Degree, and calling, (1 Cor. 7. 20, 21, 22.) unless hee will bee as guilty of confusion in the body politique, or Ecclesiasticall, as the members should bee in the body naturall, if one should strive to usurpe anothers place; The foote the head, the eare the eye; and unless we will be as guilty in resisting the ordinance of God, as they should bee of deforming the act of his Creation.

1 Cor. 14.
12. to 31.

1 Pet. 2.
13. 13 17.
Mat. 20. 14

Deut. 17.
9. to 13.

Submit selves therefore to all manner of ordinance of man for the Lords sake, *Apo vñ sū*, Take that which is thine own and goe thy way. If thou beest a Ruler, do it with diligence: If an Officer, wait on thy office: If a Teacher, attend to teaching: If but a servant, doe that without slothfulness, (Rom. 12. 7. to 11.) If a Judge, be learned, (Psal. 2. 11.) yea, and upright too, (Psal. 58. 1.) If thou art to be judged, be obedient, or else thou must be cut off, both for thine owne sin, and also for others example. Nor must thou be obedient onely when Superiours be good and courteous, but even when they are cruel and froward: Nor onely when they punish thee justly for ill doing, but even when thou sufferest wrongfully, yet must thou endure for conscience sake, (1 Pet. 2. 18, 19.) which the Apostle confirms by the example of our Saviour Christ, to (vers. 25.) who when he suffered resisted not, no nor so much as threatned, (vers. 23.) although he could have had more then twelve Legions of Angels, (Mat. 26. 53.) teaching us, that we must not resist Authority, although unjustly oppressing: (muchlesse iustly ruling although punishing.) First, Neither offending it, (Mat. 17. 27.) Secondly nor defending our selves against it, (Mat. 26. 52.) what specious pretences soever we may make for it. For who might have pretended fairer in that kinde, than the Primitive Christians against Idolatrous Persecutors? yet they professe, that *Arma sunt preces & lachrymae*; so that *nemo nostrum quando apprehenditur, reluctatur*; nec se adversus injustam violentiam vestram, quomodo vimini, & copiosius master sit populus, ulciscitur: Cyprian. Who might have pretended more rightly the defence of himself, of his fellow Disciples, of his Master, yea of Religion, than Saint Peter? Yet heare our Saviours mandate and his menace, his mandate: [Put up thy sword into thy sheath:] His menace, [For all they which strike with the sword, shall perish with the sword.] [All] whosoever Clergie or Laity,

strike

Ambros.

strike against authority, or without the licence of it, in what case soever without exception of 1. *Se defendendo*, or 2. Maintenance of a Covenant, or 3. Defence of Religion. And what manner of Christians those men are who dare resist their rightfull, righteous, religious Sovereigne: Or what manner of Religion that is, which they pretend gives priviledge to such rebellious practices, I leave to every good Christian to consider: Onely give me leave to tell you, sure I am, it is not such as was known to Primitive Christians: It is not such as was allowed by our Saviour to his Apostles, nor is it such as the Apostles taught the People of their times: for they without any cloake, *Sub moderamine inculpata tutela* (which indeed never can be by Arms but onely by Laws) Howsoever Pontificians and Consistorians conspire: as *Buchanan* laboured to beguile his Nation, and some of our Country-men have beguiled themselves, and Jesuites would have beguiled the whole world, and without any distinction so offensive and defensive disobedience, the Apostles taught the Church of God, *That he which resists*, (be it how it will) *resists the Ordinance of God.*

Aug. l. 22.
cont.
Faust. c.
75.

His Majesties Proclamation and Declaration, &c.

[*And he that resists purchaseth to himself damnation.*] which is the fourth reason to enforce this [*Wherefore, &c.*] and beares a threefold reading, 1. *Judicium*, Judgement: *Tremel.* 2. *Condemnationem*, Condemnation: *Beza & Tumpson.* 3. *Damnationem*, Damnation: *Vulgar & Kings Bible.* All which are but the Graduations of the punishments, implied by the originall, *Kōmōi* for not onely *Ἐρεχθῆσαι τῷ χριστῷ*, (*Matth. 5. 22.*) they shall be in danger of the judgement of censure and condemnation of the censorious: Although this be a punishment which an ingenious spirit would willingly escape, which made *David* pray, (*Psal. 39. 8.*) Let me not be made a rebuke unto the foolish, whilest they censure, reprove, condemne my actions in their Assemblies, much more a man that is shot through the head with popularity, as His Majestie saith of the then revolted *Rolloc*, as indeed all factious persons in Church and Common-weale are, especially if they aspire by, or adhere to the popular faction; For such, like the Camelion, which turnes to all colours save white, lives onely by the aire, and delights rather in breath then other, *Ac si mallet costam quam crundam*; so they who apply to popularity, and suit themselves to all company, saving the innocent, can live no longer (at least not

4.

Larger Declaration: on. p. 25.
405.

- with delight) then they sucke the breath of applause from the multitude. But behold, not onely those which sit in the gate (the Rulers) speak against such disobedient persons, but if they escape the songs of the Drunkards (who perhaps may whoop on their sides) yet shal very babes and sucklings chant their disloyalty, and the Vipers tongue shall slay them, (*Iob. 20. 16.*) Thus an evil condemnation shall fall upon them, whereby their name shall rot, and their memoriall shall stinck, even *αἰώνι*, under the censurē of those who are as censorious as themselves: Nor onely so, but *ἑαυτοῖς κρίμα λόγονται*, They shall receive Judgement, and Condemnation: 1. Both Judgement before the Tribunall of men, where the sentence of guilt is esse shall proceed against them; and when sentence is given upon them, they shall be condemned, for such ungodly persons shall not be able to stand in Judgement, neither these sinners in the Congregation of the righteous. 2. And also they shall receive Condemnation from the Justice of God, who stands in the Congregation of Princes, (as to survey, so to assist) and is a Judge amongst the earthly gods, yea even of those whom they sometimes cannot come by to judge according to their deservings; who when he shal arise (as he will arise) to judge the earth, he will recompence such wicked persons after their deservings; he will reprove them, and set before them, even in Order, the things that they have done: As first their Pride, next their Covetousnesse to maintaine it, after that their rebellion to declare it, then their Hypocrisie and counterfeiting Religion to vaile and defend it, & at the length he will bring Death hastily upon them, and they shall go down into hell, sithence such wickednesse is in their dwellings and amongst them; and is not this a fearefull Judgement and Condemnation? so fearefull, as what can be conceived to be added? And yet behold, 3. *κατάκριμα*, *Rom. 14. 23.* *κατάκρισις*, the Judgment, Condemnation, yea, Damnation of an accusing conscience shall consummate their misery, even such as drave *Judas* to be his own Executioner upon earth; This shall do continuall execution of Gods just judgement upon them in hell, by that worme that never dies, and that fire which never shall be quenched, where their rebellious carcases shall be an abhorring to all flesh; wherefore for the escaping such fearefull 1. Judgement. 2. Condemnation, 3. Damnation here, and hereafter from God and man; *We must needs be subject.*

2. [*Subject*] Which is the duty ; That as the Devil overcame man by his disobedience to God, so man may return to God and overcome the Devil, by obedience to man for the Lords sake. Christianity is a Schoole of Humility, and we must not look every one upon our own excellencies, but upon other mens; having the same minde in us, which was in Christ Jesus, in giving (not in taking) honour, preferring one before another, *ταπεινωτις ιςυς*, humbling our selves as little children ; As they submit to their Parents, so must we be subject to our Prince, for he is the Person to whom principally the Apostle presseth this subjection ; as *Aquin. Dion. Carth. Bruno.* and *Clau.* glosse it. The subjection to others being for his sake, as the subjection to him is for the Lords sake ; which that we may performe aright, let us consider these three particulars :

March. 10.
27, 28.
Philip. 2. 4
Verf. 5. 10
9.
Rom. 12.
10.
Math. 18.
2.

1. *Qualibus*, To what manner of Princes we must be subject.

2. *In quibus*, In what things we must be subject.

3. *Quomodo*, How we must expresse our subjection.

1. *Qualibus*, To what manner of Princes we must be subject.

As the Apostle injoyne Servants concerning obedience to their Masters, so say I to Subjects concerning their Sovereignes ; Let as many as are under the yoke count their Governours worthy of all honour, (*Sive fideles, sive infideles*, whether they be gentle, or whether they be cruell) that the name of God and his Doctrine be not illspoken of : 1. And if they be believing, let us not despise them because they are faithfull and beloved, and partakers of the benefit, to wit redemption. 2. Or if they be unbelievers, let us not rebell, nor resist them ; because although, 1. *Quidam illorum dantur ad timorem & poenam, & increpationem*, Some of them are sent meerey for a terrour and a punishment. 2. Yea, *Quidam ad illusionem & contumeliam, & superbiam* ; Some of them set up themselves in pride, meerey to contemne, and scorne, and scoffe at their Subjects, as the persecuting Emperours did, when they exposed the Christians naked to fight with beasts and beastly Heathens. 3. As well as *Quidam ad correctionem & utilitatem subjectorum, & conservationem Iustitie* ; For a fatherly reformation of offenders, a loveing protection of the obedient, and the preservation of Justice for both : Yet we must consider and confesse, that *Ad utilitatem Gentilium terrenum Regnum positum est*

1 Tim. 6.
1, 2.

Hab. i. 13.
14.

1. Tim. 6.
3, 4, 5.

est à Deo, non à Diabolo, qui nunquam evincere quietus est; Imo qui nec ipsas quidem gentes vult in tranquillo agere, ut simentes regnum humanum: Earthly Kingdoms are erected by God, not by the Diuel, who, as he is never quiet himself, so would he not have the people live in peace, (as appears by his late practices) which government is the meanes to procure and preserve, preventing men from devouring those that are more righteous then themselves: And for being like the fishes of the Sea, or the creeping things who have no Ruler over them: for, *Per legum positiones reperiuntur multiplicem gentiliū in iustitiam,* Kings and Princes by their Laws restraime and bridle the fury and violence of our naturall corruptions: yea, and the worst of Princes is never worse then *Quemadmodum populi digni sunt Dei iusto iudicio in omnibus aequaliter superveniente:* Iren. l. 5. c. 24. such as the people have provoked God to set to afflict them, whose just judgement alwayes interposeth it self in such weighty cases. Although sometimes we know it not, oft-times we will not acknowledge it: which being so, may oblige every one of us to be subject to all powers, of all qualities, conditions, dispositions, tempers, religions, under whom the Lord hath placed us: *Sive 1. Nutricius, sive 2. Hypocritis, sive 3. Hereticis, sive 4. Tyrannis:* Whether they be nourishing fathers, for whom we must praise God: or dissembling Hypocrites, or obstinate Heretickes, or bloody Tyrants, for all which we must pray to God: Whatsoever *Sanders, Allen, Stapleton, Parsons, Mariana, Boucherius, Santarellus, &c.* on the Romish part: And *Knox, Buchanan, Gilbey, Goodman, and Duns,* on the other extreame have formerly taught, *Calderwood* hath followed; and some too fiery spirits of late have seditiously and scandalously put in practice, of whom I may say in the Apostles language, If any man teach otherwise (then what I have affirmed) he consenteth not to the wholsome words of our Lord Jesus Christ, and to the Doctrine which is according to godlinesse: but is puffed up & knoweth nothing as he ought to know, but dooth about questions and strife of words, whereof commeth envy, strife, railings, evil surmiseings, froward disputations of men of corrupt mindes, and destitute of the truth, which think that gaine is godlinesse, (howsoever they pretend godlinesse rather then gaine) from such separate thy selfe: For howsoever we must performe active obedience to such Princes onely so far as lawfully we

we may, *Calv. Bren. Adar. Rolov. Genov. usque ad arar*, so long as
Cum Deo non comparabuntur, they are not set in competition *Scorpias.*
 with God: *Tertul.* Yet we must performe passive obedience *Act. 4. 19.*
 and absolute subjection, suffering without resistance, being sub-
 ject without rebellion, even if they should command the most
 unjust superstitious, idolatrous, prophane, or irreligious things
 which can be imagined; yet I say we must not rebell, unless we
 will renounce Christianity, but we must let this be *Probatio sub-*
jectionis, the touch-stone of our subjection, even our patient and
 constant sufferings: *Gloss. in-
te. lin.*

For, *Qua passos Apostolos scimus manifesta est Doctrina*, The *Tertul. ubi
sapr.*
 truth of this Doctrine is sealed by the Apostles sufferings, who
 indured of Heathen Princes, and for not renouncing Christianity,
Carceres, Vincula, Flagella, Saxa, Gladios, impetus Iudeorum, Ceu-
tus Nationum, & Tribunalium Elogia, & Regum audacia, & Pro-
consulum Tribunalia, & Caesaris nomen interpretem non habent:
 Imprisonment, Bonds, Stripes, Stoning, Wounds, Violence of the
 Jews, Conventing before the Gentiles, Questioning in the Courts
 of Tribunes, Examinations and Answers before Kings, Arraign-
 ments at the Tribunals of Proconsuls, yea and could not find an
 Appeal to the Emperour, any protection for their innocencie;
 yet they not onely submitted themselves, and possessed their own
 soules with patience, but also taught all pious people so to doe;
 as here our Apostle makes it apparent, and (*Titus 3. 1. 2.*) pres-
 fecth it to all posterity: Put them in remembrance (for indeed we
 are too apt to forget) that they be subject to the Principalities &
 Powers, and that they be obedient, & ready to every good work;
 that they speak evill of no man, (much lesse of Princes and Pro-
 lates, as some of late have done) That they be no fighters, (much
 lesse Armed Rebels) but soft, lowly, gentle, shewing all meek-
 nesse to all men, much more to Rulers; yea, and such effect did
 this Doctrine produce, that *Sanguis Martyrum semen Ecclesie,*
Cypr. The blood of the Martyrs was the seed of the Church. The
 blood, not the sword, that were too Turkish. And however, *Circa*
majestatem Imperatoris infamemur, Tert. ad Scap. l. 2. They were
 slandered as disloyall to the Emperour; yet, *Nunquam Adversarii,*
vel Nigriani, vel Cassiani inveniri potuerunt Christiani: Never a-
 ny Nigrian, who made Religion the stalking-horse for Rebelli-
 on; Nor never any *Cassian* who assaulted his Sovereign by As-
 sassination

His Maje-
 sties De-
 claration
ubi supr.

assination, could be found amongst the Christians: *Christianum nullus est hostis nimirum Imperatoris, quem sciens à Deo suo confis-
tari, necesse est ut & ipsum diligat, & revereatur, & honoret, & sal-
vum velit, cum toto Romano Imperio, quousque seculum stabit, tam
diu enim stabit: Colimus ergo Imperatorem, sic quomodo & nobis
licet, & ipsi expedit, ut hominem à Deo secundum, & quicquid est à
Deo consecutum, & solo Deo minorem:* For no true Christian can
be an enemy to his King or Emperour, whom he knows to be
placed over him by God, and therefore upon necessity must love
him, reverence him, honour him, pray for him, and desire and in-
deavour his safety as the safety of the Kingdome; as being next
to God, lesser onely then God, and endowed with the power
which he hath from God, over all the men in his Dominions.
Hereupon was it that the Christians fought so many valiant bat-
tels, and obtained so many glorious victories, even for Heathen
and persecuting Emperours, yea even for *Julian* the Apostata
himself: but never did they fight any battel, pitched any Field,
arrayed any Army, armed any Legions, or so much as entred into
consultation against their Emperour. And thus you see, *Qualibus,*
to what manner of Princes we must be subject. And I think all
will willingly conclude, *Si parendum est magistratui profano,*
certè multo magis obedire oportet Sancto & Christiano, Bez. If
Heathens were thus obeyed; much more should Christians; If
persecuting, much more pious Princes, such as our Gracious So-
veraign, whose clemencie may challenge our love, as wel as his
power command our duty, whom God preserve, and prosper long
over us in honour and felicity, and give us the grace and grati-
tude to be subject, *not onely for feare, but even for conscience sake.*
And so I come to consider

In Matth.
22. 21.

2. *In Quibus?* In what things we must be subject? Wherein
the true stating of the Question is much differenced from the mi-
staken and mistaking Tenents of many of these times, who con-
ceive and would beare the world in hand.

1. That they are bound no further to Subjection, then with a
Rightly Regulated Conscience, they may performe Active Obe-
dience to all their Superiours Edicts and Commands.

2. That they are not bound to Active Obedience, where they
have a doubting conscience, although not fully informed by the
right rule of Reason, or expresse authority of Gods word.

3. That

3. That the Supream Magistrate, must have expresse affirmative warrant in the word of God for all his injunctions, or else the Subject needs not obey them.

Whereas the truth is,

1. Concerning the first; That although Active Obedience binds onely in the Lord, yet absolute subjection is due without any resistance for the Lords sake, *ad omnia illius*, To humane Ordinances (1 Pet. 2. 13.) Even when man ordaines; not the Load (1 Cor. 7. 12.) yet such a man as is ordained of the Lord, and so presumed to ordain according to the Lord, wee may not in any wise resist.

2. And as concerning the second, Although when man is left to his own liberty, The rule is to be observed, *Quod dubitas ne feceris*, because he that doubteth is condemned of his own Conscience, yet when we are Commanded by Authority, and wee onely doubt in our selves whether that bee good and lawfull which is comanded, or not, The Rule of Saint *Augustine* must be observed *Si dubitas feceris*, If you onely doubt doe it, except you have expresse warrant out of Gods word, or the Analogie of faith, and undeniable necessary Consequence to the contrary; Authority must turne the scale of thy doubting conscience, and weigh downe thy Judgement to Active obedience, so that

3. The Magistrate is not bound to expresse Text for warrant of each of his particular edicts; It is sufficient that it is contained in his generall Commission *Dixi Diesis*, I have said ye are Gods. (Psal. 82. 6.) and therefore have committed my delegated power to you, *Per me Reges Regnant*, By me Kings Raigne (Pro. 8. 15.) And therefore by my authority may lay injunctions upon their Subjects, and they are obliged to Active Obedience, except they can produce a negative Act of Parliament out of the high Court of Heaven; for Princes are not onely instead of God by representation (Exodus 4. 16.) but they have the power of God over those to whom they have commission (Exod. 7. 1.) I have made thee *Pharaohs* God, yea and put caute the Subject could produce a contradictory command of God to that of his King, yet is not his passive obedience dispensed withall, nor any part of his absolute subjection dissolved or cancelled, But wee must needs be Subject, (at least by suffering if not by doing) in all things, even against the dictate of a doubting, yea, or a discerning conscience.

Ephes. 6.1.

Rom. 14. 23.

Ambros.
To 3. Epist.
1. 5. Orat.

3. But then in the next place it remains to be resolved by what meanes, or in what manner this subjection is to be expressed, which must be by these seven meanes following; where there are not *Inra Regni* by mutuall consent of Prince and people to supersede them, or dispence with any of them.

1. First by praying for them (1 Tim. 2. 1. 10. 4.) I exhort therefore that first of all, Supplications, Prayers, Intercessions, and giving of thanks, be made for all men, for Kings and all that are in authority, that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliuesse and honesty, for this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour, who wil have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth. Where observe we must pray, 1. To the end that we may live godly and peaceably, when we did not live so before: 2. That they may come to the knowledg of the truth, when they knew it not before: 3. And that they may be saved, when they were not in that state before. None so bad then, to and for whom we are not to expresse our subjection by this duty.

Li. Tit. 3.
1, 2. Citat.

2. Secondly, we must speake no evill of them; (*Exod. 22. 28.*) Thou shalt not revile the Gods, nor curse the ruler of the people. Is it fit to say to a King, thou art wicked; and to Priuces ye are ungodly? (*Iob. 34. 18*) No certainly, nothing lesse, and therefore follow the counsel of *Martialis*, who lived in the Primitive times, learned of the Apostles, and taught to succession *A murmuratone custodite corda vestra*; Keepe not onely your hands from mutiny, and your tongues from muttering, but even your hearts from repining.

3. Thirdly, we must not dispute their Commands, for where the word of a King is, there is power, and who may say unto him, what doest thou? (*Eccles. 8. 4.*) (*i. e.*) Not publikely and illegally to raise opposition against him, onely we may privately informe our own judgement, to prepare as peaceably either for active obedience or for Martyrdome.

Iosh. 1.
16, 17.

4. Fourthly, we must expresse our subjection by doing all their commands which are not directly against God, resolving with the *Israelites*, All that thou commandest us we wil do, and whithersoever thou sendest us we will goe, onely the Lord thy God be with thee.

Fifthly, we must expresse it by suffering all punishments patiently,

ently without any resistance; for those things which we dare not do when they command them, because they appeare (not seem) to be directly against God, (as hath been before demonstrated;) imitating S. Chrysostome, (*Epist. ad Cyriacum*) *Cum à civitate fugerem, dicebam intra meipsum, si quidem vult Regina me exilem agere, agat in exilium; Domini est Terra & plenitudo ejus; & si vult secare, secet; idem passus est Isaias, &c. Et si substantiam auferre, auferat, nudus exivi ex utero matris mee, nudus etiam revertar*; If the Queene will have me go into banishment, let her banish me; The earth is the Lords, and all that therein is. If she will have me sawen in sunder, I submit my self; *Isaias* suffered so before me. If she will confiscate my goods, I am contented; Naked came I out of my mothers wombe, and naked must I returne again. Behold, this must be the patience of the Saints. Apoc. 13.
10.

Sixtly, by supplying meanes, *Ad necessaria secundum statum sui conditionem*; *Lyr.* paying due tribute to our Princes; for this is the manner, *Quomodo velis te subjici protestatibus, redere jubens cui Tributum, Tributum: cui Veltigal, Veltigal; (i.e.) qua sunt Caesaris, Cafari, & qua Dei Deo. Tertul.* Which tribute must be paid without limitation of the quantity before, or accompt of the disposing of it after payment, *Gloss. Ordinar.* If Calvin understand it aright, (which I dare not assure, nor will I dispute) for, *Neque nostrum est vel Principibus prescribere, quantum in res singulas impendant, vel eos ad calculum vocare*: We have no power to prescribe to Princes what they shall expend upon occasions, nor to call them to accompt for their employment of what is expended which I conceive to be intended where there are not *Pacta inter Principem & Populum*: nor fundamentall Lawes of the Land to the contrary. Calv. in
ver. 6.

Seaventhly, we must expresse our subjection by guarding of the Princes person, fighting for him upon occasion, and sparing him from going out with us to battell, lest he should quench the light of *Israel*, (*2 Sam. 21. 17.*) And what kind of consciences those men have, who can let their leige Lord go out to battell without them, (they being required) or who can leave him in his Tent: in the field, when they return to their own houses, I leave both to men experienced in the Word, and practiced in the sword to consider: and so proceed.

3. To the third part of my Text, which is the necessity of this

Matth. 21.
3.

Luke 19.
42.

Dion :
Cath :

Cal. 1. 10.
1. 1. 20.

duty of subjection, implied in these words [*must needs*.] Must is for the King, and so it is indeed : and so is this: And therefore implies a double duty by these two words [*must*] and [*needs*] termes of double necessity ; *Dominus opus habet*, Our Lord the King, the Lord of us and all we have hath need, and who will not then let all go presently ? He must have it : in case of true absolute, imminent necessity, to save our selves and the publique, according to the Laws of the Land. The supporting of His State is that *Vnum necessarium* for our safeties, and the safety of the whole Kingdom; and therefore the Apostle doth not onely say, 1. It is convenient that we be subject (*i.e.*) for ornament sake. 2. Or it is fit that we be subject (*i.e.*) for order sake. 3. Or it is profitable that we be subject (*i.e.*) for providence and discretion sake. 4. Or it is contenting that we may be subject (*i.e.*) for peace and quiet sake. 5. But *Ἀνάγκη*, It is necessary *Obligaciones juris & propter vim coactivam superioris, viz. quia tenemini & potestis ad hoc compelli ad profitendam veram subjectionem.* [*We must needs be subject*] for absolute necessity sake : *Necessitate salutis*, *Aq.* even for the necessity of our salvation in Heaven, and of our safety upon earth. What is it but subjection which continues the blessed Harmony in Heaven amongst the Angels ? What is it but Rebellion which bred that confusion in Hell amongst the damned spirits ? What is it but subjection which can continue Peace, Plenty, Piety, Order, and Unanimity amongst men upon earth, Whereas Rebellion brings forth War, Waste, Wickedness, Confusion ; Desolation, and Destruction : wherefore for avoiding these, and preserving those, *We must needs be subject*. And so I come

4. To the persons obliged, which is the fourth thing proposed in my Text, in this word [*Ye*] *Καὶ ἵνα εἰς τὴν, καὶ μοναχὸς, καὶ ἄνθρωπος, Throph.* And so Saint Chrysostome before him, *Διὸς ἐν τῇ πᾶσι διατάξει, καὶ ἵνα εἰς, καὶ μοναχὸς, καὶ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ πᾶσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων μὲν.* With whom consent Theodoret and Occuminius amongst the Greeks, and Greg. Mag. and S. Bernard amongst the Latines, expresse themselves both in opinion and phrase to the selfe same purpose ; we the Clegye, ye the Laity ; we the Priests, ye the people ; or ye the mighty Peeres, we the many multitude. 1. For neither are Peers excepted and reserved like the *Lacedemonian Ephori, Romane Tribunes, or Athenian Demarchi*, to restrain the insolencies or exorbitances of Princes oppressions. 2. Nor are the Priests exempted

empted like the *Roman* Hierarchie, to be insolent and exorbitant in the Common-weale. 3. Nor are the people priviledged (as is pretended by some schismaticall *Demagogi*) to carry all by force of their collective body; But we and ye, 1. Peers, 2. Priests, 3. People, must all needs be subject: And that

5. [Not onely for feare, but even for conscience sake.] Which is the last member proposed for prosecution. [Not onely for feare] And yet we must be subject for feare too, which, *Cogit vel invitatos, Marlorat*. Compels those that have no Conscience; *Imo & possunt potestates etiam sine causa irasci, Hieron.* And yet we must feare and be subject too (though they oppress our tender conscience) for feare of punishment from God, and from the Prince.

1. From God, who will not suffer his Ordinance to be condemned; *Non enim privati est hominis abrogare imperium ei quem Dominus cum potestate nobis praececit. Calv.*

2. From the Prince; for, *Vlitionem repossere possunt magistratus ob dignitatis suae contemptum. Idem.* They may justly avenge the contempt of their authority, 1. Either by their Laws, by which *In legum transgressores & inobedientes severiter animadvertunt: Marlorat.* Or else by Armes; for, *Portat gladium.* He bears the sword, (*vers. 4.*) And if He draw it against Schismatiques, Heretiques, or Rebellious persons, *Magistratus justè punit gladio, Aug.* They must not cast off feare, and encourage themselves and their company against his commands, as if resisting for the cause of God (as they pretend) they were to be accounted Martyrs; for they are no more capable of Martyrdome, dying in contempt of lawfull Magistracie, then the Idol Priests, or the devils themselves were by the subversion of their Temples, or ceasing of their Oracles, by vertue of our Saviours Incarnation; or by the command of the Emperour, converted to Christianity: *Aug. ubi supra.* But on the contrary it may be verified, that they who under the royall command of a rightfull King, obediently, conscientiously, zealously, and courageously fight against a Schismaticall, or Hereticall Rebellious people, (who make Religion the pretext for Rebellion) if they die, they dye Martyrs, if they live, they live Confessors: and therefore we must feare even the Princes sword. That I may not insit upon losse of favour, friends, honour, credit, and the like; Although a wise man will consider even in this, that the indignation of a King is as the roaring of a

*Theophylact.
Lombard.*

*Lib. 1. &
Parmon.
c. 7.*

Prov. 20.

Anas 38 Lion; and if this Lion roare, who can but be afraid? for he that provoketh him to anger, sins against his owne soule; and what then shall become of his body? Or if any be so fool-hardy as not to feare, yet must he be subject nevertheless, *Not only for feare.*

[But even for conscience sake.] *Non solum, quia resistere potioribus & armatis impune non liceret, quemadmodum tolerari solent injuria quae propulsari nequeunt: Sed sponte docet obediendum hanc submissionem, ad quam verbo Dei obstringitur conscientia: Cal.* Not only because they are armed and can over-master us, for so men suffer injuries from private men, because they cannot withstand them: but the Apostle teacheth, that a Christian is bound to subjection to his Sovereigne by the Word of God; and the eye of conscience more firme and close, then by a Souldiers Belt, or Jaylois Boles and Manacles: So that, *Etiamsi certo constaret non manus illorum (alioqui valde longas) posse effugere: Marlorat.* Although we were assured that we could scape their reach, or oppose their power: Yea, *Etiamsi exarmatus esset magistratus quem impune lacerare, & contemnere liceret, nihilo magis id tentandum quam si pernam statim imminere cerneremus.* Although the Magistrate had neither Armes, nor Armies, so that men might provoke and contemne his power in respect of punishment, must we not presume to neglect him any more, then if we did see Armes and Armies, Racks and Gibbets, and all engines for execution prepared before us: *Quia nisi omnino subiciamini Principi polluta esset conscientia vestra obviante divina ordinationi; Bruno.* Because unless we be absolutely subject to our Prince (pretend what purity we will) our conscience is defiled, and every step we march against him, we set our selves in battell array against the Ordinance of God: And indeede I cannot but wonder what hard hearts and cauterized consciences those men have, who doe not presently smite themselves, and their hearts die within them like *Nabals* when they find themselves guilty of subtracting subjection from their Prince, (a greater ingratitude then which cannot be excogitated, and ingratitude is one of the greatest sinnes;) for Subjects are obliged.

1. By the rule of right Reason, to obey him, without whom we cannot be safe; but without the King the Common-weale cannot bee safe, no more then a ship without a Pilot in a storm.

my

Ambros.
Theophyl.
last.

Calo.

1 Sam. 25.
37.

my Ocean ; And therefore by the rule of right reason we must obey him.

2. By naturall equity, which bindes to do good to them which do good to us, but Kings and Princes do good to us, for by their meanes we obtaine great quietnesse, and by their providence many worthy things are done to our Nation: By them we receive honour, enjoy riches, peace, plenty, and freely professe and practice piety: and therefore even for naturall equity, *We must needs be subject*, which is the least good we can doe to them. Aq. 24. 2.

3. By morall civility we are bound to be subject to him who protects us: But Kings and Princes protect us from evill doers, who would violently take away our lives, insolently usurpe our lands, prodigally mispend our goods, lasciviously deflowr and ravish our wives, & mercilessly slave our children, yea, they are the Protectors and defenders of our faith, and therefore we are bound at least not to rebell sithence all these mischiefs have been, are, & will be the effects of such disobedience, from which *Good Lord deliver us*.

4. By Christian Religion and conscience, which enjoyns, that we must not resist the Ordinance of God: but Kings and Princes are the Ordinance of God, and therefore we must not resist them. *ver. 1, 2.*

And doe 1. Right reason, 2. Naturall equity, 3. Morall civility, 4. Christian Religion and conscience oblige us to subjection? Oh then take heed, and never trust any (though never so faire Professors) who pretend conscience to countenance disobedience, at least to cast off subjection, as it is hard to disobey and not to rebel. Yet such alwayes have been the faire pretence of the foulest practices. Thus the colour of the common good to free the people from Subsidies, Taxes, and Oppressions (which then seemed by their Governours to lye upon them) led the people of the *Jews*, yea and some *Romans* too, to follow *Theudas*, *Judas of Galilee*, *Catiline*, and their companions. Thus the Rebels of elder times in this Island, christned their Insurrections, the Army of God & the holy Church, making Religion the Patronesse of their impiety. *Jack Straw*, *Jack Cade*, *Wat Tyler*, *Fryer Ball*, alias *Wall*, and such others, made 1. The oppression of the Commons, 2. The insolencie of the Nobility, 3. The covetousnesse of the Priests, and the inequality of men of equall merit, the vail of all their violence Iosep. Antiq. Iudai. l. 18. c. 1. & l. 20. c. 6. Salust. conjurat. Catilin. Speed.

and

Hollinshead
Rich. 2. p.
429.
Grafton p.
330, 331.

L. 2. de
Bello Iu-
daic. c. 16.

Naucles.

Prov. 24.
21, 22.

and villany. Thus the Rebellion in the North, *Lincolnshire*, and *Norfolke*, were raised under pretence of 1. Reforming Religion, 2. Freedom of Conscience, and 3. Bettering the Commonwealth; yea, and they are alwayes masked under the vizard of, 1. *Pro Lege*, 2. *Pro Grege*, 3. *Pro Rege*; whereas indeed they are against the King, break the Laws, and make spoile of the people, as *Iosephus* relates the story of the Rebellious *Jews*, pretending onely against *Florus* harsh, unjust, and cruell usage, and not against the *Romanes*: But as King *Agrippa* clears it by his Remonstrance, They did but onely say so; for their actions were such as worse could not have beene done by the greatest Enemies of the *Roman* Empire, for they sacked the Townes, robbed the Treasuries, burnt the Houses, wasted the Fields; neither were they the Townes, the Treasuries, the Houses, the Fields of *Florus*, but of the *Roman* Empire. I will not make Application, but sithence these things have ever beene so, I will onely conclude with *Solomon*s Admonition: *My son, feare God and the King, and meddle not with them that are seditious; for suddenly shall their destruction come, and who knoweth the ruine of them?* Yet certaine it is that ruined they shall be, and perhaps when themselves least suspect it, suddenly as with the Arrow of Lightning shot from the Bow of God, which may serve as a Corollary to our Apostles premises to enforce this conclusion, [*Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not onely for wrath, but even for conscience sake.*] Which God grant us all grace to be, for *Iesus Christs* sake, the Patterne and Patron of perfect obedience; to whom with the Father and the holy Ghost, be all honour, glory, power, might, majesty, and dominion, from this time forth for evermore. Amen.

F F N F S.

ACCOMMODATION
Discommended:
AS
INCOMMODIOUS
TO THE
COMMON-WEALTH.

Plainly shewing by five undeniable Arguments, That none but Papists, or Popishly affected, can stand for Accommodation in these Perilous times.

For the Satisfaction of all such, as are led away by the Specious Name of Peace.

Printed in the Yeare,
1642 LONDON, *March. 16*
Of Peace, would not heare!

ACCOMMODATION

Discontinued:

AS

ACCOMMODATIONS

WYOMING-VALLEY



OF THE WORLD
TO BE
WYOMING-VALLEY
ACCOMMODATIONS

Accommodation Dis- commended,

AS

INCOMMODIOUS TO THE COMMON-WEALTH.



Lthough in these unhapy Distractions of the State, an Accommodation hath bin desired by some, who have bin thought *true Protestants, and worthy Patriots upon many plausible pre-
tences, and thereby have weakned the hands of many well affected to the Cause. Notwith-
standing I will plainly demonstrate by these ensuing Argu-
ments, that an Accommodation at this time is a peace of Popery,
as bad as the Bishops Cannons charged with *et cet.* and now
discharged by an Ordinance of both Houses.

I.

First Accommodation is not the Language of Canons, and
therefore cannot conduce to the Peace of *Jerusalem*.

1. It is no *Scripture word. Now to strive to vilifie the
Ordinances, which are in Scripture; And to set up an *Ac-*
commodation

* As the Earle
of Bristol.
Earle of Dor-
set.
Sir Benjamin
Rudyard.
& M. Waller.

Argument 1.

* See *Concordance*

A. 2

Accommodation, which is not in Scripture, no, not so much as in the Apocrypha, is to relinquish the word, and follow the inventions of man, which is plaine Popery.

Arg. 5.

* See Thomas Thomafius, Cooper, who was a Bishop, And Rider; enlarged by Doctor Gray; a known Malignant, Arg. 3.

2.

Secondly, *Accommodation* is a Latine word, the Language of the Beast, for it is derived from *Commodum*, which signifieth * profit, and you know all, the Popes Religion is for profit, or else from *Commodus*, who was a Roman Emperour, and a persecutor of the Church.

3.

Thirdly, *Accommodation* is a Merchant word, as is well known to all those who have told twelve of the *Exchanges*. Now the Pope and his Priests, are known to make Merchandise, even of the Soules of men, as factors for *Beelzebub*, and brokers for the Divell.

4.

Arg. 6.

My fourth Argument shall be drawn from the persons which most desire it, which are popishly affected as we shall shew by degrees: such are the Arch-bishops, Bishops, Prebendaries, double beneficed, and Common-prayer-booke-reading Ministers, Doctors of Law, Commissaries, Registers, Nobility, and Gentry, and able Citizens: First the two Arch-bishops, though they could never agree with one another, till they were accommodated together in the Tower yet rather then Doctor Layton shall pisse in the high-Commission Court at Lambeth house and young Hotham drinke healths to Mr. Pym, in his Lordships Sacke, at Cayood-Castle, they desire an *Accommodation*. Next the Bishops, being most of them have bin imprisoned (as all honest men ought to be) and so from loose li- vers became fast freinds do now desire an *Accommodation* amongst others, as well as themselves; which is without all question as much high-Treason, as that Petition, which they preffer'd to his Majesty, with a Protestation. Then the Deanes and Prebendaries, foreseeing that their Lands and Revenue

Reveries, which were misplaced by the ungodly charity of our ancestors, will be in danger to be employed in discharging the godly publique faith, (which faith is contrary to hope, and which publique, is contrary to all private interest) most unreasonably desire to see an end of these Rents, and a final Conclusion by an Accommodation.

Besides your double benefited men, fearing that the troubles of the times will breed a distraction of their liveings, and seeing Lecturers, dayly creepe into their pulpits to pick their pockets, and plunder the well affected women in their parishes, respectively * desire to save their tithes, and parishoners wives for themselves by an Accommodation. The common prayer Booke Readers perceiving the Peoples talking of porrage, has left them scarce any meat to put in their mowthes, as being onely paid by the fitts of the women who have to torne the surplices, as they have scarce left the ashirt to their backs, desire to conclude with the peace of God, which passes their understanding, except there be an Accommod., the Civilians with their hands in their pockets like butchers in a Lent out of Parliament finding no gilders ther, as in former times; when fornication and adultery were worth money, (which now are committed gratis) and perceiving no end of * refunding such moneys as they had unjustly scraped together, and of * lending considerable summs to some worthy members, desire to go to their graves in peace, and not to leave their estates, lands, and leases to be spent by their sons upon whores, and a Civill war, the Nobility having more to loose then five hundred of them, and having served this King and his father before, notwithstanding finding themselves now oft abused by scurvay fellows, and almost every weeke sent about sleevelesse arrants, perceiving they were gul'd when they lookt for Gunpowder, in his Majesties Sack and claret, now at last desire if it be possible to returne into his Majesties favour, by the back staires of Accommodation

* Dr. Burgess.

Sir, John

Lamb.

* Dr. Eden.

The Gentry having lost their Race & hunting horses, their cheife delight and onely subject of their discourse, and seriously considering that this VVarr would produce a parity in the Laity as well as the Clergy, and their worships will be called base fellows without any reparation in the Court of Honour, are prickt on by their VVives toward Oxford for a Knighthood; from whence they returne, and stickle in their Countries for Subscriptions for Peace, and Accommodation.

Lastly, all the Rich and honest Citizens finding their Shops Plundered, for the maintenance of their *Property*; their bodies imprisoned, for preservation of their *Liberty*; the Service of God abolished, for the upholding of *Religion*; their *Arms* taken from them, for the safety of their Persons: their VVives and Children instigated against them, for better Order in their Families. their Prentizes sent to the Army, for the better looking to their Shops, most carnally desire to enjoy their former happinesse by an *Accommodation*.

Argument. y.

5.

My fifth Argument is drawne from the Persons which do most strongly oppose it, all which are truly Religious and well affected, as we shall shew by degrees.

Such are the Right Reverend Lecturers, the Reverend Teachers, the Holy Sitters, the Divell and his Angels, the Captains and Officers.

First the Right Reverend Lecturers inspired from above by *Bookers Almanacke*, and having found the *Red-Horse*, in the *Revelation*, at *Keinton-Field*, where they were very industrious, even to the spoyling of their *Bevers*; and sweat out of pure Zeale, & running away after so many godly Exhortations, for bringing in Money. Plate, Horses, and Wedding Rings (which they hope by this coyning, will be abolished) after so many thanksgiving for being gloriously beaten, after so many miraculous Deliverances from unheard of, nay even unthought of Treasons.

* Mr. Arrow-
smith.

* Mr. Marshall
© M. Sedgwick
who lost not a
Thumb in the
Businesse.

After

After such pregnant hopes of a through Reformation from all Religion, after so many soule-saving, heart-breaking, faith-confirming, sin destroying, State-disturbing, King-reviling, Church-Confounding, sermons, are resolved not to betray their lives to the Law, and their good names to perpetuall infamy by a beggerly *Accommodation*. next the reverend Tubbers, VVho like so many *Diogeneses*, bid *Alexander* himselfe stand out of their light, in ordinary vocations but extraordinary callings, those spirituall coachmen who whip up mens soules with ules of reproofe, * *Pisse* the pulpit with Holy VVater, and drive on so furiously that they cannot stop for *Accommodation*, next under the Tubbers lye cloie the holy sisters, women of extraordinary humillity and lowlinesse, not fearing what man can do unto them having heretofore petitioned the ablest members, that they would be pleased to stand unto them, shewing a great readinesse at all times to lay downe themselves at their ule and service, with all their profits and commodities against an *Accommodation*, the Divell having profited very much by the aforesaid persons in accusing and slandering, and finding himselfe made more an Ass by these, then by those in *B. Iohnsons* play, (for as for lying he is so farr from being their father that he is but a child to them, as for malice, so farr from being their teacher, as he desires to be their scholler, for envy he is fat in respect of them, for thevery, he has not so much permission, nor ever went so farr in plundering of mens consciences) desirous these happy dayes may continue, which promise to make him a glorious and flourishing King, is resolved by all his Angels in Hell, and agents on earth, to fix his cloven foot of dissention against an *Accommodation*. Next to the *DIVELL*,

The confiding Captaines and Commanders having no estates of their own to trust too, desiring to see their brethrens shops shut up as well as their owne, till they shalbe inabled to reaire their broken estates with breaking into houses, and leading silly, womens goods Captives, leaving their Generalls ensigne on their husbands, and not willing to give over the laudable custome of c'ubbing a thimble or a bodkin for a mornings draught, and taking * up horses by warrant to sell them againe for double their

* At Ashford
in Kent, the
last Fast-Day,
Mistis Staggs.

rownd,
fshere.

price with tickets, whereby they may drinke healthes at supper,
limoaking such Noses as they have, and cursing the Parliament in
sweeter, and lastly knowing well that if it must needs come to
fighting, and there be no other remedy, a good horse or a sawpie
will secure them, sweare and stare that they hate the Cavalier
Accommodation, and the next time they see him, they wilbe the
dearh of him.

And now my brethren, having by these arguments, as by a triple
cord, fastned this abominable Idoll of *Accommodation* to the
Popes chaire, from whence, through the hole by which he is sear-
ehd, it came, what remaines but that all which are well affected
to the true protestant Religion, newly Printed & newly set forth,
should oppoie this *Accommodation* as much as government, or the
Common Prayer.

F J N J S.



CHARLES BY THE GRACE OF GOD
King of England, Scotland, France and Ireland, Dux
et of the Faith, &c.



CHARLES BY THE GRACE OF GOD
King of England, Scotland, France and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, &c.

A

13

SERMON

PREACHED

Before the

KINGS

Most Excellent Majesty

at OXFORD,

By H. K. D. D. *K*



OXFORD, *March 16*

1642
Printed for W. Web. 1643.

A
SERMON

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By H. K. D. D.



OXFORD, May 16

Printed for W. Wood. 1843.

**To the
CHRISTIAN**

**ed in Reading him
to share with**

FOrasmuch as I was at this
Sermon among other au-
ditours, who judge it ve-
ry divine like for the
matter and the manner of handling of
it, and afterward understood that
divers which heard it preached, and
more which did onely heare of it by
the report of others, were very
desirous to have the view either writ-

To the Christian Reader.

ten, or rather printed, therefore I
having obtained a copy of it for mine own
use, I thought it expedient to commit
it to the presse, for the publick good of
all such as will vouchsafe to
read it with patience,
and judge of it by
the rule of

charity.



side in with a charity. O
-un rad: gnom. abmre.
-or in ghonj ote, amoth
the for all amith re
to guilhard to rangem ed: bna restan
sade hoostyeban bractista bna .
bna hedaneg ti bmad doiter revib
ed ti fo evad. Along his chider avom
very ever, made fo roger ed
-citer vethis vethis ed read of moorth
not

**A Sermon preached at Oxford before the
Kings Most Excellent Majesty.**

Psal. 101. 1.

*I will sing mercy and judgement, to thee, O Lord, will
I sing.*

In this Psalm the Kingly Prophet
David declareth how he will be-
have himselfe in his Kingdome:
first touching his own person: and
afterward touching his subjects,
both in the Court, and in the Countrey.
In this first verse of the Psalm, he undertaketh
as promised to sing, the matter of the song is mer-
cy and judgement. The person to whom he sing-
geth is expressed in those words *to thee, O Lord, will
I sing.* In that he assumeth to sing the matter which he
hath in hand, he implyeth that he will doe it with
joy, with a loud voice, and with his full power.
It argueth joy: For a man will sing when he is affected
with joy. And how should the children of the Captivity sing one of
the songs of Zion in a strange land, when they sit
mourning and weeping by the Rivers of Babel,
where they hang up their harps upon the willows
that grow thereby? And as a pleasant song re-
queth a merry heart to do it also: stretched out
with a loud voice.

Jan. 5. 13.
Psal. 137.
v. 3. 4.

voice with great strength puttherunto. So then
by this example of *David* we are taught in the
meditations of our heart, the words of our tongue
and the actions of our life, tending to godlinesse
& justice, to do all with chearfullnes, fervency,
and to the utmost of our power. For example, in
the case of our inward affection toward God, our
duty is, *To love the Lord our God with all our heart,*

Deut. 6.5. *with all our soules, and with all our strength.* In the
matter of Gods worship, joyward with the ad-
vancing of his glory, & the furtherance of our sal-
vation: behold *David* *danceth before the Ark with*

2. Sam. 6. *all his might:* Of the Kingdome of Christ it is pro-
phesied thus by the Psalmist: *2 by people shall come*

Psal. 110. *willingly in the time of assembling, thine army in holy*

3. *beautie. The zeal of Gods house did eat up the enemies*

Psal. 69.9. *prophe.* And from the time of *Iohn the Baptist* to
theite, *The Kingdome of heaven suffereth violence,*

Mat. 11. *and the violent take it by force. If Paul come to*

12. *thee, and see thee sitting subject to Adularia, this spirit*

Act. 17. *will be stirred within him, and if hee and Barnabas*

16. *being at Ephesus perceive the people so farre from*

Act. 14. 14 *them by the name of Iupiter and Mercurie, then they*

17. *will turne their backs in signe of despising and abhor-*

18. *ring it. If Moses when he cometh downe from the*

19. *Mount Sinai, hee shall see the people to be as brutes, be-*

20. *cause they have made golden Calfes, and given worship unto it, then*

21. *he will be wroth, and he will say, this people hath*

22. *corrupted their hearts, and they have despised my word, and they*

23. *have despised my voice, and they have despised my law, and they*

24. *have despised my commandments, and they have despised my*

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power and strength upon the people, and maketh the
 children of Israel to drink of cups designed them of their
 idolatries. If we speake of charitable almes, then
 by S. Pauls rule, *The Lord loveth a chearfull giver.* 2 Cor. 9.7
 If execution must be done upon the enemies of
 God and his holy Church, then *Jeremie* pronoun-
 ceth him *cursed that doth the works of the Lord neg-* Jer. 49.13
ligently. We should by *Pauls* advice to the Ro- Rom. 12.
 manes, *be fervent in spirit.* And by this admoni- 14.
 tion given in the Epistle to *Titus*, we ought to be Tit. 2. 14.
zealous of good works. And surely, if any doe frame
 themselves after the pattern of the *Lodovicans*
 who were here dworne, neither ho nor cold he will
 cum Do galls that God shall spew them out of
 his mouth. Apoc. 3. 16.

To prevent which inconvenience, *David* here
 affirmeth that he will sing this heavenly dige of
 mercy and judgement: the which words may be
 construed two wayes, the Analogs of faith pre-
 served. First, in respect of the time past by way
 of praise for Gods mercy towards himself; and
 Gods judgements against his enemies. Secondly
 in regard of the time to come touching the go-
 vernment of the Kingdom by way of practice of
 mercy toward the good, and of judgement a-
 gainst the bad.

The first interpretation yieldeth unto us this
 doctrine in generall, that we should show our
 selves thankfull unto almighty God for all his be-
 nefits bestowed upon us according to the com-
 mandment of God joyned with a comfortable
 promise

- Psal. 50. *Call upon me in the day of trouble, and so will I deliver thee, and thou shalt glorifie me.* And after the example of the Psalmist saying: *Open thou my lips*
 Psal. 51. *Lord:* (that is, give me occasion to praise thee) *and my mouth shall shew forth thy praise.* And if God vouchsafe to deliver *David's* desolate soule from the sword and the power of the dog, from the lions mouth, and the hornes of the Unicornes, then will *David* declare his name unto his brethren and praise him in the midst of the congregation. But alas if a view be taken of us upon whom the ends of the world be come, it is to be feared that we shall be found no better in this case then they were in the daies of our Saviour Christ, when as of ten lepers that were cleansed, *only one returned to give thanks.* And verily so have worldly minded men been usually accustomed to mistake the originall and spring-head of the temporall benefits which they receive, that the Nimrods of the earth, which lived in the dayes of *Abraham* when as they took up all with the angle, and caught it in their net, and gathered it in that yearn, whereof they rejoyced and were glad, then they sacrificed to their net, and burnt incense to their yearne, because (in their false imagination) by them their portion became fat, and their meat plenteous; that is they flattered themselves, and gloried in their own wit, force, and power, as though thereby they had gotten all their victories with increase of wealth and honour, and so robbed God of his glory.
- Lu k. 17. *turned to give thanks.*
 15. 16.
 Hab. 1. 15 *when as they took up all with the angle, and*
 16. *caught it in their net, and gathered it in that*
yearn, whereof they rejoyced and were glad, then
they sacrificed to their net, and burnt incense to
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plenteous; that is they flattered themselves, and
gloried in their own wit, force, and power, as
though thereby they had gotten all their victo-
ries with increase of wealth and honour, and so
robbed God of his glory.

In revenge of such kind of unthankfulness, when as superstitious people, in the time of *Hasea*, ascribed unto their lovers, (that is to their Idols) the gift of their bread and wine, corne and oyle, wooll and flax, silver and Gold, then Almighty God returned in his high displeasure, and took away his corn in the time thereof, and his wine in the season thereof, and he recovered his wooll and his flax, which he had lent unto them for a time to cover their shame withall.

Hof. 2. 9.
to the 11.

But *David* to avoid the like both fine and punishment also thereof, protesteth here, that he will sing the mercy of God. I lay the mercy of God toward him, and not his own merits. And hereupon it was that being hardly beset, and greatly distressed and perplexed in the daies of *Saul*, while his hope of the Kingdome was suspended, he maketh his prayer in these termes, *Shew thy mercies thou that art the Saviour of them that trust in thee, from such as resist thy right hand.* And he hopeth one day to come into the house of God, in acknowledgment of his mercy. Ioke back to former ages, and shall find *Leah* at his return from *Mesopotamia*, homeward in the way to *Canaan* being greatly enriched after the service of almost three apprenticeships under *Laban*, framing his prayer of thanksgiving in this wise, *O Lord I am not worthy of the least of all thy mercies, and all the truth, which thou hast shewed unto thy servant, for with my staffe came I over the Jordan, and now have I gotten two bands.* And I conceive assured hope, that by this example my gracious Sovereigne doth often meditate upon the mercy of God toward himself, in respect of the great increase of temporall blessings, which he hath found and felt. And as for us beloved, all of us which

Psal. 17. 7

Psal. 5. 7.

Gen. 31. 10.

Gen. 31. 10.

be ranged in the number of sinners, considering on
the one side the manifold and heinous finnes, which
have formerly reigned amongst us, both unpunished
and unrepented of: and on the other side the fearful
dangers that we have cleaped, I can say nothing, but
that which *Jeremie* spake in his lamentations long ago:
*It is the mercies of the Lord that we are not consumed, be-
cause his compassions faile not.* Pray we therefore on the
behalfe of our King, that it would please Almighty
God to pronounce of him as he spake in older time,
by *Nathan* of *Salomon*: *I will be his father, and he shall be
my son, and if he sin, I will chasten him with the rod of
men, and with the plagues of the children of men, but my
mercy shall not depart away from him.* Pray we likewise
for this Church of England, Scotland, and Ireland,
that God would vouchsafe to hallow it with that
blessed promise which in *Isay* was uttered over the
whole church of Christ militant by the spirit of pro-
phesie thus, *The mountains shall remove, and the hills
shall fall downe: but my mercy shall not depart from thee,
neither shall the covenant of my peace fall away, saith the
Lord, thy both compassions to thee.* This done, then may
both King and Subjects, even every of us meet
with joyfull heart that which we read in this *Psalm*,
I will sing the mercies of the Lord for ever.
Thus *David* having already sung the mercy of God
toward himself, he will sing also the judgement of
God toward his enemies. And to begin with his
private and capitall enemy King *Saul*: after that he had
been wounded by the archers of the *Philistines*, fear-
ing lest the uncircumsised should have come and
thrust him thorow, and have murthered him, he took a
sword, and fell upon himself: and so a cruel life
had

Lam. 3. 13

*2. Sam. 7.
24. 15.*

Psalm. 1.

*1. Sam. 31.
3-9.*

had a desperate end. And as for David's chief enemies
in the Court among David's favourites, namely *Abishai*
and *Dag*, we read the ruine of them both. For *Abishai*
travell'd with mischief, and brought forth a line, he
made a pit and digg'd it, and fell into it himself, his
mischief returned upon his own head, and his cruelty
fell upon his own pate. And after that *Dag* had for a
space boasted himself in his wickedness, that being a
man of power he could doe mischief, *Psalm 51.*
the length God plucked him out of his tabernacle,
and rooted him out of the land of the living. Beside
these particulars, God gave unto David, the necks of
his enemies in generall, and he did beat them as small
as the dust before the wind, and he did tread them flat
as the clay in the streets. Thus let thine enemies per-
ish O Lord, and thine Enemies likewise, but let
him beat the Sinner when he shall in his might.

Now the good that may ensue by the consideration
of the fall of Gods & the Churches enemies, is of
two sorts. First God is thereby glorified, as may ap-
pear in this parable of *Exodus 16.* when God appointed
for this cause, to shew his power in him, and to de-
clare his name throughout all the world. And in the
destruction of the *Amalekites*, the earth was filled
with the knowledge of the glory of the Lord, as the
waters cover the Sea. Secondly, men (if they have
grace) may thereby be edified, according to the con-
fession of the faithfull in *Isaiah*, saying, *Isaiah 41. 10.*
waited for thee O Lord, the day of thy judgement: for
thy judgement is as the world, the inhabitants of the
world shall transgress thee. *Isaiah 41. 11.*
O *Hideme* O *David* in the day of thy judgement, in
respect of his sinne past by way of pride and unbelief.

A Sermon preached

giving. Now he proceedeth to sing the same song in regard of the time to come touching the administration of his Kingdom by way of practice; knowing that the duty of Princes and publick Magistrates; as to be Ministers of God for the wealth of them that do well by the exercise of godlinesse and honesty; and to take vengeance on them that doe evil, committing impiety and iniquity. And these two mercy, and judgement, must go hand in hand, being in association combined together lest if they were altogether, and utterly severed, then mercie without judgement might turne into foolish pity, and judgement without any temper of mercie might become extreme cruelty.

And first to speak of *Mercie*, happy is that Prince who hath the wisdoms and the will to be mercifull to whom, and when, and where it is expedient. *For such mercie and truth preferreth the King, and his throne shall be established with mercie*, Moreover happy is that countrey, where mercie and truth meet together, and so righteou (both) and peace besse one another, and worldly happy are those that are to whom the prince vouchsafeth to show mercie and loving kindness. *For the Kings for a little time the tearing of a lion, and in much strength of dominion, but in the light of his countenance is life, and his favour shall be a cloud of his favour, and all the dew upon the grass.* And David, well knowing how laudable and honorable it was to be mercifull (with discretion) being established in his Kingdom, he did not enquire if he continued yet alive any of the house of Saul, for whom he ought to show the mercie of God (that is, such mercie as is acceptable to God) for his old enmities and wrongs sake. And we find it to be a laudable custome of Princes, that they may speak in

Rom. 13.

3.

1 Pet. 2. 14

P. o. 20. 18

Psal. 85.

10.

Pro. 16. 14

15 & 19.

12.

2 Sam. 9.

1. 3.

before the King.

the Scripture phrase in the Psalmes, by hearing the mourning of the prisoners, and deliverings the children of death. And in *Isa.* by loosing the bands of wickednesse, and by taking off the heavy burdens, by letting the oppressed go free, and by breaking every yoke, former extortions, exactions, and other grievous oppressions: O how faire a thing is this mercie in the time of anguish and trouble: It is like a cloud of raine that cometh in the time of drought. Thus can David shew Mercie, when he thinketh it meet, and Indgement also when the matter so requireth it. For he is not ignorant, that the establishment of the Kings throne is Justice, and Indgement: and the seat thereof is peace. Yea manifold is the good effect which followeth the executing of justice upon malefactours.

First it is profitable to the offendours themselves, for affliction giveth understanding. Foolishnesse is bound in the hearts of a child: but the rod of correction shall drive it away from him. The rod and correction give wisdom; the blownesse of the wound serveth to purge the evil, and the stripes within the bowels of the true: that is, sharpe punishment which pierces even the inward parts, is profitable for the wicked to bring them to amendment. But on the contrarie, he that spareth the rod smiteth the child: witness the example of Heli towards his sonnes Hophni and Phineas. And of David towards his son Amnon, whom he would not displease from his childhood, so say, *Why hast thou done so?* and so in the end he proved a presumptuous traytor, and rank rebell. Secondly, this exemplarie justice is commendous unto others that see by standers and beholders, who may learn to beware by their neighbours harms, according as Moses inflicteth punishment to be afflicted upon the transgressours of the law, that Israel may hear and feare.

Where.

Psal. 121.
Isa. 58.7.

Psal. 121.

Prov. 16.
Isa. 32.17.

Prov. 12.
15.

Prov. 29.15
Prov. 30.30

Psal. 13.14

1 Sam. 2.7
12.22.23.
24.
1 Reg. 2.6

Deut. 13.
11. and
17.13. and
21.21.

Deut. 19.

Numb. 16.
27. 28.

1. Cor. 5. 6
Eccles. 8.
11.

Psal. 101.
8.

Deut. 17.
14. 24.
21.
Josh. 7. 15

2 Sam. 21.
1. 6. 14.

Whereupon *Salomon* gave in this exposition of
politic, or judicial proceedings: *Salomon a few words*
the foolish will beware: that is to say, the simple and ig-
norant men learn their duty when they see the wic-
ked punished. And for this cause did God by *Moses*
command that the censlers of *Korah* and his compen
being 250 in number, who had been destroyed and
consumed by a fire that came out from the Lord,
should be taken and beaten forth into broad plates, for
the covering of the Altar, that they might be a sign
to the children of Israel of Gods judgements against
all malicious, seditious, and rebellious persons.
Whereas on the other side, if the malicious person
at Corinth be not censured by excommunication, be-
hold, *a little leaven leaveneth the whole lump.* And by
the judgement of the preacher, because sentence a-
gainst an evil worke is not executed speedily, there-
fore the heart of the children of men, is fully set in
them to doe evil: *this is*, by way of abridgement,
where Justice is deferred, there sinne reigneth. There-
fore the Princely Psalmist promises in the last verse
of this Psalm, *he will destroy all the wicked of*
the land, that he might cut off all the workers of in-
quity from the cite of the Lord.

Thirdly, the executing of heinous and notorious
offenders withholdeth the wrath of God from the
publick state of the Realme, by taking evil out of Is-
rael. But the unpunishing of *Achan*, (though his
crime was unknown) was so hurtfull to the host of
Israel, that the hearts of the people melted away
like water. Neither could the great death in *David*
time be removed, nor *the* *city* *perished* for *Smith*
crusely, long before committed against the Gibeo-
lites



nites, till seven of *Saul's* offspring were hung up to the Lord in *Gibeath of Saul*. In brief due execution done upon great and grievous malefactors, is a sacrifice acceptable unto God, and a preservative of the state of the Church and commonwealth. Therefore, *a wise King scattereth the wicked, and causeth the wheel to run over them.*

But here must be inserted a caveat against all cruelty in execution of justice. For by the law of *Moses* even in seeking of birds nests, it was not lawfull to take the damme with the young. Neither might the body of the executed malefactor remain all night upon the tree. Beside this, God would not turn to them of *Damascus*, because they had threshed *Gilead* with threshing instruments of iron, neither would he turn to the children of *Ammon*, because they had ripe up the women with child of *Gilead* that they might enlarge their own border: there is like to be judgement merciesse to *Pilate*, who would shew no mercy, but mingled the blood of some that had offended him, with their own sacrifices. Yet no marvell it is that he did so; for though the righteous man regardeth the life of his beast, yet even the mercies of the wicked are cruel.

Howbeit, though cruelty is alwaies to be abhorred, yet temeritie in dealing with the adversaries of the church, the practicers and maintainers of a false worship, is likewise to be excluded; because it is most perillous to the church of God, as appeareth by the history of the *Cananites*, who by the connivency of the *Israelites* being permitted to converse with them, and to live quietly among them, became prickles in their sides, and thornes in their sides. When *Joshua* the King of *Israel* came downe to visit *Elisba* lying sick upon

Prov. 20.
25.

Deut. 22. 6

Deut. 22.
22. 23.

Amos 1. 3
13.

Jam. 2. 13
Luke 13. 9
Pro. 12. 10

Numb. 33
35.

his death bed, he was willed by the Prophet to take into his hand the arrow of the Lords deliverance against *Aram*, and to smite the ground: wherupon he smote thrice and ceased: But the man of God was angry with him and said, thou shouldest have smitten five or six times, so thou shouldest have smitten *Aram* till thou hadst consumed it, where now thou shalt smite *Aram* but thrice; the meaning is, that *Asa* deserved just reproof, and great blame, because he seemed content to have victorie against the enemies of God, for twice or thrice, and had not a zeal to overcome them continually, and destroy them utterly. And surely *Saul* cannot spare *Agag* saying to his own hurt. Neither can *Abab* have the life of *Ben-hadad*, but with his own losse. Wherefore the King *Asa* did not fail to depose his grandmother *Maachab* from her regency, because she had made an Idoll in a grove, which Idoll he brake down, and stamped it, and burnt it at the brook Kidron.

Consider here a little with me (beloved) the mishap, (that I say not miserie) of divers Princes (keeping me within the limits or bounds of the holy Scripture) in this case of shewing mercy, & practising of judgement. For first of all it falleth out not seldome, that those notorious malefactours deserving death, whom Princes do pardon in mercie, (if not upon foolish pittie) doe afterward most unthankfully and treacherously seek to take the Scepter out of the hand, and to pull the Crown from the head, and to withdraw life from the body of their benefactors, who had graciously forgiven them their crimes, and so consequently given to them their lives, lands, goods, libertie and all. This may be fitly exemplified in *Absalon*, who after that

2. Reg. 13.

24. to the

20.

2. Sam. 14.

1. Sam. 24.

22. 23.

1. Reg. 20.

42.

2. Chro.

15. 16.

2. Sam. 14.

2. Sam. 14.

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2. Sam. 14.

that he was pardoned for the murdering of his brother *Amnon*, and restored to favour in Court, rose up early, and stood hard by the entering in of the gate, and reached forth his hand to every suiter of account, and by slander, flattery, and faire promises, he stole away the hearts of the people, and at the length he brast forth into actuall rebellion against his naturall father. *2 Sam. 15.* Likewise when he had escaped without punishment for stabbing of *Abner*, he was thereby emboldned to proceed forward to the murdering of *Amasa*, and this done without controlement, he presumed to aid aspiring *Adonijah* to the prejudice of *Salomon*, who was to succeed in the Kingdome by the appointment of his father *David* yet living. *2 Sam. 17.* *Ibid. 20.* *1 Reg. 1.*

Secondly, Princes have beene sometimes overawed by the Powers of the Realme, or otherwise for fear of the tumult in the State, they durst not either shew kindnesse, and give entertainment to good men whom they loved, or to execute mighty malefactorious, as in duty they should have done. Of the first sort we have an example in *Achish* the King of Gath, who confessed that *David* pleased him as an Angel of God, but therewithall he told him that he must be packing out of his company, because the Princes of the Philistines did not favour him. Of the second sort we have an example in *David*, who though he spake & did much in detestation of *Isabells* murdering of *Abner*, yet he durst not put him to death for it, as it may be collected by these words of his. *I am this day weake and newly anointed King, and these men the sonnes of Zeruiah be too hard for me: the Lord reward the doer of evill according to his wickednesse.* *2 Sam. 19.* *6. 9. 10.* *2 Sam. 36.*

But this falleth out well and rightly, that whom *Da-*

A Sermon preached

1 Reg. 2. 35. *Did spare in policie, those Salomon executed in judge-*
 6. 8. 9. 31. *ment, as raising Shimei, and bloody Isab.*
 44 45. 46.

Here let me stand a little upon *Dauids* promise to
 sing *mercy and judgement*, and consider whether hee
 performed the same alwaies or not. I will put the case
 in the example of lame *Mephibosheth* the sonne of his
 old and deare friend *Jonathan*, to whom I confesse he
 did kindly shew mercy for his fathers sake, by resto-
 ring unto him all the fields of his Grandfather *Saul*,
 and licencing him to eat bread at his owne Table con-
 tinuallly: but when he came to the point of judgement,
 I finde him defective. For when *David* fled before the
 face of *Absalon*, *Ziba* the servant of *Mephibosheth* mee-
 teth him with a large present of his Masters goods, and
 presenting the same unto him, he frameth sycophandy
 a most false accusation of treason against his Master,
 as though he had said, this day shall the house of *Isra-*
el restore me the Kingdome of my father. Whereupon
 rashly without leaving the one eare for the defendant,
 he gave sentence, condemning the innocent in favour
 of the plaintiffe, being a calumniator, saying to *Ziba*, be-
 hold thine are all that pertained unto *Mephibosheth*, and
 when as *Mephibosheth* afterward met *David* returning
 after the overthrow of *Absalon*, & fully cleared himself
 of the haynous crime of treason wherewith he had
 beene falsely charged, then *David* giveth sentence in
 this wise, *Thou and Ziba divide the lands*. Herein *Da-*
vid did evill intaking his land from him before hee
 knew the cause, but much worse that knowing the
 truth, he did not restore them. And here we may ob-
 serve that in the case of justice our *heart* is more upright
 then our *reason*, our contemplation is sounder then our
 practice. Or to speake to the capacity of the meanest
 hearer,

2 Sam. 9.
 1. 3. 7.

2 Sam. 16.
 1. 2. 3. 4.

2 Sam 19.
 29.

hearer, a man may more easily perne the cause of Justice in his private study, then rightly practice it in publicke upon the Bench. For in solitary meditation a man may without difficulty abandon all rashnesse, and partiall affection; but in judicall place abroad, respect of persons, and other corruptions doe easily enter into our mindes and hearts, by the Ministry of our eyes and ears.

Now the way to prevent this mischief, is to doe that sincerely, which *David* promisseth here to doe; namely, *to sing unto the Lord*, that is, to shew *mercie*, and practise *Iudgements* to the glory of God, whereunto all things ought to be referred, according to *Saint Pauls* direction, *whether ye eat or drinke, or whatsoever ye doe, do all to the glory of God*. Inasmuch as almes must be given in charity without the sound of a trumpet, and prayer must be made of devotion without publicke ostentation. And to descend from the generall doctrine to the particular instruction which I have in hand, miserable was the case of that wretched Judge who did right to the poore widow, nor for feare of God, or reverence to man; but only to avoid her clamor and importunity. And no better was the case of the Philistins in the booke of the Judges, who when as the Timnite gave his daughter being *Sampsons* wife, to another man, they regarded not to punish this unjust and adulterous act: But when as *Sampson* in revenge of this wrong, had with three hundred Foxes turned taile to taile having firebrands fastened thereto, set on fire, and burnt up the rickes and the standing corne with the Vineyards and Olives of the Philistins: then they came up in troopes and burnt the Timnite and his daughter with fire. Thus the wicked punish not

1 Cor. 10.
31.

Mat. 6. 1.
to the 7.

Luke. 18.
45.

Judg. 15. 1
to the 7.

A Sermon preached

vice for love of Justice, but to be revenged in respect of former losse, and for feare of future danger which else might come unto them.

Again, *to thee O Lord will I sing*; that is, howsoever by the chaunting of this ditty of *mercy & judgement*, I shall seem to howle in the eares of the ungodly, yet my song to thee, O Lord, shall be thought very melodious. Whereby we are taught this generall doctrine, that in doing of our duty in our severall vocations, this ought to be our comfort, that our words and works are pleasing unto God, howsoever they be displeasing to the world of wicked men. So though *Noe* was scorned by the men of his time for preparing the Arke and urging repentance to prevent the perill of the Deluge to come: yet is he by the providence of God *ad perpetuam rei memoriam*, Chronicled for a Preacher of righteousness. And though *David* for dancing before the Arke, being girded with a linnen Ephod, was by his wife *Michal* despised in her heart, yet was he had in most high reputation by the maids of honour attending upon *Michal*. Yea *David* will yet bee more vile then thus, and he will be low in his owne sight, knowing that all shall bee acceptable in heaven, which is here on earth done before the Lord, that is for no worldly affection, but only for the zeale which wee beare to Gods glory.

Isai and the children which God gave unto him, were as signes and wonders in Israel: yet their reward was with the Lord. If *Iohn* come neither eating nor drinking, they say he hath a devil. And if the Sonne of man come eating and drinking, they say behold a glutton, and a drinker of wine, a friend of publicans and Sinners: But yet wisdome is justified of her children.

2 Pet. 2. 5.

2 Sam. 6.

14. 16. 20.

21. 22.

Isa. 8. 18.

VV. 1. 2.

25.

Mat. 11.

18. 19.

Ast. 26.

24. 25.

before the King.

dren. If *Festus* be judge of *Pauls* speeches, then *Paul* 1 Cor. 5.
is beside himselfe, much learning doth make him mad. 9. 13.
Howbeit, *Paul* is not mad, O noble *Festus*, but he spea- Ibid. v. 3.
keth the words of truth and sobernesse. The Apostles
were made a gazing-stock unto the world, and to the
Angels, and to men, they were counted as the filth of
the world, and the off-scouring of all things: howbeit 1 Cor. 4.
they passed very little to bee judged of mans judge- 15. 16.
ment: knowing that they were unto God the sweet sa-
vour of Christ in them that are saved, and in them
which perish: to the one, the savour of death unto 2 Sam. 23.
death, and to the other the savour of life unto life.

Thus the sweet singer of Israel promiseth to sing
the divine ditty of *Mercy* and *Judgement*, to the Lord
of Lords, even God the Father, the Son and the Holy
Ghost, to whom three Persons, and one everliving
God, be all honour and glory both now, and for ever-
more, Amen.



FINIS.



Some New Observations and
Considerations upon the present State
of things in ENGLAND.

*The Differences betweene King and
Parliament impartially disputed, the
Persons on both sides truly Anatomized,
and the Publique Faith
Vindicated.*

1642

BY J. S. Gent. *Arch.*



It is a principle in reason as well
as policy to support great de-
signes with firme resolutions,
& endeavours equall to both;
wisdom (which is the ob-
ject of the intellect) speaks
no lesse, coramon and pru-
dence (which acts in the will)
directs what it is to decline
the accomplishment of an expedient once attempted;
Many justify publique folly, and deny publique faith;
they approve of safety, but dislike the meanes, they af-
fect the appearance, and reject the essence of truth; they
seeme to obey the King, and yet repugne the Lawes;
they honour the Parliament; and slight its power;
they are ambidexters, and yet neuters; for they looke
one way, and swim another. If you demand a reason,
passion shall step in, and plead tradition; and if you
A make

make a further progression, they will be ready to swallow you up with your duty of Submission to higher powers; they urge a personall, and connive at a nationall good; if they be learned, they speake and write obscurely; if ignorant, it is sufficient they have the learned (though malefactors) for their presidents, private relations so charme them, that they seem to be asleepe, and happy were this Kingdome, if they might not be awaked till reformation may receive a deepe rooting, the discipline (or circumstantiall part of religion) they dote upon, but which of them have appeared in defence of any doctrinals which have beene wounded by Arminians and others, or have suppressed superstition, or the graduall of Idolatry? It is a facile matter, to make lubricke professions, and reserved oathes; but how do they checke such semblances by the expresse opposition of the generall good? But they say they have a Protestant King, who will defend the Religion of *Queene Elizabeths* time, they have known Lawes still in force, and with whom, or for what should they contest? In answer to which, my subject will admit of variety of matter (as necessary introduction to my conclusion) therefore let it not offend the Reader, that a method is propounded to so short a worke.

1. *Quest.* First, I demand, Whether at the *Queens* time, there were not reliques of superstition fit to be abolished?
2. *Quest.* Secondly, Whether since that time the same have not multiplied?
3. *Quest.* Thirdly, Whether if the same be urged, they may not be denied?
4. *Quest.* Fourthly, if innovations of law or religion be enforced by power, they may not be forceably resisted?

For

For the first, It is notorious, whose immediate successor Queen Elizabeth was, and how active in reformation; but as in nature a habit is not without great perill deserted, so in policy a suddaine change causeth a Catastrophe; undoubtedly had the good Queene had the command of time, or that the threed of her life had been prolonged, she would have prevented the plea of the present opposers, *Sed non reluctandum est cum Deo.* 1. *Ans.*

For the second, who can be ignorant what Commissions for composition with recusants have beene since authorised? and what growth such toleration hath occasioned; what indemnities, appeales, and connivences have been fostered, what encouragements they have implicitey and expressely received? and how in many places they have trampled upon our most refined Protestants? they began to overlooke the power provided for their suppression, and under the Armes of their papal protectors to undermine authority, but I hope I may speake to them as Seneca in another case, *Non in re sed opinione laborasti*, your endeavours have not been pertinent, but opinionate. 2. *Ans.*

For the third: if I justifie not the dissenting from, I doe (*ipso facto*) tolerate the assenting to an impious imposition? power is no further extensive, then it hath subordination from, and reference to the divine pre-scrip'ts, *duo Contradictoria non possunt simul esse vera*, contrary powers cannot be at once effectually, and I am confident this subject would not be insisted upon, but that *Casus plerumque ridiculus multos elevavit*, a ridiculous matter will blow up some disputations. 3. *Ans.*

For the fourth question, it is as undeniable as any of the former, for if it be examined whence this high 4. *Ans.*

strua of resistance is derived, it is answered from Majesty, and there it is patronized, and though I appove not what *Keckerm.* cites in his question) *qualiter indicandum est de resistentia Principis (posse principem eodem ordine & jure Regno deici quo admissus est si eas leges & p^aia violet sub quibus admissus est: yet I say with Augustine, Regna sine justitia, magna potius l. trocinia sunt, quam imperia,* A government without justice, is rather a robbery then a Royall authority. When the Apostle saith, *Submis to every Ordinance of man, for the Lords sake*, it must be intended they are such Ordinances which the Lord will favour, and these words (*for the Lords sake*) are a limit, and not a motive to obedience. And for the

Rom. 13.

1.

words of submission to the higher powers, it is denied that they referre to the Kings personall command: His Majesty in His owne Declaration acknowledgeth His government to be a mixt monarchy, and that mixture presupposeth some what (at least) of an equall power to majesty, and what can that be, but the lawes Divine and Humane?

Obj.

But say some, of all difficulties, none equalizeth this, that profound judgements, proficient in Law and policy, at this Tragedy on either part, and who shall presume to be a moderator? humane reason steps back divine precepts seeme ambiguous, and who shall further explaine?

Ans.

It is a maxime in experiment, that an united strength, is most prevalent; in nature all things move towards their first element, singularity is an enemy to good, for that the entity of good is mutuall, and diffuseth it selfe into reciprocals. All the senses of man may have their deceptions (though not all at once) and as the object of sight is better discerned, one eye being shut; when

when they are both open, because that sense is more contracted to the object; so when a whole Kingdom acts by its representative, there is the most clear conveyance of discerning. Then hence will arise this proposition, That they that best know the Kingdoms danger, can best provide for its safety; but the Parliament doe best know the Kingdoms danger, *ergo*, &c. And hence comes in the *quere*; The danger being thus knowne, may they be by power impugned? Reason rules us to decline things destructive, and prevention is the best of policies. *Seneca* saith, *Facilius est permissio resistere quam regere, & non admittere quam admissu moderari*, It is more easie to resist than rule; and not to admit, then being admitted to moderate a mischief; where the supreme priviledges (political or divine) are in hazard, the greatest ayd may be made use of for their preservation; and if the King deny to secure his people by His power, they may secure themselves by their own; For as farre as publique are preferable before private advantages, so farre an Ordinance in Parliament before the more personal commands of a Prince. A King is as a private person, if not considered in the execution of his Kingly Office; and in that Office he hath His limits. *It is a period to reason*, that the will of one should subvert the being of a Nation; for posterity may have cause to curse such an introduction to slavery; obedience is no further lawfull, then it hath a mutuall reflection of good; and is so much the more unjustifiable, by how much the more the publique detriment may be occasioned therefrom. If the subjects Jewels (the Lawes) may be defended, they may in such manner be defended as they are supposed to be; as an excellent saying is spoken by a wise King (as noigilsa

Hecker. in his Curs. philosophici disput. 35, cites it) Hoc
gladio pro me utitor si recte imperaro, sin rempublicam
laesero contra me utitor, Use this Sword for me if I rule
 rightly, but if I wrong the Commonwealth use it a-
 gainst me. The case might be concluded with Doctor
Ferne, if the King did solely deviate, the best way
 were to withhold from him what he willeth where-
 with to accomplish his unjust ends, and so the flame
 might be extinguished by withdrawing the fuel; but
 this case is of a different complexion, His Majesty's
 actions have an influence upon many, or rather,
 theirs upon him; and for former want of Parliament,
 there is such a swarme of evil doers in the Land, that
 they stand in need of a protection; and because they
 cannot safeguard themselves, they will have assistants
 of equal guilt, and for that a resistance (so pernicious)
 cannot be supported without some power that may
 strike terror in the people, they have got the King to
 owne them, and that no sooner attain'd, but (by some
 supernatural prevalency, which we have cause to fear
 Heavens have permitted for our scourge) have seduced
 our Sovereigne to leave His Parliament, (a small
 blow, and the seed of our sufferings,) and now they
 can boast of their cause, their Captain, and their quar-
 rel; and woe unto us, in that our Kings personall and
 politicall powers are intercombarent. It is not un-
 knowne how their Army consists of many who would
 not stay to heare the meaning of justice; that pretend
 to fight for, what apparently they fly from, who fame
 truth, and therefore fear the touchstone; some there
 may be (whose worth the weak publique hath never
 heard of) and for ought that can be judged of them
 are more indifferent for law, and Laodiceans for
 religion,

religion, and of such I conclude that those troubles might sooner be determined, were they as good as they are great. Those who are related to His Majesty, as Servants, Officers, Favorites, (or that expect any such interests in reversion, or otherwise) are many, and we wonder not if they are borne away in the streame of their expectations: What Bishops doe proceed (undoubtedly) from a spirit of revenge (which is ever acted with envy) and ceaseth not till the object of its malice be made the subject of their chastisement: we expect not reasons from ignorants, nor why indigents thrust themselves upon such a service; It is more then sufficient, that defect of wit and wealth are their prime inducements. Papists (whose Religion tolerates them to be cruell) begin to make us sensible of a papall enemy; they acknowledge Protestancy, and their usurped Catholisme, to be direct contraries, and yet they are undertakers for defence of the Protestant religion, (a mystery to reason, and a perillous insinuation) indeed they are (*ad hunc aptiores quam ad artem*) fitter to be marked for mortall enemies, then competent assistants, and beyond contradiction they will make use of their power to root out their opposers; of all which persons take a survey, and you will finde the remainder of their strength very inconsiderable; so that the instruments the matter, and manner of their first disservice from us, and association amongst themselves and the ends they apparently propound may so stigmatize their pretences that none who prize their owne or posterities good can forbear to endeavour their suppression. To what distresses we are now subjected, a tender heart cannot conceive, without great reluctancy; and we are the more unhappy in

this, that we begin to be weary of defending our lives, liberties, and religion; great Forces are raised, a great worke is on foot, the hearts of people are enlarged; and why should their hands be straitened? There is a publique Felicity, which claimes the Publique Faith; Justice is the efficient cause of Law, execution the life of power; the protection of offenders justifies the offence, and to dispence with punishment is an implicit encouragement: to intrust the Kingdome in unsafe hands is to provide for its ruine; and should the Nation perish, the Parliament sitting, what blemish would accrue to such future assemblies? many are acquainted with their disease and remedy, and sleighting both, blame the Physicians; what monsters are they to nature, what mockers of God, whiles they thus persist? many never appeared, and some appearing have disanimated multitudes by their apostacies, so sweet is the name of propriety, and the Mammon of this world, that they dote upon the increase of wealth, whiles a losse of the totall should more affect them; they are so far from believing, that it is requisite to hazard all for the preservation of all, that they will not hazard part for the securing of the rest; they imagine not how individuall and dependant all interests be, nor how they are bound by the Lawes of God, nature, and Nation to sacrifice themselves, much more their estates, for the generall good (wherein they have a particular share.) There is a strange misprision of the word Publique, when it is taken for the essentiall independency of the Kingdome; for it doth, or ought to receive influence from every member, and so by participation they are both compleated. Those that fall backe from their good beginnings checke their owne judgements, and

and discover their diffidence; in the one, they become
 objects of scorne to the world; in the other, they pro-
 voke the Almighty to punish them with what they
 feare. The vulgar presuppose some invisible power
 in a Kingdome to preserve it selfe, and twere more
 to'erable if it were in them an act of faith; but being
 otherwise, how doe they injure themselves, the weale
 publique, and succeeding ages, by their shufflings;
 (and it were well if the practise of greater persons did
 not favour of these or more ridiculous tenets.) The
 worke is framed, the instruments appointed, and the
 wheele of reformation is now rouling about, and will
 you deny Oyle to refresh the decayed sinews thereof?
 And although it be the opinion of every Christian,
*(quod non pecuniam sed militum ducumque virtutem bellis
 & imperii nervum esse)* that it is not money, but the
 good cause and vertuous Captaines, that are the chiefe
 causes of victory, yet in concurrent and second causes
 we may urge the saying of Demosthenes, *Opus sunt opes
 & sine his nihil fiet quod opus*, There is need of riches,
 and without them nought can be done that is needfull.
Thucyd. saith, *Bellum non est in armis, sed in expensis &
 sumptibus per quos efficacia arma & utilia sunt*, warre
 consists more in expence then Armes. And as the Ora-
 cle said to the father of Alexander, *Hastis pugna argen-
 tatis atque omnia vinces*, Fight with gilded Speeres,
 and be confident of the conquest. Much use may be
 made of such morall sentences. Gods usuall way of
 working is by meanes, and where such a way is offered
 it is a great sinne in man to neglect it; a supernaturall
 potency is not limited to naturall, but naturall to it;
 we tempt our maker, in losing our opportunities in all
 contrivances there are the principles and instrumen-
 tals

Αργυρίαις
 ἵπποις
 καὶ
 χρυσῷ
 πάντας
 νικήσεις.

tals, & it is a grosse omission not to improve things for
 their proper ends, *Evangelium non tollit politias & fides*
non destruit naturam, The Gospell takes not away po-
 licy, nor doth faith destroy nature; spirituall things
 doe not exclude temporall, but regulate them; Our
 trust in our divine Captaine forbids not the use of
 helpes, but declares them subordinate. Oh let not the
 practice of men publish them guilty of such unrea-
 sonable opinions; nor let them conceale themselves, lest
 judgement finde them out; he that gives the Talent
 will demand an account; and shall thy brethren pe-
 rish whiles thou hast meanes to prevent it? It is an un-
 naturall and ingratefull part to accompany designers
 to a hazard, and there to leave them; to assist the ini-
 tiation of a good worke, and to relinquish the same
 unfinished, manifests an illqualified mind; (for such
 variation is inconsistent with the life of a Christian.)
 Doe you dispute the security of moneys lent out? you
 may rather doubt of the safety of that you retaine;
 what greater ingagement can be expected, (or being
 expected, can be given) then the body representative
 of a Kingdome? they are intrusted in the whole, and
 shall they be distrusted in regard of part? can any
 knowing man conjecture, that they have not consci-
 ences, interests, and expectations equall to any other?
 shall your election give them (and your diffidence di-
 vest them of) your confidences? they are agitating
 your affairs, & will you not allow their disbursements.
 For your satisfaction, they have exceeded the presi-
 dents of any of their predecessors, and are become your
 particular accountants, and doe we still repine? we ne-
 ver read of any denials of supply (when demanded by
 former Parliaments, but how the people have un-
 boweld

boweld themselves in such a case is obvious, to every Historian;) will you be the first that ever deserted (take heed you bewaile not being destitute of) such a Councell? Is it probable they will dilacerate the authority of future Parliaments, as not to dis-engage themselves? Not to give credence to a private friend, is inhumanity; not to a Parliament is morall infidelity. When that serene day shall appeare wherein these troubles shall admit of a tranquillity, you may be confident to receive your owne with advantage, in the interim they are sharers with you in your sufferings. *He that gives to the poore, lends to the Lord*; necessity denominates poverty, and what so great as that which is publique? if times thus continue, the rich will be made a prey, and will rejoyce to preserve any part of their estates; To be involved in a condition equall to the most miserable, is a thing we feare not, but are like to taste of: When His Majesties forces were at *Bransford*, many of the malignants sent necessities to the Army against him, what they did (against their seeming selves) because of feare, shall not we doe much more for conscience sake? so stupid are the hearts of men, that no arguments have any inforcement, unlesse tipt with extant danger, and those opely referring to their personall losses; perils meereley imminent (to what ever object they relate) leave a sleight impression, but I pray such may escape a too late repentance. What I here importune refers onely to those who see a necessity of reformation, and who either have not afforded some supplies, or if they have, intend no addition; Alas, our miseries grow, the enemies forces are like Caterpillers in the Land; we have *Moses* prayer, but want *Aaron's* rod; nature calls upon you, to be tender of thousands who
 carry

carry their lives in their hands for your sake; religion dictates this way, to prevent the powers of the prelate, &c. who have long tyrannized over the truth; your own safety may inform you what sadnesse will seize upon you when you must survive your liberties. The Question is not whether religion or no religion, lawes or no lawes, but whether both in their purity and rigor shall take place? As for those who delight in these distractions; who gaine by the peoples groanings; or who are such persons formerly intimated, or their adherents, I invoke the omnipotent for their conviction, and that in the meane time their hands may not bring to passe their owne enterprizes. And here sorrowfull perdes expressions, *Labeo, omnis morbus est habitus contra naturam*, (every disease being a habite against nature;) the disease and cure of this Region do imphedeject me, warre is the physick, and must we not expect a doubtfull combat betwixt the spirits and the humors? The animadversion of His Majesties past, and present condition, doth dissolve my thoughts into teares, even in this that the Defender of the Faith should (*per accidens aut aliter*) become an offence to the faithfull. But we hope the principles of Law and Religion have still residence in His Royall brest, & will appeare, when the obstructions occasioned by evill Counsellors shall be made perspicuous, and that in the close of differences the hearts of the people shall have cause to make inward acclamations for their Soveraignes safety, their Parliaments fidelitty their owne liberty, their religious settlement; and posterities approaching happiness, which sweet season heavens hasten to this Kingdom comfort.

FINIS.

THE GRAND 15
PLUNDERER:

K A
S V B I E C T

Never before written;

*And great pity it is, that so mischievous a subject
as this is, should survive in such malignant
Times as these are.*

Written by one, who hates not the man, but
his manners; and loves his person, but
likes not his condition.



March. 17-

Printed in the year, 1643 1642

THE GRAND
PLUNDERER:

S A B I E C T

Never before written

And great pity it is, that so many
as this is, should be so much
in the hands of the wicked

Written by one, who hates not the man, but
his manners; and loves his person, but
likes not his condition.



March. 17.

Printed in the year, 1643.



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The grand Plunderer.

Monstrum horrendum ingens cui lumen ademptum.
 He's a horrid, huge monster, deprived of the eye
 of Equity, for indeed Justice (one of the foune
 Cardinal vertues) is in as much antipathy to him,
 as day to night, or the glorious splendour of the
 Sunne to cymmerian darknesse. 'Tis the proper-
 ty of Justice, *suum cuique*, to render to
 every one his owne due and right, but it is this
 monsters property (or rather his monstrous nature) to take away from
 us our propriety, those goods which wee may justly say chaine to,
 and in which wee have sole interest. *Admirandum est hoc monstrum*,
 this monster is to be admired at, for that hee doth desperately ravish
 from us our right, *manu violenta*, by a violent hand, *vinc habeat nemo*
quis sed apertes habere, by hooke, or by crooke, *per fas, aut nefas*,
 he neither feares nor cares how, or by what unlawful meanes he comes
 by it, only so he may have it. He makes no more conscience to swal-
 low up speedily a mans estate at a bit, then our Dutch doe to devoure
 cimby pills of butter, and never purge for it. As his name is formi-
 dable, so his nature is dreadfull, being of himselfe physically (namely
 naturally) a terrible scarrecrow, and horrible vulture to those persons
 and places, with which he is resident, or wheresoever he is present.
 He joyces at others sorrowe, and rises by their fall: He can hardly
 subsist but by the spoyle and ruine of his neighbour, to whom such is
 his

his implacable malice and cruell hostility, that for his owne ends his endeavour is to make him a sacrifice. He is a bad servant to God, as ill a Subject to the King, the King of Kings vicegerent here in earth. His motto, is Have at all; either *totum aut nihil*, All, or nothing at all: His dialect like that of the Carthaginian *Hannibal*, *Alitum (inquit) nihil est, nisi Pano milite portas frangimus*, nothing is by him performed, unlesse with a troope of souldiers, he batters the gates, and enforce 'em open: And for his actions, I may say of them, as sometimes *Catiline* the Romane conspirator said of his, The ill that he hath done cannot be safe but by attempting greater. He is truly the Malignant Particuler *αἰσχρῶς*, by way of eminence, above all others; none so malicious as he and he more malevolent and ill affected then any. As he is *malignus in concreto*, so he is that party in *Abstracto*. He is a spirit, he an evill one, for he has no spirit at all unto peace, and that's the reason he delights so much in the rumours and tumours of warre: He is a sonne of tumult and insurrection, the onely Antagonist to peace and union; like the Salamander, he lives by and in the fire of contention: He himselfe is of himselfe *malum ignis*, an evill fire, (as the word *malum* signifies no lesse) the only incendiary and firebrand of civil and intestine warre; in which horrid time, he consumes and devours all that he meetes with, and like a truculent Tyrant, spares none whom he may or can oppresse. High and low, rich and poore, noble and ignoble, bond and free, all are alike to him. As the Divell himselfe (that subtle and Sly *Piscator*) of all fish loves soules best, so the desire of his soule is the heart of your estates; that's the maine point that he aims at, nevertheless all is fish that comes to his net, and then (having once catcht you) hee makes money and emolument of the goods so gotten for his owne advantage: He cares not who buyes 'em (whether a Jew, or a Christian, all's one to him) so he may receive the gaine and profit for them. He is altogether composed of sedition, murder, and rapine; with which triple cord of iniquity he is so strongly bound up, that from his impiety he can hardly be dissolved, but is strongly

strongly bound up from his impiety, he can hardly be dissolved, but is firmer tyed (and as it were obliged by an unhappy fate) to transgresse more and more in an outrageous manner, against God the King, and his Subjects. To plunder is properly predicated of him, the more alluding and he himself inclining to those hideous attempts and direfull outrages, which in the horrid time by him, as horrid are perpetrated and committed. He breakes in violently, and seizes as unmercifully upon the best he can lay his hands on. He invades first by force, where having got entrance, *sic volo sic jubeo* *Ita provolunt* : his will is his Law, and he feares no controllment nor contradiction, assuming to himself an arbitrary power and jurisdiction, and by no meanes will be perswaded to yield conformity to the legislative authority of the Law of this Land.

Never was there more plundering and pillaging then hath beene in these latter times, and is now at this time. What barbarous insolencies, inhumane affronts, and never the like heard of villanies have been and are still daily acted both here in *England*, and also elsewhere in *Ireland*, in the famous cities and countreys of those two once flourishing and renowned (but now tottering, and sick languishing) Kingdomes, the sad history of this unhappy age doth sufficiently testify. In pristine times the Plunderer was termed *Damon nocturnus*, a Devill that ranged about in the night season. The act of Plundering was then reputed so heinous a crime, that it was accounted no better then Burglary, and that was then *opus tenebrarum* a work of darkness, and was ashamed to shew it self openly to the view of the world, but now in these latter times, he is grown to that frontlesse impudence, that he is become *Damon meridians*, and dares attempt such facinorous actions, even at nooneday, as if he had commission and authority to performe them *Cum privilegio*.

— *Audax omnia perperit.*

Genus humanae ruit per vestitum nefas.

Good God what an age do we live in! what a wilderness of woe is

this strange world now come to! *Plutur ex rapto*, men now a diles
 live by catching and snatching. *Terras astras reliquit*, Iustice hath de-
 serted the earth, and is ascended into heaven. She is not more a pil-
 grime then a peregrine, and not so much a sojourner as a stranger a-
 mongst us. There is little or no divine justice administred, few or no
 wholesome Lawes executed. Courts of judicature lie now vacant,
 except the supream Court, and supremest of all Courts, which in
 regard of the weighty affaires of the state of this Kingdome cannot
 be silent, *Toto Mars sedit in orbe*. What a havock hath this blou-
 dy hand of Warre made in the world? The drum every night gives
 Martiall summons, and the Trumpet every day is sounding in our
 eares. Death hath a long time marched into the field, where two
 great and powerfull Armies have resolutely met, and thousanden
 both sides unfortunately flin. New forces for this civill, (uncivill)
 warre have been and are raised: both the Armies are at this instant
 full on foot in the very bowels of this Kingdome, ready every time
 to fight, so that without Gods gracious mercy to this Land and na-
 tion, a dreadfull desolation like an ominous and insuspicious monster
 hovers over our heads. People talk of a cessation of Arms for twenty
 dayes, and of a treatie in that time for an accommodation: but (as
 ought I hear, there is little or no hopes of a present pacification, and
 so be feared that the Sword (which hath bin so long drawn) will not
 be in haste sheathed, by which there hath already bene so much
 Christian blood spilt, that nothing for satisfaction but in can decide
 this great contestation between the King, and the Parliament. Who
 would have thought two years ago, that such times as these would
 have been? Our Progenitours never knew the same, and I pray
 God succeeding generations may never see the like. Sure this is the
 iron age, and we that live in it *durum genus sumus*, we are a hard na-
 tion, hard-hearted, and iron-like qualified, *Misanthropi* and *Tymonisti*
 (men haters like *Tymon* of *Athens*) are commen every where a-
 mongst us. I will not say *Homo homini Dammus*, Man is to man a Devil,
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but I may say, *Nemo homini Lupus*, Man is to man a Wolf. Many men do endeavour and aim at nothing more then to devoure one another, and that they do two manner of wayes; either by the violence of their hands, or by the virulence of their tongues, by exacting oppression in their goods, or by detraiding defamation in their good names. In the former manner the Plunderer is injurious against all Law to his brother: *Legem ubi se putat nullam divinam, aut humanam*, he will not be confined nor conformed to any Law (which should regulate his actions) either divine or humane. Hence it is that he breakes the Law of equity, and of charity; and hence it is that either such an unhappy Ataxie, disorder and confusion in the fabrick of this Kingdome, that every one therein is altogether for himself, for his own ends, and particular advantage; so that there is no love, little amity, little unity, least of all uniformity or unanimity, and no peace at all now amongst us.

Lucian ingeniously feignes, that *Chorus* was one time conducted by *Mercurius* to a huge promontorie and ample high mountain, that he might there take a full survey of the World; and being asked when he descended from thence upon the earth, what he beheld, he said, he saw the heavens above him like a vast circumference, the earth below him like a small Orbe; what appeared to his view no bigger then a black spot; in which he could discern multitudes of men, like so many swarms of bees, of severall sorts, and all conditions; the greater he perceived to be like so many Hornets, and they did sting the lesser; then he beheld divers motions and commotions, various actions and passions, some running, some riding, others swimming and swaggering; some againe struggling and striving, many quarrelling and fighting; plundering, and pillaging, killing and slaying, all in such a hurly-burly, and nothing in the whole universe (worth the seeing) but an universall uproar.

The morrall of this Apologue may be applied to these our times. It doth evidently appeare (we may see it without a perspective glass)

glasse) that in the world there is a gentall confusion; and like to
 a miserable combustion: It is too true (I would to God it were
 false) that the whole world is up in arms, and at this time in the
 Kingdome of England as there are Armies of feares abroad, so there
 are myriads of disasters, distempers and distractions here at home.
 This unnaturall, illegall, civill warre (which of all warres is the
 worst) is the cause of all our woes. Were it not for this there would
 be no newes of towne taken, Lords, Collopells, Captaines, com-
 manders, and so many souldiers slain, so many massacres (as there
 are) daily acted; were it not for this, there would be no carrying
 into captivity, nor complaining in our streets; no such plundering
 and pillaging as now there is amongst us: but in regard of this
 man can be certainly confident of what he hath, for he is certain of
 nothing but uncertainty: neither is the King of his Kingdome, nor
 the Peere of his Land, the Knight of his revenue, the Gentleman of
 his estate, the Citizen of his commoditie, nor any Subject of his
 perty. *Bellus alea est incerta*, when once the Die of warre is thrown,
 uncertain who shall win, or lose; none can determine or know who
 shall have the victory, or the overthrow, but the Lord of hosts our
 great Generall Commander who alone knowes all things.
Quid iam nisi vana supersunt? What now remains, but that we
 pray unto the Lord God of our salvation, that he would save us
 deliver us from the hands of our enemies. Pray we to the God of
 Peace that he would be pleased to grant us Peace, and that Peace
 God which the world cannot give, but which passeth and surpasseth
 all humane understanding. Pray we to God for our gracious King
 that the King of Kings would preserve him from his false friends
 and fierce foes; for the Kingdome that God would open their eyes
 to see, and for all the people that he would open their hearts to con-
 sider those things which belong to a temporall, spirittuall, and eternall
 Peace.

FINIS

A suddaine

16

ANSWER

To a suddaine

MODERATOUR;

Who, directed by Reason and no more,
expects suddaine PEACE, or
Certaine RUINE.

This assures him from GODS Mouth, he shall see neither *suddaine Peace*, nor *Ruine*, and yet certaine *Peace* (though never in his way) to them that love *Truth* in sincerity; and certaine *Ruine* to the Adversaries thereof.

——— *Pacem Te possumus omnes.*

JOB. 34. 29.

When He giveth quietnesse, who then can make trouble? and when He hideth His face, who can behold Him? whether it be done against a Nation, or against a man onely.

PROV. 16. 7.

When a Mans wayes please the Lord; He maketh his Enemies to be at peace with him.

LONDON,

March. 17.

Printed in the Yeare of *Restoration*, when the times alwayes have
beene, are, and will be *Troublous*. 1 6 4 2.

March 17



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REASONS by way of APOLOGY, for this
Suddaine ANSWERE.

IT is Suddaine indeed, and, may be, the Reader will say so; the labour of a few houres, stollen away in the Night from sleep: If I nodded over it (which is not my manner, yet) it is pardonable. The Reason it was so Suddaine is. besides the quicknesse of the time, the same the Author gives of his MODERATION, *lest it prove like an Almanack, which a few dayes passed puts out of date.* As he had a grave respect to the Times, and to his Reader, so have I too, for I find his Booke (I never yet found his second) as the Ayre is, when some Epidemicall disease is raging, *very catching*; the very Reason this, why this Answer is suddaine. I protest to the Reader, for these Reasons, I could not sleep till I had done it. I must give a Reason also why I give him any Answer at all: Because I find him neither an (empty) *foole*, nor a *railer*; if either of both, I knew my charge, *Answer him not*, 2 King. 18. 36.

I find him upon confession without *brife*, a Moderator, and in his own Character a *mesley*. What is that? I cannot tell my selfe, except such a thing as he makes *Religion, Truth and Peace*: neither the one nor the other; nor good, nor bad; but another third thing & that is stark nought; I know not what he is, but like a Meteor he is, he hangs in suspense, and, likely, will fall anon. A well poised lump betwixt ayre and earth, and, because of its predominancie, does fall flat thither; and there it would expire, breath-out, and die quickly, but that it hath some of the qualiie we call *beate*, which keeps it from being *key-cold*: Hee might have forborne his Characters, for I knew before I came at them, as what himselfe is; so what he makes, *Religion, Truth, Peace, Miscellanies* All: „ and so has uncovered himselfe in the eyes of all the godly, „ as one of the vain fellowes shamefully uncovered himselfe. The good Lord remember not this against him, but remember him of that dreadfull threat, *I will see, &c.* „ To comfort him now a very little, if he were sensible of his danger, I will tell him what his Readers say in his prayes: That he is so brimfull of wit, as that he runs over, and full of Reason also: but this is too short of his commendations: I will adde, now I have read and understood him; The Moderator is full of Rhetorick and Oratory too. And let him take all that, but little good that will doe him, till he shall devote all that, in homage and due service to the glory of the *giver*. For my part I like his Rhetorick very well; but three words of *plaine English* I like ten times better: specially at this time.

Nay, let me tell you. I have read 1000. Papers and 1000. too, and never met with any I liked better for the Composure (though he Rambles, and so he confesseth) and worse for the *matter*. Strange! you will say. I thought so. I shall have an heavy Censure layed upon me before I begin. Good Reader hold a little, let me speak first, and that I may gaine upon thy Patience; I will assure thee this, That though I have

a naughty, and an untoward heart, and most Deceitfull: yet I shall, in the name of all the true hearted in the world, cleare it to be, in this great businesse, neither *double* nor *cloven*, nor *biased* any way but to the way of *Peace, Truth, and Holinesse*. And because I can force my selfe to beleieve, That the *Moderator* is, as he seemes to be, a man, that loves his Country, and desires the Peace of it with all his heart; I shall so contend with him as a Man, that loves, and desires the same thing, and as heartily as he doth and shall forbear all bitterness, counting it an unreasonable thing, that a man pursuing Peace should pursue persons, make Warre with them, or make a lie.

It is true his characters are naught, and, in reading them my spirit was stirred on the suddaine not a little: The way also he goes in pursuance of *Peace*, is cleane out of the way of heaven: But yet I beare him witnesse he pursues *Peace* heartily: And the Characters he gives of himselfe and *Truth*, are hearty also, as he feelles his own pulse, and as he conceives of *Truth*. My Answer shall not deal with him there but it shall keep with him in the maine. As for his Rhetorick and Oratory both, dilating upon the good of *Peace*, and evill of Warre, I think he might have spared both, for we are flesh and blood also, too sensible of punishment, and senselesse of sinne, we can feele as quick as we heare, or he can speake.

I would now bespeake his heart towards me, before he reads on ward of my Answer.

The Lord give him to look for Truth here on earth, and to find it, which he sayes he looks not to find till he comes to heaven: And such a *Peace* now, which will stand him in stead, when he lies on his death bed: And in pursuance of all this, a better guide, then now he followes, *directed by reason*.

HE that is his own guide has a foole to his Master; and he that is guided by Reason has but a blind guide at the best and yet he will be more blind and fool too, if he will put it out: though holding the *clue* of Reason in his hand, and opening both his eyes. he shall not be able to see wherat to enter, or where to come out of the *Labyrinth* of these times.

But the man speaks not so many words (he thinks) as he does Reason, and yet we could almost wender, what the man stands reasoning about, and expecting all the while, were it not that he tells us, he is *directed by Reason*, and does expect *suddaine Peace* or certaine Ruine. I protest to him before Almighty God, nay from His mouth he shall see neither: not a *suddaine Peace*; a man directed by Reason cannot expect so: the motions are too violent (we take nothing from an Almighty hand, but He is making inquisition for blood) to be hushed up and still'd on a suddaine. Nor certaine Ruine, except to the enemies of God, and His Peace; and your *misling* persons, certaine Ruine to them also, and it will be *suddaine*, when it comes: but, *directed by reason* we beleieve their ruine will not be suddaine neither, not yet: But I make hast to my promise, which is a suddain Answer.

I omit his preamble, It seems the mans eyes are open: and *directed by reason*, what sayes hee?

Moder. The cure is Desperate.

Ans^r. Quickly answered, The Disease is so.

M. The Chyrurgions doe cure too farre.

A. Not farre enough.

M. In letting-out putrifaction, they let out the very Vitalls.

A. It must be so: never any man took a strong purge but precious spirits went out together with the excrements. There is some spending of vitalls, And yet the Body must be purged, else it dies: I am perswaded his Physitian will tell him so, though directed but by reason.

M. When the Militia, the Navy, the Ports were first put into new confiding bands, I looked upon that action like to that cloud, which seemed as a mans hand.

A. Who bid him doe so? His eyes misguide him, and his Reason too; was then the first appearance of a cloud, and but such an appearance, as a mans hand then? The Lord knows, and his People also. That the cloud was up, as high as the Sun at noon and a thick cloud also, and it darkened the heaven long before. And there was no other way directed by Reason that could be taken to prevent a shower of blood from falling (like the raine we call Spouts) [when the raine falls not broken into drops, we call it the Spouts, Sr. W. R. Hist. l. 1. 7. Sect. 6.] upon the Church, truly so called but by putting the Militia into new (for the old were naught and rotten) confiding hands, for the others could not be trusted, they have declared themselves the betrayers of God, His Christ and their Country.

M. The more active of the Parliament are accused of Treason.

A We grant that.

M. The Kings adversaries are impeached by the Parliament for Traitors.

A. That is true too, Traitors sure enough, that will advise their King to betray his great Trust, Lawes, Liberties, Religion, and all into his enemies hands.

M. Thus the Scene begins to alter, and instead of Reforming the Parliament is busied, almost puzzled in saving (for so they call it) a distressed Church and State.

A. We call it so indeed, and the Parliament are busied, nay, as the man directed by reason sayes, puzzled too in saving of it. I pray heaven (it is the Players phrase, good, but abused too often) blesse them in this puzzling worke, the proper worke of a Parliament indeed, but of God to finish it: and because it is such a puzzling worke, The God of wisdom lead them into all wisdom to the execution of their charge: the cutting off that Viperous generation of men, those troublers, who are eating out the bowels of their Mother: and let those, that have ingaged themselves upon this puzzling worke, the saving a distressed Church and State know, they shall not lose their labour of love, and worke of faith, though Israel be not saved, which were but a little short of Blasphemy to doubt.

M. Common Law called Salus Populi, and Statute Law, enacted by nature, called Lex Necessitatis, must warrant all their undertaking, and justifie all manner of severity and violence.

A. No but it shall not, but the contrary, It shall condemne all undertakings to distresse the Church and State; and curse from heaven all manner of violence upon the people: And it shall warrant and justifie all undertaking against those miscreants, who have so wasted their owne Country, and eate out the heart of their own Mother.

M. The

M. The most eminent discovery of this warre was about the Town of Hull.

A. Be it so; but a Discovery there was sixe yeares agoe, when the Service-Booy was sent into Scotland; and quickly after the Sword: Then (to look no farther back) there was a Discovery plaine enough, and more then an appearance of a cloud and thick darknesse; it gathered towards the North, and what if we grant it was most eminently seen before the Town of Hull? we grant it and this withall must be granted too for it is eminently discovered also, That the ground of the quarrell is not whether the Town of Hull shall be the Kings: but whether this Kingdome shall be the Lords (i.e.) whether the Lord Christ shall have this Kingdome for his Possession. I will venture my soule upon it, and it is more to me then all the Kingdomes of the world. This is the ground of the Quarrell, and eminently known so to be. I look for a Viall of wrath now, and the Spout of His Displeasure to be powred down: yet I am secure about it, for the Kingdome is the Lords: Let the Lord Christ alone to Rule there, He will Reigne most gloriously amidst His enemies: He is a strong Redeemer, and they that will not submit to His Golden Scepter, shall be broken to pieces with His rod of Iron.

M. The King has caught the affections of his Subjects with Promises and Protestations, to defend the property and liberty of his Subjects, though Promises are but shadowes.

A. They are so indeed, and no trutting in such shadowes, but whether he hath caught the affections of his Subjects under these shadowes, I think it is scarce questioned.

M. But if he has caught his Subjects under these shadowes, how much more then will his Subjects be his when these promised Blessings shall be theirs in earnest?

A. There needs no Question: they will be all his, when he makes all good which he says; when he speaks that they may see him; good words realized by good actions then they will be all his hand and tongue, and heart and all, the truest Subjects to their King that are in the world as long as he is the Lords, keeps to Him, his Master in heaven, and will intrust himselfe, and his people under His shadow, which is the shadow of the Almighty.

M. What advantage have we had by any thing that has been acted by the Sword?

*A. We cannot boast of Advantages, though we have I thinke as much advantage thereby as we looked for from such an instrument, an oppressing thing where ever it is: and yet I will say we have had and have a very great advantage by it. It hath kept the Sword of the adversaries from some of our throats; and the Cause of Christ from being trampled upon by the foot of Pride, like myre in the street: And though we are a wasted peeled people indeed, yet, blessed be our God, not like Ireland; we are not yet delivered up as a prey to the adversaries teeth; he cannot execute the fiercenes of his wrath upon us: and this Advantage we have by the Sword. In short, we have the very same advantage by the Sword now, which Nehemiah and the builders had in those troublous times; if they had not had the Sword in the one hand, they could not have builded with the other: I know I have but a hard pull of it, to draw advantage from the Sword: but yet this Advantage we have, as afore said: Therefore the Moderator does us a plausible wrong here, in telling us in his foolish pity, that we are abused. No, we are not abused in his sence, nor after his thoughts, though abused we are, and most notoriously abused: by whom? By those from whom we can expect no right, such Sonnes of Belial they are: so much to our abuse, and the Moderators pity. At this standing we may gather some Flowers of Rhetorick, and observe some straines of Oratory bestowed upon that old Theame, *The Tyranny of Warre*: and in passage he bestowes*

bestowes pretty civill language upon the Parliament sometimes, but that is his craft, that he may give them some by-blowes, presently after undiscerned, and truly his smiting is very smart, and as palpable as a man *bluffed*, we know which way. Let him goe his way he sayes;

M. *Though the times are so catching, we can scarce call any thing our own, yet, I hope, they will let us enjoy the use of our reason still which shall alwayes lead my faith, &c.*

d. Yes, good reason; enjoy it, and use it, I pray you, and your faith too; but no reason it should lead your faith, but rather follow: but take your course, and goe on.

M. *And expectation in such open affairs, as these: my Reason and faith both having settled me, and made me obstinate in this opinion, that a peace warily concluded on by an accommodation must be the happiest issue that can be given to these differences.*

d. Look ye, the *Moderateur* is an obstinate Man, he cannot moderate well: but I will doe him the favour to passe that by; we have all now, and can eye his full scope. I shall goe forward a litle, and returne in good time: and he shall goe on now with little interruption, for they be matters of great Difference, but not controverted betwixt us: he tells us how he came to be settled in his opinion, *viz.* from the Aimes in this Warre (wherein we must observe his *modesty*) The grounds or causes of it, (where we must discern his *charity*.) That he will think Religion, Laws, Liberties, the moving cause therof, for that's confessed, though *not agreed upon*. Then he falls into his Rhetorick againe, as if words could make us more sensible, what Warre is, then blowes. I assure you, he is deceived: we need not his Rhetorick, nor Oratory neither, our *sense* is quick enough at that point, *God knows*. Then he assureth when *all is done, there will be no victory*: yes, but there will, for when all is done, *Truth* will prevail, and be more glorious the more it was darkened, dashed upon and opposed. I passe by his by-blowes, rather his rude dashing upon the Parliament: then up againe, wipes his mouth and away. But I cannot forbear the mentioning of this, touching his Religion (for it is not ours I hope.) *It is many times but a servant to other designs, and so it shall be followed, and this is his allowance.* Truly, if I would speake here in so cleare a case, I would speak cleare contrary. that all Designs should be servants to Religion, should serve to usher-in that: would we have our Laws better exercised, our liberties more enlarged, and secured? yes indeed would we. What, by the domineering Sword? O no, the thought of it makes our hearts to bleed: but yet this is the designe to bring in Religion, to settle, ensure, and secure that, as in *Nehemias*'s dayes.

He goes on, I cannot observe his method, for I see none: he deales truly with us in this, for he tells us he *rambled*, he does indeed, let him ramble-on; if he goes to before, I must *ramble*-after: but he falls in his way upon the *Remonstrance of the Kingdome*, and censures it at his pleasure. He would not have had the vile Counsellors discovered; nor the Malignant generation, when it was boldly affirmed there were none such in the land; nor any in *Ireland* say we as truly.

Then he gives a shrewd blow at the Parliament, againe telling us, what keeps it from *staggering*; but there he is quite out, for that, which he mentions, will make them fall, when right Aimes, the glory of their God, and the good of this people, shall make them stand firme and steddy, upheld by an Almighty Arme. Then he falls upon Arguments of *advantage and disadvantage*. The Advantage the King hath (for that syllable has as much advantage as another Army;) The advantage the Scots had

had in their yeare; and the disadvantage-ground we stand upon; and here he speak not reasonably as a man directed by Reason; yet truly the Advantages on the one side are so considerable; the disadvantage on the other side so great, that surely the man, who is directed by reason, and has no other guide, will be stark mad with Reason. But let me put in a word to make him sober, there be great advantages on their side, great disadvantages on this side, Treasure spent, and spirits spent, and all spent: see now and spy out, on whose side Truth is. It is but a syllable neither, but more considerable then many Armies: on whose side is truth? on the stronger side (you will say, as a Moderator) that hath all advantages in fight. Nay, I doe not beleieve it, but leave it not to my conceit, for I shall not declare my mind now at that point, but spy it out, on whose side Truth is, there is the advantage.

But the King can worke like a King, and bestow Honours like a King, &c. He can so, and he is more bound to God that hath so enabled him, but God (one syllable also and no more, yet of more Advantage than all the Armes in the Heaven, Earth, or Sea) can doe more, hee can worke like a God; give like a God; sustaine like a God; all like a God, where God is there is the advantage. spie it out, it is discernable, where Truth is there is God, and where He is there is there is the advantage; yet he will goe on merrily for all the trouble, that is directed by Faith; hee not so, that is directed by Reason: yet we will go on.

The next step he falls upon *Charactars*, gives us a cleare-one of himselfe, of Truth also, and so he hath dishonoured himselfe, and thrust back Peace; God give him to see it, and pardon the iniquitie of His Servant: Above all. The Lord unvaile his eyes at this high point that he may seek for truth here, find it, and stand up for it, resist the opposers of it even unto Death (if the case so require) for so he must doe on earth, else he shall never find heaven, as he expects, and truth there.

Now we are at the end, we will returne, and according to his desire, *owne Reason on which side swever we shall finde it*: and seeing it lead us to an accommodation, thereby to finde peace, thither we will returne, for there is all the matter, and kinnell of the businesse.

That a Peace warily concluded on by accommodation must be the happiest issue that can be given to these Differences. Here the Moderator hath a great advantage of mee, though what I speake, shall be directed by Reason, and by something like it, but much better; yet I say, he hath a great advantage, for speaking for a State-Peace as he doth for a State-Religion, and Truth (all which I abominate as much as he allowes) hee is more to the Genius of the State, and more in shew for the Peace of his Country than I can be; and yet I will not stoop an inch to him at those high points, my love to Religion, to Peace, to Truth, to my King, to his Kingdome: why then must wee heare so ill, in undertakings of this kind that we are sonnes of Mars; wee call for a sword, we delight in blood, speake to us of Peace, we are for Warre, are content to see our Country rent asunder with her owne hands? A heavie censure this were there any of that wee call Truth in it as the searcher of all hearts knowes, there is none, we appeale to him in it. (I speake in the name of all the true hearted in the World) He knowes we seeke Peace, and pursue it, as heartily as King Hezekiah did, when a proud adversarie was before his wall: so heartily, and yet the doubt may be, whether not too eagerly, and therefore it flies from us: but I say, we pursue it, our consciences beare us witnesse, our God also, wee wish for peace as earnestly,

earnestly, as the husband-man does, whose Horse is taken from him, hee cannot plough, his heart too, he is carelesse to sow, because he knowes not who shall reape: so the *Moderatour*, we tell him; we desire Peace as the husband-man does; if he will beleeve it, and why should he not? If the husband-man ploughes not, hee cannot sow; if he sow not he cannot reape; then we must want bread & seele the want sooner then hee: I am willing to insist a little upon this first, to cleare us of this dirt cast into our faces, that we doe not wish our Countries peace; I tell him againe, for I would speake very feelingly, we will bid as much to purchase Peace, as the Countries will doe, which have been hurried and spoiled; we will give as much as they for Peace, if we may except one thing, but it is more considerable then an Army, what is that? A thing not much enquired after, but we call it *Truth*; wee thanke God, he hath given us so much discerning of it, that wee can put an esteeme upon it, that we can count of it though but a monosyllable, more considerable then Armies, which the Country-men for the most part, cannot doe, so much to blame are their Teachers: we speake this with hearts griefe, and in the dearest affection to our Country mens soules, and say, except but that we call *Truth*, and we call God to record upon our soules, we will give as much as all the Countries give; nay, & yet I will speake no proud word we will give as much for Peace as this moderate man will do, so he will not give *Truth* for it, which we may suspect by his Character, he will rather part with then his money. At this one syllable only, but so considerable, we shall differ with him if different in mind from us, and turne our backs upon him & yet shall shew our selvs as sensible of the blessings of Peace, and the misery of warre as the *Moderatour* can be, and need not his flowers of Rhetorick to expresse our *scase* that way, our feeling, I meane, which is the tickelst *scuse* we have, and I have expressed it already as feelingly as I can when we approve our selves at that point, as tender as is the husband-man.

Why then hearken sayes he to reason, to an Accommodation. What is that? To Accommodate this difference by some middle way, wherein either party shall remit somewhat of the rigour of those termes in which they now stand. This is an Accommodation and the way unto it, and the *Moderatour* is so obstinately resolved upon it, that he thinks he hath spoken all, and is in the right way to Peace, and that there is no other way, when as the very Truth is, which will appeare presently, *Toto Cels errat*, The man is quite out of the way, and if I might expresse it so, as one doth he is heavenly wide, for first, hee takes it for granted, that there are but two parties offended, the King and his friends, the Parliament and their friends: That is a great mistake, for all the Powers in Heaven and Hell are parties here, and offended greatly: Michaell, and his Angells, *Satzebub*, and his Angells, nor these onely, there is a principall Verbe, (whom hee hath left out) one syllable indeed but infinitely concerned and engaged in this businessse and of more advantage then are all the World: And there is a second Person, equally concerned too, whom for honours sake I will name, *Ephesians* 1. 12. far above all Principality, and power, and might, and Dominion, and every name, that is named, not onely in this world, but also in that which is to come: all these he hath left out of the Treaty, the Father and the Sonne. These two the *Moderatour* hath (whether willingly, or ignorantly I judge not, ignorantly I thinke) left out of the Treaty, acknowledging but two parties offended; And so though he bee all for a middle way, yet hee hath mistaken his way utterly. And now he is more than halfe perswaded, that no man will under-

take to answer him : why ? Because the Answer he thinks, will run point blank against Peace, that Mother-Blessing, so comprehensive, that it contains all things which make a Nation honourable, and the head of Kingdomes : And hee will clash against sacred Majesty too, for he will not abate an inch from the height of that *Imperious* Reformation, which the Parliament Intend, and carry all levell unto.

I shall by *Gods* good hand upon me walke straight on, & unbiassed in a *middle way*, indeed, not gazing upon or prying into, what the King and Parliament do: *The Lord* *blesse King and Parli.* say I and make them of one mind & one heart, & so direct them in all their wayes that in all they do they may have the answer of a good conscience from within, how ever things stand or fall without. But I say I will not meddle with these State-affaires, my loose shall not enter into this maze : Something the *Moderator* will force from me anon, which will reflect upon sacred Majesty, but it shall be spoken with the clearest evidence of Truth and love to his Peace and Crowne that is conceiveable.

Therefore to undeceive the *Moderators* over-hasty expectation, I will tell him now the way I will goe & then goe on in it; I will apply my self to that third party *God*, for three persons are but one *God* whom the *Moderator* hath left out of the treaty for *Peace*; and shall make it cleare in a few words to all that will see; that hee is a *Syllable* of such concernment in this busines, that till he be put into the Treatie, till he be treated with and in his own way there will be no way made for *Peace*. & I must tell him this also by the way, that this third party is, in a treatie of this Nature, a hard Master, and will hold us with some rigour to his Termes, and *Imperious* demands, and cannot endure a *middle way*; which, notwithstanding, a World of men doe now bear upon, and with all their might bend unto: but if it be the right way then *God* hath deceived mee; and if it be *Gods* Peace they seek after, then this is not sacred Scripture which I shall now propose to your eye; *It is a day of trouble and of treading downe, and of perplexity, by the Lord God of Hosts; and thou didst looke in that day to the Armour of the house of the firrest.* I observe hence, that *Iudab* was greatly distressed at this time; Peace seemed to be quite taken from them; and saine they would recover it again but they were quite out of the way; a great blame lies upon them, what was it for? not because they looked to the Armour of the house of the firrest, which house of *Armory* *Solomon* built for his whole Kingdome. *1 King. 7. 2.* nor are they blamed for spying out the breaches of the City of *David* which were many, and looking to all meanes to stop the same, and to fortifie themselves they were not blamed for this, for all this was wisely done, and the better, had it been don sooner. But for this they are blamed; *Thou didst looke to the Armour etc. but yee have not looked unto the maker thereof, neither had respect unto him, etc. v. 11.* They looked not unto *God* in all this; they had no respect unto him, and yet they would have Peace, and would be safe, well fortified against their Enemy; not considering that *God* was their Adversary; *He poured upon them through that Viall the fury of his Anger and the strength of battell. Esay 42. 25.* and he must be looked unto, a respect must be had unto him, before ever they shall have peace on the Earth: and it must be obtained by weeping and mourning, *Esay 22. 12.* whereunto the *Lord* called them by those evils He inflicted upon them. But we read there how untoward the people were, and it is just our case now; we comply with the *Moderator*, here we are of his judgement, for we looke to every thing, and bend our selves every way, but we looke not unto the *Lord God*, we have not a respect unto him.

And this I thought fit to premise in more words, that I may be the shorter afterwards; but especially, that the people may know, wee wish their Peace, as heartily as themselves can do, onely they must know also unto whom they must *looke*, and have a *respect* unto, if they looke to have their expectation answered; for the Lord gives Peace, it comes from His *hand*; as the inward Peace which cannot be *plundered*; so the outward also: the Lord, God of Peace give his People both through the Lord Jesus Christ our Peace-maker, and is called the *Repairer of the breach*.

And so I returne into our way againe in the pursuit of Peace, by way of *Accommodation*; and here;

We protest againe in the presence of GOD, That our eares are open unto it, and our eyes spying out a way whereat to enter in and come fairely out with an Olive branch in our hands. for it seemes a Labyrinth: And yet wee could have an easie passage, if the Peace sought for were a mans Peace, in his hands to give; or the sword, we would have sheathed, mans sword; we could then make up the difference by an *Accommodation*. But the Peace is GODS Peace, whom the Moderator, the Inquisitor also (likely one and the same) hath left out of the Treaty. GODS Peace I say, in his hands to give when he pleaseth, and we must wait his time: the Sword is in mans hand indeed, as the *dxe* is, and the *Red* is; but it is Gods Sword wherewith he is avenging the quarrell of his Covenant. Mans the Viall. God powres it out: we beg, and intreat and pray, saying, *Rest and be still*; *Ier. 47. 6.* The Answer is still, *It cannot rest*: The Lord knowes the Father of our Spirits, the God of all flesh; He knowes we would have Peace; but we know no way in the world how to accommodate it, but by making Peace with God (who is offended) removing what is grievous to his Eyes, and by breaking downe that which breaks His heart; *Zach. 6. 9.* And we are confident, till this be done, *valiant ones shall cry out, and Embassadors of Peace shall weep bitterly* *Ier. 33. 7.* as once they did; for ask from one end of the heaven to the other; but it will suffice to aske from the beginning of Gods book to the end of the same. The Answer will be *No Peace*, till God be at peace; till we have made His Christ our Friend: And this cannot be, till we have done as aforesaid, removed that which makes Him our Enemy; and our weapons turne back *wherewith we fight even against Babilon*.

I protest before the living God (indeed I am earnest, and is there not a cause? I am pleading for God. He needs me not, not such a poore worke, but it would make a dumb man speake, heareing that he who stands for all, stands now as a Cipher, nay lesse then that, He paines not a place, he is not so much as once named in this Treaty, nor is the removing of those things so much as mentioned, which make Him our Adversarie: I am pleading for God, for his Cause, his Truth, his Peace, his King, his Kingdom; in a dearer affection, my deceitfull heart tells me: to my Country, then is exprestable.) I protest then before the living God, that if so be wee should stand and aske every day from the moneth of *March* to the next the next year, *Is it peace?* the Answer will be as often repeated, *No, no peace, no see namodass it*, nor never will be, till you are come up to God, to his Terms: to make Peace with him, through that middle way, God, Man, Jesus Christ: I pray you hearken to it and consider on it.

M. There is a State Religion, which may be a Servant to other designs, and such a Truth too, and such a Peace also.

A The Moderatour sayes so, and gives us Characters of all these (as of himself too) but some thing like Reason will not give me leave to thinke, that such a Religion is

any better then no Religion : or that such a *Peace* is not more destructive than war, our *Peace* with that, where with we should have warre; and warring against God of whom we should seek *Peace*, hath caused all our troubles, it cannot lessen them.

But the Peace is not the worse cunning through the Princes hand.

A. No, but much the better, so he seek it too as we must at Gods hand, and by that middle way, which God found out, thereby to declare the unsearchable riches of his Wisedome, Mercy, Grace. It is supposed now that in seeking *Peace* at the right doore, the extra or intra prohibens, that which will hinder the obtaining our suite must be removed, even what ever provocations there are before Gods eyes.

M. And he is a gracious Prince.

A. I will pray. God save the King, and blesse him, with the blessings of His right, and His left hand; and having given some grace, add more,

M. Remember we not the Declarations he hath made? no Prince ever gave such engagements.

A. Yes we Remember very well. And that others have said almost as much, and have done almost as little. But let the *Moderator* goe on: though he hath lost his guide and is quite out of the way.

M. He is an envious man that would not make a bonfire for every Declaration he hath sent.

A. I dare not say so, that he is an envious man, that will not make a bonfire: I think he may be a good man, and yet think a bonfire an unworthy expression of true Joy. I would forbear farther Answer here, but I cannot & faine I would speak abstractly, and in the generall (though there is deceit) but I must speak as the case requires, in truth of heart A Rulers Declaration of his Grace, Trust, and Service is to no purpose except to make a Bonfire. if it be not followed, with Truth and Action: The higher the person is the more he stands charged from the mouth of God, and his example so to practice, that he may be seene to speake, *He hath spoken with his mouth, and fulfilled with his hand, is four times repeated [1 King. 8 15. 2 Chro. 6]* To the prayse of God Himselfe, King of Kings, and Lord of Lords, Higgaion Selah, also words seriously to be considered on, I will adde this; good words are good Remonstrances of of a good mind; when Actions are not Contra-Remonstrances.

M. We could not see our season, we might have closed with the King, when he seemed to open his Armes.

A. Truly if I could forbear now (but my words are as fire within me) I would answer nothing; because I have two affections, which are almost become passions, so stirring they are within mee at this very time, *Anger* and *fear*; I am angry with the *Moderator*, and for very just Reason, I could be shrew his fingers for opening the Kings Armes so wide; and I could wish he had bit his tongue, when he told us, they seemed to open and no more; so some Persons have done, and an Engine also, they seemed to open their Armes to embrace, and killed in embracing, [*Philote amplexu strangulant: Sen: Hist: of the world, Page 532.*] I have overcome my *Anger*, I will by Gods help overcome my *fear* too, why should I be afraid to speake, speaking from Gods mouth, and in a zeale for my King, and Country, guided by knowledge? I am constrained; the Lord knowes I am, for I will appeale to Him, beholding with open face, the Sword lifted up like *Abrahams* hand, over *Isaack*, to kill him and his Mother too (that is the purpose) a dumb man spake then & why not I now? I will open my mouth and speake; *It shall not be told to Posterity* (It is the *Moderators* Reason) why he spake, and I love my King & Country as well as he, *Peace* too & Truth also)

The

That we doe all wilfully blind the eyes of our Reason, and will not see that which is palpable before us: I must speake that our Children may not tell their children that their Parents were a poore naked People, blind too, and dumb also. In answer then to these open Armes; This I say first That next to the open Armes of God the Father of our Lord Iesus Christ, and in him so wide opened towards us; next to those Almighty Armes would his poore People, flie for refuge into the Armes of his Majestie; and they will force themselves to believe they are open to defend them his distressed People: but if they should come, they cannot force themselves to believe, that those at his elbow, will not close his Armes upon them, even when he is opening to receive them and so strangle them out-right, which is quickly done, for they are more than halfe dead already; because his Armes and heart are so shut against his good people. What have they done? Hee that searcheth the heart and trieth the Reines knoweth, they know not themselves guilty of any thing against his sacred Majestie, wherefore his Armes should bee closed against them: and opened towards his, and their Enemies. They have looked narrowly into their hearts, what they have done or spoken, which might close his Majesties armes against them, and they finde nothing that they have done, or spoken, but good for him before the Lord, and therein they have not been: silent night nor day, and that is their comfort.

M His Majesties Armes seeme open to receive them, why doe they not come?

A His good People, those that are his indeed, cannot trust *(hewes, and seemings)*; When his armes are wide open to those about him, his and their Enemies, his Armes cannot so much as seeme to open towards his poore people. I will give him, who is not willingly Ignorant, good Reason for this, when I have told him what besell my selfe once, which will instruct the ignorant more then Reason can small things will illustrate great. I came once to my friends house, whose heart I knew could close with me as mine with him; and entring his Out-Court, out flies a Mastive Dog to my face, by a Providence I withstood his first onset, and presently help came in; for I was at my friends house, whose Armes were open to receive me, hee saw well what a greeting I had, therefore he greeted me the more heartily and I him: but I told him Sir, the Proverb holds not, *love me love my Dog*, you must truste-up your Dog, else you know who will never come at you, though you could open your Armes as wide as the two Poles are distant North and South: he beleaved me, else he had not shewed himselfe a wise man, or a friend.

He that will open his Armes to receive his friend, will take care, to remove all Jealousies his friend may so much as conceit to the contrary; much more will hee take care; that his Dogs mouth may be muzzled-up, if not trussed up by the neck.

To speake out, for so I am resolved from the mouth of God; his sacred Majesty cannot open his Armes to receive his Subjects into favour and grace; he cannot so much as seeme so to doe. so I say directed by Reasons, more strongly bottomed, then are the everlasting hills, and perpetuall Mountaines.

1. He cannot open his Armes to his poore Subjects, till he hath opened his heart to God in confession, that God made him King in his stead, let him upon His Throne. [Gods Throne;] put the Testimony into his hand, his Law-Booke before his eyes, commanding him to doe thereafter, to be a Father to his Country, Lord Protector there, to doe his People all right, to suffer no wrong to be done unto them, for therefore God made him King, and set him upon His Throne; till the King hath opened his heart to God

in confession of his owne finnes, the finnes of his people also: their Idolatrous wayes and Courtes, which brings a sword to lay his Land waste: till he hath so done, he cannot truly open his Armes to his poore People.

Whether the King hath done this or no he is to be accountable to God alone. Be it so, though that is nothing to our purpose: but till he hath made this confession in sinceritie and Truth, he cannot so much as *seeme* to open his Armes towards his Subjects indeed and in Truth: And when he shall make this his confession betwixt God, and his owne soule, then will the consequence therefrom be as discernable to his poore Subjects, and as operative towards them for good, as *light is*, and *life is*, both which will manifest themselves where ever they are: till this be done he cannot open his Armes towards his poore Subjects.

2. Nor till hee shut his eares, and his heart to *vile Councillours*, I say vile Councillours, who make the King rush upon the drawne sword, and practice against the Law of Heaven, and the Law of the Land, and are themselves as the *Revening Wolves*; he cannot open his Armes to his distressed people, nor his eare to their crye, till he hath closed his eare, and his heart fast up against those vile men, nay not till he hath cut them short by the shoulders, or trusted them up by the neck.

3. Nor till he has barred up his heart against the *Councils* of her, that hath laine in his bosome, for she drives the trade of the World, and is a Chiefe, and principall Agent therein: To dethrone the *Lord Iesus Christ*, and to advance *Antichrist*, (it will never be, but it is the great designe, Trade and project the World is now driving on: And she an active instrument, for carrying on that Designe with all her might.) The King cannot open his Armes truly, and heartily to receive in his poore distressed people, till he hath barred up his heart against the Councill of her that hath layd in his bosome, nor which was first, and it shall be last.

4. Till he walkes contrary to himselfe, as contrary as were the streames in the South, when they were turned backe: as contrary as *Manasseh* was to himselfe; after he was brought into the Thornes, and was humbled: till his heart bee turned backe, till he walke contrary to himselfe; till he shall confesse his iniquity, and the iniquity of his people with their trespasses, which they trespassed against the Lord, and that also they have walked contrary unto the Lord and that the Lord hath also walked contrary unto him, till he shall confesse this, and thus open his heart before the Lord, he cannot open his Armes toward his good people. And according to the Tenure of these words, his good people have done for themselves, and does and do speak for their King, also thereafter night and day before the Lord; and what they speak before the Lord I will not shame to speake before men, I will adde, whosoever he is, that is to make answer to such a passage as this, and does not speak, according to the Tenure and purpose of these words, the truth is not in him, he holds it in *unrighteousnes Rom. 1. 18.* and he is an Enemy to his King and Kingdom; to the Soule of his Soule, and the life of our lives; the life of Truth, and the Faith of the Gospell. I have spoken according to my charge the Oracle of God: But yet if, in the judgement of any, as one of the fooles in *Israel*, It is for *Israels* sake, that they may have Peace, if as a man beides himselfe, it is for *Israels* sake too, in abundance of affection to *Israel* that *Israel* may have Peace, Peace with God and then peace from God, even from His Hand, which cannot be till our *uncircumcised hearts* are humbled for our *warlike wayes*, therein warring against the God of our Peace: No Peace I say againe to Prince or people, till there be a *girding with sackcloth* and a *wallowing in dust*, Jer. 6. 26.

for our shedding of blood, & provoking the Lord with Images & strange vanities. And this I have desired to speak to my own & every mans heart in as expresse terms as Isaac the monk spake to Valence the Emperor who told him that things went very croffe. No marvail said Isaac, for you walk croffe to God. You shall have no Peace while you warre with Him. You have hurried the faithfull Pastors from their flockes, Restored them againe and cease thou to rebell against God, and God will cease to fight against thee [*Tripart. Hist. lib: 9. Cap. 13.*] Thus plainly I have spoken that we may have Peace, Peace now, when warre is at the gate, peace then when pangs are upon us, a peace that cannot be plundered. Amen.

I looke for peace, when I looke to see fire like another deluge round about me, when others shall be at their wits end for expectation: I resolved therefore to speake out, and plainly for the Peace of my King, and Countrey, that he and his people might be shewne the excellent way to accommodate the same. Again, I live if I doe live, by Truth in my heart; I would dye when I must dye with Truth in my mouth; then I looke to goe to Heaven, and finde Truth there, and live with Truth for ever. These thoughts made me abstractly settled, that I would speake out the Truth, and for *Truth* to helpe me God Amen. I have two words more; I have bent my answer to the maine scope the Moderator has in his eyes the Peace of the King and Kingdome, we both make way after the same thing, and goe both croffe; He would have Peace by an Accommodation while we stand in defiance with Heaven: I would have peace made with God first, the whole matter is committed to Him, Who is the Way the Truth and the Life; for He is judge himselfe. Other things may seeme to require answer but truly I tooke care onely to finde out his scope, and thereunto to bend my answer; he glorieth at this & at that; & claspeth here and there, and taketh a libertie of conceit, yet will make us beleieve He conceits the best and will not censure, in-deede that is a point of wisdom. And yet we have warrant to beleieve that the Aymes of the Lords servants have beene strait and levell to His glory and His peoples good else His Hand had not bene so with them hitherto. If I have any discerning or can make any discovery upon the wayes of men, and finde them off and on I pray God, as well as I can, to settle them: If I finde them constant to themselves to God and his Cause, I say and I am sure of what I say, *after they have suffered a while, the Lord will make them and their worke perfect.* [*1. Pet. 5. 10.*] For there shall be no worke done for the Lord which he will not finish, and recompence those that have laboured in it. There are disadvantages now but one God is sufficient to make all up, a scattering now; there will be a time of gathering. A Croffe wayes and wills (now) God is making a Method of them. That he is not plucking downe his house, he assures you in the word of a God, who tenders his house and household, better then any father on earth can do. And now that my thoughts are upon Gods House I thinke of an Epithete: The Moderator is pleased to give: The Reformation now intended, and upon Designe; he calls it an *Imperious* Reformation. It is well if it be so, for if there should be a daubing in such a worke as that is so nearly concerning God and his Christ, we should say of it as Iob said in Davids words; *It is abominable.* We wish heartily, that Reformation may be *imperious*, command, that it will abate nothing of Gods Right, nor suffer anything to stand, that grieves his Spirit; and is offensive to his eye. Certainly so it should be, and so it must be. *The house that is to be builded must be exceeding Magnificall, of fame, and of glory thorough all Countreies.* [*2. Chron. 22. 22. 5.*] Why so magni-

magnificall & wonderfull great? For great is our God above all Gods [2 Chron. 2. 5.] It is easily applyed, the Lord hold the hands of his Servants to the worke, their eyes to the Rule, their hearts to him; That is the way to have Peace againe, which the shedding of bloud and abominable Idolatries have taken from the Earth. The Lord fill his Servants with his Spirit, make them compleat for this great businesse, It is for their God, and his Christ, a great God above all Gods; blessed for ever, Amen.

I have one word more to say to my owne heart, and to the Moderatours; Let us cease from our owne wisdom, from seeming wiser than our Teachers, and giving Rules to our betters: nor let us be too bold with our fellow Subjects neither; they may be directed by Reason too, and happily by a better guide; Let us looke to our selves, and into our owne hearts, pry narrowly there, what wee have done to make the breach wider, and to let in wrath upon our brethren: upon true search we shall lay hands upon our mouthes, smite upon our thighes, and be humbled even unto dust: and all our worke will be to make our Peace with our God; In his name who can repaire, and make up the Breach though wide as the Sea: when every one shall doe so in his owne particular, God will give us Peace; It shall come in as a River, and righteousness as the waves of the Sea. Amen.

Let him take hold of my strength that he may make Peace with Me: and he shall make Peace with Me. *I say. 27. 5.*

Scias { Eum pessimè dicere qui optimè placeat malis, eum optimè dicere qui minimè placeat bonis. Plin. Ep.



A Postscript.

IN this Treaty of peace, we should looke upon the Kings Majesty as the principall, but being not Himselfe, but engaged to a Partie, who pretend Loyalty yet drive their owne ends to the ruine of their King and his Kingdoms: We looke upon them, even the Atheists in their Kingdomes, the Papists all the world over; And doe affirme from Sacred testimonie, That we can accommodate a peace with them upon no better termes, then we can make peace with the Devil,

FfNfs.

ΑΥΤΟΜΑΧΙΑ:

17

OR,

The Selfe-Contradiction

OF

Some that contend about
Church-Government,

Dialogue-wise digested into a Scholasticall
Discourse, betweene Religion, Reason,
Prejudice and Partiality;

Wherein some of the principall *Pleas* and *Pretences*
lately produced in the examination of the *Petition* for the
Prerogative are taken into consideration and discussed:

By *Irenæus Philalethes;*

Or, one that unfeignedly desires to keep the unity of
the Spirit in the bond of Peace, and speaking the truth in
Love to grow up into him in all things, which is the Head,
even CHRIST.

IOH 33. 17.

*I will answer also my part, I also will shew mine
opinion.*

March. 18.

London, Printed Anno Dom. 1643¹⁶⁴²

5 19th Nov. Sunday

AYTOMAXIA
OR
The Self-Contradiction
OF

Some that contend about
Church-Government

Dialogue-wise digested into a Scholastic
Discourse, between Religion, Reason,
Prophecy and Prophecy

Wherein some of the principal Points and Propositions
lately produced in the examination of the Puritans for
Presbyterianism are taken into consideration and discussed

By Irenaeus Philaster;

Of one that unfeignedly desires to keep the unity of
the Spirit in the bond of Peace, and his heart is
set to grow up into him in all things which is the Head,
EVEN CHRIST.

I will answer also my part, I also will show mine
opinion.

London, Printed Anno Domini 1647.




To all that wish well to the great
good worke of Reformation
now in hand.

When the common Causes of the Church and Common-wealth lye at stake, as now they doe, wherein every man is a sharer, it would be an unseasonable, either thriftinesse or modesty for any man that hath a head, and a hand, and a heart to see them both on worke, so stand by as a looker on onely, and not to shew himselfe willing in an adventure of so great expectation to hazard all the information and advice that he either hath of his owne, or can take up of others, whereby the common stocke of publicke counsell may bee any wayes augmented. This consideration hath moved me, though the meanest of many, with all submissive humblenesse to tender to the serious consideration of those that will vouchsafe to peruse it, this ensuing discourse: and to that end that the Authors unworthinesse, may not forestall that entertainment, which otherwise perhaps the worke might finde to shadow my selfe for the present under the borrowed name of

Irenæus Philalethes.

A. 2.

In.



A Scholasticall Discourse
about Church-government, in a
Dialogue between *Religion*,
Reason, *Prejudice*, and
Partialitie.

Religion



Sister, well met.

Reas. Well met, good sister: and the better if you will give me leave to propose one question to you?

Rel. With all mine heart: and I hope I shall obtaine the like libertie from you.

Rea. Otherwise I should renounce my name, and be constrained to confesse that reason it selfe were become unreasonable. But if mine expectation deceive mee not, your question and mine will be both but the same.

Rel. That I shall easily resolve you of, when I heare what yours is.

Rea. Mine is what you conceive may be the cause that you and I are suspected by some to be of different opinions in the controversies now on foot concerning Church-government,

B

vernment: wherein some are so vehement on the one side, as if the whole life of all religion lay upon it; and others so confident on the other, as if there could be no colour of reason at all to the contrarie.

Rel. If that be it, your expectation deceives you not: for had you not moved it first unto mee, I should have prevented you.

Rea. I hope then since our questions are the same, wee shall both agree in one joynt answer.

Rel. It may be so too: at least if what is answered by one be approved by the other, I hope the question it selfe by that meanes will fall to the ground, and those that before suspected us two to be of different opinions, will find themselves mistaken.

Rea. That is the worst that I will wish them, though the wrong done to me therein be verie great; for what more hainous offence can Reason be furnished to be guiltie of, than opposition in Religion?

Rel. And is it not as great an affront unto Religion, to suppose it unreasonable?

Rea. If you please to esteeme it so it is. But that is the fruit of your favour, that you will vouchsafe your younger sister to goe hand in hand with you, whose dutie is to bee your servant.

Rel. The odds of our age is not so great, for wee are twins, and if in some things you be guided by me, it is but that I in other things may have the better assistance from you.

Rea. I pray you then let me first see how you will guide me to find out the ground of this suspicion, which wee had both an intent to enquire each of other, and then you shall have the best assistance that I can afford you to follow it further.

Rel. Your motion is reasonable: and to answer your demand, I think that the cause why you and I are suspected to be of different opinions in the controversies now on foot concerning

concerning Church-government, is because some men consult with us severally apart, not both together, and either mis-conceive us themselves, or mis-report us unto others. For when we have been both in place together, I do not remember that ever you dissented from mee, or I from you in any thing : and I am much mistaken, if either Religion or Reason rightly understood, bee not alwayes the same.

Res. This I must needs assent unto : and I think I may adde that another cause of the same suspicion is, that there are divers counterfeit wanderers abroad in the world, who because they have some resemblance of us, are bold to assume our names unto themselves : and some that are not so thorowly acquainted with us, as to discerne the difference, take answers from them, and report them for ours.

Rel. You are in the right, I doubt not for that : and there are some besides, that to maintaine their owne interests, give entertainment unto two dangerous Dames, whose perpetuall practice is to screw themselves into acquaintance with those whom they find most forward in troublesome times, to take a side and make a partie. These two, though they be of different dispositions in themselves, yet because they have both one businesse in hand (which is to keep faction alwayes on foot) still together. Where ever they are admitted (and that is almost everie where, for they are fit to serve any mans turne, except hee be a friend to peace) there as opportunitie is offered, they play their parts, aggravating some things, and extenuating others, stretching and straining all the shreds of Religion and Reason, which they have raked together from us, or from others that mask themselves under our names, that so they may suit and set forth to the full, those causes and persons which they intend to censure or excuse, to condemne or to applaud.

Res. Prejudice and Partialitie, you mean; do you not?

Rel. Yes that I doe : and am verily perswaded that

were it not for them, we two should never be thought, by any man of indifferent capacitie, to differ in any thing: For true Religion can no more be unreasonable, than right Reason can be irreligious. But Prejudice many times makes that seeme unreasonable, which is indeed religious: and Partialitie puts a colour of religion upon that which is unreasonable.

Rea. I am of your mind, and so I suppose we are both satisfied for the generall: But how may it appeare that in the controversies now on foot, concerning Church-government, these two have had so great an hand?

Rel. If ever you and I be in place together where they are, and the least occasion be offered to enter into that dispute, we shall find it by experience presently.

Rea. Then let it be now: for unlesse I mistake, those two that goe before us are they; if we mend our pace but a little, wee shall quickly overtake them: and I beleieve they are not so well acquainted with us two, but that wee may easily draw them to discover themselves without suspecting who we are.

Rel. Content: so that you will undertake to give the first occasion of speech to that purpose, and that neither you nor I shall suffer them to goe away unsatisfied in any thing, that either concerns our selves severally, or the state of the cause in generall, if we can help it.

Rea. I accept your conditions, and will wait my opportunity to put them in practice.

Pre. Speake softly, or else those two that come after us will over-heare us, and I like not their looks so well, as to with them acquainted with our counsels.

Par. You are too too suspitious: for ought you know they may be as well affected to the cause as we our selves: and the businesse is such as I am loth to think any especially of our Sex so bad as not to be a friend unto it.

Pre. In that you discover too much partialitie to promise your selfe the favour of those whom you are not acquainted with.

Par. And you too much prejudice to censure them before you heare them speake : and therefore I am resolved if they offer us any occasion of conference to entertaine it. If we slacken our pace but a little, they will be with us presently.

Rea. You are well overtaken.

Par. You are welcome.

Rea. If your intention be the same with ours, to take the ayre here, this Alley will afford roome enough for us foure to walke and talke together.

Par. And that Arbour when we are weary to sit downe and rest us.

Rel. And what shall be the subject of our discourse ?

Pre. The present occurrences of the time, if you please, wherein every one is so deeply interrested, that till they be one way or other resolved, I should suspect our discourse of impertinence, if it were employed any other way.

Rea. I hope then you will be able to afford us matter enough, for by your speech I begin to ghesse already that you are sufficiently versed that way, and that our coming hath but interrupted the discourse you were in betwene your selves upon that subject.

Par. I doubt not but we can say as much to that purpose as some others : and yet we shall be beholding to you for any further information that you shall be pleased to enrich us with.

Rel. Where shall we then begin ?

Pre. If you will at the last report we received (*Febr. 27* 1640.) which was that the *London* Petition, and the *Ministers* generall Petition, and their Remonstrance are Committed, and that onely the point of *Episcopacy* is reserved to the Houses.

Rel. I like your motion well : and shall be glad to understand from you what you conceive the reason may be why the point of *Episcopacy* is not Committed as well as the rest.

Pre. I hope it is because the House is already resolved that Episcopacy is to be utterly abolished without any further question or dispute at all about it. For *Dagon* must goe downe however.

Par. And the Arke of God be set up in stead thereof: and therefore I thinke the House doth well not to trouble a Committee with it, being as needs they must be sufficiently satisfied already of the necessity of the Presbytery Parish discipline.

Rel. It seemes then you apprehend the same difference betweene the Presbyterian and Prelaticall government as you doe between the Arke of God and *Dagon*.

Fre. and Par. Yes that we doe.

Res. But that the House holds the same opinion of them is peradventure but your supposition or surmise, because they doe not put that point to Committee as well as the rest. But may there not be some other reasons of that reservation?

Pre. It may be there may. Yet I hope the House is so well affected to Religion that they will not entertaine any reason with more respect then it. But what other reason doe you thinke there may be?

Res. It may be they thinke that when all the abuses are taken away and the faulty Governours removed, the government it selfe will appeare good enough, and so there will need no further dispute about it. Or it may be they thinke it a matter that may be of dangerous consequence to unrivet that respect which the present government of the Church and Common-wealth have unto one another, the roots whereof if the earth were taken from them, peradventure would appeare so wrapped together, that one would not well be taken away without wronging the other. And to stocke up a tree that is overgrowne with mosse, or hath some cankered boughes upon it, when digging about it, and pruning might suffice to make it beare good fruit, may peradventure seeme to some no point of good husbandry.

Pre.

Pre. As though there would be any hope that ever men should gather Grapes of Thornes, or Figs of Thistles. For doe you not know what the *Scots* Commissioners have said in their charge against *Canterbury*: That to negotiate for *Rome* to reduce the Reformed Churches to the heresies in doctrine, the Superstitions and Idolatries in worship, and the tyranny in government which are in that See, and for which the Reformed Churches did separate from it, is an evill which hath issued not so much from the personall disposition of the Prelates themselves, as from the innate quality and nature of their Office and Prelaticall Hierarchy which did bring forth the Pope in ancient times, and never ceaseth till it bring forth Popish doctrine, and worship where it is once rooted, and the principalities thereof fomented and constantly followed.

Res. Yes, it is true, they have said so indeed, and I wonder at it: For I suppose they will not deny but that many a good mother hath brought forth an ungracious childe, to her owne both shame and sorrow: and that they cannot be ignorant how early a beginning, and how long a continuance the Prelacy had in the Church before that the Pope was borne: that the Greeke Churches generally are governed by Prelates still, as they have beene ever since they first were planted, and yet never acknowledge the Popes primary, but renounce him utterly. Some naturall causes meeting with matter predisposed unto such effects by an Antipathesis, sometimes bring forth their owne contraries: and therefore to mother the Pope and his Antichristian Hierarchy, upon the Office of Bishops or Prelacy it selfe may seeme no more reasonable then to father the stinking smoake of a dunghill, upon the beames of that Sunne that shines upon it. It was long agoe said that Religion brought forth riches, and that the daughter devoured the mother, yet no man I thinke will thereupon inferre that all Religion is unlawfull. But if it were the Prelacy or office of Bishops it selfe that at first brought forth the Pope,

Pope, certainly he hath proved a very undutifull and unnaturall sonne to bereave his mother both of her dowry and her liberty (I had almost said of her life too) and make her meerely to depend upon the countesie of his will and pleasure. For it is a truth notoriously knowne to all the world, that the augmentation of the Popes authority in spirituall things have beene the diminution, or rather that destruction of that power which Bishops had formerly in causes of Ecclesiasticall cognisance. And it was the great and constant endeavour of the *Papalini* in the Councell of *Trent* to crosse their designs, who laboured by all meanes to get it decreed, that the office of Bishops was of divine institution. Little I suppose do some men thinke how much they gratifie the Pope, and what acceptable service they doe to the Court of *Rome*, though it be but against their wils, whilst they oppose that opinion so vehemently, that some have not forborne to wish that it were treason to maintaine that the office of Bishops is of divine institution. Which though it were not, yet God forbid that the maintenance of such an error in opinion should be accounted treason, so long as there is no law against it.

Pro. Whether it be treason or no to maintaine that the office of Bishops is of divine institution, I will not now dispute: but that the office of Bishops or Prelacy it selfe is evill and unlawfull, is fully demonstrated by many unanswerable arguments.

Res. And yet it may be those arguments which you thinke unanswerable either have beene already, or may be answered.

Pro. What say you then to those eight reasons urged from Scripture against Episcopacy in the examination of the Petition for the Prelates, which are not as those that are alleaged on the other side, meer probabilities onely but more.

Res. So they say indeed that urge them: but whether they deserve to be so esteemed of will appeare by considering

ring them severally: and if you please to produce them in their order one by one. I shall tell you freely what I thinke may be said of them.

Pro. The first is out of *Acts 20.* where the whole charge of all the affaires of the Church of *Ephesus* was left to the Elders by Saint *Paul*, who tels them that the Holy Ghost had made them overseers over that flocke which they were *visitors*, and the word signifies in the judgement of all both to feed and to rule.

Res. This argument logically resolved, must run thus. If the whole charge of all the affaires of the Church of *Ephesus* was left by Saint *Paul* to those Elders there, whom the Holy Ghost had made overseers over that flocke, both to feed and rule them, then Episcopacy is unlawfull: (For either that must be the conclusion, or else the argument answers not the undertaking fathered upon it; and the rest in the Title page of the booke.) But the whole charge of all the affaires of the Church of *Ephesus*, was left by Saint *Paul* to those Elders there, whom the Holy Ghost had made overseers over that flocke, both to feed and rule them. Therefore Episcopacy is unlawfull. To this I suppose it may be said.

First, that the sequell of the major is false, unlesse it bee presupposed. 1. That nothing is lawfull in Church government, but that which is there recorded by Saint *Luke* to have beene then directed by Saint *Paul* to be done at *Ephesus*. But what if Saint *Paul* at other times gave other directions unto others? what if he gave direction both before and afterward, to one to doe that which he then directed to be done by many? which whether he did or no, let them that doubt and would be resolved, read, and mark well what he writeth to *Timothy* and *Titus*. Cannot that be true which Saint *Luke* relateth concerning the charge that Saint *Paul* gave to the Elders of *Ephesus*, but that Episcopacy must therefore be unlawfull? Will they say, that the charge then given by Saint *Paul* to the Elders of

Ephesus, recorded by Saint *Luke*, was the perfect platforme of Church-government that ought to be universally, and perpetually observed in all places, and by all persons without any variation? How then will they answer Saint *Paul* in other places where he speakes of many things belonging to the government of the Church, which are not there mentioned at all by Saint *Luke*? How will they answer themselves when they propose such things to be observed in Church-government, as are not there given in charge by Saint *Paul*? 2 The sequelle of the major may be said to be false, unlesse it be presupposed that amongst those Elders unto whom the charge of the affaires of the Church at *Ephesus*, was then and there left by Saint *Paul*, there was no Bishop: for if any of those Elders were not an Elder onely, but a Bishop, also the charge must be left unto him with the rest: and how then shall the unlawfulnessse of Episcopacy be inferred upon Saint *Pauls* leaving a charge unto many Elders, if some, or but one of them were a Bishop? But that amongst those Elders there was no Bishop, is more then is said by Saint *Luke*, and so more then can be proved from that Text. I speake not of a Bishop in that acceptation wherein a Bishop and an Elder are taken to be all one: for in that sense there must needs be as many Bishops as Elders, unto whom that charge was left by Saint *Paul*. But by a Bishop I understand such an Elder as hath precedency before and presidency over other Elders. And till it be proved that there was none such amongst the Elders of *Ephesus* when that charge was left unto them by Saint *Paul*. This argument will be of no more force than this would be, if I should say, He that ruleth over men must be just, ruling in the feare of the Lord. Therefore for one ruler to have precedency before, and presidency over other rulers, is unlawfull. 3 The sequell of the Major seemeth to be false, unlesse it be presupposed that Episcopacy is such a thing as either must or may belong unto them that either are no Elders at all, or have no flock, no Church

to feed and rule. For if there be any force at all in that illation, it must depend upon that inconsistency, which is presupposed to be between Episcopacy and Eldership, or between overseeing and feeding, and ruling. And for my part I shall easily grant that for any man that is not an Elder, to take upon him to be a Bishop, or taking upon him to be a Bishop, not to feed and rule the flocke over which he is made an overseer, is unlawfull: and if any such Episcopacy be set up in the Church, as cannot be exercised by a feeding, and ruling Elder; let it be utterly abolished forever, and the remembrance thereof blotted out from under heaven, both name and thing: but untill then this sequell will seeme to be of no great consequence.

Secondly, I suppose it may be said that the minor is not true, unlesse it be well understood, and with good limitation. For first, the whole charge of absolutely all the affaires of the Church at *Ephesus* was not left to the Elders; but only that charge which is there expressed by Saint *Luke*, the charge of overseeing, of watching, of taking heed unto themselves, and to the flocke of feeding and ruling the Church. Might not the Church of *Ephesus* have other affaires, the charge whereof might be left unto others? If not then in the Church of *Ephesus* there needed no other Church-officers, but Elders onely: and why then should any other Officers be needfull in other Churches? Secondly, when the civill Magistrate, by whose authority *Ephesus* was governed, should be converted to the faith of Christ should have no charge of the affaires of the Church of *Ephesus*, unlesse hee were one of those Elders and overseers of the flocke, that were both to feed and to rule the Church? Might not part of that charge which then was given the Elders of *Ephesus* by Saint *Paul* belong afterwards to others; together with them: Thirdly, if the whole charge of all the affaires of the Church of *Ephesus* was left to the Elders, what then was left unto the people? What shall become of their so much magnified power of electing their owne Bishops and other Church Officers?

of their interest and right to joyne with their Church Officers in the censures of the Church? Were they of *Ephesus* onely excluded from the exercise of this authority and power? Or are not these inconsistent unawardable contradictions? The whole charge of all the affaires of the Church was left to the Elders (suppose it onely, or else the argument is not exclusive, and so makes nothing against Bishops) and yet the whole charge of all the affaires of the Church was not left to the Elders, but it is a principall part of the civill Magistrate who is keeper of both Tables to have a care of the Church, and to exercise his authority for the preserving of Religion, and for the peace and safety of the Church. And each particular Church hath her owne power and authority, and the use and benefit of all the ordinances of *C H R I S T*: neither is there any thing to be done without the expresse or tacite consent of the Congregation in matters which are proper and peculiar to a particular Church, whether in election or ordination of Ministers, or in admitting or excommunicating of Members. And it is in many respects expedient both for the Members of each Church, whether Ministers or people, and for the right governing and well-being of the particular Churches in a Nation professing Christian Religion, that besides their particular Assemblies and Elderships they convene by their Commissioners, Ministers and Elders in greater Assemblies, that matters that concerne all the Churches within their bounds respective, may with common advice and consent, be agreed upon for their good and edification. And yet the Church may have no Office, nor Office-bearers, but such as are by divine appointment which are Elders and Deacons, or more particularly Pastors, Teachers, Elders and Deacons, by which Christ hath provided for all the necessities of his Church. These things they profess they are all agreed upon, who urge this Argument to prove the unlawfulness of Prelacy, *page 31. 32.* But unlesse they can shew us with how these things, and this and their other Arguments agree together we shall be but where we were before.

Par. Where ever you are, I doubt not but they are in the right, and will easily make their argument good, when they hear what exceptions there are taken to it.

Rel. This then is that which they must doe, if they will make good that first argument, they must directly prove that when the whole charge of all the affaires of the Church of Ephesus was left by S. Paul to the Elders, whose office it was both to feed, and to rule the Church of God there, whereof the Ho. Ghost had made them overseers, it was unlawfull in the discharge of that duty. For any one of those Eld. to have precedency before, & presidency over the rest as a Bi. In the mean time, if you will, let us go on unto the other arguments.

Pre. The second is, whatsoever you make to belong to Episcopacy, as Epis. is either matter of jurisdiction or ordination. Jurisdiction doth not belong to the Bi. for our Saviour saith, *Go. & which Church to interpret of one man, is against that place, because he saith, whatsoever ye bind,* against the couise of Scripture, because one man is never called a Church, & against common sense, because the word Church there signifies an Assembly. And for ordination the Apostle saith unto Timothy, *The gift that is in thee which was given thee by Prophecy,* &c. 1 Tim 4. 14. Therefore ordination also belongs unto the Elders.

Par. I hope this is home to the purpose, for if jurisdiction & ordination belong unto the Bishops. what can they then pretend unto, but their titles of honour and goodly revenues.

Rel. This argument presupposeth that power of jurisdiction and ordination, is challenged by, or attributed unto Episcopacy, as *proprium quarto modo*, a power that belongs unto all Bishops, unto Bishops only, & that as they are Bishops and not otherwise: which if any man pretend to be true, let him, if he will, and if hee can maintain it. But in the meane time, let us consider what force the argument is of against the precedency, and presidency of Bishops, before and over other Elders in the exercise of the authoritie and power of Jurisdiction and Ordination. For the

of their interest and right to joyne with their Church Officers in the censures of the Church? Were they of *Episcopu* onely excluded from the exercise of this authority and power? Or are not these inconsistent unawarable contradictions? The whole charge of all the affaires of the Church was left to the Elders (suppose it onely, or else the argument is not exclusive, and so makes nothing against Bishops) and yet the whole charge of all the affaires of the Church was not left to the Elders, but it is a principall part of the civill Magistrate who is keeper of both Tables to have a care of the Church, and to exercise his authority for the preserving of Religion, and for the peace and safety of the Church. And each particular Church hath her owne power and authority, and the use and benefit of all the ordinances of C H R I S T: neither is there any thing to be done without the expresse or tacite consent of the Congregation in matters which are proper and peculiar to a particular Church, whether in election or ordination of Ministers, or in admitting or excommunicating of Members. And it is in many respects expedient both for the Members of each Church, whether Ministers or people, and for the right governing and well-being of the particular Churches in a Nation professing Christian Religion, that besides their particular Assemblies and Elderships they convene by their Commissioners, Ministers and Elders in greater Assemblies, that matters that concerne all the Churches within their bounds respective, may with common advise and consent, be agreed upon for their good and edification. And yet the Church may have no Office, nor Office-bearers, but such as are by divine appointment which are Elders and Deacons, or more particularly Pastors, Teachers, Elders and Deacons, by which Christ hath provided for all the necessities of his Church. These things they profess they are all agreed upon, who urge this Argument to prove the unlawfulness of Prelacy, *pag. 31. 32.* But unless they can shew us with how these things, and this and their other Arguments agree together we shall be but where we were before.

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argument Logically resolved runnes thus. If jurisdiction and ordination doe not belong to the Bishop, then Episcopacy is unlawfull. But jurisdiction and ordination doth not belong unto the Bishop. *Ergo*, Episcopacy is unlawfull.

First for the sequell of the Major, if it have any truth in it, it must be upon this opposition, that in the exercise of jurisdiction, and ordination none may lawfully have precedence before, or preidency over others, but those unto whom the exercise of jurisdiction and ordination doth belong, and unto them onely: which if it were true, then neither the civill Magistrate, though Christian, nor any particular Church Officer, whether Pastor, Doctor, Elder, or Deacon, might lawfully have precedeney before, and preidency over others in any of those Assemblies wherein the power of jurisdiction and ordination are to be exercised. But this I presume will not be pretended by any that is not a professed friend to Anarchy, and an utter enemy, not onely of Episcopacy but order also. If any such be, I leave the moderators of all, both generall and particular Assemblies and Eldershups to maintaine themselves against them, and if they be not able of themselves to make their party good, let them, if they will intreat the assistance of their civill Magistrate.

For the Minor, as it hath two matters in hand, Jurisdiction and Ordination; so it is not barely propounded onely, but proove likewise offered of the severall parts. First, for Jurisdiction that it doth not belong to the Bishop, they offer to prove, Because our Saviour saith, *Go tell the Church*, which Church to interpret of one man, they say is against that place, because he saith whatsoever yee bind against the course of Scripture, because one man is never called a Church, and against common sense, because the word Church there signifies an Assembly, and so they would intimate that Episcopacy is contradictory to Christs particular speech in that place, to the generall course of Scripture, and to common sense. Which if it bee true, the Office

Office of Bishops is not onely irreligious, but unreasonable also, and so not unlawfull onely, but abominable. But what if all this be nothing so? May not jurisdiction belong to the Bishop, unlesse that speech of our Saviour, when hee saith, *Go tell the Church*, be interpreted of one man? Will Logicke allow this inference for good, Our Saviour Christ saith, *Go tell the Church*, which Church must not be interpreted of one man, therefore jurisdiction doth not belong to the Bishop? Is the Bishop no part of the Church? or is he such a part of the Church as unto which that doth not belong, which is pretended to belong to the whole Church? But we must suppose their meaning is, that jurisdiction doth not belong unto the Bishop onely. Nor doe I say it doth, but that in the exercise of that jurisdiction, though belong ing unto others, with him it is not unlawfull for one, as the Bishop, to have precedency before, and presidency over all the rest: and that this is neither against that place, nor against the comse of Scripture, nor against common sense.

Ans. For the two former, let me tell you what I thinke. They that urge this argument say, that to interpret the Church of one man, when our Saviour saith, *Go tell the Church*, is against that place, because he saith, Whatsoever ye bind. The argument I suppose must be this, The Church that must be told, is the Church that may bind: But the Church that may bind, is not one man, *ergo*, the Church that must be told, is not one man. The Minor they prove because our Saviour saith, Whatsoever ye bind, speaking unto many in the plurall number, not unto one alone in the singular. To this it may be said.

First, that the Church that must be told, and the Church that may bind, is not to be understood of the whole community and multitude of the faithfull in a particular Congregation, but of the Elders and Officers onely, as those unto whom the power of the keys is committed by Christ to be exercised by them, as is well maintained against the

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Separatists, by some that are no great friends to the Prebacy. And therefore if in any Congregation, there should be but one guide or officer onely, unto whom the power of the keyes were committed by Christ to be exercised by him in binding and loosing, as at the first planting the Church, sometimes untill more officers be chosen, it must needs be he that should tell that man might well enough be said to tell the Church, without contradicting our Saviour, whom he saith, Whatsoever yee shall bind: for in telling that one man, he should tell him whom our Saviour intended should be told, when he said, Goe tell the Church.

Secondly, what shall hinder, but that our Saviours speech being directed immediately unto the Apostles, and mediately through them to the ordinary Ministers of the Church may be understood as well distributively, as collectively, not onely that what they altogether, but what each of them severally should determine in the exercise of that power of the keyes which was committed unto them by Christ, should be ratified by him. For the first and principall part of that power, which is the power of preaching the Word authoritatively, and administration of the Sacraments, whereby the keyes are exercised in *foro interiori*, in the inward and private Court of Conscience: there is no man I suppose can doubt, but that it was exercised by each of the Apostles severally, and may be by the Ministers of Christ in particular Congregations: otherwise it should not bee lawfull for one man alone to preach the Word, and administer the Sacraments in any Congregation, without the assistance of others. For the other part of the power of the keyes, whereby they are exercised in *foro exteriori*, in the outward and publike Court of Ecclesiasticall Jurisdiction and censure, if it should be so much more proper to a Company, or Assembly of Guides and Rulers in the Church, then the other, as that it may not be lawfully exercised by one alone, but by many together, and that with the notice of, and due respect had unto the whole society,

as some pretend, yet how it will be proved by that Text I cannot see, unless they can shew that the Pronoun *Te*, the same word in the same sentence must of necessity be understood, sometimes distributive, and sometimes onely collective; sometimes Whatsoever ye whether jointly together or severally apart, sometimes Whatsoever ye not severally apart but jointly together shall binde? which in the later sense would not be true of the Apostles by whom not onely the former part of the power of the Keyes was exercised severally but the later also; for in that terrible processe against *Ananias* and *Saphira*, *Act* 5. we read not of so much as any one word interposed by any of the other Apostles or Disciples, but *Peter* himselfe did all: so against *Simon* the sorcerer, *Act* 8. And *Saint Paul* tells *Timothie*, *1 Tim* 1.3. that he besought him to abide still at *Ephesus*, that he might charge some that they taught no other doctrine: that himselfe had delivered *Hymeneus* and *Alexander* unto Satan, *1 Tim* 1.20. And *Titus* that he left him in *Cress* that he should set in order the things that were wanting and ordain Elders in every Cite, *Tit* 1.5. bids him rebuke them sharply whose mouths were to be stopped, *vers* 11.13. yea, to rebuke with all authoritie, *chap* 2. 15. to reject an hereticke after the first and second admonition, *eb* 3. 10. Himselfe being absent did passe sentence of excommunication against the incestuous person at *Corinth*, and afterward absolved him: That in this the Apostles did exercise any extraordinary privilege, which ordinary Officers in the Church are incapable of, and may not lawfully exercise is easier to pretend than prove; how ever this place of *Matth* doth not seem to reach so far. Again, they that urge this Argument say, that to interpret the Church of one man, when our Saviour saith, Go tell the Church is against the course of Scripture because one man is never called a Church. But though one man be never called a Church in Scripture, yet it is not therefore necessary that to interpret the Church of one man must be against the course of Scripture; for though

it be not the course of Scripture to call one man a Church, yet it is the course of Scripture sometimes so direct that speech as unto one man which must be understood of a whole Church, and to use those words concerning a multitude which must be understood concerning one man; for in the second and third Chapters of the *Revelation*, where Christ intends unto the seven Churches of *Asia* is spoken as unto the seven Angels of the seven Churches; and that which is spoken unto *Peter* who was but one man, *Mark* 16. 17. must yet be understood of the rest of the Apostles, and all their successors as well as of him: so *Iosh* 7. 1. when *Achan* had taken of the accursed thing, it is said that the children of Israel committed a trespass: And *Ierem* 2. 1. it is said, that it was told the house of *David* saying, Syria is confederate with *Ephraim*, when the meaning is, it was told *Ahaz* King of Judah that *Rezin* the King of Syria and *Pekah* the son of *Remaliah* King of Israel went up towards Jerusalem to war against it, as it is *verse* 3. In like manner, as that which is told to the whole Church may be said to be told to every particular member of it; so that which is told to the chief and principall member of the Church may be said to be told to the whole Church; as a man is said to see that which his eye sees, or to hear that which his ear hears, and the like; and so I suppose it may appear, that to interpret the Church of one man is not so inconsistent with our Saviours speech in that place, and the course of Scripture in other places as is pretended.

Res. And for the third part of the argument wherein they say, that to interpret the Church of one man when our Saviour saith, Go tell the Church is against common sense, because the word Church there signifies an Assembly, it is in effect to say, that all synecdochicall expressions wherein either the part is put for the whole, or the whole for the part are contrary to common sense; for it can be no more against common sense to interpret the Church of one man than to interpret one man of the Church. And

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yet men think they speak sense and are commonly well enough understood when they say, The Junie hath given up their verdict; though the foreman only speak for them all; & when they say the Court hath ordred such on such a businesse though the Sentence were pronounced by one Judge alone. Or if they mean not the words but the matter, and that it is against common sense: that in an Assembly as the Church is, any thing should be done to or by any one more than another, why do they not then condemn the course of proceeding in Parliament as against common sense, because the House of Commons is an Assembly, and yet they that tell the House any thing direct their speeches to the Speaker which is but one man, yet such an one as without whom all the rest are no House nor can do anything.

Pre. Suppose this were true that you say concerning Jurisdiction, that notwithstanding this argument yet it may belong to the Bishop. What will you say to the other part of the argument concerning Ordination? The Apostle saith unto *Timothie*, The gift that is in thee which was given thee by prophecie with the laying on of the hands of the Presbyterie, *1 Tim. 4. 14.* therefore Ordination also belongs unto the Elders.

Rel. To this it may be said; First, that it runnes upon the same wrong ground that the former did, presupposing that what belongs unto the Elders doth not belong unto the Bishop, as though the Bishop were no Elder, or which is more to the purpose, as though that which belongs unto many might not in respect of precedency before and pre-eminency over the rest be ordinarily exercised by one of them.

Secondly, it may be said, that if that which was done in the Ordination of *Timothie* be a necessary rule alwayes to be observed in the Ordination of all others, then Prophecie and the laying on of the hands of the Presbyterie must be inseperable companions in every Ordination. Not such Prophecie onely as Saint *Paul* speakes of, *1 Cor. 14. 39.*

whereby is understood the ordinary ministeriall interpretation and application of the written word; but such Prophecie as *Timothie* was ordained with, which as appears by that of *1 Tim. 1. 18.* was an exercise of the extraordinary gift of Prophecie in the prediction of future contingencies; and for by this argument, when the extraordinary gift of Prophecie ceased either there must be no more Ordinations, or else they might be without the laying on of the hands of the Presbyterie, as well as without Prophecie, notwithstanding that Text.

Thirdly, it may be said, that the phrase therewith used by the Apostle seemes to impart that the laying on of the hands of the Presbyterie was but a concurrent act as necessary unto another which was more essentiall, implied in the word *given*, and for ought that appears by that Text, as the acts of giving the gift, and laying on of hands, for the agent by whom those acts were exercised might be divers. The rather because the Apostle useth divers prepositions *ad* and *per* not the same *ratione*; he saith indeed, The gift which was given thee by prophecie, as *1 Tim. 1. 6.* he saith, The gift which is in thee by the putting on of my hands; but he saith not, and by the laying on of the hands of the Presbyterie, but *with* the laying on of the hands of the Presbyterie; and it is easie to conceive a difference between that which is done by divers together, and that which is done by one with others. It is true indeed that *per* is sometimes used for *ad*, but then it is construed not with a genitive case as it is here but with an accusative. I speak not of that giving which was virtuall, powerfull, and efficacious, for so it is the same God that worketh all in all, *1 Cor. 12. 6.* but I speak of that giving which was ministeriall, instrumentall, and declaratory; and so the Apostle having said, The gift which was given thee by prophecie it were no absurdity to interpret it by a Metonymie, and understanding the agent by the action; to say that the gift was given by him that did prophecie unto, with the rest of the Presbyters present, by the laying on

on their hands did as much as lay in them concur; otherwise we must conceive that all the Presbyters present at the Ordination of *Timotheus* did not onely lay on their hands together, but likewise with their mouths utter all those words that then were used, whether of prophesie, prayer, benediction, or the like, which the Apostle seemes in a more peculiar manner to assume to himselfe, when he saith, The gift of God which is in thee by the putting on of my hands.

Fourthly, it may be said, that this argument makes nothing against the lawfulness of Episcopacy in the Church of *England*, wherein other Presbyters are to lay on their hands with the Bishop in all Ordinations of Presbyters.

Par. Suppose this were true that you say to prove the invalidity of their second argument, yet I hope you can finde no inconsistency in it with their other tenets or any such contradiction of themselves as you pretended in the other.

Rea. Why not the very same? For if each particular Church hath her own power and authoritie and the use and benefit of all the Ordinances of Christ, and there be nothing to be done without the expresse or tacit consent of the congregation in matters which are proper and peculiar to a particular Church whether in election or ordination of Ministers or in admitting or excommunicating of members as they pretend in their fourth proposition, *page 32.* How then shall Jurisdiction and Ordination belong onely to the Elders, as is presupposed in this second Argument? Perhaps they will say, that what is done by the assembly of the Elders is done either by the expresse or tacit consent of the whole congregation. And may not others say as well that what is done by the Bishop is done either by the expresse or tacit consent of the other Elders, and consequently of the whole congregation? Or if they will pretend it unlawfull for the rest of the Elders to give any such expresse or tacit consent to that which is done by the Bishop, Why shall it

not be as unlawfull for the rest of the congregation to give any such expresse or tacit consent unto that which is done by the Elders? If that which is done by one be right, and that which ought to be done, shall it be unlawfull for one to do it? Or if that which is done by many be wrong and that which ought not to be done, shall it therefore be lawfull because done by many? If it be in many respects expedient both for the members of each Church, whether Ministers or People, and for the right governing and well-being of the particular Churches in a nation professing Christian Religion, that besides their particular Assemblies and Elderships they convene by their Commissioners, Ministers, and Elders in greater Assemblies that matters that concerne all the Churches within their bounds respective, may with common advice and consent be agreed upon for their good and edification, as they pretend in their sixth proposition, and yet the Church may have no Office or Office-bearers but such as are by divine appointment which are Elders or Deacons, or more particularly Pastours, Teachers, Elders and Deacons, by which Christ hath provided for all the necessities of the Church, as they have it in their third proposition, why should it be thought any more inexpedient much lesse unlawfull to convene by Bishops than by Commissioners, or what evidence of divine appointment can they shew by which Ministers or Elders are warranted to be Commissioners and forbidden to be Bishops.

Par. For this they tell you in their first proposition, that Church discipline is to be learned from the Word of God, and in such particulars as are common to the Church with other Societies is to be directed by the light of nature, the Church observing alwayes the generall rules of the Word; and therefore me thinks though the convening of particular Churches in generall Assemblies by their Commissioners be not expressely appointed by the Word of God, yet it is sufficient that they are directed thereunto by the light of nature,

nature, which tells them it is expedient for them so to do, it being one of those particulars which are common to the Church with other Societies to be joyned together in one common Government for their common good, either voluntarily of themselves being formerly altogether free and independent upon any humane authority or jurisdiction in matters Ecclesiasticall, but what they had severally within themselves, or else by direction and appointment of those superiour powers to which they are subject and subordinate.

Res. Very good, and may not then in like manner the precedencie and preidencie of Bishops above other Elders in publike Churches joyned together in one common Government for their common good be both lawfull and expedient, as one of those particulars which is common to the Church with other Societies, wherein it is to be directed by the light of nature? What direction can the light of nature in this respect give for the one that will not as well hold good for the other? For no man I suppose either doth or will pretend but that in the one as well as the other the Church must alwayes observe the generall rules of the word, that all things be done decently and in order, and to edification. And that all things in Church Assemblies may not be done decently and in order, and to edification as well by Bishops as by Commissioners, Ministers, and Elders is not yet I thinke discovered, either by the light of nature or revealed light in Scripture; nor have the lights of the Christian Church, who at and since the beginning of Reformation have discovered many secrets concerning Antichrist and his Hierarchie which were not known to former ages for ought I know, yet shewed us this.

Par. And yet perhaps they may have shewed it, though you know it not; or if already they have not, yet they may do hereafter if they thinke it necessary. In the meantime, what say you to the third Argument? We finde no rules nor instructions in Scripture for the ordering of Bishops

shops as distinguished from other Elders, Pastors, and Teachers, and therefore we cannot believe that there is any such distinct Office. *Indicent nobis loca*, as *Voetius* speaks, let them shew us those places of Scripture where is that peculiar Ministrie, and where are those speciall instructions which belong to the Bishops alone, and not unto other Pastours?

Res. For this Argument if I were willing to wave it and thought it more safe to avoid the force than stand in the face, and bear the brunt of it, I could say that logically resolved it will be found to consist meerly of particulars; for the antecedent is we finde no rules, &c. and the conclusion is therefore we cannot believe, &c. whereupon to infer the unlawfulness of Prelacie must presuppose that Prelacie cannot be lawfull unlesse they that urge this Argument believe that there is such a distinct Office; but to let that passe, the thing they aime at (I suppose) is this, Episcopacie is not lawfull unlesse there be such a distinct Office, such a peculiar Ministrie. But there is no such distinct Office no such peculiar Ministrie; *ergo*, Episcopacie is not lawfull: the *minor* they offer proof of thus, If there be such a distinct Office, such a peculiar Ministrie as Episcopacie, then there are rules and instructions in Scripture for the ordering of Bishops as distinguished from other Elders, Pastours, and Teachers; but there are no rules and instructions in Scripture for the ordering of Bishops, as distinguished from other Elders, Pastours, and Teachers; *ergo*, there is no such distinct Office, no such peculiar Ministrie as Episcopacie. Thus I thinke I have put this Argument home to the full force it hath with all the advantage that can be given it, and yet I suppose it may be said to conclude as little to the purpose as the other two. For first it makes nothing against the lawfulness of Episcopacie unlesse it be pretended to be of divine institution. For I presume they will not denie but that an Office of humane institution may be lawfull although there be no rules nor instructions in Scriptures for the ordering of those by whom that Office shall be exercised, as distinguished from other Officers. Perhaps

haps they will say that they speak onely of Church Officers and that no Office in the Church is lawfull unless it be of divine institution; and if it be of divine institution, there must be rules and instructions in Scripture for the ordering of those by whom that Office shall be exercised, as distinguished from other Officers; but then they must remember that if the Office of Bishops in the Church be proved indeed to be lawfull, they must of necessity either acknowledge it to be of divine institution, or else forego that pretended principle whereupon this Argument is grounded: and if they cannot prove the Office of Bishops in the Church to be unlawfull, neither can they prove it not to be of divine institution; but if it be of divine institution, it must be not onely lawfull but necessary: and which of the two they will rather sticke to when they see that both cannot stand together, I leave it to themselves to choose, in the mean time let us consider that the whole strength of this third Argument depends upon this presupposed Proposition, that no Office in the Church is lawfull, unless it be of divine institution; this they have not so much as expressed here, but in their first and third Propositions page 31. they say, that Church Discipline is to be learned from the plain and perfect Word of God, and that the Church may have no Office nor Office-bearers but such as are by divine appointment, yet there they offer no proof of it neither, but barely propound it as that which amongst themselves they are agreed upon, and therefore I suppose their silence might be sufficiently answered by saying nothing; but it may be they thinke there is enough said to that purpose by others, and are of his minde, who taking upon him to discover the unlawfulness and danger of a limited Prelate, or general all presidency in the Church very artificially insinuates with his Reader in his two first pages, and would have him to beleeve that it ought to be taken for a supposition, and as a principle undeniable, that all the Offices and Vocations in the House of God must be of God and not of men, and

that such as are of men and not of God are unlawfull; that the assertion of a principall Office and calling in the Church meerly upon humane right were a challenge of the Scriptures that they are not perfect and an exalting of the wisdom of men above the wisdom of Christ, that man can no more make the Office than he can give the grace, that from Christ both the institution of the Office and the blessing of the Officers must come; it is therefore (saith he) supposed to be no lesse unlawfull to adde an Office to divine institutions than it is unlawfull to take away an Office warranted by divine institution, the one wounding the bodye of the Church monstrous, the other maiming it maimed. We are forbidden *precepto negativo* to presume to governe the Church by humane wisdom, we are commanded *precepto affirmativo* to follow the rule of divine wisdom, and we are warranted *precepto comparativo* rather to follow Christ than Antichrist, for so we must speak (saith he) because it cannot be denied by any but such as deny the Pope to be Antichrist. That he whose heat, though perhaps his calme examiner hath said enough to cool, yet I hope it shall be no presumption for me to plucke asunder some of the coales which he hath quenched in a heap together. And to begin with that particular first which is laid down as undeniable, that to maintain the Office of a Bishop lawfull, is to follow Antichrist rather than Christ, which (he saith) cannot be denied by any one that is true the Pope to be Antichrist; no man's presumption he makes against his own knowledge, having in the former page acknowledged, that those who are his adversaries in this cause, who dispute against him and others for Ecclesian Bishops, and for Episcopacie by divine right are not withstanding in this dispute against the universall discipline of the Pope, which discipline they cannot do, and yet deny the Pope to be Antichrist, if the principall point of his Antichristianisme be, that he claimeth to maintaine universall discipline, as this Antichristianisme must denie,

having

having as he hath page 90 designed is as the last and highest step of that ladder by which the Pope is mounted up to be universall Bishop and Antichrist; where if universall Bishop and Antichrist be not Synonymall termes that signifie one and the same thing, it behoves him to distinguish and tell us wherein the difference between them lies; and page 17. he saith; that nothing is more pressed by the strongest amongst them that pretend the antiquitie of Episcopacie than that the Angels of the Churches of Asia were Bishops like unto themselves; out of which number (I suppose) he will not exclude the learned Bishop of *Downham*, nor yet pretend that he was such an one as denied the Pope to be Antichrist: when he hath reconciled these his own contradictions then let him object to his adversaries that this his undeniable principle is supposed by themselves; in the mean time (if as this Author saith) it was presupposed by Christ himselfe that no Office in the Church must be of humane but of divine institution, and yet the Antichrist the Pope presupposeth that his own universall Episcopacie alone is of divine institution, and that the Office of all other Bishops is derived immediately from himselfe and not from Christ: let him with an indifferent eye and a minde impartially disposed and not interested look upon his adversaries tenet, who (as he saith) will prove Episcopacie (not the universall Episcopacie of the Pope, but that of Diocesan Bishops) by divine right, and his own who denies it any right at all but what it hath from Antichrist, and then let him say which of the two doth rather follow Christ than Antichrist, and *ergo* which is better warranted *precepto comparativo*. But he saith, we are forbidden *precepto negativo*, to presume to governe the Church by humane wisdom, and we are commanded *precepto affirmativo* to follow the rule of divine wisdom: where he seems to presuppose such a contradiction between humane and the rule of divine wisdom as makes them altogether inconsistent and unrecordable; else why should

he not conceive that wisdom governing the Church by humane, might follow the rule of divine wisdom? Our Saviour hath not set serpentine wisdom and dove-like innocency at such a distance but that they may sometimes meet together and accord well enough in the same subject: between fleshly carnall wisdom indeed and that which is divine and spiritual there is not a disparity only but a contrariety also, Because the carnall minde is enmity against God, for it is not subject to the Law of God nor indeed can be, *Rom. 8.7.* But between divine and humane wisdom there is no contrariety though there be a disparity; the one may be subordinately serviceable to the other; Saint Paul to the *Ephesians* saith, See that ye walke circumspectly not as fooles but as wise; *Ephes. 5. 15.* and to the *Colossians* chap. 4. 5. Walke in wisdom towards them that are without, and taxeth the *Corinthians* either for the want of that wisdom or of the use and exercise thereof when he speaketh to their shame, and saith, Is it for that there is not a wise man among you? No, not one that shall be able to judge between his brethren? *1 Cor. 6. 5.* May there not a greater measure of humane wisdom be conferred upon, and exercised by some than others amongst those in the Church whose Offices are of divine institution? And may there not be matters to be judged between those brethren whose office in the Church is the same for the judging whereof that wisdom may be necessary? If not, what expediency can there be for particular Churches to convene by their Commissioners in greater Assemblies? or what care needs there to be taken in the choice of those Commissioners? Is it a challenge of the Scriptures that they are not perfect, and an exalting of the wisdom of men above the wisdom of Christ, to say, that the office and calling of Commissioners in greater Assemblies of the Church is meerly upon humane right? Can man no more make that office nor be can give the grace? or is both the institution of that office and the blessing of those officers from Christ? or is the body

body of that Church monstrous wherein that office is set up? or is it of God onely and not of men? In answering this let him answer himself, and see whether his Arguments drawn from the Baptisme of *John*, the Apostleship of Saint *Paul*, and Priest hood of *Moses*, will not be as militant against the office of Commissioners, and so of moderators as of Bishops. But to returne to that we hold in hand, as they say that the Church may have for offshoot office-bearers but such as are by divine appointment. If this should be granted yet can it make no more against Diocesan Bishops than against Lay-Elders. If they say that the office of Elders is an office of divine appointment so will their adversaries say, that the office of Bishops is. If they reply, but not of Diocesan Bishops, so will their adversaries, but not of Lay-Elders: and to the latter part of their Argument will use their own words, and say, we finde no rules nor instructions in Scripture for the ordering of Lay-Elders as distinguished from other Elders, Pastors, and Teachers, and therefore we cannot believe there is any such distinct office. *Indicent nobis loca*, let them shew us those places of Scripture, where is that peculiar Ministry, and where are those speciall instructions which belong to Lay-Elders alone, and not unto other Elders? and the like as before of Commissioners. But because this is but determination, and onely to argue against the pretended Presbytery, not to answer for the impleaded Prelacy, let us further consider what may be said to their antecedent, we finde no rules nor instructions in Scripture for the ordering of Bishops, as distinguished from other Elders, Pastors, and Teachers. *Indicent nobis loca*, let them shew us those places of Scripture where is that peculiar Ministry, and where are those speciall instructions which belong to the Bishops alone, and not unto other Pastors? *Indicent nobis loca*. First, it may be said that if they speak of Bishops as distinguished from other Elders, Pastors, and Teachers, as that they are Bishops onely, and not either Elders, Pastors,

or Teachers, also they must *wait* for their answer till they meet with such Bishops, for in the Church of *England* they require persons that there are any such, where none but those that are Elders before are admitted to be Bishops.

Secondly, it may be said that the rules and instructions which are found in Scripture for the ordering all Elders, Pastours, and Teachers, are the rules and instructions by which the Bishops are to order themselves in the governing of all those Elders, Pastours, and Teachers that are under their charge; as the same rules by which a Scholar is to learn are the rules by which his Master is to teach him; as the Lawes by which Subjects are to lead their lives are the same Lawes by which their Rulers are to govern them; and therefore though the Office of a King be distinguished from all other Offices both in Church and Common-wealth, yet *Dauid's* rule and instruction for him is no other but the same which is generall, not onely for all other Rulers but even for all men whatsoever; justice was the fear of the Lord, *1 Sam. 12. 3.* And *Moses Deut. 17. 18. 19.* prescribeth him, when he sits upon the throne of his Kingdom to write him a copy of that Law which God by *Moses* had given unto all Israel in a book out of that which was before the Elders the Levites; and it shall be with him (saith *God*) and he shall read therein all the dayes of his life, that he may learne to fear the Lord his God, to keep all the words of this Law and these statutes to do them. So that it is not alwayes necessary that he who is to be proceeded before and president over others in the exercise of any authority should have speciall instructions apart peculiar to himselfe whereby he may be distinguished from others; thus are implied in the same Commission with him, as it is alwayes seen to be so practised; those things which peculiarly belong to such proceedings and presidency being matters of order, decency, and comeliness, wherein common discretion and prudent experience guided by the light of naturall understanding, and rules of reason are more of use than the strictest instructions.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, if those be speciall instructions and rules for the ordering of Bishops, as distinguished from other Elders, Pastours, and Teachers: whereby they who are Elders themselves are directed how to exercise authority and govern themselves in charging, commanding, rebuking, excommunicating other Elders and Deacons, and so how to behave themselves in the house of God as Officers over other Officers, the places have been long ago shewed them where those instructions are in the Epistles to *Timothie* and *Titus*, those places being generally so interpreted by all Christian Writers, and that interpretation warranted by the generall practise of all Christian Churches at all times; and in all places, some Churches and Writers in some places only of late yeares, and those but a few in comparison of the rest excepted. If they pretend that those instructions were given by Saint Paul to *Timothie* and *Titus*, not as to Bishops but as to Evangelists: they must remember that the Office of Evangelists, as it was distinct from other inferior offices was to be exercised in planting of Churches by preaching the Gospel unto them that had never received it, not in ordering and governing of Churches already planted. So *Eusebius* in his *History*, *lib. 3. cap. 20. De Evangelistarum potestate hoc est: utique de plantando: ut ubi non erat presbiterium: Evangelistam mittimus: ad hoc ut plantet ecclesiam. Scripsimus etiam magno Pontifici sanctissimo. And that the instructions given unto *Timothie* and *Titus* by Saint Paul, touching not only the planting of new Churches, in Epistles, but also in places where the Gospel had never been preached, but the ordering, maintaining and governing of those Churches there which were already planted, and therefore though *Timothie* and *Titus* might at that time be in other places, or towards other persons exercising the office of Evangelists, yet there and then according to Saint Pauls instructions they were to exercise the office of Bishops not only over others but even over themselves themselves were Elders in the Churches and appointed in the words.*

Pra. That is evens as much as to say Bishops over Bishops, and Elders over Elders, or Elders over Bishops: for as it followes in the fourth Argument we finde in the judgement of the holy Ghost that a Bishop and Elder are one, as appears *Acts 20.* by comparing *verses 17.* with the *28.* those that are called in *verse 17.* are called Bishops in the *28.* which the English translate Overseers, and onely here: so *Th. 1. 5.* compared with the seventh, where those who are said to be Elders in the fifth verse are each of them called a Bishop, in the seventh otherwise there should be no force in the particle *for.* This is the arguing of the Apostle, Ordain Elders *verse 5.* If any be blamelesse, *verse 6.* For a Bishop must be blamelesse, *verse 7.* and they quote in the margin, *Gerard. de Ministris Ecclesiasticis,* collecting the same conclusion out of that Text. What can you say to this? *Ans.* I can say, that it stickes to their fingers that thinke to strike the Bishops with it, as the other former reasons did, and they cannot easily rid themselves of it, but that it will involve their Lay Elders and entangle them in the like contradictions as before: for if a Bishop and an Elder be all one, then a Lay Elder must be a Lay-Bishop, and consequently a Lay-pastour too, if the Author of the discovery before mentioned be in the right, who saith *pag. 4.* that the office of a Bishop, and the office of a Pastour are not different, and that the office of the Bishop and Elder is one and the same. And what then shall become of their third Proposition before mentioned wherein they particularly reckon up the office-bearers which the Church by divine appointment is to have to be Pastours, Teachers, Elders, and Deacons; for that Pastours and Teachers are distinct Officers by divine appointment they may say if they will, but they can never prove. But leaving this to be resolved with the rest, the Argument that here is offered to prove the unlawfulness of Prelacy is drawn from the identity of a Bishop and an Elder, and that is inferred upon the application

application of both those names to the same persons.

But first, unlesse they be alwayes so applied in the same sense and alike properly, the identity of the things they are applied unto will not follow thereupon. Saint *Paul* calles himselfe sometimes an Apostle, sometimes a servant of *JESUS CHRIST*, yet it will not therefore follow that an Apostle and servant of *Jesus Christ* are all one, but there may be servants of *Jesus Christ* which yet are not Apostles though *Paul* were both, and so though it were granted that the same persons in the places quoted are called and were both Bishops and Elders, yet it will not therefore follow that a Bishop and an Elder are all one, or that all that are Elders are Bishops, though all that are Bishops are Elders. The twelve that were chosen and sent forth by Christ, *Matth. 10.* are called Disciples, *verse 1.* and Apostles, *verse 2.* they were both Disciples and Apostles, yet it will not therefore follow that a Disciple and an Apostle are all one, for though the twelve that are called Apostles were called Disciples too, yet there were others called Disciples that are not called Apostles, as the seventy sent forth, *Luke 10. 1. &c.*

Secondly, to that of the *Acts* it may be said that in the 17. *verse.* they are called Elders with relation to that office which before they had borne in the Church of Ephesus, and Bishops in the 28. with relation to that office which they were to exercise afterward not onely as before whilest they were Elders onely in feeding and ruling the people, but likewise afterward as Bishops also in watching over the other Elders amongst whom some should arise speaking perverse things to draw away Disciples after them, as it followes *verse 32.* yea, *verse 29.* the Apostle tels them, that grievous Wolves should enter in among them, not sparing the flocke. Since then their worke was now to be greater, was it not fit that they should be furnished with further authority, that what before they could not do as Elders onely, now they might do as Bishops also? Especially

cially in the absence of *Timothie*, whom formerly the Apostle had left there with Episcopall Authoritie amongst them: if Authority to precede before and preside over others in the exercise of the power of Ecclesiasticall Jurisdiction and Ordination be Episcopall Authority. And why might not the Apostle mean it in a generall sense and signification, and call the Elders Bishops, because they were for the time to supply that room in governing the Church, which *Timothie* before had done, and other Bishops after did? Or why should not *ἐπισκοποι* there be a generall word to signifie Overseers, as the English translates it, and not a particular name of some Church-officers distinguished from others, as well as *πρεσβυτεροι* to signifie Ancestours, *Heb. 12. 2.* which *Beza* translates *Majores* there, and if I should say onely there, I thinke I should not erre: or as *διδασκαλοι* to signifie a Minister of what kinde soever, as *Rom. 13. 4.* and in sundry other places? Or why should it argue a Bishop and an Elder to be all one, because in this place those that are called Elders in *verse 17.* are called Bishops in the 28. any more than it will argue a Draconship, Bishopricke, and Apostleship to be all one, because *Acts 1.* that which is called *διακονια* a Ministry, *verse 17.* is called *ἐπισκοπικη* a Bishopricke, *verse 20.* and *ἀποστολικη* Apostleship, *verse 25.* Will the consequence be any better in the concrete than it will be in the abstract? Or would not this be a better deduction from these and the like places, that because those who are called Elders are called Bishops also, therefore the office of an Elder and the office of a Bishop are not so distinct but that the same person may exercise them both, he that is an Elder be a Bishop also, and he that is a Bishop be an Elder also, and both Bishops and Elders be Deacons? In which respect it is no wonder that Saint Paul telling *Timothie* how Bishops and Deacons must be qualified, *1 Tim. 3. 1. &c.* makes no distinct mention of Elders: and directing *Titus* how Elders and Bishops must be qualified, makes no mention at all of Deacons; and that the directi-

ons which he gives in both places both for the qualification of Bishops and Elders and Deacons are in effect the same with small or no variety; so little it should seem did Saint Paul then thinke it necessary that in every particular Congregation, there should be so many severall distinct officers as some men now adayes pretend.

As for that place of *Titus* and the Argument drawn from the particle *For*, wherein they say there should be no force unlesse those who were said to be Elders in *verse 5.* were each of them called a Bishop in the seventh may be said.

First, that if the Apostle had intended to call each of them a Bishop in *verse 7.* whom in *verse 5.* He called Elders it is like he would rather have used the same number, the plurall in both places, and have said not a Bishop but Bishops, as before he said not an Elder but Elders.

Secondly, there may be force in the particle *For*, though each of them be not called a Bishop in the 7. who are said to be Elders in *verse 5.* For though this be the arguing of the Apostle, Ordain Elders, *verse 5.* If any be blamelesse, *verse 6.* For a Bishop must be blamelesse, *verse 7.* Yet there is no necessity that the Argument must be gathered, as it is by Gerard whom they quote in the margin, *Illi constituendi sunt Presbyteri qui sunt sine crimine, quia Episcopum cuius officium potestas iurisdictionis & gradus differt à Presbytero oportet esse crimine.* Those are to be ordained Elders that are blamelesse, because a Bishop whose office, power, jurisdiction, and degree doth differ from an Elder must be blamelesse. But it may be gathered thus, *Illi constituendi sunt Presbyteri qui sunt sine crimine, quia Episcopum qui ex Presbyteris eligendum est oportet esse sine crimine.* Those are to be ordained Elders that are blamelesse, because a Bishop who is to be chosen out of the Elders must be blamelesse. And so the Argument will carry no lesse but rather more force with it, being not drawn *ab eodem ad idem*, or onely *à pari* but *à maiori*. For he that is not fit to be an

Elder how shall he be fit to be a Bishop? as the Apostle upon the like occasion argues from publike good Government to private. For if a man know not how to rule his own house, how shall he take care of the house of God? *1 Tim. 3. 5.* If they say there is no necessity that these places of the *Acts* and *Titus* should be thus understood, and that these are but uncertain conjectures, it may withall be said that there is no incongruity in them, nor any contradiction either of the words or meaning of those places, but more probability of truth than that the next and all succeeding ages of the Church for fifteen hundred yeares together should be ignorant of what was practised in the Apostles dayes: or knowing it should set so light by it, and so little esteem a principall point of the kingly office of Christ (as the Presbyterian discipline is pretended to be) as with a joint consent to agree and continue in the practise of a course so different from or contrary to it, yea if some may be beleev'd, inconsistent with it and putting down that forme of Government which is necessary to set up that which is unlawfull. And if it may be made to appear that not onely in the times of *Augustine* or *Cyprian*, or *Ignatius*, but even in the times of the Apostles themselves, the Prelacy or office of Bishops (as they are distinguished from other Elders) had its being in the Church, is it not most agreeable to reason, that when the Apostles themselves in Scripture speak of Bishops and Elders and Deacons, they should sometimes at least (if not alwayes) be understood to speak distinctly of them as severall office-bearers in the Church? Nay, what if they themselves that plead against the lawfulness of Prelacy must make it to appear, or eat their own words, and unsay again what they have said and urged as one of their principall arguments against Episcopacy? Some of them say, that from this perpetuall prebendancy and primacy of order, as the first step of the ladder, Antichrist hath mounted up to be universall Bishop and Antichrist, whereupon they observe that Prelacy and Poperie

perie are inseperable, and that Antichrist was conceived in the time of the Apostles: others, as you urged before, say, the office of the Bishops and their Prelaticall Hierarchie did bring forth the Pope in ancient times; if this be so, let them tell us first, whether any mother can be said to bring forth a childe but she by whom it is conceived. Secondly, whether any mother can cenceive a childe before she her selfe be borne and brought forth, and so have a reall being and existence in the world. Thirdly, whether Prelacy must not therefore of necessity be pre-existent unto, or co-existent at least in the Church with the first conception of Antichrist. Fourthly, whether any then can deny that the office of Bishops and their Prelaticall Hierarchie was existent in the Church in time of the Apostles, but such as deny the Pope to be Antichrist, or that Antichrist was conceived in the Apostles dayes, or that the Bishops and their Prelaticall Hierarchie did bring forth the Pope? whilest they unty these knots which they themselves have knit upon their own threds, let us if you will, go on to the other arguments.

Pr. Their fifth argument is this, One Bishop now hath jurisdiction over divers Counties and Hundreds of Churches, but in the Apostles times there were divers Bishops in every City, *1st. 1. 5.* Elders in every City who (as we have proved) are the same with Bishops, *Phil. 1. 1.* Bishops and Deacons at Philippi. It is certain, in these places they were not all Christians, it is most likely very few of them, and yet those few had divers Bishops set over them, other kinde of Bishops than these the Scripture knowes not: yet in these times the Elders had extraordinary gifts, as appears, *James 5.* where the Apostle sets down a rule for all Churches in those times, that when any was sicke the Elders should anoint him with oyl, and so he should recover. If then Elders had then miraculous gifts, and yet there were divers appointed for every City, then it cannot be conceived that now when Elders have no such extraor-

dinary gifts yet that one should be set over many Counties it may be thousands of Congregations. What can be said to this?

Res. To this it may be said. First, that it is not another argument, but onely an amplification of the former presupposed to be proved already, that Elders and Bishops are the same, & therefore the same answer serves it, for as much as concernes the main ground of reason upon which it is built.

Secondly, for that which is further added here out of *Phil. 1. 1.* Bishops and Deacons at Philippi, two things they seem to intimate therein; first, that Bishops and Elders in the Apostles times were one and the same, because the Apostle onely makes mention of Bishops and Deacons. But to this it may be said, that by the same reason it might be as well concluded that in the Apostles dayes Elders and Deacons were the same, because the Apostle onely makes mention of Bishops and Deacons, and the rather because *S. Luke, Acts 20* makes mention onely of the Elders of the Church at Ephesus; and they that urge this argument say, that the whole charge of all the affairs of the Church were left by *S. Paul* to the Elders, to those Elders there, that were both to feed and rule the Church; so that the true inference thereupon should rather be, that Bishops, Elders, and Deacons are not such distinct Offices in the Church as must of necessity be exercised in every congregation by severall persons, but that Elders may do that which Deacons should do, and that Bishops may do that which Elders should do; which accords very well with the order observed in the Church of England, where none are admitted to be Bishops but those who before were Elders, nor any be Elders but those who before were Deacons, nor do those which are ordained Bishops cease thereupon to be Elders, nor those which are ordained Elders cease thereupon to be Deacons, but being afterward promoted unto higher Offices having still power as occasion is offered, to performe

performe the duties of those that are inferiour, as *Omne maius continet in se minus*. And as there to the Philippians the Apostle makes mention onely of Bishops and Deacons, so to *Titus* he makes mention onely of Bishops and Elders, and neither there nor to *Timothie* of Pastours, and Doctours, which yet are pretended to be distinct Officers in the Church by them that urge this argument in their third proposition before mentioned. As well therefore may they conclude against themselves from this place to the Philippians, that Elders, Pastours, Doctours, and Deacons in the Apostles times were one and the same, as that Bishops and Elders were.

The other thing that they seeme to intimate in urging that place to the Philippians, is that at Philippi, there were divers Bishops: which being granted, yet all that they can infer thereupon, is no more but that in one City there may be more Bishops than one: but that will make no more against the lawfulnessse of the office of Bishops than it will against the lawfulnessse of the office of Elders or Deacons, because in one citie there may be more Elders and Deacons than one; besides that, it doth not appear by the Text whether all those Bishops and Deacons there mentioned by Saint *Paul* were usually resident at Philippi, or whether some of them might not come from other places and meet there as in a generall Assembly, when Saint *Pauls* Epistle was to be delivered unto them. But they say, that in the Apostles times there were divers Elders in every citie, and that they would prove by *Tit. 1. 5.* Elders in every citie: but then they must remember that those Elders in every citie (understand it in Crete, a very large Iland, wherein there were anciently an hundred cities) were all to be ordained and governed by *Titus*; and so, whate ever those Elders were, or were to have, yet *Titus* was to have that power of jurisdiction and ordination over all Crete: but that in one citie there must of necessity be more than one Elder will never be necessarily concluded out of those words

words, unless out of the like words, *Acts* 14. 23. they can conclude that in one Church there must of necessity be more then one Elder: for there it is Elders in every Church. The truth is, that the meaning of that phraise is City by City, Church by Church: so that no City wherein there was a Church, was to be left without an Elder, nor any Church in any City, if any City there were, more then one Church. For that every severall Church must have a severall Elder, if any do, yet I will not deny. But that many Elders in the same City, or in severall Cities or Churches, might not bee under the authority of one Bishop, is no more proved out of this, then before it was out of other places. That which they say, that one Bishop now hath jurisdiction over divers Counties and hundreds of Churches, is true indeed of some, but not of all Bishops in the Church of England, if it be true, as I suppose it is, that in the County of Kent there are two Bishopricks, Canterbury and Rochester, that Oxford hath onely Oxfordshire, Gloucester, but part of Gloucestershire, Rochester, but 98 Parishes, Carlisle, but 93. to say nothing of the Bishop of Man, against whose Office, some of those exceptions that are taken to others, would peradventure prove but impertinent. This therefore makes not against the Office of Bishops, to prove it unlawfull, but against the present division of Diocesses in the Church of England, to prove it unequall. And so I will not deny but that it is as of Parishes also, and not unequall onely, but in many places very inconvenient: and therefore that which they inferre that it cannot be conceived that one Elder should be set over many Counties, it may be thousands of Congregations, I shall willingly grant, not of Elders onely, but of Bishops also, and heartily wish it may not be so. But if by authority, that inequality should be taken away, and the number of Bishops so augmented, that not every Congregation onely might have an Elder of it's owne, but every County also a Bishop of it's owne, or more then one, if need require, and so the hundreds and thousands of Churches, over which
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some Bishops now have jurisdiction be reduced unto some scores apiece, this argument would afterward serve to no purpose.

Thirdly, for that which they adde, it is certain in these places (namely, whereof Saint Paul speaks, *1 Ti. 1. 5.* and *Ph. 1. 1.*) they were not all Christians, it is most likely very few of them, and yet those few had divers Bishops set over them; understanding Bishops but as they would have it understood of Elders, if it argue any thing, it must be either that every congregation though there be but a very few Christians in it must have many Elders set over it, or else that in no congregation there must be more than a few people though there be divers Elders; and whether of the two soever they infer they must presuppose that the Churches of those times must be paternes to all succeeding ages, of the number as well as of the kindes of their officers, and of the proportion of the people that ought to be in every particular congregation; which if it be granted in time they may go about to bring Church-government from Parishes to private families, and urge for their evidence *Rom. 16. 5.* *1 Cor. 16. 19.* *Col. 4. 15.* *Phil. 2.* where the Apostle speaks of Churches in houses more expressly than ever he speaks of any Lay-elders, Commissioners, moderatours, clothes, Church-sessions, or generall assemblies; and yet they that urge this argument pretend, that Church-discipline is to be learned from the plain and perfect Word of God, and that the Church may have no Office nor Office-bearers but such as are by divine appointment, *pag. 31.*

Fourthly, when they adde that in those times the Elders had extraordinary gifts of working miracles, and yet there were divers appointed for every citie, whereupon they would infer that it cannot be conceived that now when Elders have no such extraordinary gifts, yet that one should be set over many congregations; it may be said, That the present defect of extraordinary gifts makes nothing against the lawfulnessse of any perpetuall office in the Church, but

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rather confirms a necessity thereof: for if it were granted that every Elder then had extraordinary gifts, and in that respect was better able to discharge all duties whatsoever in that congregation over which he was set then any Elder can be now adayes, will it thereupon follow that it is unlawful now for one Elder as a Bishop to have precedency before, and presidency over other Elders? Or will it not rather follow that such precedency and presidency of Bishops over other Elders is necessary now though it were not, because then every Elder had extraordinary gifts which now none have; for though they that had extraordinary gifts, and so were immediately assisted by the Spirit were equally able to do all that was necessary for the well ordering of themselves and the Churches over which they were set, yet they that have onely ordinary gifts are not so equally able to guide and governe either others or themselves, but that the superintendence, oversight, and inspection of some that excell above others may be alwayes usefull and profitable, yea sometimes requisite and necessary; whom to call Bishops, as generally they have been called in all Christian Churches except some that of late have varied is but to speak in that language which having been most and longest in use should in all probabilities be best understood.

Pro. The longer the worse, for it is a dangerous thing to take words that are common to many things and appropriate them unto a particular. If it once gain the appropriation of a name or title it will soon challenge the thing it selfe, and the keeping up of the name after it hath been abused will keep up the thing it selfe.

Rel. So they say that urge these arguments, page 26. but withall they must remember that it is as dangerous to take those words that are appropriate unto a particular, and extend them as common unto many things; which if they do not extend the word Bishops unto Elders, yet sure they do; that extend the word Elders unto such Officers in the Church

Church as are not to labour in the word and doctrine, and have no authoritie either to teach or feed the people, and in so doing according to their own positions they must extend the word Bishops also unto them. But what is the next, their sixth argument?

Pre. Their sixth is this, the Scripture acknowledgeth no superiority or inferiority between officers of the same kind; one Apostle was not over another, nor one Evangelist over another; (indeed the Scripture saith, The spirits of the Prophets are subject to the Prophets; but this subjection was mutuall, one not having more power over another than that other had over him) neither is one Deacon over another; and what colour of reason can be given, that one Pastour or Teacher should have power over another?

Rel. To this it may be said, that the Scripture doth acknowledge superioritie and inferioritie between Officers of the same kinde in the Campe, the Common-wealth, the Church. In the Campe among Souldiers, *2 Sam. 23.8.* we reade of the Tactimonite that sate in the seat chief among the Captaines; of *Abisbai*, that he was chief among three, and had the name among three, Was he not most honourable of three? therefore he was their Captain, howbeit he attained not unto the first three, *verse 18, 19.* Of *Benaiah*, *verse 23.* that he was more honourable than the thirty but attained not to the first three. And the Church is compared to an Army with banners, *Gal. 6.10.* the Officers therein to souldiers, *2 Tim. 2.3.* In the Commonwealth amongst Magistrates, we reade that *Moses* chose able men out of all Israel, and made them Heads over the People, Rulers of thousands, Rulers of hundreds, Rulers of fifties, and Rulers of tennes, and they judged the People at all seasons, the hard causes they brought unto *Moses*, but every small matter they judged themselves, *Exod. 18. 25, 26.* That *Darius* set over the Kingdom one hundred and twenty Princes which should be over the whole Kingdom, and over these three Presidents of whom *Daniel* was chief,

6.1,2. In the Church amongst the Priests, amongst the Prophets. Amongst the Priests we reade of the chief Priest, and the Priests of the second Order, 2 Kings 13.4. Of more chief men found of the sonnes of Eleazar, then of the sonnes of Ithamar, 1 Chron. 24.4. Amongst the Prophets we reade, that when Saul sent messengers to take David, they saw the company of the Prophets prophesying, and Samuel standing as appointed over them, 1 Sam. 19.20. Of the sonnes of the Prophets sitting before Elisha, 2 Kings 4.38. and asking leave of him as of their master, to enlarge their dwellings, 2 Kings 6.1, &c. Therefore to say, that the Scripture acknowledgeth no superiority or inferioritie between Officers of the same kinde is largely spoken; but we must suppose they mean Church-officers of the same kinde under the Gospel. If so, then either they must exclude Christian Princes from all Offices of Government in the Church contrary to their fourth Proposition before mentioned, or deny that the Scriptures doth acknowledge any superiority and inferiority between them and other Officers of the same kinde; contrary to that of Saint Paul to Titus, ch. 3.1. Put them in minde to be subject to principalities, and powers, and to obey Magistrates: and to that of Saint Peter, 1 Pet. 2.13,14. Submit your selves to every ordinance of man for the Lords sake, whether it be to the King as supreme, or unto Governours as unto them that are sent by him. Or yet if they say further, that they mean onely, such kinde of Officers in the Church as are properly Ecclesiasticall than either Doctours and some kinde of Elders are not properly Ecclesiasticall Officers, or else the Scripture acknowledgeth no superiority and inferioritie between them and Bishops, Pastours, and other Elders; if according to their own Propositions formerly mentioned, the Office of Bishops, Pastours, and other Elders, be but one and the same; and though as they say, one Apostle was not over another, yet the like cannot be said of Evangelists, Prophets, and Deacons generally, but of such Evangelists

gelists onely as were not Apostles; also of such Prophets and Deacons, as were Prophets and Deacons onely, not Apostles, Evangelists, or Elders also. If an Evangelist were an Apostle also, might he not be over other Evangelists that were not Apostles? If a Prophet were an Apostle or Evangelist also, might he not be over other Prophets that were no Apostles or Evangelists? If a Doctour were an Apostle, Evangelist, or a Prophet also, might he not be over other Doctours that were no Apostles, Evangelists, or Prophets? If a Deacon were not a Deacon onely, but an Evangelist, a Prophet, a Pastour, or an Elder also, might he not be above other Deacons that were none of these? If they say, No; what will they say to that of Saint Paul, 1 Cor. 12. 28. God hath set some in the Church, first Apostles, secondarily Prophets, thirdly Teachers, after that miracles, &c. Or if they will denie that any Evangelists were Apostles also, any Deacons Evangelists or Elders also, or the like, what will they say to Saint Matthew and Saint John, and the rest of the Apostles? who in that they preached the Gospell unto those who before had never heard of Christ, did exercise the Office of Evangelists, as was shewed before, What will they say to that of Acts 21. 8. Philip the Evangelist who was one of the seven? What to that of Paul, 1 Tim. 3. 13. They that have used the Office of a Deacon will purchase to themselves a good degree? And when they demand what colour of reason can be given that one Pastour or Teacher should have power over another, if it be answered, because one Pastour or Teacher may be advanced higher than others, to be not a Pastour or Teacher onely but a Bishop also, what can they reply, but that it is unlawfull for a Pastour or a Teacher to be so advanced? Which some perhaps may thinke is not to argue but to beg the question.

Parl. But will not they that thinke so finde themselves deceived, when they see that it is not begged but onely borrowed and brought backe again with advantage in their

next argument, the seventh, which is this. There is no mention in Scripture of any under an Apostle or Evangelist that did performe any work of Office in any place but in his own particular Church; the Apostles & Evangelists which are made distinct Officers in the 4 of the *Ephesians* had their commission generall for all places without any limitation; but in this latitude of their commission they have no successors. There was no place where Apostles or Evangelists came but had the same power which we suppose none of our Bishops dare arrogate to themselves. If therefore they succeed not Apostles in the largenesse of their Commission, then their succession must be of those Pastors and Teachers, whom we find the Holy Ghost hath set over particular Congregations.

This argument me thinkes is such as the Prelates and all their adherents should be afraid to meddle with: for it wounds both wayes, and whether they plead their succession from Apostles and Evangelists, whose commission was generall for all places, without any limitation, or from those Pastors and Teachers, whom we find the Holy Ghost, hath set over particular Congregations, they will never be able to free themselves from one of these two unavoydable consequences, either that they must forsake their Bishopricks where now they live in honour, ease and plenty, and goe travell over all the world in poore, despised estate, & take perpetuall pains in preaching the Gospell of Christ, as the Apostles and Evangelists did, or else from their Lordly Palaces, and large revenues, suffer themselves to be reduced unto particular Congregations, as ordinary Pastors and Teachers then were, and the rest contented with such a competent meanes of maintenance as shall be allowed and allotted them: neither of which I suppose they will be well contented with. And therefore you had best let this argument alone to be answered by themselves some other way, for feare you should forfeit that favour which perhaps otherwise you may have some hope to find with some of them, if ever they should heare how much you have said in their behalfe already.

Rel.

Rel. Your advise peradventure would be welcome to some who cares not what becomes of truth and holinesse, so that they may promote those ends, for w^{ch} they have engaged themselves, & please those persons upon whom they depend. For us it may be before we part, if we continue our discourse so long, you shall find, that neither feare of frowns, nor hope of favour from one side or other can worke us to take part with either where we think they leave the truth betweene them in the midst, and are factious at both ends.

Pre. Whether we shall continue our discourse so long as to see sufficient evidence of such indifferency in you, and your opinions as you pretend, is more then we can tell before hand. However, if you will, let us heare what you think may be said unto this seventh argument.

Rel. First, I think it may be said that there is no necessity that our Bishops must succeed either the Apostles and Evangelists, who had their commission generall for all places without limitation, or those Pastors & Teachers whom we find the Holy Ghost hath set over particular Congregations; for they may succeed those Bishops whose commissions were neither generall for all places without any limitation, nor yet restrained unto particular Congregations, who were by the Apostles set over whole Cities and Countries (wherein there were divers particular Congregations that had their particular Pastors and Teachers) such as *Timothy* was at *Ephesus*, and *Titus* in *Crete*. To which I suppose there can be nothing replied, which hath not bene already considered:

Secondly, whereas they say, that the Apostle and Evangelists are made distinct Officers in the fourth of the *Epistles*: if they meane therby made so distinct, as that both the office of an Apostle and the office of an Evangelist may not be exercised by one and the same person, it may be said that so it is false as was shewed before. For to say nothing of the rest who did ever yet deny *St. Matthew* and *St. John* to be both Apostles and Evangelists.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, when they say that the Apostles and Evangelists had their Commissions generall for all places, without any limitation: that in this latitude of their Commission, they had no successours: that there was no place where Apostles or Evangelists came, but they had the same power It may be said. 1 That they seeme to confound the Offices of Evangelists, which before they said to be distinct, when they allow them the same latitude of Commission, and the same power without expressing any particular, wherein their Offices commissions, or powers did differ, but leaving it to be collected only from their divers names, which names may notwithstanding be sometimes used concerning the same persons as was shewed before. 2 That they seeme to place the distinction, and difference of the Offices of the Apostles and Evangelists, from the Office of Pastors and Teachers, merely in the latitude of their Commissions with the Apostles & Evangelists, they say, had generall for all places without any limitation, but Pastors & Teachers, the Holy Ghost hath set over particular Congregations: for other difference they mention none, whereas it may be said that this is not the only, nor the main difference. For what if the Office of Apostles did differ from all other Offices, especially in this, that the persons who were to exercise that Office, were chosen, set apart, and designed thereunto, immediately by God himselfe? whereas those that were to exercise other Offices, had not their callings to those Offices immediately from God, but from men. What if the Office of Evangelists did differ from other inferiour Offices in this, that they were not as Evangelists to be exercised in the guiding and governing, the feeding and ruling of Churches already planted, but in planting new Churches, and in preaching the Gospell in such places, and to such persons, as where, and by whom before it had not been heard of, or not entertained, as was shewed before? What if the Office of Pastors and Teachers, which is the Office of Elders, as Elders was to feed and to teach particular

was to feed and to teach particular Congregations and Churches already planted? What if the office of Bishops, as Bishops was to rule, to guide and governe either those particular Congregations and Churches, onely which as Elders they were to feed and teach those particular congregations and Churches being private, such as were altogether free and independent upon any humane authority or jurisdiction in matters Ecclesiasticall, but what they had severally within themselves, or all those particular congregations and Churches, which either being private, were voluntarily of themselves, or being publike, were by the direction and appointment of those superiour humane powers to which they were subject and subordinate in matters both civill and Ecclesiasticall, joyned together in one common government for their common good? If so, what then shall hinder but that as Deacons then did the worke of Evangelists, though not as Deacons but as Evangelists, and as now where the Presbyterian government hath place, Pastors and Doctors do the work of moderators and commissioners in generall Assemblies, though not as Pastors and Doctors, but as moderators and commissioners: so Elders then might and now may doe the office of Bishops in ruling and governing, though not as Elders yet as Bishops?

Fourthly, whereas they say that in the latitude of their commission, Apostles and Evangelists had no successors, that there was no place where Apostles and Evangelists came but they had the same power, which say they, none of our Bishops dare arrogate to themselves. It may be said, 1. That what our Bishops dare doe or will doe is one thing, and what they may or ought to doe another. 2. That though in the latitude of their commission Apostles and Evangelists had no successors, yet in other things, (that notwithstanding) they might have successors. 3. That if that power which Apostles and Evangelists had in all places by vertue of their generall commission

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were no other but that which our Saviour himselfe expreſſeth, *Mat.* 28. 19 20. Goe teach all Nations, &c. and *Marke* 16. 15. Goe ye into all the world, and preach the Goſpell unto every creature; before they can prove it arrogancy in our Biſhops to exerciſe that power, they muſt tell us where thoſe places are, where as Miniſters of Chriſt, and Stewards of the myſteries of God, it may not be lawfull for them to preach the Goſpell and baptize. But they ſay there is no mention in Scripture of any under an Apoſtle or Evangeliſt that did performe any worke of office in any place but in his owne particular Church. But will they ſay withall that nothing is lawfull to be done but what is mentioned in Scripture? How then ſhall it be lawfull for particular Churches or Presbyteries to elect commiſſioners for generall Aſſemblies, or for generall Aſſemblies, to elect moderators that ſhall have preſidency before and preſidency over other commiſſioners in thoſe aſſemblies whereof they are choſen moderators, unleſſe they can ſhew ſuch election mentioned in Scripture? If inſtance ſhould be given of thoſe that were ſcattered abroad, *Act.* 8. 4. who went every where preaching the word, will they ſay that they were all Apoſtles or Evangeliſts, or that they had no particular Churches of their owne? Let them ſhew then where this is mentioned in Scripture. Or will they ſay that it is unlawfull for a Paſtor of a Church in Scotland to preach the Word, or to adminiſter the Sacraments in a Church in France? Is not the Church the houſe of Gods? Are not the Miniſters of Chriſt Stewards of the myſteries of God? and may they not where ever they meet with thoſe of his houſhold in his houſe give them their portion of meat in due ſeaſon, and as wiſe Scribes inſtructed unto the kingdome of God, bring forth out of their treaſures things new and old? May they feed and teach no where but wherethey muſt rule and governe alſo? Or may they not rule and governe in thoſe places where others alſo are to feed and teach? May not the exerciſe of the power of the

the keyes in *foro exteriori* be committed in a speciall manner unto some above others, even amongst them to whom the exercise of the power of the keyes in *foro interiori* doth indifferently belong? *Indicent nobis loca*: let them shew us those places of Scripture where any such expresse prohibitions are put upon them.

Pre. What then will you say to their eight and last Argument? If Church Officers be not limited to severall Congregations, then there is no limitation by Divine institution; and if so, then a Pastor may have many, yea, all Churches in the world under him, and so the Popedome must be granted at most inconvenient, and not against any divine institution. If it should be said, that though one can over-see divers, yet it followes not, that he can over-see all. We answer, that no man can over-see divers, but by substitutes, and by substitutes he may over-see all, and so the difference will be onely in the inconvenience, and not in the unlawfulness, which is in the nature of the thing.

Res. To this it may be said, first, that the consequence is not generally true, if Church officers be not limited to severall Congregations, then there is no limitation by divine institution. For severall congregations may be limited to some Church officers, and that by divine institution too, though all those Church officers to whom they are limited, are not limited unto any one of them. Divers Kingdomes may be limited to one King, and yet one King not limited to one Kingdome. Divers companies of Soldiers may be limited to one Captaine; divers regiments to one Generall: and yet one Captaine not limited to one company, nor one Generall to one regiment. If it be so in civill and military government, why may it not be so in Ecclesiasticall? especially where Churches are not private, but publike, united in one common society for their common good. *Titus* I suppose was not limited unto any particular congregation in Crete, when he was authoris'd by *St. Paul* to ordaine Elders in every City: and yet all

the severall congregations in Crete were so limited to *Timothy* his Jurisdiction, as that they might not reject that authority which he had over them. For *St. Paul* tels him there were many unruly and vaine talkers and deceivers, whose mouthes were to be stopped: and bids him rebuke them sharply. 1 *Ch.* 10. 11, 13. and *Ch.* 2. 15. hee ads with all authority: let no man despise thee. Nor doth it appeare that *Timothy* was so limited to any particular congregation at *Ephesus*, as that hee had nothing to doe with the rest. And it is evident by *Acts* 20. 17. &c. that there were many Elders of the Church at *Ephesus*, and why not then many severall congregations where those Elders were Church officers? for if this their argument be good, what reason can be given why the limitation which they pretend to be of divine institution, should not restraints severall congregations unto severall officers of the same kinde as well as severall officers of the same kind to severall Congregations? Me thinks the restraint should either be reciprocally, or else the holy Ghost in Scripture would have said, That limitation by divine institution, was to be understood as restraining Church officers of severall kinds to severall Congregations, but not severall Congregations to severall Church officers of the same kind: That one Congregation may have more then one Pastor, Doctor or Elder, but that no one Pastor, Doctor or Elder may have any thing to doe in any more then one Congregation, no, not though he be not a Pastor, Doctor or Elder only, but a Bishop also. *Indicent nobis loca*: let them shew us those places of Scripture that say this, and then they shall speak to the purpose indeed. But Elders in every City, *Ti.* 1. 5. and Bishops, and Deacons at *Philippi*, *Phil.* 1. 1. and ten thousand more such, if they could be produced, would prove no such matter as was shewed before.

Secondly, It may be said, that though there be no such particular limitation by Divine institution of Church-officers to severall Congregations, that therefore it shall be utterly

utterly unlawfull for any one Church-officer to have any authority, or to performe any work of office in more then one Congregation onely; yet there is a generall limitation by divine institution, by which all things are appointed to be done decently and in order, and to edification: and against this divine institution, the Popedome is, or that one Pastor should have all Churches in the world under him not inconveniently onely. And there are other limitations by divine institution, that no man should stretch himselfe beyond his owne measure, that no man should take that honour to himselfe unto which hee is not called, that no man should despise Dominions, nor speake evill of Dignities, but that every soule should be subject to the higher Powers, and the like. Against all which divine institutions the Popedome is, or that one Pastor should have all Churches in the world under him; much more that he should oppose and exalt himselfe above all that is called God, or that is worshipped; that he, as God should sit in the Temple of God, shewing himselfe hee is God: as that man of sinne that sonne of perdition, that wicked is described by Saint Paul, *2 The. 2. 4 8.*

Thirdly, It may be said that it is one thing to have many, or more then one Church committed unto one Pastor, either by their owne consent, or by the appointment of those that have authority over them, and another thing for one man to challenge to himselfe, not only many, but absolutely all the Churches in the world, as properly belonging to his Pastorall office, to pretend that that his universal independent unlimited authority is of divine institution, and must be believed as an Article of the Christian faith, and submitted unto by every one under paine of damation as the Pope doth.

Fourthly, When they say that no man can over-see divers Churches but by substitutes, and by substitutes hee may over-see all and so the difference will be only in the inconvenience and not in the unlawfulness

which is in the nature of the thing: Which propositions they produce in answer to their owne objection against themselves, that though one can over-see divers, yet it followes not that he can oversee all. 1. It may be said that in the Argument which they would put into their adversaries murtheres, they alter the question which is not concerning the possibility or impossibility of of the Popes having all the Churches of the world under him, but concerning the lawfulnessse or unlawfulnessse of it: For when they inferre in their Argument as an absurd consequent that would follow upon their supposed antecedent, then a Pastor may have many, yea, all Churches in the world under him, and so the Popedome must be granted at most inconvenient and not against any divine institution. I hope they would not have us understand, that [may have many, yea all] of what one man can possibly have, but of what lawfully he ought to have; unlessse they will say that nothing besides impossibility either can be, or at least is by their adversaries pretended to make the having of all the Churches in the world by the Pope, or the having of many, by some one other Pastor unlawfull. And so much indeed the words following seeme to import, although it may be they intend no such thing, when having said that no man can oversee divers, but by substitutes, and by substitutes he may oversee all, they adde, and so onely the difference will be in the inconvenience, and not in the unlawfulnessse which is in the nature of the thing it selfe; as though all the unlawfulnessse that is in the nature of the thing it selfe (*viz.* the Popedome or that one Pastor should have many, yea all the Churches in the world under him) either did or were pretended to stand only in the impossibility of it, and that all the rest that could be objected to it were matter of inconvenience only. Therefore that Argument as they propound it, is not *ad idem*, it should have been conceived thus: Though it be lawfull for one to oversee divers, yet it followes not that

it must be lawfull for one to oversee all : For many things may make the oversight of all by one unlawfull which will not hold true of the oversight of some onely by all. And so their answer of the impossibility of over-seeing divers but by substitutes, and the possibility by substitutes of overseeing all is nothing to the purpose neither.

Secondly, It may be said that divers or many, and all are not alwayes termes of gradation to be so understood as though all were more then divers or many (as to aggravate the absurdity they thinke will follow on their adversaries tenets they doe seeme to intimate) For one may be all sometimes, and then there are neither many nor divers, but to that end that what was onely one before may be divers afterwards, or many more must be added unto all, or all divided into more then one. Thus the whole Catholicke Church upon earth was twice contained in one: Family, *Adams* and *Noahs*, and the whole true visible Church, for ought we know, afterward successively in the particular Families of *Abraham*, *Isaac*, and *Jacob*, and then to have said, that no man could oversee all Churches in the world, but by substitutes had not been true which way soever understood, either in respect of impossibility, inconvenience or unlawfulness. But when they say that no man can oversee divers but by substitutes, I suppose they meane divers particular Churches or congregations of Christians, such as were in the Apostles dayes, and such as either are or should bee now members of the visible Church, that is companies of men seperated from the infidels of the world, to serve God under all the same divine and humane Lawes, or under the same Ecclesiasticall government, both divine and humane. That one Pastor ordinarily should have many or more than one of these congregations under him to feed and teach, which hee cannot doe, himselfe but by substitutes, if any man can and will maintaine to bee lawfull, let him, but that it is possible
plentifull

plentifull experience shewes. If so they understand it that no man can oversee divers Churches but by substitutes, that is to feed them and teach them not successively one after one, but both or all together: I shall not stick much to say as they say. But if they understand by overseeing, ruling, governing and guiding not the people only, but the Pastors and teachers as it may be the word in Scripture is properly to bee understood, so to say that no man can oversee, that is, rule and governe divers but by substitutes is largely spoken. For whereas all rule and government consists, especially in these two things, making and publishing of Lawes, and examining, and judging of causes according unto them, nothing can hinder but that one man may doe both over divers congregations in the Church, as well as over divers Cities and Countreys in the Common-Wealth: especially if he be to doe it not alone, but together with others, not as substitutes meely but assistants or helpes in government. Such overseers, such rulers and governors having precedency before, and presidency over other Church officers that Bishops are not, or that they may not lawfully bee, is that which is pretended to be proved by these arguments, but whether their performance have been answerable to their undertaking, let wise men judge.

Pre. But what say you to those 4 particular instances they give of difference between the Bishops that were in the time of the Apostles, and presently after, and those that are now?

Rea. For the generall, I say that they promise a larger discussion of them ere long, upon another occasion, and then it will be best considering of them, when they have said all that they thinke needfull, But in the meane time if you will propound them in their order, severally as they have shewed them briefly, so I will not be long in telling you what I thinke may bee sayd of them.

Pre. The first, is that Bishops then were parochiall,
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not diocesan: for there were Bishops of villages and small townes, as *Sozomen* in his seventh booke testifies, and according to *Eusebius* Churches, wherein were Bishops, were called parishes. *lib.3.44.lib.4.Ep.25.lib.2.c.6.* *Ignatius* saith every Church should have her communion table, and every Church her Bishop. And *Cyprian* saith the bounds of a Church were not greater than a Bishop might call together the whole multitude about the affaires of it.

Res. For their quotations, I confesse, I have not particularly tryed them all: but supposing the testimonies rightly alleadg^d, yet it may bee sayd that they conclude not that which they pretend for Bishops, might bee both parochiall and diocesan, notwithstanding these testimonies. For *Eusebius* it is ordinary with him to use the words parish and Church promiscuously: as the Scholiast observes upon the proeme of the first booke of his history. And that which, *lib.2.cap.1.* hee calls *Episcopalem Hierosolymitanam Ecclesiam sedem*. *lib.3.cap.10.* hee calls *sedem paraciam Hierosolymitanam*. So hee calls *Ephesus*, *Corinth*, *Alexandria* and others parishes. *Timotheus primus Ephesiana paracia Episcopatum sortitus scribitur*. *lib.3.cap.4.* *Dionysius paracia Corinthiorum pastor*. *Ibid.* *Arrianus primus Alexandrina Ecclesia paracius cum in ea paracia annos viginti duos impleset moritur*. *lib.3.cap.13.* *Abilio quitredecim annos Alexandrina paracia Episcopatum tenuit*. *lib.3.cap.25.* *Ephesina paracia Episcopus Polycrates*. *lib.3.cap.28.* Yet I hope they will not say that the Bishops of those places, were Bishops of villages and small townes onely; for of some of them at least though hee calls them parishes, hee intimates that there were more Churches in them then one: Of *Alexandria* he saith *Marcum primum Ecclesiam Alexandria constituisse*. *lib.2.cap.16.* Of *Titus Cretensium Ecclesiarum Episcopatum sortitus scribitur*. *lib.3.cap.4.*

But what if those Bishopricks that first were called parochiall were afterward called Diocesan? Shall divers

names, especially at divers times disprove the identitie of those things to which those names were given. Doth not the Holy Ghost say, *2 Sam. 9. 9.* He that is now called a Prophet was before time called a Seer. The use of divers names although at divers times, argues indeed a different reason why those names were used, but not that the things themselves to which those names were given were not the same. And for the names of Parishes and Diocesses, if we looke to the proper signification of them, it may be we shall find sufficient reason why Christian Churches united in one common government should then be called Parishes rather than Diocesses, and no y^e Diocesses rather than Parishes: For the proper signification of a Parish at least, as it is used in Scripture, is a place where strangers dwell as sojourners, *in transitoria in p^{ri}ncipio*, when they dwell as strangers in the Land of Egypt, *Acts 13. 17.* And so indeed the Church in the Apostles time, and a long while after dwelt as a stranger or sojourner in the Common-wealth. And though the word Diocesse be not found in Scripture, yet afterward in those times which the sacred History reaches not unto, it might well enough be used: For properly it signifies that place where a man dwells, as in his owne home: so that of *Plato in Timæo* is rendered, *quædam civitas in proprias sedes & domicilia habens.* And so since the dayes of *Constantine* the Great in most places of the Christian world, the Church and Common-wealth have been enfeoffed and dwelt together as joynt-tenants or tenants in common, being generally subject to one and the same publike administration (as the word also signifies) though some have earnestly endeavoured to execute a writ of partition between them as parceners. But to returne to their testimonies: To that of *Ignatius* every Church should have her Communion-Table, and every Church her Bishop if the place they intend be that which I find in his Epistle *ad Philadelphenses*, as I suppose it is, it may be said, 1. That the words every Church which they

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render twice in English, every Church, and every Church are once onely used by *Ignatius*, who saith not as they say, Every Church should have her Communion-Table, and every Church her Bishop; but *ἑνὸς ἑκάστης ἐκκλησίας ἑνὸς ἐπισκόπου, καὶ συνάκρου ἐκκλησιαστικῆς, καὶ διακόνων*, which *Vairlenius* renders, *unum altare omni Ecclesia & unus Episcopus cum Presbyterorum collegio, & Diaconis servis meis*, that is, one Altar in every Church, and one Bishop, together with the Colledge of Presbyters, and the Deacons my fellow servants. And so their dealing with *Ignatius* here is cleane contrary to their dealing with the Centurists, *pag. 9.* For here in their English they put in more words then *Ignatius* hath either in the Greeke or Latine; but there they leave out in their English some words that are in the Latine, as themselves have quoted it in the margin. For though they say thus we find it written, yet it seemes they read it otherwise. In the Latine we finde it written, *Hoc vero consuetudo in iuxta verbum Dei observata hoc seculo & sequenti in legem abiit ut in Niceno Concilio, &c.* But in their English we read it thus. But this custome afterwards grew to a Law, as appeares by the Nicene Councell: Whereas they should have said; But this custome observed according to the word of God in this and the following age, grew into a Law as in the Nicene Councell, &c. For the rest of their translation, or paraphrase, or glosse, or whatsoever it is, upon that passage of the Centurists, I leave it for others that have leisure to examine; but this kind of dealing may breed a suspicion that all their quotations are not to be taken from them upon trust. For this of *Ignatius*, he saith not every Church should have her Communion-Table, but there is in every Church one Altar or one Communion-Table (for I thinke the meaning will be the same, though the sound be different) nor doth he say that every Church should have her Bishop, but he saith there is one Bishop together with the Presbytery (or Assembly of Elders) and with the Deacons

my fellow-servants. So that whatsoever they should or ought to have, yet it seemes by *Ignatius* that in his dayes which were within the first Centary; for his Martyrdome is referred to the yeare 109. there was no Presbytery or Assembly of Elders without a Bishop, and he but one in every such Assembly. And the distinct mention of Bishops, Presbyters and Deacons, as officers of divers orders in the Church is so familiar with *Ignatius*, that I wonder of all men they would bring him to prove that Bishops were parochiall not Diocesan, and especially this his Epistle *ad Philadelphenses*, wherein there are two such passages in behalfe of Bishops as fuller I thinke can no where else be found. The one is (as they are rendred by *Vairlenius*, *Principes obediunt Casari, milites principibus, Diaconi Presbyteris sacrorum praefectis: Presbyteri Diaconi & reliqui Clerum una cum populo universo militibus principibus, & Caesares ipsi Episcopo pareant, Episcopus Christo ut Christus pat. i obedit, & hac ratione per omnia conservabitur unitas.* The other is, *Exclamavi magna voce inter eos quibus loquutus sum. Non meus est sermo sed Dei, Episcopo attendite, & Presbyteris, & Diaconis.*

To the place which they urge out of *Cyprian*, it may be said that the proposition they would prove from thence, will never follow, that Bishops were Parochiall, not Diocesan: for though the bounds of a Church were not greater then that a Bishop might call together the whole multitude about the affaires of it, yet notwithstanding there might be within those bounds not a parish of one onely, but a Diocese also of many Congregations; if they will allow that difference to make the distinction betweene a Parish and a Diocese. What is their second difference?

Pre. The second is even in those times, when Episcopacy began to grow to some height, yet the election of Bishops was by the whole Church, but it is not so now. *Ambrose* saith, That is truly and certainly a divine electi-

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on of a Bishop, which is made by the whole Church. *Platina* tells us, that *Ludovicus* the second, commanded by his Letters, that the Romans should choose their owne Bishop, not looking for strangers to meddle in it, for it belonged to the Citizens. *Ambrose* complains to *Nepotianus* of the great disorder in the Clergie, that they runne to Bishops Suffragans, and being chosen of none: And the Bishops without any lawfull election, is chosen in private of the Canons or Prebendaries onely, without the knowledge of the people.

Rea. These quotations I have not examined, and therefore will say nothing to the contrary, but that they may be true: But that in those times a Bishop was not alwayes chosen by the whole Church where he was to be Bishop, I thinke may appeare sufficiently by other testimonies; whereof for their three, I will instance other three, as ancient at least, and as authenticall as theirs. The first shall be that of *Ignatius*, in the Epistle quoted before, *Ad Philadelphenses* *Nunciatum est mihi pacem habere Ecclesiam Antiochenam qua in Syria est. Dices itaq; vos ut Dei Ecclesiam eligere Episcopum ut obeat legationem Dei, ut concedatur illi in idem loci congregatus etiam glorificare nomen Dei. Beatus ille in Christo Iesu qui dignus habitus fuerit ejusmodi ministerio, & vos studium vestrum adhibentes, in Christo glorificabimini. Volentibus enim vobis non erit prorsus impossibile pro nomine Dei, ut semper fecerunt proxima Ecclesia mittere Episcopos nonnulla vero Presbyteros & Diaconos.* Where he seemes to speake of it as an ordinary thing, and anciently practised that one Church should choose not onely Bishops, but sometimes Elders and Deacons also for another. And if you conceive this instance impertinent, because a learned man lately on the credit of a written copy of an old translation of these Epistles in barbarous latin in *Cajus* Colledge Library in *Cambridge*, resolves that it is not a Bishop, but a Deacon that *Ignatius* speaks of, and makes account that it was but to carry a mai age

from the Church of *Philadelpha* to the Church of *Antioch*, which hee thinks it without the compasse of common sense, to imagine that they should ordaine a Bishop, for though he thinks it reasonable that they should ordain a Deacon to that purpose, I would wish you withall to consider, that he sayes it is agreeable to the charitableness of those times, to thinke that neighbour Churches sent some their Bishops, some their Presbyters or Deacons to comfort, to advise, to congratulate with the Church of *Antiochia* in their Bishops absence: that from the beginning Bishops were propagated through all Churches, by no other meanes but by the assistance of neighbour Churches that had Bishops before; and then to bethinke your selfe, whether it be not as probable at least that *Ignatius* should desire them of *Philadelpha* to choose one whom they might send to reside at *Antioch*, to supply his absence and succeed in the vacancy, as onely to carry a message thither, and returne againe.

The second shall be that of the Councell at *Laodicea* in the 42. Chap. *Episcopum non oportet prater iudicium Metropolitanorum & finitimorum Episcoporum constitui ad Ecclesia principatum*: and Chap. 13. *De eo, quod non sit populi concedendum electionem facere eorum, qui altaris ministerio sunt applicandi.*

The third shall be that of *Sozomen*, lib. 7. cap. 8. *Cum sacerdotibus nomina eorum quos ad ordinationem digni iudicabant charta inscribere Imperator iussisset: ac sibi ipsi ex omnibus iis, nuntius electionem reservasset: alii alios in album r. tulerunt: quare & Antiochena Ecclesia presul inscriptis ipse quos, quos voluit: quibus omnibus ultimo loco & Nectarius adiecit in gratiam Diodori. Imperator igitur perlecto inscriptorum catalogo substituit in Nectario: & intendens mentis aciem sicum tacite consultabat impressa ultima nomenclatura digito: rursusq; ad caput egressus cunctos ordines percurrit, ac Nectarium deligit.* That therefore which they adde in the end of this Argument, and the Bishop with-

without any lawfull election is chosen in private of the Canons and Prebendaries only without the knowledge of the people, is no such apparent evidence difference between the Bishops that are now and those of the primitive times, as is pretended.

Pre. But what will you say to their third difference? They had no superiority over other Ministers as they have now. The *Helvetian* Confession 5. 12. hath these words; Equall power is given to all Ministers of the Church; from the beginning no one preferred himselfe before another, saving onely for order some one did call them together, propounded the matters that were to be consulted of, and gathered the voyces. The honour of a Bishop being taken from the rest of the Ministers, and given to one, was the first step to the Papacie.

Res. To this it may be said, That the question is now not *de Jure*, but *de Facto*, and that the *Helvetian* Confession which they urge, expressing but what opinion they were of, by whom it was composed, is no sufficient evidence of what was anciently practised in the time of the Apostles, and presently after, when that the Bishops were much different from that they are now, in that there was not that superiority of them over other Ministers, as there is now, is the thing they undertooke to shew us; which when they have done, wee will shew them the places alledged before out of *Ignatius* and *Ensebinus*, and leave them if they can, to reconcile those times with themselves, or else, if they will, to confesse that the practice of those and all other times in some particulars, both hath beene various, and so may be.

Whereas they say, that the honour of a Bishop being taken from the rest of the Ministers and given to one, was the first step to the Papacie. If they meane so given to one over all, that nothing is pretended to be left to any other, but onely what they have from him, it may be said to be not onely the first step to the Papacie, but the very last.

last accomplishment and perfection of it ; though so it be rather taken then given, rather challenged by him that usurps it as his owne, then generally confessed by all to be his due. If they meane amongst some given more unto one than unto others of that number, it may be thought to be no more then is intended by Saint *Paul*, when he saith, Let the Elders that rule well, be counted worthy of double honour, especially they who labour in the Word and Doctrine, 1 *Tim.* 5. 16. Although to say that is taken from the rest of any number which is given in a speciall manner, unto one amongst them is not alwayes true neither : For if they never had it before, or if it be given unto one amongst them for the use and benefit of the rest, or if it be left in substance, unto all the same, and onely augmented in respect of circumstances unto one, then it cannot properly be said to be taken from them. But certaine it is, that the Papacie could never have ascended to that height it did in the person of the Bishop of *Rome*, if he had not usurped to himselfe above all other Bishops that which equally belonged unto each of them, as well as to himselfe, and were all other Bishops in the world restored to those rights againe which properly belong unto them, the Bishop of *Rome* might have lesse of the Pope and more of the Pastor in him, and be a better man, though not so great a Prince. But what is their fourth and last difference ?

Pre. The fourth is, they challenged not the power of ordination and Church censures to themselves, as now they doe : power of ordination belonged likewise to Presbyters, for besides the evidence of Scripture, the third Canon of the Councell of *Carthage* sayes, The Bishop giving the blessing, let all the Elders there present, lay on their hands ; That they had not the power of Church censures to themselves : *Cyprian* saith, That the Presbyters, and other Church officers, have as well power to absolve as the Bishop. And in another place, for as much as absolution belongs

belongs unto all, I alone dare not doe it. And *Augustine*, it helpeth much to make the partie more asſamed, that he bee excommunicated by the whole Church. *Ierome*, the Elders have interest in other censures of the Church, and the Church it selfe in excommunication. What say you to this?

Res. This undertaking is of two parts. first, that Bishops in the time of the Apostles, and presently after challenged not the power of ordination and Church censures to themselves. Secondly, that the Bishops now do. The former consists of two parts also, the one concerns the power of ordination, the other of Church censures, both which for as much as concerns the evidence of Scripture which they pretend, we have considered already: and we will not let passe without some observation, those testimonies from antiquity which here they have added. First, that the power of ordination belonged likewise unto Presbyters, they offer to prove by the third Canon of the councell of Carthage which sayes, the Bishop giving the blessing, let all the Elders there present lay on their hands. But first let them remember that the same Canon which speaks, giving the blessing, and all the Elders laying on their hands by his, is evidence enough against them, that Bishops and Elders then were not held to be the same, nor to have the same power of ordination. For in the ordination of an Elder, whereof alone that Canon speaks, the Bishop alone is to give the blessing, and holding his hand upon the head of him that is ordained, the rest of the Elders that are present, are to hold their hands *juxta manum Episcopi* by or neer the hand of the Bishop. If the Bishop then had power in every ordination to doe something which no other Elder might do besides him, it is not truly sayd, the power of ordination belonged likewise unto Presbyters. I say in every ordination because although in that third Canon of the 4 councell of Carthage it bee said that in the ordination of a

Presbyter, all the Presbyters present, shall hold their hands by the Bishops: yet in the Canon next before in the ordination of a Bishop, two Bishops are appointed to hold the volume of the Gospels over his head, and one pronouncing the blessing over him, all the rest of the Bishops that are present, are appointed with their hands to touch his head: and there is no mention at all there made of Presbyters. And in the Canon next after in the ordination of a Deacon, it is appointed that the Bishop alone which blefseth him shall lay his hand upon his head. So that the Councell in three severall Canons directing the ordination of three severall sorts of Church officers, Bishops, Presbyters, and Deacons in each of the three the Bishop is appointed to pronounce the blessing, and lay on his hand: all the Presbyters onely to lay on their hands by the Bishops, in the ordination of Presbyters: which it is not likely the councell would have so appointed to be done if they had known that either of right or of custome, the power of ordination had belonged likewise unto Presbyters. So that this testimonie seems to make more against their power of ordination then for it. How ever it must needs bee impertinently produced against Bishops in the Church of England, with whome the Presbyters present, are to lay on their hands in the ordination of Presbyters agreeable unto that Canon.

That they had not the power of Church censures to themselves, they offer to prove by two places of *Cyprian*, one of *Austin*, and one of *Ierome* which they have not directed us where wee should finde, and therefore I have not sought for them to examine them. But to those two places of *Cyprian* I oppose two of the second councell of Carthage, one in the 7 chapter *Qui meritis facinororum suorum ab Ecclesia pulsati sunt si ab aliquo Episcopo aut Presbytero aut Clerico fuerint in communione suscepti et refugientes nisi Episcopi regulare iudicium etiam ipse pars cum ijs crimine teneantur obnoxii.* Another in the 8 chapter *si quis Presbyter u*
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propositio suo excommunicatus vel corruptus fuerit, debeantque apud vicinos Episcopos conqueri ut ab ipsis eius causa possit audiri, ac per ipsos suo Episcopo reconciliari. Quod nisi fecerit, sed superbia (quod absit) inflatus facernendum se ab Episcopi sui communione duxerit, ac separatim cum aliquibus schisma faciens sacrificium deo obtulerit, anathema habeatur et locum omittat. By which it appears plainly that the Bishops of those times had the power of Church censures in their owne hands which they did exercise not onely over the rest of the people, but even over the Presbyters themselves. And not onely in the time of that councell, but before as appears by the like passages in the first councell of Nice. *cap. 5. Rectè visum est per singulos annos in singulis provinciis his in anno Episcoporum concilium fieri ut similia unum convenientes ex communi provincia huiusmodi examinent quæstiones, ut ita denuo hi, qui ob culpam suam Episcoporum suorum offensas merito contraxerunt, dignè etiam a cæteris excommunicati similiter habeantur, quousque in communem vel ipsi Episcopo suo visum fuerit humaniorem circa eas ferre sententiam.* In the counsell of Elders. *cap. 53.* In the first counsell of Antioch. *cap. 6.* In the counsell of Sard. *cap. 16 17.* To that of Austine I oppose that of the 4 counsell of Carthage. to which Austine himselfe is one of them that subscribes. *cap. 55. Episcopus accusatores fratrum excommunicat, et si emendaverint vitium, recipiat eos ad communionem non ad clerum.* To that of Jerome I oppose that of the second councell of Ardate. *cap. 10. De his qui in perensione pravariati sunt in potestate vel arbitrio eris Episcopi, si eos ex animo errorem desistere et agere penitentiam viderit, ad communionem pro Ecclesiastica humanitate suscipere.*

When the latter part of their undertaking (which they have onely propounded viz. That the Bishops now doe challenge the power of ordination and Church censures to themselves) is either proved or confessed, then let them either if they can reconcile these testimonies with

those which they produce, or if they will confesse that the Bishops now a dayes do not challenge so much more power of Church censures to themselves then the Bishops then did, but that the antiquity of Diocesan, Bishops as Officers a superior order above Presbyters, may be sufficiently evidenced by them, notwithstanding this pretended difference.

And thus you see what wee thinke may be said to the instances introduced to prove the pretended difference between the Bishops of old, and those that are now as before you heard what wee thought might bee said to the arguments urged to evince the office of it selfe unlawfull.

Pre. It seemes then you two approve of the Prelaticall Petition in every thing.

Rel. Nay, that I beleeve is more than can be truly collected from any thing that you have heard us say. And if you two will undertake the defence of it, wee shall tell you as freely what exceptions wee thinke may bee taken to it as wee have told you already what wee thinke may bee answered to their arguments that plead against it.

Par. It may be wee could say as much to that purpose also as others: for we have been both as well acquainted with some of the sticklers on that side, as on the other. But I suppose it would be superfluous for you to plead against it, now when it hath been already sufficiently examined, and such objections made against it as I beleeve in some things at least will never be answered. I rather desire you would tell us directly what you thinke concerning the maine question, which is whether of the two the Prelaticall or Presbyteriall government, be that which is of Divine institution: for if that doubt were once resolved, all other disputes would be at an end.

Rea. It may be not neither. For what if Divine institution should be distinguished, so as that in one sense both kinds of government might truly bee sayed to bee of Divine

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Divine institution, and in another neither? The questions then would be whether both either should not or might not bee retained? Or which of the two were more convenient? Or whether that which is best in both should not bee chosen and the rest let alone.

Rel. For my part I could wish of that as of many other questions that it had never been moved at all or that at last both sides would agree to let it rest.

Pre. You may wish what you will, but if you ever hope to see it, so you are like to be deceived. And since it is on foot already, you should but bewray your owne ignorance or inadvertency if you should not see something to resolve upon.

Res. Let me tell you then what I am resolved of, and it is this. A thing may be said to be of divine institution two ways. Either in *specie*, or in *genere*. In *specie* I take that to bee of Divine institution, which is expressly, immediately, directly, and absolutely limited and appointed by God himselfe, not onely for the substance but likewise for all the circumstances of it, as under the Law the legall service was and all the officers and office bearers thereunto belonging unalterable by any but by God himselfe. In *genere* I take that to be of Divine institution, which is not expressly immediately directly and absolutely limited and appointed by God himselfe for circumstance as well as substance, but generall rules onely given by him unto which whatsoever else may bee reduced may bee said to be of Divine institution, not simply but in some respect not expressly but implicitly, not immediately but mediately, not directly but indirectly, or by consequence. And in this latter sence I suppose that all Church government under the Gospell, whether Prelaticall or Presbyteriall, ordered according to the generall rules of decency, order and edification may be said to be of Divine institution, but in the former sence neither of the two. For I do not thinke that ever God himselfe did expressly pre-

scribe the one or the other, but onely left such generall rules as according unto which hee would haue Church government at all times either established or altered in respect of the severall circumstances of persons, times and places, and the like as occasion should require. In which establishing or altering of Church government when that is done which is best to bee done both for substance and circumstance, both with relation to the generall rules, and also to those emergent occasions which in all humane deliberations are wisely and prudently to bee considered, I thinke that the government so altered and established, may bee said to be of Divine institution. And accordingly to choose the best, is necessary to choose the worse and leave the better is unlawfull. So that as I said before, the maine thing that I thinke is now to bee enquired, is which of the two formes of government, Prelaticall, or Presbyteriall is best. I meane not simply of it selfe, for so we should dispute of an abstracted notionall *Idea* which hath no reall existence in the world: but I meane which is best in relation to the time when, the place where, and the persons amongst whom Church government is either to bee newly established or having been formerly established is to bee altered or continued. Or rather whether out of both there may not be one forme drawne that shall be better than either by reforming whatsoever was formerly amisse, and retaining whatsoever shall bee found to bee right, and as it ought to bee.

Pro. It seemes then you thinke the Prelaticall and Presbyteriall formes of Government are not so inconsistent, but that one Church may beare them both.

Res. It is true, I do so alwayes provide that they bee both rightly ordered as they ought to bee, and neither permitted to intrench upon the others rights,

Pro. Suppose they might be so ordered, as that one Church might beare them both: yet what will you say for

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for the common-Wealth? Is not the Presbyteriall government pretended to bee inconsistent with a Monarchy, and the Prelaticall government with a Republick? Or doe you thinke that such a forme of government in the Church may bee framed of them both together as may bee indifferently consistent with any well ordered forme of civill government whatsoever?

Res. I doubt not but there may, what ever is pretended against them severally, or howsoever those pretences are grounded: for all the antipathy and inconsistency that is conceived to be either betweene those governments themselves, for betweene either of them and any well ordered forme of civill government, I thinke may fitly be referred not to either forme of government it selfe, but either to the unnecessary adjuncts of it, and adhatents to it, or to the exorbitant actions of the governors, or to those propositions which some men take as principles, whereupon they would inferre the necessity of the one, or unlawfulnessse of the other: For the first, I think the very forme of government might be framed so, as that that they might all be taken away which justly may be excepted against: For the second. that they might be sufficiently provided against by good constitutions, and the diligent execution of them: For the third, if the questions themselves were silenced, there might be hope that those propositions would no longer see the light; some where of I suppose, were they thoroughly searched, would be found to be inconsistent with the principles of all good government whatsoever, and meerly to tend either unto anarchie or tyranny. But I will not undertake to play the Chirurgion any further in the search of this sore, lest instead of a soft and ripe impostume ready for the razor, I meet with an old unconquerable *Scirrhus*, or a popular *Polypus*, the *Noli me tangere*, of the many headed and more handed multitude.

Ps. But will you leave us thus unsatisfied, and not tell

tell us either what you thinke are the things that are amisse in the present government, or how they may be amended?

Res. As I should not be backward to speake my mind freely in either of those two particulars, or any other, tending to the generall good and peace of the Church, if I should be called thereunto; so I hold it neither needfull nor fitting to be forward in thrusting in my Sicke there, where there are so many Reapers already, that if they should divide equally, there would scarce be enough for every man to take an handfull; yet, to give you a generall intimation of my mind, I will not stick to tell you, for the first, that amongst the principall things, which I take to be amisse in the present government of the Church of *England*, I reckon these.

1. That Ecclesiasticall authority is sometimes exercised by meere lay men, as Chancellours, Officials, and the like.

2. That Ecclesiasticall authority is extended to the cognisance of causes not properly belonging to it, as Matrimoniall, Testamentary, Decimall, and such like.

3. That the exercise of Episcopall authority in many places, is either excluded, or restrained by the peculiar exempt jurisdictions of Deanes, Arch-deacons, and the like.

4. That neither Parishes nor Diocesses are either equally or conveniently divided.

5. That the revenues of some Bishopricks amount to as many thousands *per annum*, as some doe hundreds.

6. That the values of Church-livings are so unequal, as some scarce arise to so many pounds *per annum*, as some doe hundreds.

7. That by reason of impropriations, plurality of Church livings, and *Non-residence* Offices and Benefices, are divorced so, that many times the profit goes one way, and the paines another.

8. That

8 That Ministers in their owne Parishes, are not allowed to exercise such authority as is necessary for the prevention, and reformation of offences and offenders.

9 That in no cause of Ecclesiasticall cognisance, there is any dispatch to be had without fees.

10 That by reason of the difference and uncertainty of customes in tything divers compositions and rates for tithes, the maintenance of the Ministry, is very unequally, both raised and distributed, and much occasion left unto contention.

11 That the profits of Ecclesiasticall jurisdictions, and offices are sometimes set to farme to those that are exercised in the same jurisdictions and offices, as officials registers, and the like.

12 That through the defect, or uncertainty of Ecclesiasticall constitutions, too much arbitrary power is left to Church Officers to do what they list, or to leave undone that which they like not.

But I will add no more at this time. For this I suppose will be enough to let you see that I am not so partially affected to the present government of the Church of England, as not to think that it needs to be reformed, though I cannot conceive any reason at all why it should be necessary to abolish it.

Reas. And for the other particular wherein you seeme desirous to be satisfied, that is, how we thinke those things that are amisse, may be amended, although I will not take upon me to prescribe to others, because they have it in hand who are sufficiently furnished, both with ability and authority, to that purpose; yet this I will not sticke to tell you, that I am perswaded it is a great occasion of those differences which have beene set, and still are kept on foot, concerning Church-government, that those who take upon them to treat thereof, doe not distinguish before they define. For if they imagine there must be one certaine forme of Church-government, the same not only for substance, but for circumstances, also wherein all particular Churches must agree, and

that every particular Congregation wherein the Word and Sacraments are adminiſtered muſt have that one and the ſame forme of government within it ſelfe, entire and perfect in all particulars of circumſtances, as well as ſubſtance without relation unto, or dependance upon any other Congregations or perſons, one or more I believe in the end they will finde themſelves miſtaken. It may be that old rule, *qui bene dividit, bene docet*, carefully practiſed, would render them better Maſters in this Art then hitherto they have ſhewed themſelves; and if the diſtinction of particular Churches into private and publique were well obſerved, that which is truly ſpoken of the one, would not, I ſuppoſe, be ſo often as I thinke hath bene miſapplied to the other. For thereupon, perhaps, it would appeare that the practiſes and examples of Churches in the Apoſtles dayes, and a good while after, which were all, or the moſt of them private, are but impertinently urged, as neceſſary patterns and preſidents in all particulars, for theſe Churches now which are all publique. And that the beſt forme of government in publique Churches, ſuch as ours are, would be that wherein the ſubſtance that of neceſſity muſt be the ſame in all private Churches is retained pure and perfect, that yet thoſe circumſtances are not neglected whereby the civill power, which is the bond of that union whereby the Church and Common-wealth are joyned together may be beſt maintained, and the influence thereof into the whole and ſeverall parts of both not inverted; which temperate conſtitution of the Eccleſiaſtical with due reſpect unto the civill State, if once it were attained unto, Peace would be within our walls, and Proſperity within our palaces; then ſhould wee obtaine joy and gladneſſe, and ſorrow and mourning ſhould ſee a way; then violence ſhould no more be heard in our Land, nor waſting or deſtruction within our Borders, but wee ſhould call our walls ſalvation, and our gates praiſe.

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Par. But what are wee the neerer for all this, unlesse that you tell us what a private and what a publique Church is? Or what if there be no such distinction at all? How shall wee be satisfied?

Res. If in these, and divers other particulars to this purpose you will be content, to seeke satisfaction there, where I found that which hath satisfied me, then reade Master *Mortons* Treatise of the Church annexed to his *Salomon*, which, though it were printed above forty yeeres agoe, yet containes many things so pertinent to the present occurrences of these times, that a man would almost thinke it had bene penned by a prophetick spirit, fore-seeing what necessity there would be one day of wile moderation to temper the violence of prevailing opinions: And if you reape any benefit by it, or any thing that you now have heard from us, the next meeting I pray you let us know, that we may give God thanks together for it, till then we take our leave.

Par. And wee bid you farewell.

*Soli Deo gloria, veritati victoria, Ecclesiæ
pax, Reipublicæ prosperitas, Regno stabilitas,
Regi clara plena ac felicitas.*

FINIS..

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CERTAINE
INFORMATIONS

From severall parts of the Kingdome, for
the better satisfaction of all such who desire to be
truly Informed of every weekes Passage.

From the 13. of *March*, to the 20. of *March*. 1643.

Monday, March 13.

From *Alesbury* in the County of *Buckingham*, it is informed, that 14. of the *Marleborow* and *Cirencester* prisoners, are escaped from *Oxford* and come thither for succour, and they relate, that in all about 40. of them got away from thence, having by little and little loosened the stones out of the walls with their knives, which was not at all perceived by their Keepers, by which meanes they having made a wide hole in the wall, in the dead of the night they crope through the gap, and got over the Outworkes, where there was no Watch nor Sentinels, and passed over hedges and ditches in fields, avoyding the Roades and High-wayes, and so came off cleere unespied by any of the Scouts, but through what wayes the residue of them got off, they could not relate: Since which, some of them are come to *London*, and affirme the same.

From *Derby* they write, that Captaine *Sanders* with his company is returned thither from *Newmarke* upon *Trent*, with much honor, but with the losse of three of his souldiers, for his Company valiantly beat the *Newmarke* Cavaliers out of their *Bulmarke*, and kept it sixe houres, expecting to be relieved by the *Lincolneshire* men, who comming on to second them, were commanded to retreat, by Serjeant Major *Ballard*, the then Commander in chiefe, by the appointment of the Earle of *Lincolne*, and the Lord *Willoughby* of *Parham*, through which default of Major *Ballard*, they were forced to leave one peece of Ordnance and a Drake behind them, which being perceived by a

Sea-man, who was a Cannonier to the Lord *Gray*, and amongst the *Nottingham* Forces, hee vowed, that if the Cavaliers must have the Drake, they should not have it charged; and seeing the enemy come on a pace, he stept to the Drake which was charged to the muffle, and fired it, which made such a lane amongst them, that they had better beene without it.

And they further write, that the Souldiers were so enraged at Major *Ballard*, that if they could have met with him, they would have hewed him in peeces, for if hee had not commanded the Retreat, they had taken the Towne, and beaten the Cavaliers out, for they were so afraid of themselves, and therewith so ready to run away, that they begun to fire the Towne, and have burned a hundred dwelling houses in it at the least. At their departure from thence, the Lord *Willoughby* of *Parham* gave the *Derbshire* men a Troope of brave horses, with men and Armes futable; and to *Nottingham* men he gave two Sakers with bullet and powder for their better defence.

From *Oxford*, it is informed, that such of the wofull *Malborow* and *Cirencester* Prisoners, that will not take the late invented Protestation there against the Parliament, are put into the Traytors Tower in the Castle, where they are almost stifled and famished, insomuch that their lamentable cries for want of foode, are heard all over the adjoining streete, and although some people in Christian Pity and commiseration would relieve them, yet they dare not, for feare of the cruell and unmercifull souldiers.

Out of *Somersetshire* they write, that Colonell *Strode*, and the rest of the Captaines that are lately returned home, came with their companies to *Somerton*, which is neere to *Ilchester*, and intended to set upon Mr. *Philips* and his Complices the next morne, which they having notice of by some treacherous Informers, durst not abide their comming, but run all away the night before quite out of that Country.

On Saturday last, it was voted in the House of Peeres, that during the Treatie & Cessation of Armes between the King and the Parliament, there should be a free trade, with such restrictions as in the Kings Propositions are limited, and that no ships under the Earle of *Warwickes* command, should goe out for the defence of the Kingdome, during the said Cessation and Treaty; but the House of Commons, taking the said Votes of the Lords into their serious consideration and debate, resolved not to retrocede from their former Votes, viz. That there should be no free trade during the Treaty and Cessation of Armes, for sundry dangerous inconveniences that may ensue to the Kingdome and Parliament thereupon, and that the ships should be set forth during the time of Treaty and Cessation of Armes, for feare of for-
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raigne Invasion; whereupon the Lords being advertised that the shippes were ready to be put out to Sea, which they knew not of before, retracted their Vote concerning the ships.

Captaine *George Tompson* was lately sent by the Earle of *Stamford* out of *Devonshire* to the Parliament, to signifie unto them that the Gentry of *Cornwall* and *Devonshire*, had agreed upon a Cessation of Armes for twentie dayes longer then the former, which expired about the beginning of the last weeke, and that they intended to have a Treaty at *Exeter* to settle the Peace of those Counties; against which Cessation, and Treaty, the Earle of *Stamford* had protested, least *Hopton* and his Complices should gaine time and advantage; whereupon the Parliament immediately sent Mr. *Prideaux*, and Mr. *Nichols*, two of their Members into the Westcountry to protest against those proceedings, and to disanull both the Cessation of armes and the Treaty there.

Tuesday, March 14.

From *Norwich*, in the County of *Norfolke* they write, that some hurt hath beene done there lately, by a strange accident, which hapned thus, The Peece of Ordnance which was planted against Mr. *Holls* house, was brought backe againe into the City, charged with powder and bullet, which the Cannonier through covetousnesse (it being his fees) thought to save and make money of, and thrusting his Spooone into the Peece to unlade it, the handle of the Spooone unloosed out of the socket, whereat the Cannonier being vexed, in a fury he violently struck a halfe pike into the Peece, supposing to have fastned it into the socket of the Spooone, and so to have drawne it out, but the Steele of the halfe pike striking upon the bullet, by force of the strong concussion betweene those two hard things, struck fire, which tooke hold upon some gunpowder that lay scattered about the bullet, wherewith the Peece being fired, of it selfe discharged, and the bullet raked downe the length of a whole streete, and hurt and maimed divers men, women and children, and slew two outright, and the Cannonier escaped with the losse of one arme: but that which is most remarkeable in this accident, as the Letter relateth, is, that none were hurt by the Bullet, but such as were known to be disaffected men, and children and servants of such kinde of people.

His Excellency the Lord Generall being advertised, that Prince *Ruperts* designe upon *Bristol*, through Gods great mercy proved successlesse, and that he was returned againe with all his forces to *Oxford*, hath recalled those Partees of his army that were advanced to *Nettlebed* and *Stokenchurch* neer *Oxford*, at which last Towne, as the report is there hath been some skirmish
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betwene the Kings and his forces, the particular events whereof, rest yet to be related : But from *Oxford* it is Informed, that the whole City was infinitely astonished at the Rumors of the Lord Generall coming upon them, in regard they were left in a manner defencelesse, by the absence of the Kings forces from them, which were all drawne by Prince *Rupert* towards *Bristol*, and the Ladies and Gentlewomen there were put into such an affrighted amazement therewith that they knew not where to bestowe or hide themselves, so that it is conceived, that if the Lord Generalls Forces had but approached the City, the Inhabitants thereof would totally have deserted it.

And it is further Informed from *Oxford*, that the Earle of *Dover* being at dinner at the Majors house, spake it openly at the Table that he was assured, that the King had a partie of three for one in the City of *London* and suburbs thereof, and that they knew where to have armes, when the opportunity should serve, which may be a good precaution to the City of *London*, to seize upon the Malevolents and prevent their plots, but let them not procrastinate for feare of *Seris sapiunt Phryges*, and lest that they conspire (as the *Bristol* Malignants lately did) to cut all their throates.

Sir *William Waller* having gotten such armes and hrosed in *Wiltshire* as he could, is advanced into *Dorsetshire* to disarm all the Malavolents in that County, whereof there is no small number, at whose appearance there, Sir *John Strangways* and all his Malignant crew are fled from thence, whereby that County is quite freed from those disturbers of their Peace; and the only rumor of his coming into *Somersetshire*, hath also freed that County from those that began to raise combustions in it, insomuch that he is much applauded for his wisdom, in clearing all the Counties through which he passeth from such as may prove obnoxious unto him.

Wednesday March. 15.

One Mr. *Wightman* an East Countrey Merchant having had a ship staid in the Sound, by the King of *Denmarks* Officers, went to *Oxford* to the King to complaine thereof, where he was examined, whether he had lent the Parliament any money or no, which he freely confessed he had done, whereupon the King told him that he would protect neither the person nor goods of any of his Subjects, that had lent the Parliament any thing, to maintaine their Rebellion against him, insomuch that he is deteyned there as a Prisoner, and may not be suffered to returne to *London*, but Master *Charles Dering* Sir *Edward Dering*s brother, that went along with him, is permitted to come back againe ; And it is likewise Informed from *Oxford*, that the King hath a Catalogue of all the names of such Merchants as have lent the Parliament any

any moneye, and that he intendeth to take order in all Kingdomes beyond the Seas, that their persons, goods and ships shall not only be hindred from Traffique, but also be seized on for his use, which act will destroy all the Trade in the whole world.

The State of *Scotland* had sent a Messenger to their Commissioners at *Oxford*, to know the reason of their long stay there, which messenger came hither first, and went to *Hendley* upon *Thames*, intending to passe that way to *Oxford* but because he had neither safe conduct, nor Trumpet to secure him, he returned hither againe, and on Monday last he departed back again into *Scotland*.

Yesterday there was a conference betwene both Houses of Parliament in the Painted Chamber, where Master *Pym* managed the affaires for the Commons, and having read the Letters from *Bristol*, wherein was discovered a damnable Plot of the Malevolents in that City to massacre all the good People in it, and to let in Prince *Rupert*, who with an Army of 6. or 7000. men lay but a mile of it, he presented the Lords with these Votes of the Commons, First that a solemn thanksgiving shall be given to God throughout the Kingdome, for the deliverance of that City from that execrable designe. Secondly, that the Conspirators shall be tried and executed by Martiall Law, and that all their estates shall be seized upon and imployed for the defence of the Kingdome. Thirdly, that a Declaration shall be published, to warne all the Townes in England to be watchfull over their Malig-nants, and to prevent them from doing of the like horrid acts, wherunto he desired the Lords to give their concurrent Votes.

Thursday March. 16.

From *Ipswich* in the County of *Suffolke* it is Informed, that to preserve the peace and quiet of that Towne, and to prevent all confusions and combustions amongst themselves, the Major and Magistrates there raised the trayned band and such Volunteers as they could best confide in, and apprehended all the Malevolents amongst them, both in and about the Towne, amongst which they have now in safe custody 4. new Justices of the peace, who are extremely disaffected to the Parliament, and in the search of their houses, they found Muskets and fowling peeces ready Charged, so intent are these kinde of people to do mischief, that they had the meanes to effect it in a readinesse.

Out of *Northamptonshire* they write, that some of their scondes have lately taken the Easle of *Newport*, as he was going to *Oxford*, and five servants with him, he had (as it is reported) a Passe from the Lord *Fairfax* only to come

up to *London* to the Parliament, according as he pretended, but when he came into *Northamptonshire*, he deflected from the *London* road, and took the way to *Oxford*.

From *Livorno* in *Italy*, which is a sea Towne belonging to the Duke of *Florence*, whither the English trade, they write, that the English Iesuites have writen thither from *Rome*, that the *London* Petition which was some while since presented to the King at *Oxford*, by some of the Aldermen and Common Councill of the City, took no effect, because the King would not grant their request, which did not a little reioyce the Romanists, who no way desired the Peace of *England*, because it is against the advancement of their Catholique cause. *Hinc ille lachryma.*

From *Rotterdam* in *Holland* they write that *Van Trump* the Dutch Vice-admirall, hath bought a *Newcastle* ship of the Queenes, called the Peacock, under a colour to save her from being seized upon, if any *English* ships should meere with her, so that now shee may doe mischief, *Cum privilegio Belgica.*

Out of *France* the Newes is, that the *French* King is recovered of his disease, which was a desperate Dysenterie, and that he now resideth at *Versails* 12. miles from *Paris*, and that a great Army is now gathering together about *Calais* in *Picardy*, which may easily and speedily be transported into *England*, if the Navy get not out the sooner to impedimentize such a designe,

Fryday, March 17.

Out of the North parts they write, that the Lord *Cavorth* hath blocked up the passage betweene *Nottingham* and *Newarke upon Trent*, whereby all entercourse is hindred in that part of the Countrey. And from *Doncaster* it is certified, that during the Queenes abode at *Bridlington*, shee sent to the Lord *Fairfaxe* for a *Fasse*, to have some of the Earle of *Newcastles* Forces to guard her and her retinue, and to convoy them all to *Torke*; the Lord *Fairfaxe* answered, that if she pleased to accept of a convoy of his appointment, he would willingly doe her that Service, but he could by no meanes assent to a guard of the Earle of *Newcastles*, least they should endamage the Countrey, and that the Lord *Fairfaxe* hath sent 600. Souldiers, sixtie barrells of Gunpowder, with store of Granadoes and Petards to *Selby*, which are thought to be intended to force *Pontefrairie* Castle.

Furthermore it is signified from thence, that Sir *Hugh Cholmeley* is so vigilant over the least motions of any part of the Earle of *Newcastles* Army, and so ready to cut them off, that by a while he tooke seventene of the Earles Horsemen, all of them being Commanders, amongst which there is one Sergeant Major, and two Cornets.

Yesterday

Yesterday, the *western* Clothiers came with ill-newes of their losses to this Towne, how that the Cavaliers of Redding, had taken sixe waynes and one Carte laden with *Somersetshire* and *Wiltshire* cloathes, the Cavaliers made the waynmen beleieve, that they were some of the Parliaments forces, and would guard them along to save them from the Cavaliers, but when they came neere Redding, they forced them to turne in thither. Besides they said that the Cavaliers had taken many horses with Packs, and that this was done about *Basingstoke* in *Hampshire*: since which the Clothiers are gone to *Reding* to require Restitution of their goods, where they may be in danger to loose the good Horses under them.

Out of *Lancashire* they write, that the *Spanish* ship, which was lately forced into the River *Wyre* by foule weather, is burnt by the Earle of *Derbies* men, because the Parliaments forces there should have no benefite by her; she was laden with Sugar and wines, and bound for *Ireland*, she was of burthen 150. Tunnes, had 35. Marriners in her, besides souldiers, who were brought on shore to *Preston*, where the Master, Pilot, & others of them died, and that she had 21. peeces of Ordnance in her, which were recovered by the Souldiers and Inhabitants of *Preston* before she was burnt.

Saturday March 18.

Both the Houses of Parliament, after much debate and consultation, have concurred to conclude, that during the Cessation of arms and Treaty betweene the King and them, there shall be no free trade for the Cavaliers and their adherents, that the Navy shall goe out to sea to defend the Kingdome against forraigne enemies, and that such as refuse to contribute moneys for the defence of the King and Parliament, shall be imprisoned, and their goods distrained, to make satisfaction for so much as they are assessed to pay towards it.

The Parliament hath sent an Order to his Excellency the Lord Generall at *Windor*, wherein they request him to send a Martiall Commission to the Governour of *Bristol*, to trie the late Conspirators there, and to put them to execution of death, for their horrid treachery to deliver up that City to the enemy, and to Massacre the good and innocent people amongst them.

Colonell *Essex* who was lately apprehended at *Bristol* and carried to *Gloucester*, is now brought Prisoner to *Windor*, and committed to safe custody there, where he is to abide the censure of the Lord Generall, for the murder which he acted at *Bristol*, and for other heynous crimes perpetrated by him there, and it is verily supposed, that he would have furthered Prince *Ruperts* entrance into that City, if he had not been prevented by that timely apprehension.

From

From *Oxford* it is informed, that the only man now in greatest favour with the King, is Colonell *Astburnham*, who heretofore was a prisoner in *Hull*, but escaped from thence. And that the Scottish Commissioners are there still, hoping to be dismissed, but when they shall obtain liberty to return home, they know not.

The Duke of *Yendosme*, who is the Queen of *England's* bastard brother, being now reconciled to the French King, since the Cardinall of *Richieu* death, departed from hence on Thursday last, to return into France, upon whom the Capuchin Friars in Somerset house attended in a Barge to London Bridge, where they gave him the Adieu, and immediatly returned to their Cell againe.

Out of *Cheshire* they write, that the Commissioners of Array sent out of *Chester* 7 or 800. horse, and 3. peeces of Ordnance to *Middlewich* to guard and fortifie that Town, which Sir *William Brereton* having notice of, made out of *Nantwich* with his forces, met with them, fought with them, tooke 80. of them prisoners, with all their Ordnance and powder, slew some of them, and put the residue to shamefull flight.

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March 6.
Hopes of a Treatie.

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THE
KINGDOMES
VVeekly Intelligencer :

SENT ABROAD
To prevent mis-information.



1642

From Tuesday the 14. of March, to Tuesday the 21. of March. 1643.

More letters were this weeke intercepted comming from *Oxford*, two of them the same hand writing that the Letter intercepted at *Coven-try* was, but not directed to so great a Person as was that, yet to one full of action against the Parliament, and of zeale to advance Poperie in *England*; the naming of him will satisfie all men in it (*Wat Mountaine*) who was one of those together with *Sir Bazill Brooke*, *Sir John Winter* and other Papists that had a great hand in the *Queenes* Instruction to all the Papists in *England* to advance monyes to destroy the Protestant Subjects of *Scotland* by an unnaturall warre raised against them, and since the same Councils, have prevailed to raise a warre against the Parliament of *England*, the effects doe shewe it, when against the knowne *Laws of England*, Papists (not a few) but in a manner all the Papists in *England* take Armes; and many of them by Commission under the great Seale of *England*, he is blind, that doth not see (what soever the pretence is) that this warre raised against the Parliament, is not by their Councils, and surely not with intention to destroy their owne cause but ours: It is a great unhappinesse that when the Parliament of *England* (knowing how dangerous a person this *Master Mountaine* was, to be about the Person of the King or *Queene*, or indeed to remaine in *England*) hath taken so much care for the weale of the Kingdom, as in the beginning of the Parliament, to require this Gentleman to depart the Kingdom, which he did accordingly, yet that Correspondence by

M

Figures

Figures and Characters should be held with him, by those to whose presence the Parliament of *England* hath prohibited his access: the one of these Letters beare date at *Oxford*, *S. Marci* instant; concluding, Your assured friend, &c.

In the Pacquett wherein these Letters were, there were divers other Letters, two or three from Mr. Secretary *Nicholas* to Sir *Arthur Hopton* in *Spain*, Sir *William Boswell*, and others, &c. in whose, and all the other Letters were enclosed the Printed Diurnall at *Oxford* (*Mercurius Anglicus*) confirming by their Letters that Printed newes to be true, yet to shew how much delight they take in dispersing untruths, the two particular instances, in that Diurnall of Master *Marshall* and Master *Cass*, two divines, that they were taken mad because they adhered to the Parliament, sufficiently declares what little Credit is to be given to the rest, though it come countenanced from persons in great office at Court; In the said Letters to Sir *Arthur Hopton*, &c. It is certified for a truth, that the Lord *Brooke* was armed *Cap a pee* when he was shot in the eye at *Lichfield*, and thence observes a miracle, but those that were then in *Lichfield* know the contrary, and how unarmed he was at the time he was shot; by another passage (amongst others) in the said Letters, it will appeare upon what slight grounds they receive and send Intelligence at Court, for he writes that as soone as the Lord *Brooke* was thus miraculously slain, Colonel *Hastings* came with 1000. horse, dispersed the Rebels (meaning the Parliament forces) for so he is pleased to call them) and received the Earle of *Chesterfield* and all the Souldiers there with him, whereas the truth was quite contrary, for the Lord *Brooke*'s forces tooke the Earle of *Chesterfield* and all his Souldiers prisoners, granting them onely quarters for their lives, and tooke all their horses and Armes, and all the goods that were in the Close at *Lichfield* (being to a great value) which were brought in thither by the Papists and Malignants of that Country, and kept them prisoners there at this hour, the truth of this is so notoriously known to all the Malignants at *Oxford* and *London*, that Master Secretary might blush to write so contrary to Ambassadors and Agents beyond sea.

There were other Letters intercepted this week comming from *York* to *Oxford* to his Maiestie, being found about two men that endeavoured to force their passage by the Scouts at *Northampton*, but were apprehended, yet their Master the Earle of *Newport* (for the present) through the swiftnesse of his horse escaped, yet being pursued, was taken at *Coventry*, and is there in prison, and hath Confessed his intention to goe to *Oxford*, and pretended he had a licence to passe, but could produce none.

Another of the Letters intercepted directed to some of the Agents beyond

beyond sea from *Master Secretary Nicholas*, made mention with great joy, that the party for the Parliament of *England* then residing at *Dublin* did every day grow fainter and fainter, and that *M. Reynolds* and *Master Goodwin* Members of the Parliament that were at *Dublin* to manage the affairs of the Parliament there (to reduce those cursed and bloody Rebels) were forbidden access to the Councell Table, by virtue of a Letter from his Majesty to the Lo: Justices in *Ireland*; Had that gentleman that writ this Letter with so much joy, any sence of the misery of the poor Protestants there, & of their faintness of their hearts by reason the Parliament receives so little encouragement to contribute to their assistance (when their messengers, men of fidelity and integrity sent over for the preservation of those poore distressed soules, not yet devoured by the barbarous Rebels, should be discountenanced) hee would not have writ this over so *Spaine* for newes from the Court of *England*, thereby intimating his joy for the depressures of the poore Protestants of that Kingdome, which every good Christian with sadness of heart bewayles.

It was certified this weeke out of the North, that *Sir Hugh Cholmley*, with the assistance of *Sir Thomas Norcliffe*, beate up the quarters of the Queenes Popish Army neere *Maulston*, and tooke prisoners Serjeant Major *Hudleston*, Captaine *Hudleston*, Captain *Curwen*, and Cornet *Curwen*, brothers to *Sir Patricius Curwen*, and 14. horse more, and one Cornets Coulours, and kild foure, which peece of service was performed by *Sir Hugh Cholmley* with much judgement and resolution, he having but one Troope and forty Dragooners, and the Enemy thrice as many in their Quarters.

Whereas it was writ last weeke *Sir William Fairfax* was still Prisoner in the Queenes Army, it is now certified he is at liberty, and is returned to his Charge at *Pomfreite Towne*, having kild seven of the Cavaliers that issued out of the Castle at *Pomfreit* with 60. Souldiers to surprize the Centinels, and enter the Towne, since he came home.

Sir,

Here came out a Proclamation this weeke against the Association of Counties, Dated at *Oxford*, 8. *Marill*, which contained many bitter and harsh expressions against the proceedings of the Parliament, That an actual and open Rebellion was raised against his Majestie, under the Command of *Robert, Earle of Essex*, and divers other Traictrous persons, for the destruction of his Majestie, and to take away his life, &c. The Councillors that procure the setting forth of such Proclamations, especially at this time, doe it with intention to provoke the Parliament to breake off the Treary, but they are

deceived in their ends, for the Parliament will upon such reasonable reasons enforce a Treaty, that all the world may see whether they have by respects of their owne to enrich themselves, or to deprive his Majestie of his just revenues or rights; or whether they have any other end then the good of the King and Kingdome. There came forth also another Proclamation, the language not so harsh, but the conclusion full of hard opinion: It was a Proclamation, prohibiting all Gunners, Shipwrights, &c. to assist the setting forth of the Navy now in preparation, for that those that had taken the ships into their disposall did intend to flie beyond sea, and in that Fleet to carry with them the riches and treasure of the Kingdome, or to that effect: This Proclamation is so full of scandall to the Parliament, that the Sheriffes of *London* were commanded not to proclaime it, till the Parliament had prepared a Declaration to the world to shew the uniuersall of such an opinion; and let the Contrivers of that Proclamation, and the rest, know, that if the Treaty be broken off by the prevalent power of the Popish partie; the Parliament and their adherents (upon so iust a ground) are so far from deserting the Kingdome, that its hoped, nay, verily expected, they will enter into such a covenant with God and the Kingdome, and so alter the frame of managing the warre from that way it hath bene hitherto, to be performed in a more expeditious manner, that their numbers will so increase, they shall not need to flie, and they to proceede with more vigour and advantage to the Common-wealth, then hath bene hitherto, but God in his mercy direct it, if he see it fit; and unite the King to his Parliament, and incline him to take their advise, without which, he, nor this Kingdome can be happy.

It is certified out of *Lincolneshire*, that the Cavaliers in *Newarke* doe issue their Warrants into the Country, in a very high straine, requiring contribution in a great measure from the adiacent parts, or threatening to take what they have, which is more than the *Twentieth part*, so much cried out of, though they have bene assessed but at the thirtieth part of their estate: In the said Warrants they require the Inhabitants of that County not to give aide or assistance to the Earle of *Lincolne*, Lord *Willoughby*, Sir *Edward Afcough*, and others assembled at *Lincolne*, who, they say, pretend themselves to be a Committee of the Parliament; the principall actors herein, are Sir *Edward Hussey*, Sir *John Brooke*, Sir *William Theroold*, and others: the Earle of *Lincolne*, and the Lord *Willoughby* with their Forces continue still at *Lincolne*; those at *Newarke* remaine there still in Garrison, expecting *Serieant Maior Griffith* againe, who had the first time taken the Towne, but that hee was most unhappily commanded backe.

It is certified from *Oxford*, that they would be revenged on *Bristol* for the bloody designe they had there against Prince *Rupert*, to tempt him into the Towne, and then to have cut him off with his Forces as soone as he had entered it; this is not onely certified in Letters, but by divers in Towne, that heard it published at the Court, and other places in *Oxford*; and that an Order should be given, that there should be a Thanksgiving in *Oxford* for Prince *Rupert*'s great deliverance from the plot laid at *Bristol* against him: It is wondred that this should be said and done at *Oxford*; but let the matter it selfe speake for it selfe; and the whole examination of the businesse, and then see who will have the shame of it. There are Lodgings preparing at *Oxford* for the Queene; Sir *Edward Hyde* the Chancellor of the Exchequer is active therein: they generally discourse the Queene will enforce her passage to *Newmarke* before the Treaty begin.

From *Devonshire* it is certified that Master *Prideaux* and Master *Nicholls* two Parliament men came safe to *Exeter* on munday night before the treaty there was to begin; that the next day the *Cornish* Treators came to the Gates and expected entrance, but were answered by the Major, they had received the commands of the Parliament that noe treaty should bee kept in that City, and sent a convoy with them, to some place not farr from the City where they were to understand what the *Devonshire* Gentlemen had further in Commission to communicate unto them from the Parliament, There were two Articles Sir *Ralph Hopton* much insisted upon, one was, that he might passe through that County of *Devon*. (paying for what he tooke) to his Majesty with his forces, after the Treaty was concluded: Another was, that both Countreies should ioyne together to oppose any force whatsoever, whether from the King or Parliament, that should come into either Countrey, as if the *Cornish* men would keep faith in it, and deny Prince *Rupert* to enter with an Army, or if they did, what would he care, if he were able, to force his way: But it is apparant the *Cornish* men did only labour for this Treaty, that it might hold till Armes sent for to Saint *Malloes* were landed, which are since come; And till the *Falmouth* Pirates at sea had brought into that harbour further supplies, which they have likewise done, in so much as it is called *new Algier*, they take such number of Merchants ships and goods, and man out the ships so, that at this time they have 14. saile of ships at Sea, some say Sir *John Pennington* commands in chiefe; they could let passe by them the great ship that was bound to the Rebels in *Ireland*, or to supply the Papists in *Lancashire*, but God disposed it better for us then they did, and by tempests drove her on the sands on the coasts in

Lancashire, out of which the *Manchester* men, and Parliaments forces in *Lancashire* have taken 19. brasse Ordnance, and two iron ones, with Powder and Armes; But the Earle of *Darby* comming the day after the faire (for seldom he hath thrived in any thing since he tooke up Armes against his Country men the Protestants, and ioyned with the Papists) possessed himselfe of the Hulk of the ship, and because he would (as he thought) get himselfe some honour, he set her on fire, but made a hasty returne, for feare he should be espyed by the light.

The Earle of *Northumberland* (the Lord *Say* in prudence forbearing to he goe rather then to be an occasion of hinderance unto the Treaty.) With the foure Members of the house of Commons, went from the Parliament towards *Oxford* on Munday the twentieth of *March*, the Treaty being to begin on the 25. of this moneth, if his Maiesty approve of the Cessation of Armes: as it is limited by both Houses of Parliament; which is to have no free Trade at all, nor passage for persons without a safe Condoit, and that the Ships intended for this summers Fleet, be set to sea. It thus should be retarded according to the Proposition from *Oxford*, it would give an opportunity, for a *fine* *Designe* from *Denmark*, (if any such thing be intended thence to land their forces there ready to set to sea in *England*: and then the Fleet may goe out afterwards: certain Information came to the Parliament, as these Committees of both Houses were taking Coach to goe to *Oxford*, that Prince *Rupert* was advanced with a great force towards *Abisbury*: whereupon Colonell *Hampden*, and Colonell *Stapleton*, posted away to their charges: It is rather conceived, the designe was not against *Abisbury*, but to possesse themselves of some great Towne nearer *London*, to have fresh Quarter during the Treaty; and is a good signe, they at *Oxford* begin to incline to have a Treaty: The falling out and combat that was at *Oxford* between the Lord *Awbrey* and M. *Asburnham*, had like to have occasioned such distractions as to hinder their Advance.

The instructions for the first Article which the Commissioners have to observe in the Treaty, they are so reasonable (as divers Parliament men as firme) the Cavaliers will be perplexed, how to finde an occasion to avoid the Treaty; That Article being the principall of all the rest: for if satisfaction be given concerning Forts, Castles, Townes, and Revenue, and the Armies be agreed unto to be disbanded, and disbanded accordingly, the Treaty for the rest may come on at more leisure.

From the North it is certified by Letters dated the 17. of *March*, that the Queens and the Earle of *Newcastle* are Gals at *Turkey*, and the Lord *Fairfax*

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his Forces at *Selby, Tadcaster, Pomfret, Wakefield, and Leeds*: These Captaine *Hothams* forces are at *Beverly* to preserve those parts from plundering, and he himselfe not well at *Hull*: These Letters confirme more particularly the defeat given by Sir *Hugh Cholmley* to the popish Cavaliers, where Serjeant Major *Hudleston*, and divers other Commanders were taken prisoners, and Master *John Fenwick*, lately a member of the house of Commons, and one that for a while did refuse to joyne with the popish Army, was there slaine, and divers other *Cumberland* and *Northumberland* Gentlemen of quality.

From the West it is certified that the Treaty with Sir *Ralph Hopton* goes on, that they are to meete neere *Plimouth*, that ten dayes Cessation more is agreed on; but if the Treaty between the King and Parliament go not on (for as yet it is not known whether the King will accept of the Cessation as it is limited) there is no expectation that that Treaty will proceed, but in reference to the grand Treaty, the president would be dangerous to proceed in, or conclude a Treaty without the approbation of Parliament. The *Devonshire* men, now that they see Sir *Ralph Hopton* prepares and fortifies all this while, are not backward in doing the like.

Divers Letters are come out of *Cheshire*, signifying the great defeat Sir *William Bruer-ton* hath given to the Cavaliers at *Middlewich*, who came out of *Chester*, taken 3. piece of Ordnance, about 80. prisoners, and slew above 100. and routed the rest: But for *Liechfield*, whereas it was reported it was taken againe by the Cavaliers, it is still under the Command of Sir *John Gell*, and 1500. men in it. And the Earle of *Northampton*, as some write, is returned to *Banbury*, and Master *Hastings* to *Asby de Zouch*, upon the advance of the Lord *Gray*.

This last week the Cavaliers have much dishonoured his Majesty, and weakened the credit of his Proclamations, by sending forth parties of horse, and seizing on divers Cart-loads, and Horse-loads of Clothes, and other commodities comming out of *Gloucestershire* and *Somersetshire*, and taking their horses, it being an act contrary to his Majesties
Proclam-

Proclamation, which he sent to be published in all parts of the Kingdome, promising by that Proclamation, that none of his Subjects should be molested in their Trade to *Oxford, London,* or the *Western* parts; In assurance of this protection they have traded to their ruin, and destruction: Twelve thousand pounds worth of Clothes, and other Commodities being taken from them this last weeke, and carryed into *Redding*; An Item to all Clothiers and others to take heed how they credit Proclamations in time of War, unlesse presents restitution be made.

From *Norfolke* it is certified, that at *Lastiffe* near *Yarmouth* in *Norfolke*, divers Gentlemen of that country that had a designe to make a strong party in that County to oppose the proceedings of Parliament, were assembled there, and got good strength together; and had two piece of Ordnance, and one murdering piece, and would not yeild to the Parliaments force; who summoned them, whereupon fire was given by the Muskets on the Parliaments side; which so terrified the Gunner of the Caviliers that he durst not give fire to the murdering piece charged with old iron, but runne away, which the Parliament forces obtaining, turned the mouth of it against those in the Town; so they yeilded: Sixteen persons of quality were taken prisoners; besides the common souldiers: and all their Armes taken from them.

There was a quarrell this last week begun in *Westminster Hall*, between Colonell *Ogkby* a Scotch-man, and Colonell *Horton* an English-man. It occasioned the drawing of one hundred swords: but was taken up presently, though divers ill-affected to the peace of this Kingdome, and the Kingdome of Scotland did their endeavours by words to bring it to a Nationall Quarrell; for which the Parliament hath questioned them.

THE ²⁰
French Mountebank,
OR AN
OPERATOR

Fit for these present Times.

Being a man of great travell and experience
throughout most Countries in Christendome,
and to the great comfort and happinesse of this Kingdome
lately come to Town, and is ready to shew himselfe a
man of Skill, in all particulars hereafter mentioned, to the
distressed Rich for their Money, and to the Poor for Gods
sake.



1642

L O N D O N, *March. 21*

Printed for R. Austin, and A. Coe. 1643.

OPERATOR

1043



THE
French Mountebank,
O R
An Operator fit for these Times.



Conducted by the hand of Providence, me arrived at *Dover* on the first of *March*, where me stayed two, tree, foure, and five dayes, exercising my faculty in a charitable way among tee poore Seamans, tee residue of tee time before I came to this renowned City, me spent for tee most part in *Canterbury*, where by reason of tee great confluence of People, me was forced to erect a Stage, whereon to preserve my own selfe from stifling, and the better to present my own selfe and my Rarities to the sight and view of the multitude. Yet for all this me could take very little money. Me appeared every day with my Dwarfse, my Hermaphrodite, and my Monkey, and entertained them *all a modè de France*, with Songs, Anticks, and Masques, yet all would not doe, me could see but little money.

My selfe and my Hermaphrodite,
My Dwarf, and Monkey, all that night
Were very full of sorrow :
We did despaire
To take the ayre
In publike on the morrow.

Yet once more we came forth againe,
And had our labour for our paine;
Though me pul'd out rare knacks,
All with one voice
Made a great noise,
And cri'd we were but Quacks.

Then down me laid my Velvet cloke,
And quickly pul'd out of my poke.
Papers from sev' rall lands;
Where they did see
Wonders of me,
Confirm'd by thousand hands.

The silly people now beleeve,
And crafty me do laugh in sleeve,
To see them so soon taken :
They money bring
To buy each thing,
Beside, Goose, Eggs, and Bacon.

When

When me had vented all my Commodities, it was not
safe for me to stay long there; yet me be sure if tey do
them no good, tey will do them no harme: And now
me be newly come unto this famous City of London,
and the City of London cannot but confesse themselves
very much beholden to me, that after so many yeares
travaile, and experience in severall Countries, both Chri-
stian, and Pagan, me be pleased now in these latter, and
most knowing daies of mine, to leave wandring, and re-
side here with them.

The reason why me do shew mine selfe in print first is,
because me be tickled in the conceit by some, that this
is the best way to make my selfe known unto you, and
the setting up of Bills upon Posts, is the tricks of tee
Mountebanke, which me do abhorre.

Imprimis, me do meane to tell you what rare exploits
me have done abroad.

Me first in *Paris* up was bred,
A mender of the Maidenhead,
Where by mine Art I did restore,
The sound, and eke the Pocky Whore:
And so salve up Virginity,
That none could any fault espie.
This cal'd me out of *France* to *Spain*,
To stop up a new open'd Vein,
Me found the Lady fore, and Stradling,
Yet made her go quick, without wadling;
With promises to make me great,
She would have kept me for this Feat:
But me cri'd Madam pardon me,
For me be bound for *Tartarie*,
In haste, to visit the great *Cham*,

A 3

And

And rectifie his crooked Hamme,
Besides to shew a piece of Art,
Upon his *Doxies* lower part,
Me made their Tooles so well and right,
They got three Heires all in a night.
The next of my admired workes,
Was done among the cruell *Turkes*,
Where to the Fame of me, and *France*,
Me mended up a sad mischance,
The broken necke me firme did set,
Of their then Emperour *Mahomet*,
And once me rais'd from death to life,
With Cordials, the *Grand-Seigniors* wife.
Thence me came into *Germanie*,
Where were as cunning Knaves as I,
Such tricks me saw, that me did feare,
Mine for that place too shallow were.
From thence to England me soone come,
And here intend to make my home.

And now Dukes, Earles, Lords, Bishops, Knights,
Deanes, Prebends, Gentlemen of Englant, & c. and all
others, High and Low, Rich and Poore, me do addresse
mine selfe to you in all humility. For as much as me do
understand that since this present Perliament, there hath
been many strange and unheard of diseases, seizing upon
certain sorts of People, that were in perfect health before,
and as yet remaining incureable, me being accustomed to
cure such diseases, do undertake these Maladies follow-
ing, and for my better proceeding in the cure when they
come to my hands, me joyn to every Mallady some short
directions for their observation. Though a Parliament
(as me do know) be *salus Populi*, the best meanes conduce-
ing

ing to the health of this Nation, yet as in ill conditioned
stomacks, oftentimes the best Cordials degenerate into an
ill nature, and so become as offensive to the Body, as the
ill humours themselves; even so this Parliament, (which
God preserve) though as well a temper'd Cordiall for
this languishing Kingdome as ever was, yet to some ill
humoured Members it hath proved Feavourish, and set
them all on Fire, as *Iesuits*, *Papists*, and *Cavaliers*: and to
others as bad as poyson, as to *Church-Statists*, and *Mon-
opolists*, those Catterpillers of the Common-wealth, &c.
So then me being by my proffession to cure all diseases,
must not be blamed, if me do name all indifferently, and
me do see no reason why me should be blamed for name-
ing such of these diseases, which me do intend, and pro-
mise to cure, therefore *Sans dissimulation*, or Feare, me do
proceed.

Imprimis, once more; if you know
Of any Citizen does owe

More then he can pay,
Though broken-backt, me him assure
Me have a medicine will him cure,
Let him break word or day.

Is any Bishop with a paine
Much troubled in his head or braine,
And would be made lighter,
Me do suppose that the worst harme
Comes from his being kept too warme,
Let him throw off his miter.

Hath

Hath any been a great whore-master,
And in his age now wants a plaister

That will do the deed ?

Hath any Madam caught the pox
By daily tribute to her box ?

She need not purge or bleed :

She shall regain her credit well
If she observe what me do tell,

And then take what me give her :

No matter who dare to attaint her,
For there are wayes in age to Saint her,

Though ne're so lewd a liver.

Is any troubled with sore eyes,
For losing of Pluralities ?

Me have a good water :

To cool them, and a most rare pill

To purge the humours that are ill,

And feed the greedy matter.

These and many more the Professour hereof will
faithfully performe, he beeing but newly come to town
you cannot expect much from him, till longer observa-
tion hath better acquainted him with the diseases now
raging, and ranging in this Land.

If any desire to make use of him in any of these parti-
culars aforementioned, or to make known any other Mal-
ladie wherewith they are afflicted, let them repaire to
the Physitians Colledge.

Vive Le Roy.

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TRUTH TRIED²¹:

OR,

Animadversions

On a Treatise published by the Right
Honorable ROBERT Lord BROOK,

ENTITLED,

The Nature of Truth,

Its Vnion and Vnity with the Soule.

Which (saith he) is
One in its Essence, Faculties, A&ts;
One with Truth.

By I. W.



LONDON, 1642

Printed by Richard Bishop, for SAMUEL GELLIBRAND
at the Signe of the Brazen Serpent in Pauls
Church-yard, 1643. *March. 22*

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
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Printed by Knapton, 1821



To the Right Honourable ROBERT Lord BROOK.

My Noble Lord,

 Our Lordship being pleased to doe the World that honour, to impart to it somewhat of Yours (and therefore Honourable,) it was My Happinesse, amongst the rest, to be an Object of that Favour; And yet my Vnhappinesse so farre, as not in all things to fall in with your Lordship: Like a Mariner at Sea, descrying within kenne a faire Vessell under Saile, promising a rich Lading, makes up to her; and understanding whence she is, and whether she is bound, desires to view her Fraught; but comming so neere as to goe aboard, falls foule af her (as they speak) and is entangled, and perhaps may both have work enough to get cleare. The faire Vessell I had in view, was your Lordships Treatise, now under Saile, (when made publique;) which howeuer directeth

The Epistle Dedicatory.

to a Private Port or Sinus (a Friends Bosome) yet passes the Ocean to arrive at it: your Lordships Name enforms me Whence it is, and withall promises a Rich Fraught; which the Bill of Lading tells me What it is, The Nature of Truth; and blame me not if I were ambitious to see it, that I might adore it: If, by mischance, I be entangled, I hope your Lordships hand will help me to get cleare. Our first fathers, which had never seene Fire before, while every one was catching at that which shone so Bright, no marvell if he that first meddled with it, Burnt his Fingers: The Beauty of Truth is likewise Bright and Glorious; so Glorious, that some have found her Dazle their Eyes, (he might have said, Others have Burnt their Fingers, And I, perhaps, am one of them.) Truth is a Glorious Object, a fit Object only for a Noble Hand: Yet Sutor sometimes, though he presume not to Better Apelles Picture, may yet find fault with the Shooe; and that without blame, while he goe not ultra crepidam.

Your Lordship sometimes, in this Divine Treatise, for fear of Dazling our Eyes, hath left us in a Want of Light. Naked Truth, which your Lordship had the happinesse to Behold, is proposed to us Cloathed, and Guilded (rather then Painted) in a most curious Dresse indeed, yet such as hides the Body; the Beauty whereof being so well worth bebolding, we had rather have seene her (as your Lordship did)

without

The Epistle Dedicatory.

without her gowne, without her crowne, the better to have discerned her true Proportion. Rhetoricall Embellishments being the same sometimes in a Philosophicall Discourse, that varnish on a faire Picture, which helps to set it off, but withall hides it, and presents it more Glossy but lesse Distinct. For what the Orator useth to Illustrate, that the Philosopher finds to Obscure.

And thus much perhaps, if no more, may be gained by the ensuing discourse, that your Lordship taking occasion from thence, may afford more Light to that which divers desire better to understand, and Vnmask so Faire a Face. (At least those who have once seene her Naked, may take the paines to Vndresse her.) And perhaps having taken a second view, through this a more thick Perspective of not so high raised a Fancy, may give us a more Distinct Delineation of what its owne Dazling Brighnesse presented at first more confused.

I hope I shall need no large Apology to obtaine Acceptance, at least a Pardon from so Noble a Lord, (to whom, I am told, nothing can be more gratefull, and who promiseth the fairest answer,) if I Accept the Challenge: which it's like your Lordship would Performe, (if at least Encounters of another nature would give way to those of the Penne.) If I be demanded therefore of what I doe, Why at all? I reply, Because, in your Lordships name, invited: If why so late?

I have.

The Epistle Dedicatory.

*I have nothing to reply but this, Qui serò dat, diu noluic.
What was at first, in a few dayes, written to a private
Friend, having lien so long in your Lordships hands,
is a sufficient testimony that I made no haste to publish it.*

*I have but one request to make, and kisse your Lordships
band, that you would vouchsafe, if I have done well, to Ac-
cept, if otherwise, to Pardon*

Your Lordships

most humble

Servant,

JOHN WALLIS.



To the VVorshipfull, and my VVorthy
Friend, *Henry Darley Esquire.*

worthy Sir,

HHe Sad news of so Unhappy a Losse as his Lordships Death, forceth me to give an account of what might else seeme a Solœcisme. The book was newly finished in the presse, before his Lordships death, and expected only to be first presented to his Noble Hands, before it was presented to the World; to whome it was then a going, when that unhappy news stopped it, and some copies were gone abroad. I have suppressed it since, to adde that which you see adjoynd; in testimony of mine own sadnesse for so great a Losse. Which yet cannot be so fully expressed by a private penne, as by the common Tears of all those to whome Religion is deare. A sad losse it was, had it been in the Best times, to loose so many excellent Accomplishments in one Noble Breast; but Now most Unhappy, when there is so much work and so few hands; in which, I am confident, None was guided by a more single Eye, with lesse Obliquity to collaterall aimes. Vnhappy then was that accident, that deprived us of one so well worthy to live;

*Vnhappy hand! by one sad stroke who shot
Religion, Learning, Piety, what not?*

Sir, The Treatise penned long since at your request, had once passed in another Character through Yours to his Lordships Hand, not then intended to be made publique,

A

nor


The Epistle.

nor directed to any other then your own eye ; what entertainment it then found (such Candour and Noblenesse dwelt in that Breast) You know as well as I : And now, being oft solicited, as well by you as others, It was a second time *Advancing*, ambitious again to be made happy by the same Hand ; (and indeed I had been extreemly injurious to His Candour, if I should have seemed to decline His Eye and present it to another, who taking liberty sometime to dissent from Others, did with the same freedome allow others to dissent from Him, willing to accept of any Assistance in *the search of Truth* ;) but being there prevented, it is fain to *Retreat*, and fall back to the same hand where it first lodged, as being, next after his Lordship, due to you, from

Your humble Servant

March. 11. 1642

J. W.



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TRUTH TRIED:

OR,

Animadversions on a Treatise, entituled,

The Nature of Truth.

SIR,

THave, according to your desire, perused that Treatise concerning *The Nature of Truth*. (The which how farre it serves to the expounding the 24. Chapter of *Math*. I examine not.) One thing that may make it seem somewhat dark, is, that his Lordship speaking of a matter somewhat unusuall, is forced to use such Metaphors, for want of native words, which may somewhat obscure it: And his Lordship was the lesse carefull to avoid it, because they being with himsele of frequent use, and sufficiently understood by him to whom hee wrote, there was the lesse feare of being not understood, or mis-understood: And so the lesse need to prevent it, by seeking for such words as might better sute with an ordinary Reader.

Before I proceed to state the Question, *Whether Truth and the Soule be One*; It is very requisite to search, in what sense his Lordship understands *Truth*; that through the ambiguous sense, and divers acceptations of the word, we be not confounded in the progresse.

Truth in *Logick*, is when the Proposition agrees with the Thing; and *Falshehood*, when they disagree.

Truth in *Esbicks*, is when our Words and Actions agree with our Mind; and is opposed to a *Lye*, to *Hypocrisie*.

B

And

And Truth in these acceptations is nothing else but an Agreement or Conformity of a *Type* with its *Prototype*, *Archetyp* & *Etypi*; of a Transcript with its Original; of an *Idea*, or thing representing, with that represented; *Signi* & *Signati*.

Thus in *Logick*, *Vox est signum rei*, or *Imago rei*. If therefore we have that expressed in Words, to which in the order of Things there is nothing agreeing; it is a False Copy, or rather no Copy, being drawn according to no Pattern. If that be, which is affirmed to be; it is True, because they are a Copy or Representation of the Things so being.

As it is in words, so it is also in Apprehensions, *in conceptibus*; If our mind conceive a thing to be, which is not, or to be otherwise then it is, this is a False Apprehension, because the *Idea* in our understanding is not a true representation of the Thing.

In *Ethicks*, our words are to be compared with another Copy; because (thus) they are not the representation of the Things (immediately) but the representation of our Thoughts, or Intentions: Therefore, if our Words do truly expresse or represent what we think; It is *morally* True, that is, it is not a Lye, because they agree with this Copy; but yet they may be *Logically* False, as not being a true expression of the Thing. If the *Idea* in our apprehension agree with the Things, so that we conceive aright of them; and our Words be a true representation of this *Idea*; they do truly also represent the Things; There is both *veritas Logica*, and *veritas Moralis*. If wee conceive aright of things, and our words expresse otherwise then we think; this *Proposition* is both wayes false; for it neither agrees with the thing, nor with our judgement; But our *Judgement* is *Logically* true, because the *Idea* in our mind is a true expression of the thing. If we conceive amisse, and yet affirm as the thing is (if we affirm snow to be white, which we conceive to be black,) our *Proposition* is *Logically* true, but *Morally* false; and our *conceptus* is also *Logically* false. If lastly, wee conceive amisse, and speak otherwise then wee conceive, and yet diverse from what wee ought both to think and speak (as if we conceive snow to be black, and affirm it to be red:) our *Idea* or *Conceptus* is *Logically* false, our *Proposition* *Logically* false, and *Morally* false.

Thus if one intending upon a Signet to grave the Kings Image, misseeth of the true proportion, and with this Signet maketh impression in Wax, the wax contains a true representation of the Seal,

but

but not the true Image of the King ; whereas, if the Signet had been truly graven, and then impressi^on made in the wax ; the wax had truly represented both the one and the other. Thus is it in Morall and Logicall Truth.

Accordingly, one making a Promise with intention to perform it, yet afterward breaks it ; this Promise is *Morally* true, because it is a true representation of his Intentions ; but it is not *Logically* true, as not being a representation of his future Actions. And in his subsequent Actions there is also a kind of *Morall* falshood ; because they are not conformable to his promise, by which they should be regulated. Or you may say, his Promise was (*Morally*) a True expression of his Intention ; but his Intention was (*Logically*) False, as not agreeing with the Thing, because he *intended* that which was not *Futurum*. Whereas, if he had promised, with a purpose to breake it, his Promise had been *Morally* False, but his Intention *Logically* True. If, intending to break it, he yet perform it, his Intention is *Logically* false, and his Promise *Morally* false, though *Logically* true. And thus Breach of Promise will come under the nature of Injury, or Injustice ; but not under the nature of a Lye, except it were made to deceive ; because it is the true expression of the Intention, which is the immediate rule of Veracity or Morall truth.

Thus *Hypocrisie*, or Dissimulation, is a branch of *Morall* Falshood ; because *Actio* and *Gestus*, are *Index animi*, as well as Words.

And this I conceive to be the Nature of, and Difference between *Logicall* and *Morall* Truth.

There is yet another *Truth*, and you may call it a *Physicall* Truth, a *Formall* or *Essentiall* Truth : Thus that which hath the Essentials of a Man, is *verè Homo* ; so an Infant is a *true* Man. Thus we say, a *true* Church, *true* Faith, *true* Grace, *true* Gold, (not counterfeit :) thus a *Syllogisme* in a right form, is a *true Syllogisme*, though the Propositions be false. And the like.

(But mistake me not ; by *Morall Truth*, or *Naturall Truth*, &c. I understand not, *Truths about Naturall things*, or *Morall things*, (though the words be oft-times so taken :) For I am not now distributing Truth into its severall *Species*, or severall *Partes* ; but am shewing the Ambiguity of the Word, and so distinguishing it into its severall Acceptations. Thus *Morall* or *Ethicall* Truth, is that Acceptation of Truth that is usual in *Ethicks* : *Logicall*

Truth, is that Acceptation of Truth, which is used in *Logick*. &c.)

But I suppose, we are yet farre from that Acceptation of Truth, in which his Lord. speaketh: I will therefore come somewhat nearer. Beside the *Logicall* and *Morall* acceptance of Truth, we have a *Metaphysicall* acceptance: thus *Ens* and *Verum* are *termini convertibiles*. And *Truth* is taken in some such acceptance, when it is divided into *veritas Essendi* and *Cognoscendi*.

Veritas Essendi, or the truth of *Being*, is that *per quam res vere Est*: And thus *Ens & Verum convertuntur*. *Quicquid est, vere est*. For except it have a *Reall* and *True Being* (and not a *Supposed Being*) it is not (indeed) a *Being*, but is *Su*, posed to be.

Veritas Cognoscendi is that *per quam res vere Cognoscitur*. And thus also *Ens & Verum convertuntur*: For whatsoever is, may be known to be. This *Veritas* is nothing else but *Cognoscibilitas*: Therefore *Veritas*, as it is *Affectio Entis*, is defined by some to be *Convenientia rei, seu Conformitas rei, cum Intell. Etu*; (five *humano* five *divino*.) Thus *Truth* in the Things and *Knowledge* in the Understanding have relation to each other as *Objectum* and *Potentia*. As *Colour* in the Object to *Sight* in the Eye.

Colour, as it is inherent in a *Body*, makes it to be Coloured (*corpus coloratum*;) The same *Colour*, as it stands in relation to the Eye, makes it to be Visible (*corpus visibile*.) Thus *Essence*, or *Being*, as it is in the thing, constitutes it in the nature of a thing, or a Being: And the same *Essence* in the thing, as it hath relation to the Understanding, makes it *Cognoscibile*. In the first sense it is *Veritas Essendi*, in the second it is *Veritas Cognoscendi*. (Where the construction will be somewhat hard, except you give Philosophers leave to use the *Gerund* in a *Passive* signification, which amongst pure Grammarians is more rarely found.) For by the same *Essence* by which it is *Ent*, by the same it is *Cognoscibile*; That *Being* by which it is, by the same it may be known to be: As by the same *Colour*, by which the object is *Coloratum*, it is also *Visibile*.

And this I conceive to be the right acceptance of *Metaphysicall Truth*, or *Truth* as it is taken in *Metaphysicks* for an *Affectio* of *Being*: not being a *Thing* Really distinct for that thing, that truly is, and may be truly known to be; But (as they call it) *Modus Entis*.

And now we be come somewhat nearer that acceptance of *Truth* wherein his Lord. takes it; though (if I mistake him not) that sense wherein he useth it, is somewhat distinct from all these: For whether you

you consider the *Truth of Being*, or the *Truth of Knowledge*; they are in themselves really the Same, and the same also really with that *Ens*, that Being, which truly Is, and is truly Known to be: which *thing* is as true a *Being*, and as truly *Cognoscible*, when there is no Understanding present to take notice of it, as when it is actually Understood. Like as an Object is truly Coloured, and truly Visible, even then when there is no Eye present to behold it. And therefore this truth cannot be One with the Understanding, because it may be then and there where the Understanding is not.

Again, Truth being (as I said) One with the Thing known, if it be also One with the Understanding, or the Soule; the Understanding or Soule knowing shall be One with the Thing understood: A Stone and the Soule shall be one Individuall Being: For how can Truth be the same with the Stone, and the same with the Soul, except the Soul and the Stone be the same.

Object. But you will say this is that he contends for, not only, that Truth understood is one with the Soul; but that both the Thing understood, and the Sou understanding, are this Truth.

Ans. 1. To proceed therefore. If the Stone understood, and the Soule understanding, be the Same; then when began this Unity, this Identity? Were they the Same before the Stone was actually understood? Or did they then contract this Unity, when first the Soul did actually Know it?

Why they should be the same, Before the act of Knowing; there appears no more reason, then why one Stone should be the same with another Stone; why one man should be the same with another man: And so Peter or Paul might be as truly said to betray Christ, as Judas, if Peter and Judas be one and the same.

And if they should then contract an Unity, (and not before when the Understanding doth first Actually understand it; we must take that saying, *Intellectus intelligendo omnia fit omnia*, in a more grosse sense then ever it was meant. And, in my judgement, it is utterly impossible, for that which hath once been *Aliud* to be made *Idem*; as also for that which is One, to be made *Aliud a seipso*. I say, it is impossible for two things to be made one and the same, by a *Reall Identity*.

'Tis true, Two things may be so united as to be made One *Aggregatum*; as the Body and the Soule make one Man, the Divinity and Humanity of Christ make one Person: But that two things can

become the *same*; that the Soule is the Body, and the Body the Soule; that the Humanity of Christ is his Divinity, and his Divinity his Humanity; I conceive not onely false, but impossible. The Hand and the Foot (with the rest of the members) make one Body; but neither the Hand is the Foot, nor is the Foot the Hand, but really distinct.

Ansiv. 2. But further, as it is hard to shew, when this neer kindred either of *Affinity*, or *Consanguinity*; this Union either of *Identity*, or of *Identification*, had its first Originall: So, if there be any such Union, (either *connate* or *contracted*) between the Soul and a Stone: Then will not onely *One* but *All* Soules (at least, all soules actually understanding and apprehending it) be the same with this Stone. And these Soules, being one and the same with this one individual Stone, they will be one and the same with each other.

Thus we shall have but *one* Soule informing *all* Bodies; not by a *Pythagoricall Metempsychosis*, by translating of soules from one body to another, but as *Animus Averroisticus*, one soule extended through the whole Universe, informing so many men as there be bodies, wherof every man is partaker *tanquam communis auri*: Nay neerer, for of the Ayr each takes a part; but as for this Soul, each Is, each Hath this Soule entire.

Neither doth it inferre onely an Identity of Soules, but an Identity of Objects also: For all Objects being apprehended by one Soul, they become *all* One with it: And being *all one* with the same *numerical* Soule, they must be also One with each other.

So that all Soules will thus be *One*, all Objects will be but *One*, and this *One Object* one and the same with that *One Soule*; and all the World but *Unum Ens*, whose every parcell is *alteri idem*; the same with each other.

Object. You'l say, All this is no more then he contends for; to make *Truth* One with the Soule; and that all things that are, are nothing but this *One Truth*.

Ansiv. If this be his opinion, To prove an Identity of all creatures, because their Being, from whence proceeds their Cognoscibility, is all One with the Soule, or Understanding: His Lorr. must give me leave to dissent from him, if for no other reason, yet because he dissents from himselfe: For if his Argument be good, That all things are One with the Soul, because Truth or Cognoscibility, (which differs not really from their Essence) being the Object of
the

the Soules Operation, must also be One with the Soule; It will follow also, that God is likewise One and the Same with the Soul, because He also is *Cognoscibilis*, and may be known by the Soul: And also, that all things else are one with God, because they are all known by Him. And so he falls upon the first of those Errours, which he mentions in the end of his *Proæmium*, immediately before the first Chapter; which is, by mounting too high in the exalting of Truth, to confound the Creator with the Creature, by making her God. Neither doth it onely make Truth to be one with God; but even all things else, being one with Truth, to be One with God.

Again, if so, how is it that in the end of his 3. Chapter, concerning the Body and the Soule he tells us, not that they are the Same, or that the Body is the Soul, but as husband and wife each bringeth his part towards the making up of the *Compositum*. At least M. Sadler is mistaken as well as I, (who is presumed at least to understand his Lord's mind, sufficiently,) who tells us in his Epistle, that *Corporall Union in materialls is sometimes [Miscaled] Identity, which is at best but a cold touch in a point or two.*

But I suppose there may be another acception of Truth, which may better suite with (at least the first part of) his Lordships discourse. You may call it *Veritas Cognoscendi*, as well as the former, but in a different sense. There Knowledge was taken in a *Passive* sense, and Truth was that which makes the thing *Cognoscibile*, or fit to be understood: Here you must take it in an *Active* sense; and so *Veritas Cognoscendi*, or the Truth of Knowledge, will bee that which makes the understanding *Cognoscitivum*, or fit to conceive and apprehend that *Cognoscibility* which is in the Object. And thus Truth will be that Principle, whereby the Soule is able to apprehend or conceive that which may be known.

Veritas Cognoscendi in the former sense, and that in this sense, are both *Principia cognoscendi*, Principles of knowledge, but in a severall way. (You may distinguish them, if you please, thus; Truth of knowing, and Truth of being known, and *veritas cognoscendi* may be Latin for both.) They differ as Colour in the Object, from the power of seeing in the Eye: The former makes the Object *Visible*, and fit to be perceived; the other makes the Eye *Visus*, and fit to discern it. If the first were wanting, Vision would be hindered, because there is nothing *Visible*: (Hence it is that the Ayr, and Spirituall Substances are not seen even by the sharpest sight.) If the latter be wanting, then

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sight is hindered from a defect in the *Organ*: (Thus the most perspicuous Colours are not discerned by a blind Eye; whereas the same Colours are in themselves sufficiently Visible, and actually Discerned by others.) Thus *Veritat cognoscendi*, in the former sense, makes the Object to be *Cognoscible*; Truth, in the latter sense, gives the Understanding, or Soule, ability to know it.

Now if you call the *Power of seeing*, which is in the Eye, by the name of *Innate light* (to distinguish it from Light either in the Object, or in the *Medium*:) You may also call *Reason*, which is this principle of knowing in the Soule, or Understanding, by the name of *innate Truth*, or *Light*.

And this signification of *Truth* I conceive to be most suitable to his Lor^{ty}. meaning. (But *Verum*, or *Truth*, in this sense, is not convertible with *Ens*: For though all *Beings* have in them *Truth*, whereby they may be *Known*, yet all have not *this Truth*, or *Power to Know*.)

And thus if you understand it, it will not seem so strange a Paradox, to affirm that *Reason* (which he calleth *Truth*) is all one with the *Understanding*; and that the *Understanding* is not distinct from the *Soule*. For this will be granted by all those, which affirm that *Potentia non realiter distinguntur ab Anima*; that the Powers or Faculties of the Soule, are not really distinct from the Soule it selfe: And these are (if I mistake not) the greater part of sound Philosophers. And thus his Lor^{ty}. opinion is but the same with theirs in other words. (Yet may we still speak distinctly of these severall Faculties; as we do of the Wisdom of God, the Power of God, the Will of God, &c. which are as entirely one with God, as these Faculties can be with the Soule.) And thus much for explaining the state of the Question. I proceed next to examine the Grounds of this his Lor^{ty}. opinion.

CHAP. I.

Whether the Understanding, and Truth understood, be One.

IN his first Chapter he tells us, That *Truth* (that is *Reason*) is enthron'd in the *Understanding*; and there appears under a double Notion There is the Fountain or Ground-work (which is *Reason* it self,) we call it (saith he) the form or substance. And then sheweth workings

workings which breathe from thence (the Streams issuing from it) viz. the Operations and exercise of Reason, the effects of a reasonable soule. (We call them usually, *actus primus*, and *actus secundus*.)

The first of these he begins with, proving it to be the *Understanding in its Essence*: (The second he proceeds to in the tenth Chapter.) His Argument is this, *What is the Understanding other then a Ray of the Divine Nature, warming and enlivening the Creature, conforming it to the likeness of the Creator? And is not Truth the same?*

If you take *Truth* in any other acceptation beside that last mentioned, I see not how the Argument will hold: For if you take it either for the Truth of *Being*, or the Truth of *Knowing* (in the common acceptation;) for that Essence, whereby every Creature both is and may be known to be: It may be granted, that the understanding is one of those *Rays of the Divine Nature*, somewhat of that Excellency implanted in Man, of that Image of God whereby Man is conformed to the likeness of the Creator: It will be granted also, That the *Essence* or *Truth* of every Creature, whereby it Is or is Known to be, is a Ray proceeding from the same Center, (though to another point of the Circumference,) a Stream issuing forth from the same Fountaine of Being; and carries some weak Resemblance, *some Sparkling of that Primitive Light*, or Truth, that *Originall Essence* which is in God; (For thus every Creature hath something of God in it, *Resert qualibet herba Deum*;) Yet will it not follow from hence, That this communicated Ray of Being is the same with the Understanding. For the Argument will prove erroneous, as being Affirmative in the second Figure, in which no Affirmative Proposition can be concluded: And the Consequence will be the same with this, [What is the Body of Man but a materiall substance? And is not a Stone the same?] Which you would hardly admit as a sufficient argument to prove our Body to be a Stone.

If you take *Truth* for *Reason*, the Argument will admit of a reduction into an exact Form, thus, [That *Ray of the Divine Nature*, which doth (solely, or principally) expresse Gods Image in Man, is the *Understanding*; but *Truth* or *Reason* is this divine Ray; Therefore *Truth* (that is *Reason*) is the *Understanding*.]

And this Argument will hold good, if we grant the Soule to be the immediate worker in rationall Operations, without an intervenient Faculty: But (otherwise) those that are of the contrary Opinion would deny

deny (or distinguish) the *Major*, and say, That this divine Ray, this Image of God, consists not *wholly* in the Understanding by it selfe, but in the Soule or Understanding, accompanied with its severall *Faculties* and *Operations*.

And indeed it cannot be denied, but that the *Operations* of the Soule do containe part of this Divine Image, as well as the Soule in its *Essence*; and yet They are the Soules (immediate) Progeny, and are not immediately produced by God.

Now what others admit concerning the *Operations*, They will affirm concerning the *Faculties*; That they are but parcels of this Ray or Divine Image, That they are but lesser Rivulets derived from the greater Stream, or branches annexed to it.

Now from hence, [That the Soule in its Essence, together with the severall Faculties and Operations wherewith it is endowed, doth make up the chiefest part of Gods Image in Man] to prove, [That every part of this Image are the same with each other;] and so [the Faculties to be the same with the Soule;] is that which they will not allow.

And to presume, or take for granted, That this Image of God consists but in One *single Ray*; is but *potere principium*, it being no lesse hard to prove, then that the Faculties and the Soule are One; That Truth (or Reason) is One and the Same with the Understanding, or Reasonable Soule.

They would say rather, That the Soule is One of those *Branches*, which (issuing from the same *Root* of Being in God, from whence all other Created Beings doe arise) divides it selfe into severall *Twigs*. And we have no way to convince them of falshood in this particular, till we have first proved the Soule and its Faculties to be one Simple or Single Essence.

The prosecution or explication of his *Lor^d*. Argument doth no way oppose this acceptance of Truth which I have given, but confirms it; which (if I rightly understand it) may be thus explained; *That Truth (Reason) is Light, none will deny*, (by Light understand, that internall Principle whereby the Soule can See or Know, which is so called by a Metaphor drawn from the Innate light, (we call it *potentia visiva*) whereby the Eye is enabled to See;) *That Light* (this power or principle of Knowing or Reasoning) *in a reasonable creature is the Fountain of Life, is manifest*; (by Life understand the Life of the Soule, if I may so speak, That which specificates the ratioll Soule, and makes it *Ratioll*;) *For the Form of a reasonable Soul*, (that which makes it to

be Reasonable) is *Light*, (that principle whereby it knows and understands :) *And therefore when the Soule informeth, or giveth life to Animal rationale*, (making it Rational) *it inableth the Creature to work according to that Light*, (according to this principle of Knowing: that is, It inableth the Reasonable Creature to Know or Understand, &c.) *Thus whilst Life* (that which makes a reasonable creature to be Reasonable) *and Light* (this power of Knowing) *is Truth* (or Reason; *And Truth* (or Reason) *is Conformity to God*. (or Gods Image in us:) *And the Understanding also, as we yet discourse of it, is this Light* (this principle of Reasoning) *to the Soule; The Understanding and Truth* (or Reason) *can be but One*.

The whole Argument is briefly thus; [the Image of God in us, is our Understanding; and this Image or divine Radius, consists in Reason (which he calls Truth;)] therefore Truth or Reason is our Understanding.] His *minor* (that this Ray or Beam of Divinity in us, is Truth or Reason) is thus proved; [Because *Reason* in us is a *derivative* Beam, a sparkling, of that *primitive* Light (or *Wisdom*) which is in God:] And so That which enlightens us, and inables us to Know, or Understand, according to our measure (that which furnisheth Us with Knowledge) is a representation of Gods Sapience or Wisdom whereby He is said to Know. Now, [that Truth or Reason (which is all one) is this derivative Beam of Light, whereby we are able to Know;] and [That this ability to Know or Understand, is that which makes us to be Reasonable,] is manifest. Wherefore he concludes, That *whilst our Life* (or Rationality) *consists in Light*, (that is, in an Ability to know and understand) *and this Ability consists in Truth* (or Reason) *which is a conformity to God* (as being a Stream issuing from his Ocean of Wisdom;) *And whilst* (as Reason is this ability of knowing, so) *the Understanding also is this Light* (this Ability or power of Knowing;) *The Understanding and Truth* (that is, Reason) *must be all One*.

Those, who deny his Conclusion, would answer, That both *Reason* and the *Understanding*, doe inable the Soule to Know, or Understand, but in a severall way, as distinct principles (and therefore are not the same:) The one Instrumentally or Ministerially; The other, by using this as its Minister. Thus Fire, by its Heat, burns; a Stone, by its Heaviness, descends; Glasse, by its Levity or smoothness, reflects; and the like.

If you say, the Weight of the Stone, or Smoothness of the Glasse, are not Things distinct from the Stone and Glasse, but rather *Modifications* of

of these Things; I contend not : For neither doe I hold the Understanding, or any other of the Soules Faculties, to be a *Thing* distinct from the Soule ; but, at the most, only an accidentall *Modification* of it, not *Really distinct* from it : Yea rather, That it is the Soule it self, *quatenus intelligens*, (as the Power of God, is God himself *quatenus potens*) admitting no other but a *distinction of Reason*.

CHAP. II.

A second Argument (from the three Requisites to every Being) examined.

IN the second Chapter, he proposeth first the Opinion of those that stile the Understanding a *Faculty*, whereby the Soule receiveth or entertaineth *Truth*, and *Asserts* accordingly.

But here his Lordship (if I mistake not) varieth from his former acceptance of *Truth* ; Comparing it not to the *Innate* Light, or power of Seeing, in the Eye ; but to the *Advenient* Light, which streames to it through the Ayr, bringing with it the *Idea*, or *visible Species*, of the Object seen. For, soon after, he calls it, *those sweet beams of Light which beat upon us continually* ; which cannot be meant of any *innate* Light, but of an *advenient* Light.

And thus I see no inconvenience at all, to say, That the Soule, or Understanding, by its *Innate* Light, of Reason, (which whether you say to be distinct from the Soule, or not, it is not much materiall) doth daily receive or entertain new *Truths*, or new *Representations* of that *Truth of Being* which is really existent in Things ; either by a *reiterate* a Quall understanding of those things which it had formerly understood, or by a *new* apprehension of somewhat whereof before it was ignorant. Like as the Eye by its *innate* Power of Seeing, discerns new *Species* (conveyed to it by *advenient* Light) either from Objects formerly seen, or now first represented.

Next he lays down three *Requisites to the constitution of every Being*. *A Fountaine communicating ; a Channell entertaining ; and Waters imparted.* (*Conferens, Collatum, Recipiens.*) And he asks *Where we shall find these three, if the Understanding be a Faculty.*

I answer. If you speak of *Advenient* light (last mentioned) which is a *Representative Truth*, or an *Idea* of that *Reall Truth* which is in the Things Known ; I say, the *Reall Truth* (or *Veritas Essendi*) sends forth

forth this *Representative* Truth, or *Idea*, which is conveyed by a *Deferent* Light (either of Discourse, or Information, or the like) till it come to the *Understanding*, where it is received and entertained by the *Innate* Light (or Truth) of Reason. Like as the Inherent light of Colour in the Object sends forth a *Representative* light of visible *Species*, which is conveyed by a *Deferent* light in the *Ayr*, till it come to the *Eye*, where it is entertained by the *Innate* light, which is the faculty of Seeing.

And, as the Remoteness, or Obscurity of the *Object*; the Darknesse of the *Medium*; or the Weaknesse of the *Faculty*, may hinder *Sight*, so that we see not at all, or not perfectly: In like manner the *Distance* of the *Object*, as in things quite out of our reach; or the *Obscurity* of them, which send forth no *Species*, or manifestation of their essence towards us; our *imperfect* Discourse, or *insufficient* Information, which is as a dark *Medium*; and lastly, the *weaknesse* of our *Apprehension*; doe cause *Ignorance* in the *Understanding*, which is answerable to *not-seeing* in the *Eye*.

Again, as in *Ignorance* so in *Error*. A reflection of a *false* Light upon the *Object*, casting a false seeming colour, which may be mistaken for the true colour of it; an *indisposed* *Medium*, as when we see through Red glasse, &c. and a *distempered* *Organ*, by reason of some vitious humours accidentall in the *Eye*, &c. may cause a mistake and *Error* in *Sight*: So here, when there is a *False* Light upon the *Object*, as when we conceive that to be the effect of one thing, which indeed proceeds from some other cause, *fallacia non causa pro causa*, or the like; a *false* Discourse or Inference, or a *false* Relation, which is as a *stained* *Medium*; or a *distempered* *Understanding*, by reason of *Passion*, of *lascivious Phantasia*, or the like; may cause an *Erroneous* *Judgement*, apprehending things to be otherwise then indeed they are.

And thus I have shewed not onely those three requisites which his Lordship requires, but some others besides them; supposing in the mean time the *Understanding* to be a *Faculty*; and taking *Truth* for those sweet Beams of Light, which beat upon us; *Advenient* Light.

If you take *Truth* for *Reason*; and withall suppose *Reason* to be distinct from the *Understanding*, and *it* also from the *Soule*. You may say, The *Understanding* is the *Recipient*; *Reason* the thing *Received* in it; and that *Then* and from *Those*, when and from whence it received its *Essence*, to which *Reason* is a connate and appendent *Faculty*; That is, either from God, by immediate Creation, which many think;

er from the Parents, by Propagation, which others hold.

But I suppose there be few or none, that hold, *Reason* to be distinct from the *Understanding*, and *That* also from the *Soule*. For when they speak of *Reason*, as a *faculty* of the *Understanding*; by *Understanding* they mean, the *Soule* it selfe, *quatenus intelligens*, being considered as the Subject of *Reason*: And when they speak of the *Understanding* as a *faculty*, whereby the *Soule* is able to conceive and judge of *Truth*; Then they take the *Understanding* to be the same with *Reason*.

I should rather say, That *Reason*, and the *Understanding* (as it denotes a *Faculty*) are two words *Synonima*, denoting the same *Faculty* or *Power* of *Knowing* and *Judging*. Which *Faculty* I would not grant to be another *Thing* from the *Soule*-*Knowing*, or the *Soule*-*Understanding* but a *Modus*: As neither doe I allow to Any *Naturall*-*Power*, or *Faculty*, (which they make the second Species of *Quality*) any other *Being* then the *Being* of a *Modus*, and not the *being* of a *Thing*.

And thus we may safely say, the *Soule* receives the *Faculty* of *Reason* or *Understanding*; Thence, from whence it receives its *Being*: (as a *Stone* receives its *Heaviness* from that which Produceth it:) That which gave it to *Be*, gave it to be *Thus*.

Sometimes indeed *Accidents* are not received from that which produceth the *Substance*, but from some other *Efficient*; as the *Smoothness* of *Marble* proceeds not from the *Producer*, but from the *Polisher*: And yet I hold not, the *Smoothness* to be One *Thing*, and the *Marble* to be another *Thing*; but the *Marble* to be a *Thing*, and the *Smoothness* to be *Modus*. And thus it must be granted in *Acquisita* *Habits*; where the *Giver* and *Receiver* are the Same, and the *Thing* Received *Modally*, but not *really*, distinct from either.

But for *Faculties*, or *Naturall*-*Powers*; If you look for an *Externall* *Efficient* or *Giver*, it will be the same that produceth the *Substance*; But if you be contented with an *Efficient per Emanationem*, Thus they are said to flow or arise from the *Form*, or *Substance*. And then the *Giver* and *Receiver* is the Same; (for the *Form* which is the *Subject* *Receiving*, is also *per emanationem* *Effectiva*, from whence it ariseth as an *Essentiall* *Consequent*:) and if you say the *Faculty* Received is not so much as *Modally* distinguished from it but onely *ratione ratiocinata*; I contend not. But so much distinction at least, I suppose, we must allow it.

Having thus answered his Lordships *Quære*, I proceed to answer
his

his Objections. *If the Understanding* (saith he) *be the Recipient, then the Light* (of Reason) *which differenceth us from the Vegetative and Sensitive creatures, lieth in the Understanding, and not in the Soul: And so the Soul is either not enlightened at all, but only a Theca to the Intellectual; or else there be two Enlightened (rationall) Beings in one Reasonable creature.*

For answer, First, I suppose (as I said before) that there are few, if any, that will affirm, the Soul, the Understanding, and Reason, to be *Three* things: But they will either say, Reason *is* the Understanding, and not *in* the Understanding; or else, Reason *is in* the Understanding, which Understanding is the Soul, considered only under this Notion, *quatenus Intelligens*, as it is the Subject of Reason. And thus the difficulty appears not; For the Light which differenceth us from Unreasonable creatures, whether you call it Reason, or call it the Understanding, is seated in the Soule, and so denominates it *Intelligent* or *Understanding*.

But secondly, we want not a Recipient for Truth though the Soul be not it, It may be the Understanding.

Yet thirdly, though the Soul be not the *Immediate* Subject, it may yet be the *Ultimate*, which is more then a *Theca*.

Object. But you will reply, However it be so, that wee make this Light to be inherent in the Soul; yet it is not sufficient to make an *Essentiall* difference between the Reasonable and Unreasonable Soul. For though Reason be *in* the Soul, except it also *Be* the Soul, it makes the difference but *Accidental*; For thus the Reasonable and Unreasonable Soul will not differ in their *Essence*, but only in their *Adjuncts*.

Ans. To this I answer, First, this is a new difficulty not arising out of his Lordships argument: For though this Light (of Reason) be an Accident, yet this hinders not but that there may be his three Requisites: For an Accident may be truly *received*, in the Subject, *from* the Producer.

And yet (secondly) This, though a Faculty of the Soul, and not the Soul itself, makes notwithstanding a Noble difference between a *Rational* and *Irrational* Soul; so that the Soul loseth not its dignity, neither becomes a bare *Theca* to the Understanding or Reason: And is sufficiently dignified to have such a Divine faculty *in* it, and *of* it, by which it produceth it operations, which the *Irrational* Soul hath not. We account those Stones precious, that have in them some rare Vertues: And why not the Soul, indued with so Divine a Faculty?

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4 Especially (which is the third thing I reply) since it is *in* the Soule, that is also of the Soul. The Honey which *Samson* found in the dead Lions carcase, proceeded not *from it*, but was only accidentally or casually *in it*. A Knife touched with a Loadstone will take up a Needle, or the like; but this attractive Vertue is not from It self, but from the Loadstone: And you may call the Knife, if you please, a *Theca* or Receptacle of this Vertue; and say, it hath no other then a Relative Excellencie, as it is the Receptacle of an Excellent Vertue; (though indeed to be the Subject of Inhesion, is more then a *Theca*, or a bare Receptacle.) But in the Loadstone it is otherwise, For there the Attractive Vertue is not onely *in it*, but of it, or *from it selfe*: It is so received *in it*, that it flows *from it*, it is *sui partus*. Thus in the Soule, though Reason be a Faculty of the Soul, yet is it such a Faculty as floweth from it; and so the Soule not only its Receptacle, but also its Originall. Thus is Light *in* the Sunne, and *From* the Sunne, it is not received *aliunde*. And it is a Reall Excellencie in the Sunne, and not onely Relative, to be the Author and Originall of that which enlightens the whole World. And it is a Reall Excellencie in the Soule (and more then the Excellencie of a *Theca*) to have *from it selfe*, from its owne Essence, such a Faculty whereby it is able to Know and Understand.

But you will say still, However Reason may thus dignifie and distinguish it from Irrationall Beings; Yet this is but an *Accidentall* Dignity, an *Accidentall* Distinction, not *Essentiall*; as consisting in that which is *in* the Soule, but *distinct from it*. Therefore

Fourthly, Reason in the Soule, is not onely an *Accidentall*, but an *Essentiall* Perfection, an *Essentiall* Consequent flowing immediately from the Essence of the Soul, as an inseparable endowment: And so may make an *Essentiall* difference; (it is *Essentiall* to the Soule that Reason should arise from it.) And thus that which is distinct from a thing, may yet be *Essentiall* to it, *viz. Essentiale Consequens*, though not *Essentiale Constituens*.

But fifthly, (which I conceive to be of the greatest force) though Reason, or the Understanding (as a Faculty) be only *Essentiale Consequens*; and so, in its Formality, makes onely an *Externall* difference (*aposteriori*;) Yet it points out unto us an *Essentiale Constituens*, an *Essentiall Ingredient* (as I may so call it) from whence this Consequent doth arise. Which is somewhat in the Essence of the Soule: Whereof we can take no other notice then from its Operations. (And this Answer holds good, though you suppose Reason to be distinct from the Under-

Understanding, and Both from the Soule: For so, that *Essence* (from whence the Understanding flows, together with its Immediate and Remote Issue, viz. Reason and its Operations) will make this *Essentiall* Difference between the Rationall and Irrationall Soul.)

Thus they say, *prima Qualitates* are not *Formæ Elementorum*, but That from whence these first Qualities do Essentially flow. And though the *Qualities* make but an *Accidental* difference between them, yet the *Substantiall Forms* from whence the *Qualities* do arise make an *Essentiall* difference. (So here: The *Rationall* Soule is such a Substance as is able to give rise to such Faculties, which the *Irrationall* Soule is not.)

If you ask What this *Substantiall Form* is? You know the ordinary answer; *Dic formam lapidis & eris mihi magnus Apollo.* (It is a hard thing, by his own confession, to find out the Form of any Being, much more to discover the Being of a Form, pag. 32.) Tell me the Being of Any thing, and I will tell you the Being of This. If I ask *What the Soule is?* (which to be we are sure:) You will say perhaps, a *Spiritual* Substance: And that is all you can say, for the Essence of it. But if I ask, what it is To be *Spiritual*? what, To be a Substance? I suppose you cannot tell me otherwise, then by *Negations*, or *Effects*. And (thus) they will do in the *Elementall Forms*; They are not these Qualities, but something from whence they arise. (And so for the substance of the Soule, It is not these Faculties but the Originall of them.)

If you will say, There is no such *Something*, as this *Substantiall Form* of the Elements; because we cannot tell you *what* this *Something* is.

(To omit, that by the same reason you might banish all Being, because none can tell you, *what Being is*: For if you say (and that is all you can say) that Being is a Ray communicated from the Originall Entity in God: This tells us at the most, but *whence* it is, not *what* it is.)

I say, If you deny, that there be any other *Forms* of the Elements (beside their *Qualities*) whereby they differ one from another; Then need we look no further: For then these *Faculties*, though but *Accidents*, may be sufficient to make an *Essentiall* difference in the Rationall Soule from the Irrationall.

But further, If you can perswade them, that the *Essence* or *Form* of the Elements, and their *Accidents* or *Prime Qualities*, are the same: I doubt not, but then they will as easily grant, the *Soul* and its *Faculties* to be the same also.

And thus I have answered according to their opinion that hold the Soul and its Faculties distinct : And have shewed, that we are not so farre to seek for a Recipient of Reason, or Truth, as his Lordship might imagine. And indeed there is nothing more difficult in this particular, then in all Accidents whatsoever ; their *Subject* is their *Recipient*, and so is the Subject of Truth, or Reason, Its Recipient.

But there is another kind of *Recipieny* (which I shall touch in the next Chapter) which (if I mistake not) will cut the sinews of this Argument, and leave it of no force.

But in the mean time (having found a *Recipient*) we must seek for a *Fountaine*, from whence this Light of Reason, or Truth, is derived. For that is his Lordships next demand ; *Who is it that communicateth this Light ?*

For the answering of this, I shall first propound another *Quere* of the same nature, and then apply mine answer joyntly to both. I ask therefore first, whether *Fire* (supposing it to be an Element) be not the true *Recipient of Heat* ? and the *Loadstone* the true *Recipient of the Attractive virtue* that is in it ? and the *Sunne*, the true Recipient of *Light* ? If so, then I demand, From whence they are received ? What is the Fountain from which they are communicated ?

If you speak of an *Internall Fountain*, from whence they flow by an *Essentiall Emanation* ; The *Recipient* and the *Fountain* will be the same. And so, if you say the *Body* of the Sunne, of the Fire, of the Loadstone, be the immediate *Recipients* of their Light, Heat, and Virtue ; Then must I say, That these severall *Bodies* are the severall *Fountains* from whence (respectively) those Qualities do proceed. If you say, That these Qualities are Received (*subjetantur*) immediately, in the *Form* or *Essence* of these bodies, and not in the entire Substance ; I must say also, They do arise from these *Forms*, and flow from them by an *Essentiall Emanation*. And the Definitive Resolution of this *Quere* depends upon the determination of that Question in Philosophy, whether *Accidents* be *subjetted* immediately in the *Form*, or in the *Composition* : and (consequently) whether they flow from the *Form* immediately, or jointly from Matter and Form together. Which questions it is not materiall for me to determine ; for take which side you please, I shall soon finde both the Fountain and a Recipient.

If you look for an *Externall, Physicall Fountain*, or Efficient ; we must say, That the same Fountain from whence they have their *Essence*, from the same do they receive with their Essence their *Inseparable Accidents*,

accidents, or Essentiall Consequents, by a Comproduction. Thus the Sunne received its inherent Light by Creation, together with its Essence, from God: For in the Creation of the Substance, the Accidents are also Concreated. So Fire produced by a naturall Agent, receives its Heat comproduced, or congenerated, and conferred upon it together with its Essence from the same Efficient.

Now in any of these ways, it will not be hard to find a *Fountain of Truth*, an Originall from whence the Light of *Reason* or *Truth* may be conferred; Though we hold the Understanding and the Soule to be distinct.

If you ask an *Internall Fountain*; It will be answered, That *Reason*, or the Faculty of Understanding, flows from the *Essence* of the Soule, as an *Essentiall Consequent*; and is received and inherent in the Soule. (For I think not fitting to say, that it is inherent in the whole Reasonable Creature (jointly) consisting of Body and Soule; because it remains in the Soule separate, without the Body.) Or (if you look at them as Three things) then *Reason* must be said to flow from the *Understanding*, and It from the *Soule*; and to be received, by Inherence, in the Understanding, as That also is received in the Soule.

If you enquire for an *Externall Efficient*; So the Faculties are either Concreated with the Soule by God; or else comproduced by the Parents by Propagation. And so we want not a *Fountain*, from whence Reason may be communicated.

I proceed to his Lordships prosecution of this *Quere. This Light* (of Truth or Reason) *must be conveyed* (saith he) *to the Understanding from the Soule, from some other Creature, or from God himselfe*; but neither of these ways; therefore not all.

I see not why Any or All of these Fountains may not be admitted to be the Source of Reason, in a severall way.

First, why may not the Soule be the Fountain of *Reason* or the *understanding Faculty*; as well as the Essence of Fire is the Fountain of its Heat, and the Essence of the Magnet the Fountain of its Virtue? not by *Physicall Production*, but by *Essentiall Emanation*? Indeed, I like not to say, The Soule communicates Reason to the Understanding, (as to a Third thing;) For I have said before, the Recipient and the Fountain in this way of conveyance, *viz. per emanationem*, are the Same: like as in *Immanent acts*, the Agent and the Patient are the same. But I say, That *Reason* or the understanding Faculty, which the Soule as Recipient entertains *In it selfe*; it hath also *From it selfe*, as being the *Fountain*.

(But if you take the Understanding as a third thing from both; then the Soul must not be said to be the *Immediate* Fountain, but the Understanding must be said to be the (*Immediate*) both Source and Chanell.)

And thus his Lordships reason troubleth me not, *viz.* If the Soul communicate Light, then Hath it Light already, and so this Faculty, the Understanding, is in vain. I say, the Soule hath This Light, which both flows from the Soule as an Essentiall Consequent, and is Inherent in the Soule as an Inseparable Accident.

Next, why may not the Soule, or Understanding (whether you will) receive this Light of Reason from another Creature? I mean, from the Parent, by Procreation; producing both its Essence, and Adjuncts, as well Essentiall as Accidentall, together & not by Essentiall Emanation, as before, but by *Physicall Production*?

To the Reason annexed, *viz.* That if a Creature produce a Faculty in the Soule or Understanding that Creature must produce it by an intervenient Faculty, and That faculty must be produced by another Faculty, and so in infinitum; I answer, The faculty of Reason (together with the Soul) was produced by the Parent (according to this supposition,) and that by an Intervient Faculty, *viz.* the Generative Faculty in the Parents. And yet shall we not proceed in infinitum, For This generative faculty was produced by Another, and That again by Another, ascending still upwards till we come to the Generative Faculty of Adam, which was immediately produced of God, without an intervenient Faculty, either by Concreation with the Soule; or by Infusion, when he pronounced that blessing *Increase and multiply*.

Lastly, why may not this and other Faculties be produced in the Soule and with the Soule, by immediate creation, from God? I mean, if Soules be daily created, as most suppose; Or, if not, yet at least the Faculties in Adams Soule might be by God Created or Concreated with it, notwithstanding that they be distinct.

But you aske, Why then did not God immediately and intrinsically communicate this to the Soule it selfe, rather then as a Faculty, or by a Faculty? If he did not, it was because he Would not; and we cannot give account of this will. God might have created immediately all Mankind, as he did the Angels; yet we see he pleased rather, that they should be produced by Generation, one from another: But who can give us any other account of this his pleasure, save onely his Will? So neither, why Reason should be an *Accidentall Faculty*, rather then *Modum Substantialis*; that is, why he should produce it *mediate animâ*, rather

rather then by himself *immediately*, together with it: he might do either.

But, in generall, *By what means soever* (saith he) *Truth* (or Reason) *be conveyed*; if the *Understanding* do at all, receive *Truth*, then it is *Truth*; For God doth not communicate *Light*, but to *Light*.

If he mean, God gives *Lucem non nisi Lucido*; or *Lumen non nisi Luminofo*; I grant it, Taking the words in *sensu composito*, but not in *sensu diviso*. (And so God gives not *Animam nisi Animato*, nor *Rationem nisi Rationali*.) That is, God gives not *Light* but to that which is *Light* (i. *Lucide* or *Illuminate*,) viz. when that *Light* is bestowed: But in *sensu diviso*, That this was (before) *Lucid*, it is not to be admitted. *Light* communicated to the *Ayr*, makes it *Illuminate*, but finds it not so. God inspires not a *Soule*, but into a *Living-creature*: And so breathing into *Adam* the breath of *Life*, he made him a *Living-creature*; but found him (his body) *Inanimate*, a Lump of *Earth*. So here; God gives not the *Light* of Reason, but to that which is *Light*, or *Inlightned*, viz. *Then Inlightned* when this *Light* of Reason is bestowed.

But if by this, *God gives not Light but to Light*, he means, *Lucem non dat nisi Luci*, or *Lumen non nisi Lumini*; I cannot admit it, either in *sensu composito*, or in *diviso*. When the *Sunne* imparts *Light* (*Lumen*) to the *Ayr*; the *Ayr* is *Illuminate* or *Enlightned*: But, that the *Ayr* is *Lumen*, I must never grant, till we cease to hold, *Lumen non est Corpus*. So if God communicate to the *Soule* or *Understanding* the *Light* of Reason; the *Soule* or *Understanding* becomes thereby *Illuminate* or *Enlightned* with Reason: But, that the *Soule* or *Understanding*, is this *Light*, this *Reason*; follows no more then if you would say, That *Water* is *Heat* when it grows *Hot*; The *Ayr* is *Light* (*Lumen*,) when it is *Enlightned*; A *Body* becomes a *Colour* when it is *Coloured*; Any *Substance* whatsoever is metamorphis'd into an *Accident*, when (as a *Subject*) it Receives that *Accident*; or That the *Body* of *Adam*, formed out of the *Dust*, was made a *Soule*, when it received a *Soule* inspired.

That which is annexed as a proof; Because *Quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis*, (together with the illustrations following;) proves no more but this, Whatsoever is conferred; is no further forth conferred, then as the *Subject* is capable of, and actually doth receive it. And this we grant, That the *Soule* or *Understanding*, upon which the *Light* of Reason is conferred; is a *fit Subject* to receive or entertaine Reason, and is actually indued with Reason. And so I admit that which he cites of Dr. Twisse, *Neither a quality permanent, nor an act immanent unlesse they be made INHERENT IN the Soule*, (observe the phrase) and
the

the latter also produced by it, can be said to be given to the Soule. Hee saith, It is *Inherent* in the Soule, not that it is the Soule.

Lastly, *How passeth* (saith he) *this Light from the Understanding to the Soule?* there being as vast a distance between It and the Soule, as between It and the will, (supposing them distinct Faculties) whence grow those inextricable disputes, *How the Will is made to Understand, what the Understanding judgeth fit to be Willed.*

But here his Lordship varies somewhat the State of the Question in altering the acceptation of the word *Truth*, from truth *understanding*, to truth *understood*, and instead of innate truth of Reason, speaks of the *advenient* truth, which is a *Conceptus* or *Idea* framed to represent the truth of *Being* in the Object. For we cannot conceive *Reason*, which is now looked upon as a permanent Faculty, to be transient from one subject to another.

But *Truth Understood*, how it may be conveyed from the Understanding to the Soul; I shall Then perhaps better tell when he shews me, *How the Visible Species* are conveyed from the *Organ* to the *Soul*, or *Faculty*, seeing. That the *Organ* receives *Species*, he will not deny; for else the Soul might as well see, when the *Eye* is out: That the *Soul* also (by the *Organ*) doth apprehend these *Species*, must likewise be yeilded; else why should not the *Eye* of a dead man see? That the *Soule* and the *Organ* are *distinct*, must needs be granted; for we see them really separated by death, whereas nothing can be separated from it selfe: And when I am informed, *How the Soule and the Organ, being distinct, are conjoynd in Seeing*; I shall better be able to resolve, *How the Soule and the Faculty, though distinct, may joynthly Understand.*

Till then, it might suffice, in generall to say, That, As by the *Organ* the Soule *Seeth*, so by *Reason* or the Understanding-faculty, the Soule *Knows* and *Understandeth*: (only allowing such disproportion as must be allowed between a Materiall and Immateriall instrument.) And it seems to be no more vast distance between a *Faculty* and the Soule, then is between an *Organ* and the Soule. So that if by *Visible Species* in the *Organ*, the Soule may see; why not by *Intellectuall Species* in the Understanding (though a Faculty) may the Soule *Understand*?

But, because I love not to answer a difficulty only by opposing another; you may resolve it thus. We are not to conceive, there is any such vast *Gulf* between the Soule and the Understanding (though a Faculty) as that Truth should need a Ferry-boat to waite it over: For as the *Eye* doth not first see, and then Inform the Soule or Visive Faculty,

culty, *what it hath seene*; but the Organ and the Faculty joyntly con-
 cur to the Act of Seeing: So neither doth the Understanding first
 Receive and Entertain Truth, and afterward inform the Soule, what
 it hath Understood: But the Soule with and by this Faculty of Reason
 or Understanding, doth Know and Understand; Both concurring to
 the same Act. (Thus a Stone, by its Heaviness, descends; Fire, by its
 Heat, warms; by its Light, shines; Glasse, by its Smoothness, re-
 flects light; a Knife, by a communicated Faculty from the Magnet,
 draws iron: And yet (in some of these at least) you must of necessity
 grant a distinction *ex parte rei*.)

There is indeed sometimes a *Reflex* act of the Soule, whereby it
 Knows, *what is Understood*: But we must not think, that it is an act
 of the Soules Essence, surveying or taking account of the *Understanding*
Faculty, what it hath done; But the Soule, by this understanding Fa-
 culty, reflects upon a former Act, which It selfe by the same Faculty
 had formerly performed.

The *Gulf* is likewise fordable between the *Understanding* and the
Will, though they be distinct faculties. Not as if the *Will* by an act of
Knowledge should Understand what the *Intellect* doth dictate: But the
Soule, which by its faculty of Understanding *Knows*, doth by its Wil-
 ling faculty *Command*, and by its Loco-motive *Execute*. So that nei-
 ther the *Will* Knows what the *Understanding* Judgeth, nor the *Inferiour*
Faculties what the *Will* Commands; But the *Soule* by severall *Facul-*
ties executes severall *Functions*. Thus when the Soule by the Eye dis-
 covers a danger imminent, by the Hand it endeavours to divert it: And
 yet there is no Messenger dispatcht between, to inform the Hand, what
 the Eye hath seen; notwithstanding that the Hand and the Eye are
 Really distinct, yea Locally distant.

As for mine own Opinion, I could easily grant, The distinction of
 the Faculties, from the Soule, and among themselves, to be neither *Re-*
all, nor *a parte rei*. And concerning the first, I am sufficiently confi-
 dent: But for the second, whether the Distinction be *Modall* (i. *a*
parte Rei) or meerly *Rationall* (*rationis ratiocinata*), I do yet desire
 a convincing Demonstration to determine.

CHAP. III.

The same Argument further prosecuted and examined, in this and the ensuing Chapters.

IN the next Chapter he shewes, That if we make the Understanding and Truth to be One, (which I suppose will be easily granted; there being but few or none which make the Soule, the Understanding, and Reason (that is, Truth) to be Three distinct things:) then will it be easie to find these three Requisites: For thus Light or Truth is Dispensed; By the Father of Light; and hath for its Recipient, the whole Reasonable creature, consisting of Body and Soule. All which I admit, (as likewise will those that be his greatest adversaries:) onely with this Proviso, That he make the entire Reasonable creature to be *subiectum Denominatiuū*, and not *subiectum Inhasioni*, to Reason or Truth.

Next, he spends some time to clear this, How the whole Reasonable Creature can be said to be the Recipient; which labour, in my judgement, might have been spared: For I cannot see any reason to fear, but that it will as easily be granted, that the Reasonable Creature may be the Subject of Reason; as that the *Ayr* illuminate is the Subject of Light: without any fear of Identity in the Thing Received with the Recipient.

But it seems his Lordship speaks of another kind of Recipieney beside the Recipieney of a Subject: Such a kind of Recipieney as where the *Recipiens* and *Receptum* be the same. No Being (saith he) but it is the thing Receiving and Received: For consider any Individuall Being you please, Vegetative or Rationall, or what you will; Who is it that entertaineth this Being, but the Being it selfe which is entertained? Who is it that receiveth from the Womb of Eternity that reasonable creature, but the creature received?

You may distinguish them thus, The Recipieney of a Being, and the Recipieney of a Form: And so, the Fountain or Efficient, *dat Esse*, and *dat Habere*. In the first kind of Giving and Receiving, the Recipient and the thing Received must of necessity be the same; Thus the Efficient or Producer of Light, *dat Lucido ESSE Lucidum*, *dat Luci ESSE Lucem*, not *dat Lucido esse Lucem*. But in the second it is otherwise, not *dat Lucido HABERE Lucidum*, nor *Luci HABERE Lucem*, but *Lucido Habere Lucem*. Thus the Efficient or Fountain of Reason, *dat Rationali ESSE Rationalem*, *Habere Rationem*.

(But

(But how his Marginall note stands good, viz. *That in all things the Agent and the Patient must be One*, because *The thing Receiving and Received are One*, I cannot conceive; For thus he makes *God* and the *Reasonable creature* to be *One*: For, if I mistake not, the Fountain or Efficient is the Agent, and the Recipient the Patient.)

And indeed he must of necessity admit this distinction of *Recipieny*: For otherwise his Fundamentall Axiom would have failed. For if we allow no Recipieny, but the Recipieny of a *Subject*, whereby it receives or entertains a *Form*; It will not be Universall true, That to the constitution of every Being, there must be the three Requisites formerly mentioned. For *Substantia non sunt in subjecto*; Compleat Substances are not communicated or imparted *To a Subject Receiving* (as it so would want a Recipient,) but are onely made to *Be*, and to *be the Subject Receiving* other things.

But I desire his Lordship to consider, Whether, admitting such a *Reception*, wherein every thing is its *own* Recipient; he do not lay open so wide a gap, that his adversaries may make an Escape; and Himself break that Net wherein his Adversary should have been taken? Whether, in answering an Objection, he doe not overthrow his principall Argument? For how easie is it to say, That *Truth*, though it be neither Soule, Intellect, nor Reason; Yet it is a Faculty (or what you will) Proceeding from *God*, and its *own* Recipient. And so, though they imagine an hundred Faculties in the Soule, one dependent upon another; yet they shall never be put to a straight to find either a Fountain or a Recipient: For *God*, of necessity, must be the *Fountain* of all Being whatsoever (either *mediate* or *immediate*;) And *that Being* whatsoever it is, shall be its *own* Recipient. Therefore the Soule (in this sense) hath not the Body for its Recipient; neither did God communicate or bestow a *living* Soule upon *Adam's earthly* Body, when he breathed into it the breath of Life: But he gave *To the Soule*, to Be a *Soul*. Neither is the Soule a Recipient to the Understanding, Nor It to Reason, nor any of these to Truth, (if they be distinct things;) But each of these their *own* Recipient. Neither (lastly) is the entire *Reasonable creature* a Recipient of *Truth* or Reason (as he would have it) But *Truth* is its *own* Recipient. And then must he hold his hand from Concluding as he doth in the Close of this Chapter, That *the totum existens consisting of Matter and Form: the Reasonable creature, is the Recipient of this Truth*: Except he will say, *Veritas est Animal rationale, & Animal rationale est Veritas*.

But how, the Ignorance of this Point should give the ground to that Question, whether the Soule or the Body be *Contentum*; (which he admonisheth us of) I cannot see. For though it be granted, that Every thing be its own *Contentum*; yet this difficulty remaineth as firm as before. For, Is not *Water* its own *Contentum*: Is not the *Vessell* also its own *Contentum*? Yet he will not deny, but that (in another sense) the *Water* is contained in the *Vessell*; nor can he say, That the *Vessell* is contained in the *Water*: So though the Soule and Body be either of them their own *Contentum* and Recipient (*quia datur Anima ut sit Anima*; *datur Corpori ut sit Corpus*;) Yet that the one may not be *Locum*, and the other *Locatum*; one the *Subiect*, and the other an *Adjunct* (which is the meaning of that Question) will not from hence appear.

CHAP. IV.

Whether the Understanding faculty may not be the Recipient of Truth.

IN the 4. Chapter he proceeds, further to shew, That the Understanding cannot be this Recipient. And if he speak of such a Recipiency as where the Recipient and the *Receptum* be the same; his Adversaries, that say, Truth and the Understanding to be distinct, will contend for this as well as He: For neither will They say, *datur Intellectui se esse Rationem*, nor *datur Rationi ut sit Intellectus*. But if he speak of the Recipiency of a Subject, I see not from what hath yet been said, why the Understanding (if distinct) may not be the Subject of Reason; why they may not say, *Datur Intellectui Habere Rationem*: Since it is granted in *Logick*, That one Accident may be the immediate Subject, though not the Ultimate Subject of another. And so, if any will have the Soul the Intellect, and Truth or Reason, to be *tria distincta*: They must say, The Intellect is the immediate Subject of Reason, and the Soule the Ultimate. And then call the Understanding either a *Quality*, a *Faculty*, or *Virtus quã*, it is no great matter; (we will not contend with his Lordship for the name.) For *Virtus quã* is but a *Faculty*, and a *Faculty*, (or *potentia naturalis*) is the second species of *Quality*.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Whether the Soule and Truth in the Soule, be one.

THE like Answer must be given to that in the 5. Chapter, *Whether the Soule (without an intervenient Faculty) may not be the Recipient of Truth ?* For we cannot say, *Datur Anima ut sit Veritas*; except we agree to make the Soule and Reason one: But we may say *Datur Anima ut sit Subiectum veritatis*, or *Subiectum Rationis*, though we hold them distinct. As may appeare at large by what I have said upon the second Chapter.

That which is further added in this Chapter, whether as a Suasive to inforce this, or as a New Argument; *viz. That our Soule resembles God, who is Unus & simplex actus*, and therefore it selfe must be simple in its Operations; and we must not expect first an Essence, and then a Faculty whereby it worketh, &c. may as well be urged, to prove, That our Soule and Body are the same, because Man was made after Gods Image, who is *unus & simplex*, not consisting of Parts. Or (if you instance particularly in the Soule) It may as well follow, That we know not one thing (*successively*) After another, nor (*discursively*) By another; but by One entire Act like God, because the Soule bears the Image of God, and *Unitas* (which I grant not) is *formalis ratio Dei*.

That which is lastly added, concerning a Resemblance of the Trinity, in Truth thus understood: Is no way peculiar to this acceptation of Truth; But holds as well in every degree of Being whatsoever. All *Entity* or Being, As it lieth involved in the Originall Fountain of Being, which is Gods Essence, may represent *patrem intelligentem*; As it descends from above, *filium intellectum*; As it is received in the Creature, and maketh it to Be, *spiritum dilectum*.

And thus I have surveyed his Lordships reasons to prove, *the Soule and Truth to be One*. Understanding by *Truth*, or Light, the Light of Reason; which is the Originall or *actus primus*, from whence *Rationall Operations* doe proceed; And therefore must needs be the first of those *Notions of Truth* laid down in his first Chapter.

And, that it cannot be any other acceptation of *Truth*, that is here meant, is very apparent; If we look upon the other acceptations of Truth; which we shall find to be no way consonant either with his Method or his Arguments. For if you consider of *Truth understood*, or the *Idea of Truth entertained in the Mind by actuall Apprehension*; This will have no Being, either in the Understanding, or elsewhere, till such

time as the Understanding it self frames this *Conceptus* : But (as yet) we have nothing to doe with the *Operations* of the Intellect : For he proceeds not to consider the *Operations* or *Effects* of the *Reasonable Soule*, till he come to the 10. Chapter ;) But with something antecedent them, which is the Fountain from whence these *Operations* doe proceed ; which can be no other but *Reason*. Yea, himselfe affirms it in this 5. Chapter, pag. 23.) And likewise that acceptance of Truth, for the Truth either of *Being*, or of *Cognoscibility*, in the Obj^t hath no conjunction with the Understanding, till it be actually understood : And even Then, we cannot make it to be One with the Understanding, except we make those things to be *One*, which have neither coexistence of *Place*, nor coexistence of *Time* ; For those things may be understood, which were many thousand Yeares past, and many thousand Miles distant.

CHAP. VI.

Whether all things bee this one Truth.

IN the next place he proceeds to a Consequent or Corollary, arising out of his former Thesis, viz. *That All things, are this One Truth.*

I confesse, I was at a stand a great while, and could not imagine any shew of Consequence between these propositions : If *Truth* or *Reason*, be the same with the *Soule* or *Understanding* ; then is it also the same with *All things* else. Why so. *This Argument* (saith he) *will presse all things that are.*

This Argument ? which Argument ? Doth he mean that argument which was last propounded, towards the end of the fifth chapter, [That because God is one simple act ; therefore, not only the Soule and its Faculties must be One, but even All Creatures must be One, because there is in All somewhat of Gods Image, whose Essence is *Unity* ?] If this be his Argument, I shall content my self with a bare deniall of the Consequence, till I see some shew of prooffe. For, That *Unity* is Gods Essence, is (in my judgement) grossely false ; Or, were it true, yet, That because God is *One*, therefore the Creatures must also *All* be *One* ; hath no strength : For this *Unity* in God is equivalent to an infinite *Multiplicity*. And, That *One simple Efficient*, may not produce *distinct Effects*, seems to me a Paradox.

Or is it his second Argument, propounded in the second chapter, and prosecuted in those that follow ; [That, to the constitution of every Creature there must be a *Being* communicated, a *Fountain* from whence,

and.

and a *Recipient* to which ; the which *Recipient* must be the *same* with the *Being received* ! From hence perhaps he might prove, That every thing is the same with its own *Being* : But That very thing it could be the same with each other, or the same with reason, or the understanding ; follows not.

Is it then his first Argument, propounded towards the end of the first chapter ? Which perhaps his Lordship lockes at as the principall Argument ; and at all that follows, only as a Prosecution of that ; (Though his Marginall notes, and the Titles of Chapters (which I question whether or noe they be of his Lordships doing) point out to us distinct Arguments, in the beginning of the second, and in the end of the fifth chapter.)

The Argument was this, *The Understanding is nothing but a Ray of the Divine Nature, &c. And is not Truth the same ?* which I understood, as you may see, thus, [The Understanding is Gods Image in Man, And this Image consists in Truth, or the Light of Reason ; therefore Truth, or Reason, is the Understanding.] And thus the Syllogisme will be true in the first figure, if you transpose the Premises and convert the Conclusion. Or thus, [The Image of God in Man is the Understanding ; And this Image is Truth ; therefore (some) Truth is the Understanding :] And thus it will be true in the third figure. And beside these two forms, I see not how that Argument can be reduced to a true Syllogisme. Now chuse you which form you please ; yet how it should follow from hence, [That All things else are this *One* Truth,] I do not yet perceive.

It may be his Lordship would have his Argument thus ordered (in the second figure) [The Understanding is a Ray of Divinity ; And Truth also is a Ray of Divinity : therefore Truth is the Understanding, or Truth and the Understanding are One.] And if this be the form of his argument ; I will easily grant, that it presseth all things that are, as much as this. For, is not this Syllogisme in the same form, [The blessed Angels are Spirituall Substances ; And the damned Spirits are Spirituall Substances ; Therefore the damned Spirits are blessed Angels, and the blessed Angels damned Spirits ?] Then which Consequent, scarce any thing could be lesse probable. And thus indeed he may prove all things that are to be *One* Truth, one Understanding, yea one Stone, or what you will : For take any two Beings whatsoever, and they will both be found to be *Rays of Divinity*, because both proceed from the same Originall and Fountain of Being in the Divine Essence ; and there-

therefore (according to this Argument) they will be both *One*.

But his Argument thus ordered, will prove but a plaine Fallacy, offending against the Laws of the second figure, wherein no affirmative proposition can be concluded.

The most that he can prove from hence will be this, That there is some common *Prædicate*, which may be affirmed of *Both*; and so That there is some *General Nature* in which they both agree. And this I am confident there is none will ever deny that grants but this proposition, *Quicquid est, est Ens*, That *All Beings*, whatsoever agree in the general nature of a *Being*. For then they may all be the Subjects of the common *Prædicate Ens*.

But this is farre enough from proving, *All things to be One and the Same*. For to assume [That whatsoever things agree in a *Universal Nature*, are also the same *Numericall and Individuall Existence*;] is such a proposition as *Logick* will not admit of.

Yea, though his Argument should proceed thus, [The *Specificall Essence* of the Understanding, consists in this, that it is a *Ray of the Divine Nature*; And the *Specificall Essence*, as well of Truth, as of all Beings whatsoever, is the Same, *viz.* That it is a *Ray of the Divine Nature*; And therefore all things whatsoever agree in the same *specificall Essence*;] And (consequently) all things whatsoever, having the same *specificall Essence* with each other, must also be *One and the Same* with each other.] I say, though his Argument proceeded thus, yet would it little avail to prove *All things to be One and the same*. For, besides, that the *Specificall Essence* of the Understanding (and so of other things) consisteth not in being a *Ray of Divinity*; Besides this, I say, although they had all the same *Specificall Essence*; Yet doth it not follow that they must be *all One and the Same*. For are there not many *Individualls* under the same *Species*, whereof One is not the Other? Doth not the Soule of *Peter* and the Soule of *Judas* agree in all the same *Specificall and Essentiall Prædicates*, whilst notwithstanding it may be truly said, that the Soule of *Peter* is not the Soule of *Judas*, and again, that the Soule of *Judas* is not the soule of *Peter*? What *Essentiall* difference is there between water in the *Baltick Sea*, and that in the *Mediterranean*, since they are both but *Integrall Parts* of the same *Homogeneall Ocean*? Yet how true it is withall, That the *Baltick Sea* is not the *Mediterranean Sea*; and That the Water which is now in the *Baltick*, is distinct from that which at the same time is in the *Mediterranean Sea*? Two drops of Water taken out of the same spoonfull, be they in their *Essentials* never so Consonant, in their *Accidents* never

never so Like; Yet we may truly say This is not the Other, nor the Other This. How then can it follow, That Truth is One with the Understanding, and That *All things* are this *One Truth*, Because all Being is but a *Ray of Divinity*.

It follows indeed, That if all Things have the same Specificall Essence, then are they *all*, Things of the *same nature*; (but that they are *all* the same *Thing*, it follows not.)

Thus much therefore I suppose will be granted him by all, That All things are of the Same (at least *Genericall*) nature, because all things have a Being; And, When he hath proved their *Specificall* essence to be the same, It will be granted also, That they are all, Things of the same *Specificall* nature; and (if you will) That *All Being falls under the same Predicament*; (Though yet a *Predicamentall* distinction be not always a *Reall* distinction; no, not *a parve rei*.)

But is this all he seeks to prove? I supposed he had laboured to shew That the *Light* of Truth or Reason was not *onely* of the *same nature* with the Understanding, but That it was the *Understanding*. Otherwise he proves lesse then his greatest Adversaries would have granted him. For those that contend for the greatest Distinction between the *Soule* and its *Faculties*, doe not yet maintain a more *Reall* or *Physicall* distinction between them, then is between One Soule and another, which yet agree in the same Essentiall Predicates. And if you allow them the same distance between the Soul and the Understanding, which is between the Soule and a Stone, yea between two Soules, They will tell you it is more then they desire: For they will grant that the *Soule* with all its *Faculties*, and the *Body* with all its *Members*, do constitute the same *Suppositum*; which is a more *Physicall*, a more *Reall* Union, then is between two Soules, though agreeing in every *Essentiall* *Predicament*.

But (if I mistake not) that which he was about to prove, was, not that the Understanding is of the *same Nature with Truth*, but that it is *Truth*. His supposition in the first words of the 6. Chap. is, *If the Intellect, the Soul, Light, and Truth are all but One, &c.* Not, Alike, or of the same nature. And p. 21. *If you make the Understanding the Soule, Light, Truth One, then are you delivered out of these straight, &c.* And pag. 10. *If the Understanding be enriched with Truth, then is it, it selfe that Truth, that Light*; Thus he frequently calls them *One and the same*. Now To be, *it selfe that Truth*, and To be *of the same nature with Truth*, is far different. And if he prove no other but a *Logicall* Union, That Truth and

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the Understanding are of the same (Genericall or Specificall) nature; we may yet safely deny a *Physicall* or *Reall* Union or Identity; and say, Truth is not the *Understanding*, nor is the Understanding *Truth*, (though of the same nature with Truth) as well as say, This drop of water is not the Other drop, though This and the Other be of the same nature. Neither can the same Argument (taken in the same sense, without Equivocation and Ambiguity) possibly prove a *Physicall* and *Reall* Identity between the Soule and its Faculties; and also a *Logicall* or *Specificall* Identity between It and all things else. It is impossible by the same argument to prove, The *Soule* and its *Faculties* to be *One Thing*, and, The *Soule* with *All things* else to be *Things of the same Nature*: These to be *Talsa*, and Those to be *Idem*.

But to omit the consequence and dependance of This, upon that which went before: I will examine it as an entire proposition by it selfe, Whether *All things are One*?

And if so, Then must it bee either thus understood, That *All things* are *One* and the *Same* by a *Physicall* Identity; This is the *Other*, and the *Other* is *This*; *Bucephalus* is *Alexander*, and *Alexander* is *Bucephalus*: and (by the same reason) the *Bread* in the *Lords Supper* is the *Body of Christ*, and the *Body of Christ* is this *Bread*, by *Consubstantion*. In which sense it seems so impossible, that (in my judgement) it needs no Refutation.

Or thus, That all things are *One* and the *Same* by an *Integrall* Identity; that is, They be all *Parts* of the same *Whole*: all *Members* of the same *Integrum*, the same *Aggregatum*. And in this sense it is *True* indeed, but there is nothing *New* in it, nothing *Strange*: For who ever denied, that *All things*, as parts, as members, do constitute the *universe*, *One Universe*? That the whole *Aggregatum*, the whole *Heap* or *Multitude* of *Creatures* do make *One World*?

Or (lastly) thus, That *All things* whatsoever are *One*, by a *Logicall* Identity, as being *all* of the same *Nature*. And if he speak of a *Genericall* Nature, this will be as easily granted as the former: For none deny, that all things agree in the *Genericall* *Universall* nature of a *Being*: And whether *Ens* be *Genus Univocum*, or *Genus Analogum*, yet it is predicated or affirmed of *All Beings*; Only that which He calls *Truth*, Others call *Being*, both meaning no other then the *Formalis ratio Entis*, *propter quam dicitur Esse*.

Put if he speak of a *Specificall* Nature, wherein he would have all things to agree; making the *Universe* to be *One Homogeneall Body*, (which

(which he seems to mean here; though he meant, I suppose, a *Physicall* Unity, when he said, The Soule and Truth were One:) Then are we to enquire, whether those things which agree in a *Universall Genericall* Nature, may not admit of a *Specificall* difference? And for This, it will not be sufficient to prove That every Being is a *Ray* of Divinity issuing from the *Center* of Being in God, or That the *Essence* and *Form* of every particular thing is a *Ray of Divinity*: Except it be proved, That every Being is *This* Ray, that it is *such* a Ray.

If therefore all those Rays that have issued forth of that *Center* of infinite Being, If the *Streams* derived from this *Fountain* be exactly of the same nature, without any *Specificall* difference; Then is it because God could not send forth *Distinct* and *Different* Rays; or because he would not. If we make God an Agent so Uniform, as that we will admit no possible Variety, not so much as in the *Object*, or *Manner* of his *Actions*; what difference is there between the most *Determinate Naturall* Agent, and God the most absolutely *Free* Agent? If in his operations we admit not of this choice, to work *Thus* rather than *Thut*? But if he could work in severall manners, by communicating Rays of divers natures, but would not; how then hath he manifested *such* a variety of his *Wisdom* and *Power*? For there cannot be so much as an *Accidentall* Variety in the *Creatures*, except there be somewhat *Reall* produced in the *One* which is not in the other; which cannot be, If all Being, all *Entity* whatsoever be exactly of the same *Specificall* nature.

I grant therefore, an *Integrall* Unity; whereby all things are parts of the same *Aggregatum*, the same *World*: I grant likewise a *Genericall* Unity; whereby all things agree in the generall nature of a *Being*: But if he contend further for an *Identicall* or an *Homogeneall* Unity (whereby each is other, or of the same *Particular* nature, without any other then a *Graduall* difference;) I must deny both. And Mr. *Sadler* (his *Lordships* Champion) denies it with me: For so he, *Corporall Union in materials which we [miscall] sometimes Identity, is at best but a cold touch in a point on two, a most disdainfull embrace (at greatest distance) of those Beings which have much being, but little ratio.* If the Unity of all things be *Identicall*, how is it miscalled *Identity*? If *Homogeneall*, how is there *much being and but little ratio*?

His *Lordships* Reasons to perswade this *Identity*, come next to be examined: *Why* (saith he) *may it not be so since? All Being is derived from the same Uniform Fountain; since? All is the same in nature* (Jeil.) a

Beam of that excellent Light; And is All maintained in the same manner by every Individuall Existence, viz. By a Similitude and Union of nature

If his Lordship speak of a *Physicall Identity*, It is easie to say, This Soule is not the Other Soule; This drop of water is not the Other drop, though both produced by the same Uniform Agent, and in the same manner: This Beam of Light is not the other Beam, though both shining forth from the same Sunne: Because *One* (uniform) Agent may produce *Two* Effects.

If he speak of a *Likenesse* in Nature, It will be said, That the same Agent may produce not only *Two* effects, but *Unlike* effects. e.g. The same *Sunne* produceth *Heat* and *Light*. Here these severall Beings are derived from the same *Fountain* in the Sunne, which hath either Virtually or Formally both Heat and Light; They are both *Beams* issuing in the same manner from their Fountain; and Their Essence is in the same manner *received*, viz. by *being* what they are, and *Informing* a Subject recipient: Yet can I not think that Light, and Heat are either the Same Thing, or of the same (specificall) Nature: (However some fondly dream that *Light* and *Heat* are the same.) For then whatsoever is *Hot*, must also be *Light* (*Lucide*.) which holds not in scalding Lead: and whatsoever is *Light*, must also, even in the same degree, be *Hot*, which holds not in Snow, which is *Lucide*; nor in Ice, which being transparent, is also *Illuminate*.

Object. If you object a Disparity in the Example, because Light and Heat, though they both proceed from the *Sunne*, yet the one from the Sunnes *Heat*, the other from the Sunnes *Light*, and that therefore their Fountain is not the same; whereas in Gods Essence being absolutely *Simple* in it selfe, and *Uniform* in its operations, we may not imagine severall Fountains from whence severall Streams may proceed.

Ans. I answer, That Gods Essence, however *Simple*, is yet equivalent to an infinite *Variety*: And though we cannot in God suppose to be Light *distinct* from Heat, and Heat from Light; yet Gods *simple* Essence hath *virtually* both Heat and Light, and all things possible. His Essence therefore being equivalent both to *Heat* and *Light*, why may it not produce *Heat* in one thing, and *Light* in another thing, and so severall Beings in severall Creatures?

(Except you will suppose, that Gods Essence, being Equivalent to, and Productive of, all Essences possible, must of necessity exercise all this Equivalency in the production of every Being, and activate all his Efficacy in every Product, and so *agere ad extremum virium*, which

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in a *Voluntary* agent is not *Necessary*; in an *Infinite* agent is *Impossible*.)

All the *Radii* or *Semidiameters* of a *Circle* proceed from the same *Center*, but they tend not all to the same point of the *Circumference*: But the same indivisible *Center*, which lyes equally opposite to every point of the *Circumference*, As it is supposed to lye opposite to one point, it sends forth One *Radius* to it, As it lyes opposite to another point, it sends forth Another *Radius* to that other point, Though the *Center* remain indivisibly the same. Thus Gods *simple* Essence *quatenus productiva Angel*, or, as it virtually contains the Essence of an *Angel*, may produce that Essence: And the same simple divine Essence, as it contains virtually the Essence of a *Stone*, may produce a *Stone*.

And if you say, as Dr. *Ames* concerning the Divine Attributes, That these two considerations *Esse productivum Angel*, and *esse productivum Lapidis*, be distinct *ratione ratiocinata*, perhaps there will be no great error; although his Lordship admit not of Dr. *Ames* his opinion; p. 23. For *Esse productivum Angel*, or *posse producere Angelum* is not the same with *posse producere Lapidem*. For although it be the same simple Essence of God whereby he is able to do both, yet this hindreth not but that this *simple* Essence may be by us apprehended per *inadequatos conceptus*, which is no other but *distinctio rationis ratiocinata*. The same *Center* considered as it is the beginning of One *Radius*, is distinct *ratione ratiocinata* from it self considered as the beginning of Another *Radius*. And so the divine Essence, *quatenus productiva Angel*, may perhaps be distinct *ratione ratiocinata*, from it self *quatenus productiva lapidis*, without any violation to its Simplicity. They are onely *inadequati conceptus ejusdem simplici essentie*; and a *Metaphysicall Abstraction* may be sufficiently consistent with a *Physicall* Simplicity of Essence.

Thus therefore may it appeare, how the Unity or Simplicity of the Fountain, hinders not but that the Streams may admit of Specificall and Essentiall distinctions.

But he saith secondly, *All Being is also of the same nature, viz. a Beam of that excellent Light*. Therefore what? Is therefore all Being the Same? How? *Physically* the same, (as if that Soule which is of the Same Nature with another, must needs be that other Soule;) or *Metaphysically*, *Logically*, the same; that is, of the same Nature? If he mean, the first; I see not how it follows. If the second; His Antecedent

dent and Consequent is the same; and so he Assumes what was to be proved.

But for the proposition it selfe, *All Being*, saith he, *is of the same nature, scil. a Beam of that excellent Light*. And this I grant; *All Being* is of the same (*Genericall*) nature; *All Being* is a Stream communicated from the Fountain of Being, *All Being* is a *Beam*, &c. But (*Specifically*) *All* is not *Such* a Beam.

If his Lordship yet contend, That this Being is also *Specifically* the Same, only with a *Graduall* Distinction.

I desire, first, to know Whence the great *Variety* in the Creature doth proceed, if all Being be absolutely *Homogeneall*? Adde *Water* to *Water*, and it remains *Water* still; In a greater *Quantity* indeed, but yet without any alteration at all in its *Essence*, it is still but *Water*. Adde *Heat* to *Heat*, it remains *Heat* still; In a more intense *degree* indeed, but yet it changeth not its *nature*: Increase its *Intension* as long as you will, yet you shall never make this *Color* to become *Color*. A Deaf man though he *See* never so acutely, it will not help his *Hearing*.

Repl. If he urge, That the same *Light* proceeding through divers *Mediums* is stained with divers *Colours*; and why may not therefore this Beam of *Essence*, though *Homogeneall*, being received by divers *Creatures*, appear in a diverse *Form*?

Ans. I answer, the *Variety* of those appearing *Colours* proceeds from the *Variety* of the *Mediums*: But here can be no *Variety* in the *Recipient* at all: For if there be no *Recipient*, but the *Being* Received, then will the *Medium* be every way as *Uniform* as this *Light* or *Essence* received, and so cannot cause this *Variety*. It must be therefore *Various* in It selfe, or else it cannot be *Variegated* in the *Recipient*.

Secondly, If all *Beings* be but *Graduall* distinct: I demand Whether the *Essence* of a *Man*, or the *Essence* of a *Magnet* be the more Intense degree? If the *Magnets* *Essence* be the higher degree of *Light*, Why hath not the *Magnet* the use of *Reason*? If *Mans* *Essence* be the higher degree, Why hath not *Man* the *Loadstones* *Magneticke* faculty? For if there be onely a bare *Graduall* distinction in their *Essence*: then the Inferiour *Essence* is actually included in the Superiour, with an addition of somewhat more: And if included, whence comes it to passe that it cannot operate?

Again. If the *Body* and the *Soule* be absolutely of the same nature (which they must be, if *Being* admit onely of a graduall distinction.) Then the *Essence* of the *Soule* (being the superiour degree) includes in

it the Essence of the Body, and somewhat more : Therefore is it able to operate according to that Essence, and to do of it selfe, whatsoever the Body can doe. If so, then how comes it to passe, that the Soule needs the service of the Body ? Why may not the Soule separate, perform all Corporeall Operations, since it hath in it Corporeall Essence, and somewhat more. (Yea, why may not the Soule see, when the Eye is put out ?) For the adding of Another degree hinders not the Operation of the Former degree, but rather perfects it. Yea what need is there of the Body at all ? *Non belle quadam faciente duo, sufficit unus Huic operi* ; as his Lordship saith, out of *Marriall*.

To his third consideration, I must answer accordingly as to the second ; *All Being is received in the same manner by every Individuall Existence* : That is, Every Creature receives its Being, by being *What it is* : A Stone and a Plant receive their severall Beings, by being (severally) what they are. But come to particulars, and the case is altered : A Stone receives its Being, by being a *Stone* ; and a Plant receives its Being, by being a *Plant*.

That which followeth in the ensuing part of this Chapter (besides what I have already touched by the way) I passe over as being Expliatory, rather then Probatory. Onely thus much ; The doctrine of the *Platonists*, reducing all *Being* to *Number*, must either be taken in a Metaphoricall, Analogicall sense, or not taken at all. And being so, it availeth little to prove either a *Physicall* or *Specificall* Identity of Being.

Whence they had this doctrine, I inquire not, as not belonging to the present matter in hand.

Neither will I stand to debate the controversie, concerning the Nature of *Number*, whether it be a *Real*, or *Rational* Being ; Which I conceive to have as much Reality as a *Relation* hath, and no more ; that is, hath *Fundamentum in re*, but in its *Formality*, it is onely *filium mentis*, the birth of Reason. And when I am convinced, that *Paternity*, or *Filiation*, are Essentiall to *Humanity* ; that *Fatherhood*, or *Sonship* doe constitute *Manhood*, or *Humane nature* ; I shall also grant, that *Unitas est Principium Essendi*, rather then *Consequens Essentiam*. But, not to pre- judge the discourse of the next chapter, (wherein *Unity* is made to be the Essence of All things, yea of God himselfe) I proceed rather to consider the large *Encomiums* of *Unity* there express.

CHAP. VII.

Whether Unity be All in all things, or, the Essence of all things.

AND there we have it first propos'd to consideration *Whether Unity be not in nature so glorious, and of that dignity, that it is able to inform a Being, Yea, to be the Essentiall Form of all things?* It is projected in the severall kinds of Beings, *Uncreated, and Created, whether Spirituall, Morall, Physicall, or Mathematicall. In all these, saith he, you shall find Unity as it were the Form of their Being.*

And first, *Whether Unity be not All in God?* (The Humility and Reverence, which his Lordship useth in proposing of it, may be a fit pattern for all to imitate, in all approaches to a Deity; Not onely in duties of Worship, but even in Scholastick Discourses. And so neither to be peremptory in affirming, nor rash in censuring: Since the vast disproportion between an infinite Object, and a finite Faculty, subjects our Understanding both to Ignorance and Errour; *Suntque oculis tenebra per tantum lumen.*) There is (saith he) *but One God*; And more there could not be, since there cannot be Two Infinites, two Eternities; Neither could this One be otherwise, for then were he not Infinite. Unity then being so inseparable, as without which God could not be what he is, May it not be said to be Co.essentiall to him? And if of his Essence, then it is in him All; for Gods Essence is All in God.

The Objection which his Lordship moves, viz. *That there is the same reason for all other divine Attributes, they being all Essentiall to God, as well as Unity*: Will bring the Question to this Issue, *Whether of these Attributes may be supposed in nature to be First?* (For that every of them should be the *formalis ratio* of a simple Essence is Impossible :) And so, whether *Infinity, &c.* do arise from Unity, or Unity from thence?

I should rather say, That neither of these, or any other divine Attribute, may be said to be *formalis ratio*, or the Essentiall form of the Deity; but somewhat else, in it selfe Simple, and yet comprehending all these: Which because we cannot apprehend at One Discovery, we are faine to take severall Views of it *per inadaquatos conceptus*.

But if we must needs seek for a Seniority in Gods Attributes; I suppose, I might derive as clear a Pedigree of them from his *Infinitesse*, from his *Perfection*, from his *Absolutenesse* or *Independency*; as can be shew'd either from his *Unity*, or from his *Verity*.

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But not to be too extravagant, it shall be sufficient for the present to shew, whether his *Infinitenesse* flow from his *Unity*, or his *Unity* from his *Infinitenesse*? whether he must needs be Infinite, because he is *One*; or *One* because he is *Infinite*?

If we say, God must needs be *One*, because he is *Infinite*; his Lordship will not only assent, but furnish us with a Reason, *Because* (saith he) *there can not be Two Infinites*.

But if otherwise we say, That God must of necessity be *Infinite*, because he is *One*; It is not so easily proved, since there is but *One Sunne*, and yet that *One Sunne* not *Infinite*. How then can we say, That God is Essentially Infinite, or That Infiniteness is Essentiall to him: If the *Formalis ratio*, the Essentiall Form of Divinity, may consist without *Infinitenesse*? See *amysa*.

To his instances in *Created Spirituall Beings*. That *all the Commandments* are comprised in *Love*, shews That there is somewhat *Generall*, that is common to them all; or rather *Love* (as likewise *Obedience*, and the like) is a *Collective* word, and an *integrall*, whereof all those are *Parts*: But that *Unity* is either the Generall form of *All the Commandments*, or the Particular of *Any*, it shews not. The like may be said of the *Saints* which agree in the *Common nature* of *Saint ship*, and do *jointly make up* the *Body mysticall*, whereof Christ is Head. Yea of all *Creatures*, They all agree in the common nature of a *Being*, and They all make up one *Universe*; yet is not *Unity* either the Generall of *all*, or Particular form of *any* Creature.

The *Morall Virtues* are said to be conjoynd or concatenate, because they all proceed from one Fountain, *viz.* The absolute Subordination of the Will and Affections to the Understanding: which Subordination they call *Prudence*, (and is of the same extent in Morality, that *Obedience* is in Divinity) whereof all the *morall Virtues* are but *Integrall parts*. (But I had rather apply *Prudence* to the Understanding only; as that whereby it is able to judge in all Practicall things; what is fit to be done; And the universall Conformity of the Will to this universall Rule of Reason, I should call *Justitia Universalis*, Universall Justice.)

And thus I understand that Axiom, That *morall Virtues are concatenate in Prudence*: Because where there is this universall Subjection of the Will to Reason, there will be an observance of it in all particulars. But if the rules of some Virtues are observed, and not the rules of others; there this observance is not a *Virtuous action*, as nor proceeding from

from the subordination of the Will to Reason, (which would have as well prevailed in others also) but from some other Principle.

Now this shews perhaps, That the Morall Virtues are *United* in One generall *Essence*: But how appears it, That this *Essence* is *Unity*?

Physicall Beings, as *Water-drops* (and other *Concrements*, either of the Same, or Concordant Species; as the Loadstone and Iron) desire to preserve their Union and Neighbourhood one with another: But let us consider the ground; Do they desire to preserve their *Essence* that they may be *One*, that is, United or Joyned together; or do they desire *Union* and *Conjunction*, that they may preserve their *Essence*? This latter I suppose; And therefore a drop of water doth not desire to *Be*, to the end that it may be *Conjoyned* with the rest, but desires to be *Conjoyned* for its *Preservation*, lest it should cease to be. But how doth this prove its *Essence* to be *Unity*?

In summe, All those instances in Nature (which doubtlesse are very many) whereby it may appear that all things naturally do desire *Unity* (or *Conjunction* rather) either for Conservation, or for Consummation of their naturall Perfection; That by *Unity* their Vigour is encreased, *quia vis unita fortior*, and the like; will shew no more but this, That *Unity* is a Perfection of Being, not a *Principle* of Being; or That Things of the like nature conjoyned together are able mutually to help each other in their Conservation or Operation. But what is there in all this to perswade us, that *Unity* is their *Essence*?

As for the *Mathematicall Unity* of Harmony, Proportion &c. It being only Relative (for they denote but the Relation of one thing to another) can conferre nothing to the constitution of an Absolute *Essence*, as of Sounds &c.

But how this should any way conferre to the deciding of that question, whether *Quantity* be *divisibilis in semper divisibilia*: seems to me a greater mystery, then this Mystery that is to be cleared. For as long as *Mathematicall Demonstrations* shall be thought worthy of credit, it shall Never be granted, that *Continuum constat ex indivisibilibus*. And however some *Naturalists*, that know little what belongs to the nature of *Quantity*, make much adoe to the contrary, and thereby bewray their grosse Ignorance in these things; Yet I am confident, that not any One *Mathematician* (deliberately, and in a *Mathematicall* way) either ever did, or ever will assenteo them. And I cannot without indignation (or Pity rather) read sometimes how fondly and vainly some (otherwise) able Scholars think to shift off *Mathematicall Arguments*

in this and the like cases ; which will not be so easily baffled by an empty Verball Distinction, as some of their Idle Fallacies may. And if I make it not evident (to those that are acquainted with Mathematicall terms) that a *Continuum* consists not of Indivisible Points, by as certain and infallible Mathematicall Demonstrations, as *That 2. and 2. make 4.* I will hereafter turn *Sceptick*, and affirm confidently That we are sure of nothing.

If a Line consist of Indivisible points, each Point is supposed to be *Minimum possibile*, by those that doe maintain it ; (or else how are they *Indivisible*.) Then must all Points be *Equall* ; (for if they be Unequall, they cannot all be *minima*.) Then no Two Lines can possibly be *aequalis*, or *Incommensurable* ; (for if all Lines doe consist of Points whereof each is equall to other, then are all lines whatsoever measurable by this common measure of a Point ; *que aliquoties applicata, & hanc & illam commensurabit.* Contrary to what hath been often demonstrated Mathematically, That some Lines are absolutely *Incommensurable* with some other, admitting of no common measure, (as for Example, the *Diameter* and the *Latus* of a *Quadrato*, (whose Proportion therefore cannot be expressed by *Rationall* Numbers. Now that two Contradictory Propositions should be true by Mathematicall Demonstration, is utterly impossible.

Thousands of the like Demonstrations might be brought to prove it ; As, that from hence, All *Angles* may be demonstrated to be *Equall* ; The same *Line*, to be *Shorter*, to be *Longer* then it selfe, to be equall to two or more conjoynd, and yet to be *shorter* then either ; Yea, all *Lines* to be *equall*, All *Circles* of the same *bignesse*, The *Equinoctiall Circle* to be no bigger then a *Cypar*, All *Motions* to be of the same *swiftnesse*, All *Bodies* of the same *weight*, and of the same *bignesse* : And yet in the meane time All these to be *unequall*, in Length, Weight, Swiftnesse, &c. And infinite the like absurdities ; as might be shewed, if this were the Question I had in hand. Take an instance or two.

Let two Circles be described upon the same Center, of what greatness you please ; Let a Thread be fastned at the common Center, and so extended that it cut the Circumference of both Circles ; Thus extended, the one end being fastned at the Center, let the other end be moved round : Now while this Thread passeth over one Point in the Greater Circle, I demand how much it passeth over in the Lesser ? Lesse then a Point it cannot be, because *ex hypothesi*, a Point is *Minimum possibile*,

possibile; For every Point therefore that it passeth over in the Greater Circle, it passeth over a Point answerable in the Lesser Circle; There be therefore as many points in the Lesser as are in the Greater Circle; and these Points being all Equall, because every one is *Minimum possibile*, the Lesser Circle must needs be equall to the Greater Circle, because it consists of as many Points; and by the same reason, *All Circles Equall*.

Now the Thread thus moving, move it never so Slowly, it passeth over a Point in a Moment; and move it never so Swiftly, it passeth over a Point in a Moment: And therefore all *Motions* are alike *Swift*, as passing over equall distances in equall time.

Again, Let two Lines concurring in the same Point make an Angle, (of what greatness you please;) their Two next Points, joyning upon this common Point of concurrence, will terminate a Basis of Two Points, (not more, for then the *Subtendent* would be equall to both the *Crura*.) The two Third points will terminate a Line somewhat longer then the other, and therefore at least of Three points; and so on, for every point added to the *Crura*, (be the angle greater or lesse) you must adde one point to the length of the *Basis*, subtendent to that angle (and more then One it cannot be, for then the increase of the *Basis* will be equall to the increase of both the *Crura*;) Whence it will come to passe That all Angles (at an equall distance from the point of concurrence) will have their Subtendents equall (the *Basis* or Subtendent being thus measured by the length of the *Crura*, or lines containing the angle) Wherefore themselves also must be equall.

Now also it is sufficiently apparent to a Mathematician, that upon all lines whatsoever, you may erect (as from a Basis) lines of the same length containing an Angle; and therefore (both the Angle and the Basis being measured onely by the length of the *Crura*) not onely all Angles may be equall, but also all Lines, (as being Subtendents to equall angles at the same distance.) I need not adde more demonstrations to shew the Impossibility of that Opinion which makes every *Continuum* to consist *ex indivisibilibus*.

It is certain then, that *Continuum non Constat ex Indivisibilibus*: But, how this doctrine of *Unity* serves either to confirm the truth, or to clear the doubts; I see not.

But to return. His Lordship hath been copious to shew some *Union*, *Some Relation*, of One thing to, or with Another, in the severall kinds of Being. From whence he is ready to infer, That the Essence of all things

is *One*, that it is *Unity*. But be it granted, That there be divers particular *Species* under the same *Genericall* nature; (as when all particular acts of duty are comprised in *One* generall name of *Love*, or *Obedience*;) Be it so, That many *Effects* may proceed from the same Cause; (as all virtuous acts from the subordination of the Will to Reason:) That there be many *Combinations* of *Beings* or *Persons*, *Naturall*, *Voluntary*, *Oeconomical*, *Politick*, *Logick*, &c. whence may arise *One Aggregation*, *One* *Prædicament*, *one* *City*, or *Kingdome*, *one* *World*: Be there *Supernaturall* or *Spirituall* Societies, *One Church*, *Parochiall*, *National*, *Oecumenicall*, *Visible*, *Invisible*, *one mysticall Body*: Be there also in *Lines*, *Bodies*, *Sounds*, &c. (besides their *Absolute Affections*, *Length*, *Bignesse*, *Lowdnesse*, &c.) some *mutuall Relations* of *Proportion*, *Harmony*, *Discord*, &c. Be there in *Physicall Bodies*, a desire of *Union* or *Conjunction* in *One* to another; Yet will not this prove, That all things have *One Nature*, *One Essence*; much lesse, That this Essence is *Unity*. If Iron desire *Union*, (or *conjunction* rather) with the Loadstone, doth this prove their *Specificall Essence* to be *One*? Or (if it doe) doth it prove, that this *One Essence* is *Unity*? And so of the rest.

All that can arise from hence, is, That God hath so ordered the severall *Natures* of particular *Creatures*, as that his *Wisdom* doth not only appear in their *Absolute* and *Simple* natures; but hath also put *Relation* or *Respective* natures in them, whereby his *Wisdom* may appear in their *mutuall Oppositions*, *Conjunctions*, *Similitude*, *Dissimilitude*, *Sympathy*, *Antipathy*, *Help*, and *Hinderance* of one thing to another; whereby not onely *Every thing* (*Severally*) in its *Absolute nature* doth set forth Gods glory, but also *All things* (*joynly*) doe *conspire*, and work *together* in their *respective Relations*, as well for the good of those that love God, as for their *mutuall advancing* of Gods glory. All which may be, though neither *Unity*, nor any *One specificall Being*, be the *formalis ratio*, the *essentiall form* of all things; but each *species* have a severall *kind* of Being.

For my own judgement; I am as confident, that *Unity* is *Nothing*; as his *Lordship* is, That it is *All things*. 'Tis a meer *rationall*, *nominall* Notion, that hath no more *Reality* in it, then *Darknesse*, then *non esse*. Yea, *to be One*, is a pure *Negative Proposition*; and what *Reality* you can allow to a *Negation*, so much you may allow to *Unity*.

It is true, *Unus*, as it is opposed to *Nullus*, is *Affirmative*, and is the same with *Aliquis*, or *Nonnullus*: But if it signifie the same with *Unicus*, and be opposed to *Multitudo*, (according as we now take it,) it is a meer *Negation*, and no more.

Which to make clear, observe but this Syllogisme, [Whatsoever is in *England*, is in *Europe*; But in *England* there is *Rex Unicus*, One only King; Therefore in *Europe* there is *Rex Unicus*, but One King.] Where you shall find no fault in the Syllogisme, save that the *Minor* is Negative in the first figure. Whence it is appaent, That *Unity*, as it is opposed to *Multitude*, is a mere *Negative* term.

There is *One* Sunne; but is this *Unity* *Essentiall* to it? Whether another Sunne be, or be not; it nothing concerns the *Essence* of this Sun, but onely grounds an externall Relation, which is yet but *Relationis*.

Was not the *Essence* of *Adam* the Same, and he Equally a *Man*, before the production of *Eve*, while he was *Unicus*; and after both the Production of *Eve*, and the Generation of sonnes and daughters, when he ceased to be *Unicus*, there being more beside him? Was there any Detraction, or Addition of *Essence*, or any Reality, that concerned *Adams* person, at such time as his children were born? or would there have been afterwards, if all except *Adam* had been swept away?

Nay when two Drops of Water are separated, or conjoynd, is there any *Essentiall* or *Reall* Mutation in either?

Surely, if *Unity* may come, and goe, without any *Reall* Alteration; then is *Unity* so farre from being *Essentiall* to all things, that it is not so much as *Reall*.

Object. You will say; But God is indeed One, *Unus et Unicus*; and not onely supposed to be One: Therefore this *Unity* must needs be *Reall*, and not *Imaginary*.

Answer. I grant it; But what then? must therefore *Unity* be *Positive* or *Reall*? The *Ayr*, in the night time, is indeed *Dark*, and not onely supposed to be *Dark*; Will you therefore infer that *Darknesse* hath a *Reall*, a *Positive* Being, and is not a *privation* of *Light*? When the *Moon* is eclipsed, it doth *Really* and *Indeed* want the *Illumination* of the *Sun-beams*, and is not onely supposed to want them; but you will not, I suppose, say that this *Want of Light*, hath a *Reall* *Essence*. So here, God is indeed One, and not only imagined so to be, yet hath not *Unity* any Entity or *Positive* Being in it.

There is *Negatio Realis*, and *Negatio Rationis*; a *Reall* absence and a *Supposed* absence. Of the one you may truly frame a *Negative* Proposition, of the other you cannot; there may be indeed in the Understanding concerning this, *Negatio nEius*, (which is all one with *Ab-*
straction)

fraction) but not *actus negationis*, *actus negativus*. When the Ayr, in the Night time, is Dark; there is a *Reall* Abience of Light: when, in the Day time, I conceive of the Ayr according to its Essence, or according to some other Qualities, not at all regarding its being *Light*; this is *Negatio Rationis*, or *negatio Abstractionis*, there is only a *supposed* Abience of Light, but indeed a (*reall*) Presence.

* Yea, *ipsum Non-esse*, is a *Reall* Predication though it be not a *reall* Predicate (Like as *Mendacium esse Falsum*, is a Truth:) Therefore when I say, *Centaurus non est*; I do not Forge this Proposition, or *suppose* a non-entity in a Centaure where indeed there is none, but I affirm that non-entity to be, which is; for a Centaure, is *non-ens*, and not only *Supposed* to be *Non-ens*. And of Negations, or Privations, That is only *Negatio Rationis*, when by *Abstraction* Things are *supposed* to be separate, which are *indeed* conjoynd: Other Negations though they have not *realiter Esse*, yet they have *realiter Non-esse*; their non-entity is not Imaginary. (I speak of *Negatio Physica*, not *Negatio Logica*; for a Logical Negation, that is, a Negative Enunciation, is as *Reall* as an Affirmation.) A *supposed Being* is *Ens rationis*, and a *supposed Absence* is *Negatio rationis*.

Negations and Privations are *Non-Entia*, and not *Entia Rationis*; for they have not in themselves so much as *Esse Cognitum*, which is requisite to *Ens Rationis*; And when as sometimes a Negation is said to be *Ens Rationis*, it is not to be understood of its internall Entity, for so Darknesse in it selfe doth not include *esse cognitum*, but when the Understanding considers of a Negation, and so makes it *Objectum Cognitionis*, then of a *Non-ens* it becomes *Ens Rationis*. But then (I say) it is *Ens rationis*, not *Negatio rationis*.

Yet all this hinders not but that *Unity*, and all other Negations, may have a kind of *Reality*, as it is opposed to a *Fiction*. And therefore the Ayr is *really* Dark, God is *really* *Unicus*, and not onely *supposed* so to be: And yet Darknesse and Unity are not in themselves *Reall*, but *Negative* term.

I purposely passe over severall particulars, (as well in this Chapter, as in others) which his Lordship lights upon by the way; to avoid tediousnesse: and look principally at those things, to which his Lordships aim doth especially tend.

CHAP. VIII.

The Nature of Habits. Whether they be one with Truth or the Soules Essence.

IN the eighth Chapter, he speaks somewhat concerning the nature of Habits. And this is to be adjoynd to the end of the 5. Chapter: the 6. and 7. Chapters, (wherein he inferres a Corollary, concerning the Essence of All things, That it is *One*, That it is *Unity*;) being inserted as a Parenthesis. He had in the fifth Chapter affirmed *That the Soul is nothing but Truth*; Yet (saith he) *while I affirm, that the Soule is nothing but this Truth, I doe not refuse the doctrine of Habits, either Infused or Acquisite.*

But before I proceed, It is not amisse to give notice of a different acceptation of *Truth* here, from that before. He spake before of the Truth or Light of *Reason*, which he contended, to be *One* with the Soul, and not a distinct Faculty. This Light was an *Innate* or *Connate* Light, which hath its Originall and its Period with the Soule: For when the Soule begins, the Light of Reason begins, and this Light of Reason is no sooner extinct, then when the Soule shall cease to be. But the Light of *Habitnall* Knowledge, (whether Infused or Acquisite,) is not an *Innate* Light, but an *Advenient* Light; subsequent to the Soules first Existence, and really separable from it. Yet may it be Antecedent to another degree of Advenient Light, *viz.* *Actuall* Knowledge, which may proceed from Habitnall.

This *Advenient* Light of *Habitnall* knowledge differs from *Innate* Light of *Reason*; as a *Habit* in the first species of *Quality*, from *Naturalis potentia*, or a *Faculty*, in the second species. And so, howsoever it may be true, That a *Faculty* or *Naturall* Power, may be so farre the *Same* with the Soule, as that it differ only *ratione ratiocinatâ*; Yet in a *Habit*, we must of necessity grant a distinction *ex parte rei*. For where there may be a *Reall Separation* (and not onely *Mentall*) there must needs be granted a Distinction *in re*. Now that in all Habits there may be a *reall Separation*, is apparent: For (though, it may be, some Habits acquired or infused cannot be lost when they are once had, as Grace, &c. yet) before the acquisition or infusion of such Habits, the Soule was actually without them. Indeed it is true, That these *Habits* cannot subsist *without the Soule*; and therefore they may not be imagined to be *Really* distinct, as *res & res*; yet because the Soule may exist *without these*; therefore they must have a *Modall* distinction

distinction in *re*, as *res & modus*. Thus the Roundness of a piece of Coyne, though, when it is, it is the same Thing with the Silver, not being a *Thing* added, but only a *Modification*, a moulding or fashioning of the Former thing; yet must it be *Distinct* from the essence of the Silver, though not a *Thing distinct*: Otherwise when this Silver looseth its Roundness, it should loose its Essence and become somewhat else: whereas the Silver in this form, is not really distinct from it selfe in another forme, but the same Metall, the same Silver.

There being then this difference between a *Habite* and a *Faculty*: Though *Reason* should be *One* with the soule without so much as a *Modall* distinction; yet follows it not, that a *Habit* hath the same Reall Identity, but that it may be distinguished *ex parte rei*.

Habits he distinguisheth into *Infused* and *Acquisite*. When the soule (saith he) by virtue of its Being is cleare in such a Truth; it is said to be an *Infused habit*: when by frequent action, such a Truth is *Connaturall* to the Soule, it may be styled an *Habit Acquisite*, though &c.

Whether or no this be the genuine distinction between an *Acquisite* and *Infused Habit*, it is not materiall strictly to examine. If the soule by its Essence be cleare in such a Truth; that is, be ready to act according to such a Truth: I should call this a *Faculty* or *Naturall power*, rather than an *Habit*. Thus *Gravity* in a Stone, whereby it is naturally prone to descend, I should not call an *Habit*, but a *Faculty*. (Though *Heaviness*, in another relation, be neither a *Faculty* nor an *Habit*, but *qualitas Patibilis*. And so perhaps may *Knowledge*, as it is an accidentall Form informing the soule, be referred to the same species of *Quality*, though it can hardly be called by that Name: For a *Habit quatenus sic*, is so called, not with any relation to the *Subject*, but in relation to *Acts*, which flow from it, or are produced by it.)

This *Proneness* or *Aptnesse for operation* which is in any thing immediately from its *Essence*, is a *naturall Power* or *Faculty*; And a *Habit*, is a further *Readiness*, and *Pliableness*, or *Facility* of working according to this *Faculty*: A *Habit* therefore alwayes presupposeth a *Faculty*, as being but a *Facilitation* of it. And when as by *Reason* a man hath an *Ability* to understand: by *Habitual Knowledge*, he hath a *Readiness* to understand.

Now this *Readiness* or *Facility*, if it proceed from *Often Acting*; so that from the iterating of former Acts it becomes more prone either to continue or repeat those Acts; It is an *Acquisite Habit*: (Somewhat of this may be seene in *Naturall things*; A *Wheel* being once in motion

tion, it will by a smaller force be Continued, then at first Begun; yea for a while persist without help.) If this *Facility* proceed from some *Accidental Form* produced in it by an *Externall Agent*, it is an *Infused Habit*: The difference between an *Infused* and an *Acquisit* being no other but only in respect of the *Efficient*. Thus the Knowledge of divers Tongues and the Ability to speak them, which was in some of the Apostles by immediate *Infusion*, was an *Infused Habit*; whereas in others (as in *Paul*) it was *Acquisit*; differing from the other, not in Form, but in the *Efficient*.

A *Habit* therefore, whether *Infused* or *Acquisit*, being but a *Facilitation* of the Faculty, cannot be a *Thing* distinct from that Faculty, but only a *Modus* of it, which hath not in it selfe a Positive Absolute Being of its own; but is a *Modification* of another Being: And its *Physicall Being*, *Existencia Rei*, must be the same with the Being of that, which is thus *Modified*; For it is not *ipsam Existens*, but *Modus Existendi*: And this *Manner of Existing* hath not an Existence of its own, distinct from the Existence of that which doth exist in this manner: Yet its *Formall* and *Metaphysicall Being* is distinct. Yea and its *Physicall Existence*, such as it is capable of, that is, *Existencia Modi*; for not being *Res*, but *Modus rei*, we must not expect that it should have any Existence of its own besides the Existence of a *Modus*: and this *Existencia Modi* is the actuall *Modifying* of the Thing Existing after this *Manner*. The which Existence though it be not *Existencia Rei*, yet it is a *Reall Existence*, (*existencia in re*) and not *Memall*: For the thing existent is not only *supposed* to exist in this manner, but indeed doth so, thus ordered, thus *modified*: and therefore that *Modus* doth actually, & really *modificate*, and is not only *supposed* so to doe.

But if you will not admit (with *Scorus*) of any *Modus en se*, as a *Medium* between *Ens* & *Non-ens*, *Res et Nihil*, a Thing and Nothing; you must then say, it is *Res*: for *Nothing* I am sure it cannot be: For doubtlesse there is some difference more then *Imaginary* between Knowledge and Ignorance, between a Square stone and a Round stone, between Silver Stamped and the same Smooth and Plain. This difference I should call *Modall*, accounting the Roundnesse &c. not *Res* but *Modus Rei*; affirming, that when Wax &c. is put out of one form or fashion into another, there is no new Thing propounded; but that which before was, is now otherwise ordered.

And thus it is most true which his Lordship speaks, That *Habitual Knowledge, is nothing but Light more or lesse gloriosa*; It is Reason cleared

red; It's only *Facultas facilitata*, or *facultatis Facilitas*: And to this Facility or Readiness to operate, I cannot allow a Physicall existence of its own; as neither to any Habit whatsoever, as being but *Modi* and not *Entia*; It's not a *Being*, but a *Manner of Being*; not *Ens* but *aliquid Entis*. And I should easily be perswaded to grant the same concerning all Accidents whatsoever, which have long since been called *Entis Entia*: And however an Accident hath been accounted to be *Res*, and so to have *Existentiam Rei*; yet not *Subsistentiam Rei*: Though it have an Existence of its own, yet its *Subsistence* is no other but *Subsistentia Subjecti*.

Yet I cannot with his Lordship subscribe to the *Platonists*, to make Knowledge nothing but a *Remembrance*. (As if there were naturally in our Understanding, the Pictures or Pourtraictures of all Truths, but so obscured and covered as it were with dust, that these glorious Colours doe not appear, till such time as they be rubbed and washed over anew.) I approve rather of *Aristotle's Rasa Tabula*, (then *Plato's Reminiscencia*) making the Understanding, of its selfe, to have no such *Idea* or Picture at all, but capable of all. Or thus (I know not how it can be better expressed;) The Understanding is not as a *Table*, wherein the Kings Picture is pourtrayed in lively colours, but (hanging in the dark) it appears not, that there are any such Lineaments, till it be Enlightened with the Sunne, and then it presents us with a Fair Description: But rather as a *Glasse* which is able to Receive and Reflect whatsoever Colours fall upon it, though (before) it had none of them.

For I demand, What Principle is there implanted in nature to enform me, Whether there ever were such a City as *Troy*? Whether it were so destroyed? Whether this or that were *Plato's* or *Aristotle's* Opinion? What Principle to enform, that it rained yesterday & is faire to day? Certainly, matters of *Fact* have not such *Idea's* implanted in Nature; for then might they by *Discourse* be known to have been or not to have been, without the help either of *Sense* or *Information*. And if *Historicall* Knowledge may be acquired without any fore-implanted *Idea's* of those Truths so known; why also may not *Discursive* Truth be also Known without a *Reminiscencia*, or a Review of Forgotten or Obscure Principles?

Next he tells us, *That wee may Seem by frequent attingsto help the Soule, and so to create Acquisite Habits; whereas indeed it is not so, but all Attings are only new Discoveries.*

But how this can stand with his former doctrine of *Reminiscencia*, I

does not see: For this takes away not only *Plato's Reminiscencia*, but all Remembrance whatsoever. If all Actings be *new Discoveries*, How and When can wee be said to *Remember*?

But is it soe? doe Former Actings no way help our Subsequene Acts? If so, how can a Learned *Schollar* be said to Know more then an Ignorant *Peasant*? For the one is as capable of a *new discovery* as the other, it his former acts make no preparation or fittnesse for future acts. How comes it to passe, that Learned men shall apprehend those Truths at the first relation, which another cannot without much adoe be brought to conceive? Nay why should an Artiste be more skilfull in his Trade then another? Why may not an Infant new born plead his cause as well as the best experienced Lawyer? Certainly, if former acts doe not *indeed* produce an Habitual Knowledge (but only *seem* to doe) in the one which is not in the other, the one may as well act as the other, for there is the same Reasonable Soule in a Child, which is in him afterwards.

The difference surely must proceed from hence, That the Former Actings have produced a Facility and Readinesse for Future Acts: that so, what was before more Difficult, becomes now Facile.

Nay more, That which before was utterly *Impossible*, becomes now both *Feasible* and *Easie*. All the most refined Wits in the world joyning their acutest Discoveries, their strongest Iudgements together, are not able without the help of Historical Relation, ever to know such a thing as the *Destruction of Troy*: Yet when this, or the like, hath been either Seen by our selves, or Related to us, it is then easie to tell afterwards, what wee have seen, what we have heard, without a second view or a new relation. Now if the former Actings, do no way prepare for a future Act; why might not the First discovery have been made by our own light of Reason, without an Externall supply, from our Senses, or from Information, as well as the Second?

Philosophers (saith he) affirm this boldly of the *Unreasonable Creature*, attributing it to an *Instinct* or *new Influence*. *W*hy then may we not conclude the same of *Man*?

That *Philosophers* attribute much to *Instinct* in Unreasonable Creatures, I grant: But that by an *Instinct*, they meant a *new Influence*, I was not aware. Certainly *Memory* hath been accounted one of the *Sensus Interni*, and soe belonging to the *Sensitive Soule*, and therefore not to be denied to *Brutes*: And doubtlesse daily experiments put it out of question, That *Brute Creatures* make use of *Memory*, and by former acts

acts, are fitted for following acts ; not doing all from a new Instinct.

I am called in the next place, to search out the *difference between Reason and Faith*. They differ (saith he) *only in Degrees, not in Nature*: For if *Sense, Understanding, Habits be all the same, then neither doe Reason and Faith differ*.

I grant that there is the same ground, why wee should make *Reason and Faith* the Same ; that there is to make the *Faculty* and the *Habit* the Same. Reason is a *Faculty*, Faith a *Habit* : Now a *Faculty* and a *Habit*, I have before sayd not to be *res & res*, but *res & modus*. Their *Physicall* Difference therefore (I mean, if you consider Faith and Reason in the same man) is but *Modall*.

But it doth not follow from hence, That they differ not in *Nature*. For though an *Habit* have not *Entitatem Rei*, distinct from the *Faculty*; yet it hath *Entitatem Modi*; so that the *Habit* is not a *Faculty*, neither is the *Faculty* an *Habit*.

To enquire of a *Physicall* Identity, and of a *Metaphysicall* or *Formall* Identity, are *quare's* farre distinct: The Faith of *Peter* is Really and Physically distinct from the Faith of *Paul*; and yet their *Metaphysicall* *Formall* nature is exactly the Same. Again, all the *Modall* Beings in the same Subject, though their *Essence* and *Nature* be never so distinct (*v.g.* *Duration*, *Augmentation*, *Situation* &c. in the same man) be Really the same; (for neither of them, being *Modi*, have any *Entitatem Rei*, beside the Entity of their common Subject, and so cannot make a *Real* distinction, because there is not *res & res*;) Yet each *Modus* hath a distinct *Formall* nature of its own: The nature of a *Figure*, is not the nature of a *Habit*, though both in the same Subject.

But yet, though it doe not follow from that *Real* Identity between *Res & Modus*, that the Nature of Reason and the Nature of Faith be the same: Yet if he change but the terms, and say (in stead of Reason) that Knowledge and Faith are the same in nature, I will not contend: So that he mean Faith as it is an Act or Habit of the *Understanding*, and not of the *Will*. For so, Faith is an Assent to a Truth revealed: & the same individuall Assent to the same Truth, may be both *Cognitio Scientia*, and *Cognitio Fidei*. I will instance in the *Creation of the world*: By *Faith* we know that the worlds were made, and Assent to it: And by *naturall Demonstrations* it may be proved, that the world was made; and these also are sufficient to perswade assent. Now we from both grounds (joynly) assent to this Proposition, That the world was made. The which Assent in respect of the one Ground (*propter eviden-*

tiam rei) is an assent of *Science* or *Naturall Knowledge*; in regard of the other Ground (*Propter auctoritatem dicentis*) is an assent of *Faith*, or *Supernaturall* and *reveiled Knowledge*. The assent of *Science*, and of *Faith*, differ not in their *Form*, but in their *Efficient*.

But if he speak of *Saving Faith* (*quantum Salvifica*) as it doth *Save*: so it is an act of the *Will*, and not of the *Understanding*; and therefore differs from *Knowledge*.

But, to conclude this: If we speak of a *Physicall* difference or distinction, Then all the *Modi* that belong to the *same Thing*, can admit of no more then a *Modall* distinction: because having no other *Entitatem Rei*, but that of the common Subject, their *Entitas Rei* must be Common; there cannot be *Res & Res*: the difference must be either *sansquam Res & Modus*, or *sansquam Modus & Modus*: And here is no consideration of the *Nature* of these *Modi*. In distinct Things; The *Modi* are *Really* distinct and not *Modally* though these *Modi* be exactly of the same nature; as the Roundness of severall Circles; For they not having *Entitatem Rei* besides the Entity of their Subjects; their Subjects being really distinct, they must be really distinct also.

(Thus in the present case, The Faith of *Peter* is *really* distinct from the Faith of *Paul*: But Faith in *Peter* from Reason in *Peter* is only *Modally* distinct, *sansquam Res & Modus*; (*viz.* If you make Reason to be *Res*, or a Faculty Really distinct from the soule:) and the Habit of Faith in *Peter* will be distinct from all other *Habits* in *Peter* (*v.g.* from the Habit of *Knowledge*) *sansquam Modus & Modus*.)

But if wee speak, not of a *Physicall*, but of a *Metaphysicall* Difference; Here it little avails to enquire of their *Physicall* Difference, or Identity. For those things that are *really distinct*, as two Souls, may yet agree in the *same Specificall Nature*: and those which are not really distinct (as severall *Modi* of the same Thing) may have their *Formall Specificall* differences.

Again, though it be granted that *Naturall Knowledge* (attained by the use of Reason, without a *supernaturall Revelation*) be of the *same Nature* with Faith; Yet doth it not presently follow, That their difference is *Graduall*, and the one but a greater Degree of the same Light: For Skill in *Musick*, and Skill in *Metalls* or *Mineralls*, are both *Naturall Habits*; yet the Skill of a *Musician*, and the Skill of a *Chymist* are not the *same* (though of the same nature;) neither yet is their difference *Graduall*; For the one is not the way to attain the other and the other a Perfection of that former. And moreover a man may

may be skilfull in either of them without a knowledge of the other, whereas a Greater Degree of Knowledge in the same Kind cannot be without the Lesser.

That which follows, concerning *Falling from Grace*, and the *Freedom of the Will*, (as also what proceeds, How farre we do *acti agere*, that is, How farre, and In what manner, the First cause doth concur with the Second in its Operations) require a larger discourse for the deciding of them, then to be toucht at *intransitu*, and by the way. I shall therefore say onely this (and so passe them over;) *Liberty* and *Servitude* are opposit; and both are Relative terms. He that is Free from the Dominion of one Master, may be a Servant, a Slave, to another. Thus the Will, though it be Free from any *Naturall Necessity*, either from within, or without; so that it be neither determined by an inward Principle, as meer *Naturall Agents* are; neither can have either Compulsion, or Necessity, imposed upon it by the command of another Creature: Yet is it not Free from the *Command* and *Power* of God, by whose *Absolute Decree* it is determined. We must not so farre affect to be *Liberi*, that we become *Sacrilegi*; we must not vindicate our Liberty by committing *Sacriledge*, exempting our selves from being under the Power of a Deity.

If I were now to examine the nature of *Freedom*, wherein it consists: I might perhaps place it in a *Spontaneity*, that it acts *without reluctance*, *Sponte agit*: Were it not that even *Naturall Agents* (as a Stone falling) have such a free action, without Constraint, without Reluctancie.

Or it might be placed perhaps in a *Reflection* upon its own Act; whereby it doth not onely *Agere*, yea and *Sponte* (or *volens*) *agere*, without a *Nolitio*, a *Renitentia*; But also *Vult agere*: Whereas a *Naturall agent*, though perhaps *Sponte* or *Volens agit*, yet you cannot say *Vult agere*, because there is not a *Reflection* whereby it *Willeth* its Action. That which hinders me from placing it in this, is, Because I allow not any *reflex* act of *Willing* in God, besides that direct act of *Working*, who is yet a most *Free Agent*. For (beside other reasons, that if need were, might be produced) it stands not with Gods *Simplicity*, to admit *distinct acts* in God, wherof one should be the *Object* of another. Now what strength there is in this, to hinder the placing of *Freedom* in this *Reflex* act, I propose to be considered, rather then *Affirm*.

But I rather place the nature of the Wills *Liberty*, in a *Freedom*

from *Servitude*, that it is not under the command of any Creature, or a Naturall Determination of its own. And therefore though it be free from such servitude as a *Naturall* agent, or such as may be *Forced*, is subject to; yet it is not free from *Gods Command*; Nor (perhaps) from the dictate of *Reason* neither, Or, if it be, yet is not this its *Freedom*, but its *Weaknesse*.

And this is not far distant from the received opinion, which makes it consist in *Indifferentia*. For the Will can *agere vel non agere* notwithstanding anything to the contrary from the Creature; but it cannot *agere vel non agere* notwithstanding the Decree of God; and therefore is not Free from that Determination. And whereas other things are from God determined *mediante causa secundâ*, the Will is *Immediately* determined *a causa primâ*.

And therefore what he cites out of Rutterfort, *That granting all things to be under an absolute Decree, it is fond to aske, Whether the Free Creature remain indifferent to doe or not to doe*; I willingly assent unto. But you must consider withall, that *This Freedom* neither the Angels have, nor had *Adam* in his Innocencie.

And therefore, when Divines tell us, that by the Fall we have lost our Liberty, or Freedom of Will, in Spirituall things, which yet we retain in Morall and Civill Actions; I desire that they would more punctually set down, What the Liberty is, which we retain in Naturall things, but want in Spirituall; What Liberty that is, which the Angels have, and Man once had, but hath now lost: And not speak of such a Liberty as neither Man or Angel ever had, nor is it possible for any Creature to have; Nay not for God himselfe, For God having once decreed, cannot with his Truth revoke it, nor is indifferent to execute it or not; But, as They say of *Jupiter*, which make Him to be the Author of their Stoicall unavoidable Fate (understanding it *cum grano salis*) He once Commanded, and ever after Obeyed.

There follows in the next place, an Objection, *How it comes to passe, if Faith and Knowledge be One, that some who have more Knowledge have lesse Faith*.

I need not recite his Lordships Answer, I will only propose my own. If there be meant a *Physicall* Identity, whereby two *Mods* of the same Thing doe subsist by the subsistence of their common Subject, it is not hard to determine: For two Modifications of the same Thing may yet be independent of each other: And therefore it is not requisite they should be both in the same measure, or degree.

2. If by *Knowledge* be meant an assent to *Naturall* truths, and by *Faith*, an assent to *Supernaturall* truths; neither is here any difficulty: For the Knowledge of one thing is not inconsistent with the Ignorance of another thing.

3. If *Knowledge* and *Faith* be considered in relation to the same Object, Spirituall truths, or Saving truth, and *Faith* be taken for an Intellectual assent to them: Then is it not true, that there is in any (if you speak *ad idem*) more *Knowledge* and lesse *Faith*; what any Knows to be Thus, he cannot Believe to be Otherwise. For the Understanding is not a Free faculty, that it can either Accept or Reject a reveiled Truth.

4. If by *Faith* be meant, not an *Assent* in the *Understanding* to the Truth Known, but a *Consent* in the *Will*, an embracing of it (which is the Iustifying act of *Faith*): Neither is this difficulty much greater then the former; For the too too frequent finnes, even in Gods children, against light, makes it ever manifest, That the Action of the Will doth not always follow the Knowledge of the Understanding.

And yet if this too cleare experience be not able to prove it, but that you still lay all the blame upon the Understanding, as not being cleare enough in its Apprehensions, or not sufficiently Peremptory in its Dictates; and so excuse the Will of all Remissenesse: I demand then, what disability there is in the *Will* of Man since the fall more then in the confirmed Angels and Saints in Heaven? I cannot think but that the Image of God, by the Fall, is defaced in the Will as well as in the Understanding; and yet if the Will doe never disobey the Light of Reason, which is its sole (immediate) Guide, I see not wherein this disability doth appear.

I grant that the Will doth always Follow the Understanding, that is, it never goes before it, or without it; it goes never but where the Understanding hath led the way, in discovering some Good, (more or lesse,) something Desirable. For the Will is *Caca potentia*, and Knows of nothing desirable, but what the Understanding discovers. And Knowing nothing, can Desire nothing; *Ignoti nulla Cupido*.

But yet I grant not that Proposition in this sense, The will *Alwayes* follows the Understanding; that is, It never stays behind. For to Omit what the Understanding commands, requires not a discovery of some other Good, but only an Impotency, a Backwardnesse, or Remissenesse to doe its Duty. To goe without direction, requires a Positive Cause, because it is a Positive Act; But *Not to goe* when it is directed, may proceed from a Negative Cause (*Negatio Causa*,) because it is a Negative

Negative Act, or a Not-doing. A lame man doth not runne, when he knows, that he ought to runne; yet here is no need of a Positive Cause to stay him, but his Impotency (a Negative cause) sufficeth.

And thus farre do I admit that distinction of *Libertas Contrarietatis*, and *Libertas Contradictionis*, though in that way in which it is ordinarily made use of, I doe wholly reject it. There is not in the Will an Indifferency to choose *Good* or to choose *Evill*; neither yet to Choose good, or Reject good (*velle & nolle*;) both which they call *Libertas Contrarietatis*. For the Understanding doth not shew any *Amiability* or *Lovelyness* in *Evill*; nor any *Odiousness* in *Good* (*quatenus sic*;) and therefore the Will cannot Desire *Evill*, nor Reject *Good* (*Nolle*, or *Velle non*.) For *Bonitas* is *Objectum formale Appetitus*; and *Malum* is the formall Object of *Nolition*. Now the Soule cannot *velle quatenus bonum*, that in which no *Good* is apprehended; nor *nolle quatenus malum* (that is, *velle ut non sit*) that wherein it apprehends no *Evill*. But for the other kinde of Indifferency, (which they call *Libertas Contradictionis*;) to Will good, or Not Will it; to Nill *Evill*, or Not to Nill it; This I acknowledge to be in the Will. For that by reason of its Imbecillity, it is not foready to execute its Functions as it ought to be.

But yet I do not conceive the *Liberty* of the Will to consist in this; Or, that this is any *Perfection* to the Will, To be able to Suspend its Act, notwithstanding the Understandings direction to the contrary. (For this the *Angells* Confirmed cannot doe, nor the *Saints* Glorified; for if their Will could act contrary to their Understanding, then could they Sinne; And yet these Agents are no lesse *Free*, then Man is: Yea God, who is the most absolutely-Free Agent, yet cannot Will or Decree that which is contrary to his Sapience, (*intellectus divinus*;) his Will never thwarts his Wisdome.) But I conceive it to be an *Imperfection* or *Weakness* in mans Will; which, Before the Fall, was not so Stable, but that it might Fall; and is Now become so Weak, that it is *Unable to Stand*.

The common Opinion is, That, If the Will cannot disobey the Iudgement of the Understanding, then is it not a *Free* faculty but all its actions are determined by the Understanding, while It dictates, that this or that is to be done or omitted; and so *Freedom* should be placed in the Understanding and not in the Will. I may adde, (to help their cause forward) that there may seem to be no *Freedom* at all: For the Will is determined by the dictate of the Understanding, and therefore in It is no freedom, no Election; and the Understanding (by generall consent) is not Free, to judge this or that as it pleaseth, but must assent or

dissent

different according to its Light : so that Here will be no Freedom neither. For this reason they say, That the Will is not necessitated to follow the dictate of Reason ; but when the Understanding hath declared what it can, it is yet in the power of the Will to Choose.

But then, lest they should fall upon another rock, *viz.* That, if the Will may reject the Understandings advice; then may it desire that which the Understanding affirms to be Evil ; contrary to that Principle, That Good is the only Object of Desire : To avoid that danger, they have found out this distinction of *Libertas Contrarietatis* and *libertas Contradictionis*, which they apply thus ; The Will hath power indeed to disobey that which the Understanding proponndeth : But yet not so, as if, of two Objects, whereof the Understanding Allows of one, and Disallows of the other, it were free notwithstanding to imbrace Either ; But when an Object is commended by the Understanding, though the Will cannot *Elect* its Contrary, yet it may *not-elect* this, it may choose whether or no it will Imbrace it. And thus they think the whole matter is saved.

This Answer may seem plausible, and hath past for current : But yet (with their leaves) the Wound, though perhaps skinned over, is not so easily Healed. For if they may not admit the Liberty of *Contrariety* : they may not (in my judgement) admit the Other. For when the Understanding commends an Object to the Will, as that which Ought to be Desired, here are two opposite terms, to *Imbrace*, or *not Imbrace*; (*agere, suspendere* :) The Understanding saith, *Agendum est*, it Ought to be *Imbraced* ; The Will chooseth rather *not to Imbrace* it, but to *Suspend* its Act. The Understanding adviseth One extream ; the Will chooseth the Other extream. The Understanding saith, It is *Good* to Act, and (consequently) it is *Ill* to Omit, to suspend ; the Will notwithstanding chooseth to Suspend (which the Understanding affirms to be *Evill*), rather then to Act, which the Understanding commends as *Good*. Thus that *libertas Contradictionis*, appears upon triall to include also a *liberty of Contrariety* : and if it may *Not-choose* the term commended, then it may choose the term Forbidden, yea it *must choose* it, where the terms are Contradictory without a *Medium*.

All that can be said to help it, will be this ; *Willing* and *Suspending* are indeed Opposite Terms ; and therefore when the Understanding adviseth to *Will*, if the Will do [*Velle*] *suspendere*, it chooseth the term Opposite, and (consequently) that which is proposed as *Evill* ; But (they may say perhaps) the Will doth only *Suspendere*, and not *Velle suspendere*.

dere; and so this *Suspending* is not an Object of *Choice*, but only the Absence or Negation of an Act; and therefore though it doe *ire in contrarias partes*, yet it doth not *contrariam partem Eligere*, it doth not Choose, or Elect, the Opposite term, because there is no positive Act of Election or Willing exercised about it.

And this answer I confesse may seem to weaken the Objection immediately foregoing; for thus the Will is not made to Choose an Opposite term; But then let them consider, how this Answer will stand with their Opinion: They tell us first that the *Freedom* of the Will is manifested in *Suspending* when the Understanding commands to Act; and yet when it doth *Suspend*, they say this Suspension is not an object of *Choice* or *Election*; and (consequently) there is no *Liberty* exercised.

If they think thus to evade, in saying, That this *Liberty* is exercised, not in *Suspending* when it might Act, because There is no Election, & therefore no Freedom exercised; But in *Acting*, when as it might have *Suspended*. I answer, That neither will this serve the turn. For as *Suspension* is not *Objectum Volitionis*, an Object of Choice; so neither is *Acting* an Object of choice. And as we say not *Volo Suspendere*, or *Volo Non-velle*, so neither do we say *volo Velle*: For by the same reason that any may say *Volo Velle*, he may say also *volo non Velle*. So that *Willing* can no more be said to be an object of Choice, then *Suspending*.

Their *Libertas Contradictoria* therefore must either be also *libertas Contrarietatis*, and so by themselves rejected: or else it will be no exercise, no manifestation, of *Liberty*, and therefore useless for their purpose.

I admit (as I said before) the distinction in this sense; That the Will, though it cannot Elect a Contrary object, yet it may *Not-Elect* This. And thus there is no *Action* (of Choice or Desire) in the Will, but tending to some Good that the Understanding proposeth; For what is not Known cannot be Desired: But yet there may be a negligent *Omission* or *Suspension*, when it ought to Act Which I do not account to be the *Liberty*, or Perfection of the Will, (for Angels &c. have it not,) but an Imperfection and Weakness. Neither do I say, that the Will doth *Voluntarily Suspend*, or *Velle Suspendere*, without direction, (for that were a Positive Act;) but (either by Negligence, or Weakness,) doth *Not-Will*. For which there is not requisite a Positive cause, but a Negative, or the Want of a Cause.

You will say, If this be so, then will there be only a finall *Omission* of the Will, and not a finall *Commission*: For Sinne of Commission (doing

(doing or Willing that which ought not) is Positive, and therefore cannot proceed from the Will, when the Understanding dictates to the contrary. Whereas the Will doth as often fail in *Choosing* a wrong object, which the Understanding acknowledgeth to be *Evill*; as in *Note Choosing a Good Object*.

I answer, it is true, the Will doth often choose what it ought not: And yet I affirm, that the Will's Error is onely Negative and not Positive; It is Omissive only, in not-obeying some directions of the Understanding. I shall make it cleer by an Instance. *Pleasure* and *Virtue* may be Competitors, and Rivalls (as it were) both courtting the Will; (As in an Act Pleasant, but Sinnefull.) The Understanding proposeth *Pleasure* as *quid bonum*, 'tis Good, 'tis Desirable; It proposeth *Virtue* as *quid melius*, 'Tis Better, 'tis more desirable. Now the Will perhaps follows the first direction; it imbraceth *Pleasure* as being Good, and so Desirable; (for *Bonum Jucundum* is Desirable as well as *Bonum Honestum*;) But the second Precept, or Direction rather, whereby *Virtue* is proposed as *Better*, and therefore should countermand the former, this it hears not, it follows not.

If you say, the Understanding doth indeed discover some Good (though a lesse Good) in the Object; yet this is not to be accounted the Understandings *Practicall Direction* (*dictamen*;) But, that the Understanding having examined the Good and the Evill that is in every Act, and comparing them together; upon this Comparison, as it observes the Good or Evill to be more, so it prescribes, to *Do*, or *Not to Do*, *Hec age*, or *Hoc non age*: And if the Will doe *Act*, when the Understanding *Forbids*, it must be said to perform a Positive Act without direction.

I answer, I admit not the Understandings dictate to be *Imperative*, but onely *Declarative*: It onely informs, *This is Good*, *This is Evill*; but Commands not, *Do this*, or *Omit it*. But the Will upon proposall of *Good*, Embraceth it; upon proposall of *Evill*, it *Rejects* it: Yet not so, but that, by Negligence, it may *Not embrace* Good, and *not reject* Evill. And thus the proposall of *Pleasure*, as *Good*; is as truly declarative as the other; and this the Will follows: But a further declaration, whereby it declares, that although *Pleasure* be Good, yet it is *Evill* to embrace this Good, because there is a greater Evill annexed; This direction, by omission, it imbraceth not. And this I conceive to be the true nature of the Acts of the Will and Understanding.

If you would have the Will and the Understanding to be the Same,

(and therefore think these distinctions superfluous,) understand by the Intellect, *Anima Intelligens*; by the Will, *Anima Volens*, or *Anima quatenus Volens*, and then you are pleased.

And thus you see, How there may be more *Knowledge* (even of Spiritual and Saving Truths) and yet less *Faith*: Because there may be an *Affect*, a Believing, in the Understanding, (which is Knowledge, or Historical Faith;) without a *Fiducial Trust*, a Reliance, and resting upon it; which is the Justifying Faith, or the Justifying Act of Faith. *Πιστις ἡ ὁρᾷ (ᾑσᾷ), ὡς, Πιστις ἡ καὶ ὁρᾷ, without Πιστις αἷς ὁρᾷ.*

5. But if you speak of a Knowledge peculiar to Gods children, whereof others partake not ; Such a Knowledge of God wherby no man knows him but he that hath him ; That Knowledge which is Life everlasting: This Knowledge, and Faith, always go together ; the more there is of One, the more also of the Other. A *Speculative* Knowledge, whereby we assent to the Truth reveiled, is found even in the Devils, and that in as large and ample measure (I suppose) as in the Saints on Earth: For I cannot be perswaded, but the Devils (*Δαιμονες*) being *Knowing* Spirits, doe Know and Assent to the Truth of every Proposition that a Child of God knows. But there is an *Experimentall* Knowledge distinct from the former, Knowledge of another nature, whereby we Know, what we know, in another Manner : We do not only *Know* that it is so, but we *Tast* and *See* it to be so.

A Blind man *Knows* perhaps that the Sun shines, but he doth not *See* it: I *Know* that at Midnight the Sunne shines to our *Antipodes*, but I do not *See* it shine to them: I *Know* that at such a time there is such an Eclipse visible to such a part of the World, yet doe I not *See* the Eclipse. The Confectioner that provides a Banquet *Knows* that this or that dish is Sweet, but they only *Tast* the Sweetnesse that eat of it. A wicked man may Know that God is good, (as a blind man knows that the Sun shines, by the report of others; or as an Astronomer knows of an Eclipse before it come, by Calculation, or rationall Discourse and Illation;) but he *Sees* it not, he *Tasts* it not. Now we read of *Aiswros* *παυμαστικῶς*, *Heb.* 5. 14. of men that have their *Senses* exercised to discern of good and evil; there is *αἰσθητικὸς πνευμαλὺς*, *Phil.* 1. 9. a kind of spiritual *Sense*, whereby we do *τὸ αἶψα φρονεῖν*, *superius Sapere*, Relish those things that are above.

And where there is this spiritual *Taft*, this *Experimental* Knowledge; there must needs be Faith also. For Truths thus clearly, and *Sensibly* (as it were) revealed to the Soul, it seems not to be in the power of

of the Will to reject: No more then it is in the power of the *Eare* not to be *pleased* with harmonious *Musick*; or in the power of the *Palat*, not to be *delighted* with the *Sweetnesse* of a *Tast*.

And thus I suppose it may appear, How far, and From what Ground there may be Knowledge without Faith.

That *God is allmercy and sweetnesse to the Devils*, is no Article of my faith, *Those miserable creatures*, saith he, *cannot consent to it*. No more can I: And yet I deny not, *that Mercy and Justice are One thing in God*. Gods Simple Essence is the same with both; yet are not They so properly the same with each other. The *Torment* of the Devils proceeds from that Divine Essence which is *Love*; (as likewise the *Mercies* of Gods Children proceed from that Divine Essence which is *Justice*: for the *Justice* of God is equally *himselfe* as is his *Love*;) Yet may we not say, the *Torments* of those are an effect of *Love*, no more then that the *Mercies* of these are the effects of *Anger*; yet Both are the effects of that Simple Essence, which is Both. It is a far different thing therefore, to say, A Loving God doth notwithstanding Punish; and to say, A Loving God doth therefore Punish: Punishment and Revenge are *sufficiently consistent* with Love; but not the *immediate effects* of Love. Thus we say, *Musicus Aedificat*; yet not his skill in *Musick*, but his skill in *Architectur*, is exercised in Building.

The *Love* of God (as likewise his *Anger*, *Justice*, *Power*, &c.) is (I confesse) the *Divine Essence*; we allow no *Accidents* in God at all: *quicquid est in Deo, est Deus*. But I ask, Whether he think this Attribute *Love* (and so of the rest) to be an *Adequate expression* of that whole Essence? If so, then is it all one to say, God *Loves* his Children, and, God is *Angry* with his children, or God *Hates* them: If not, then is it only *inadequatus conceptus*, and there remains somewhat to be expressed by other Attributes, which is not expressed in this. The *Attributes* of God therefore (as likewise it is in other *inadequati conceptus*) may be all affirmed of the same *Simple Essence*; but not (*Mutually*) of each other: And the *Effects* of each may be said to be the *Effects* of the same Essence; but not (*Promiscuously*) of every Attribute: (unlesse we take them *Materialiter*, not *Formaliter*;) And consequently, the *ruine* (of the damned) is not (as he affirms) an *effect of infinite sweetnesse* (though of that (Essence) which is, *Infinite Sweetnesse*;) nor is God, (in this) *merciful* to them.

Again, *What we know, we are*, (saith he:) I assume; *Sed deum scimus, Ergo Dei sumus*.

CHAP. IX.

How Knowledge and Affection differ.

From what hath been spoken in the former Chapter, without adding any more, may appear what is to be said concerning his Ninth Chapter: How it comes to passe that some of mean *Knowledge* have Large *Affections*. For a *Speculative Knowledge* doth not alwayes Breed *Affection*, (because the Will doth not alwayes follow the Understanding,) though neither doth it *Extinguish* it.

It is true, there is an *Affection*, which is rather a *Blazing* (then a *Warming*, Enlivening) Love, (as the Fools Mirth like the crackling of Thorns;) Which ariseth either from a *False Apprehension*, or else from the *Novelty*, rather then the *sweetnesse*, of the Object, (as the Smell of Flowers at the first approach doth most *Affect the Sense*, though they be as *Sweet* afterwards;) And This perhaps may vanish, at the presence of a more *Clear* or more *Continued* Light. But the true *Warmth* of *Zeal* is not extinguished by the *Lights of Knowledge*, (though *Speculative*,) but feeds upon it as *Fewell*: And the greater Growth there is in (especially *Experimentall*) *Knowledge*, the greater is the *Strength* of *Affection* from it: And, thus, they that *Know* most (experimentally) do alwayes *Love* most: *Knowledge* and *Affection* go together.

Yet are we not forced from hence to grant, that *Knowledge* and *Affection* are the *Same*: Betwixt which I must needs allow the same difference (be it more or lesse, that is, *Reall*, or *Modall*) which is between the *Understanding* and the *Will*: *Knowledge* is not *Affection*, and *Affection* is not *Knowledge*.

And that Objection which his Lordship from hence makes to himselfe, *That (since men of Largest Affections, doe not alwayes Know most of God, but some of Weaker Affections may Know More;)* it might appear from hence, *That all Being is not One, differing onely in Degrees; but that there are even different Natures, amongst which one may Excell, while the other is Depress*: This Objection, I say, is of that force, that I see not how all which his Lordship brings, can take it away.

The large *Encomiums*, which he brings for *Affectionate Knowledge*, preferring it before *Speculative*, (which he prosecutes very Piously, very Judiciously, very *Affectionately*;) though it prove, *That Affectionate Knowledge is the more Excellent*; Yet doth it not shew *That Speculative Knowledge is Nothing*; or *That the Measure of Affectional* ways

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ways follow the *Measure of Speculative Knowledge*: One of which brought to have proved, if he conclude that *Knowledge* and *Affection* are the *Same*. A man may truly *Know*, that *Sugar* is Sweet, though he neither *Tast* its Sweetness, nor be *Delighted* or *Pleased* with that *Tast*. And a Christian is sometimes to live by *Faith* and not by *Sense*; That is, he is to *Trust*, and *Rest* upon the *Speculative Knowledge* of Gods Goodness, and his own Interest in it; even then when for the present he wants the *Sense* of it. He may *Know* and *Believe* that the Lord is Good, though he doe not *Tast* and *See* it. *I will wait upon God* (saith *Isa*) *which hath Hid his Face from the House Israel*. He that *walketh in darkness*, and *Sees no Light*, must yet *Trust in the Name of the Lord*, &c.

And thus much for the first Notion of *Truth*, or *Reason*, as it is the groundwork of *Rationall Operations*. In which, thus far I may go along with his Lordship, That *Reason* is but the *Soul Intelligent*; That *Intellections* and *Habits* are but *Reason advanced*; As likewise That its *Operations* are but *Reason actuated*. The first, distinguished from the *Soule* at least *ratiocination*: the two last, *Modaliter*. If he mean no more, I wish his expressions had been clearer: For then the *Notions* are not new, but the *Words*. If he do *aliquid grandius moliri*; I either Understand him not, or cannot Assent to him.

But you will tell me perhaps, that I am mistaken all this while; His Lordship by *Truth* intends not *Reason*, as I take it; For the very Title of his first Chapter, calls it *Truth Understood*, and this cannot be *Reason*, for *Reason* is not that which is *understood*, but that whereby we understand.

It is true, it doth so: But (shall I speak it once for all?) the Titles of his Chapters, and his Marginall Notes, do so often clash with the Text, that I cannot believe they were done by the same Pen. It is like his Lordship, writing it but as a *Letter to a private Friend*, by whom it is since published, did not at first distinguish it into chapters, and give it that *Analysis* that now appears; and since its first writing, as the Epistle tells us, not having so much as perused it, it is not like he hath added them since; But the Publisher (as in the like cases is frequent in Treatises of all sorts) not to trouble his Lordship with so small a matter, did it himself. Who ever did it, it is like (as elsewhere, so here) he either did not Apprehend, or not Attend punctually, his Lordships meaning. For it is clear enough, if we attend it, that that which he there contends to be the same with the *Understanding*, cannot be *Truth understood*; but the *Rise*

or Groundwork from whence all actions and sayings, the Effects of a Reasonable Soule, breathe forth. It had been more agreeable to his Lordships mind, to have said, *Intellectus* and *Principium Intelligendi* are the same; and not, that the *Understanding* and *Truth-understood*, are one. And so his Lordships method will be EXACT, making the Soule or Understanding One with its *Faculties*, chap. 1. with its *Habits*, chap. 8. with its *Operations*, chap. 10. Whereas, how the Object of all these, should come first, and be that from whence all these breathe forth, appears not.

CHAP. X.

Whether the Operations of the Soule be the Soules Essence.

HAVING done (in the former chapters) with the first Notion of Truth, as it is the Fountain or Source of Knowing, as well Natural as Habitual. In this tenth Chapter, he comes to the second Consideration, or Notion of Truth; denoting the Streams proceeding from this Fountaine: The *Actions*, and *Effects of a Reasonable Soule*. endeavouring to prove, *The particular and various Workings of the Soule, in Conclusions, simple Apprehensions, Negations, and Affirmations &c. to be all One and the Same, both with each other, and with the Soule. The Fountain and the Streams (saith he) make but One River: I adde, The Root and the Branches make but one Tree. Yet the Root is not a Branch, neither are the Branches the Root.*

To prove this, he compares the Nature of the Soule or Understanding (For, saith he, we have proved them both one) with their Irradiations and Actings. His Argument tends to this effect: *The Soules Essence*, saith he, is no other thing then *Activity* (*Actus*) and therefore must be either *Potentia agendi*, or ipsa *Actio*; *Actus Primus*, or *Actus secundus*. And if it be *Actus*, either *Primus* or *Secundus*, which he conceives to differ only in Time, it must be still in work, and is no longer then it Acts: Which Act can be no other but a Work of Reason; else how can it constitute a Rational Soule? And if so, then how doth it differ from Thought or Ratiocination? The Operations therefore of the Soule (*Conclusions, Sayings, Actions*) are the Being, the Form of the Soule.

Are they so? But, I suppose, the Soule at some times produceth no (*Rational*) Act at all, (as in sleep: Doth it then cease to be a Rational Soule, when it ceaseth to produce Rational Operations? (For when its
Essence

Essence ceaseth, It selfe ceaseth to Bee. Doth a *Stone* cease to be *Heavy*, when it ceaseth to *Fall* downwards? I think not.

But I will consider the Argument distinctly. He hath proved (he saith) that the *Soule* and the *Understanding* are both *One*. This, though I would not stick to grant, Yet (as I have formerly said) I see not any Argument, in his foregoing discourse, to prove That the *Soule* and *Understanding* are all *One*; but what will be of equall force to prove, The *Soule* and the *Body* to be all *One*. And if he will allow between the *Soule*, the *Understanding*, and its *Operations*, a distinction as *Reall*, as *Essentiall*, as there is between the *Body* and the *Soule*; I am confident there is no rationall Man that will desire more.

The *Nature* or *Being* of the *Soule* (saith he) is nothing but *Activity*. That the *Soule* is *Actus*, is confessed, I grant, by all: But whether *Activity* may be taken in the same sense, I question. This *Actus* (saith he) whether *Primus* or *Secundus* (which differ but in *Time*, and so differ not at all, because *Time* is nothing) can be no other but a *Work* of *Reason*: And so the *Soules* Operation will be its *Form* and *Essence*. That *Actus primus* and *actus secundus*, (*Gravity* and *Descension*) differ only in *Time*, I grant not: For this is not a *Distribution* of *Actus* into its *Species*; but a *Distinction* of an Ambiguous term. *Actus* in the first sense signifies *Actuality* (not *Action*) and it is opposed sometimes to *Potentia ad Esse*, sometimes to *Potentia ad Formam*; *sive sit forma Substantialis, sive Accidental*, (but never to *Potentia ad Operari*;) And thus *Actus* is no other but that *Essence*, *per quam res aut actu-Est, aut est actu-Tale*. *Actus* in the second sense signifies, not *Actuality*, but *Action*, or *Operation*; and is opposed to *Potentia ad Operari*.

I say therefore, the *Essence* or *Nature* of the *Soule* or *Understanding* is *Actus*; It is *Actus Primus*; It is that whereby the *Soule* & *actu-Est*, & *est Hoc*, or *est Tale* (*viz. in genere substantia*,) Such a *Being*, Such a *substance*. Its *Faculties* (if distinct) are also *Actus*, (yet not *Actions*;) Which you may say to be *Actus secundus* (as some doe, because they are a *secondary actuality*, whereby the *Soule* becoms, not a *Being*, or *Such a Being*; but a *Being So qualified*, *So adorned*: Or rather I should say they be *Actus Primi*, because (though *Accidental*, yet) they are not *Operations* (which I conceive to be the truest meaning of *Actus secundus*, though I confesse some attribute it to all *Accidents*,) but *Forms*; *Operative* indeed, but not *Operations*.

If you aske What is the *Form* of this *Activity* (or *Actuality* rather) of this *Actus primus* which is the *Soules* *Essence*, If it be not *Rationall*

Workings? (Which is all one as if you should ask What is the Essence of an Essence? and again, What is the Essence of That Essence? *in infinitum*. I answer, The Form of this *Actus* is *It selfe*, Its Essence. What can be the Form of *Rationality*, but *ipsa Rationalitas*? *Humanitas* you may say is *Forma Hominis*; but will you ask again, What is that which is *forma Humanitatis*? If you do we must answer still, that it is *Humanitas*, and stay there. Except you would have us invent one Abstract upon the neck of another, and say *Humanitastudo*. And thus I think somebody hath been trying practises; For if you ask what is the Form of *Honorificum*, or *Honorificabile*, they can tell you It is *Honorificabilitas*, or *Honorificabilitudo*; and aske again what shall be *Forma Honorificabilitudinis*, they will tell you, It is *Honorificabilitudinitas*. I say, we must not enquire for the Form of a Form, or the Essence of an Essence: For every thing hath its *Essence* (positive) and its *Haccity*, not from any other thing, but from It selfe; Though it may have an *Externall*, a *Relative*, or *Accidental* denomination from some *Adjunct*.

(And therefore to say, *Materia individuatur a Forma*, as though the Matter of a dead Corps, were not the same matter that was in the living Man, is a doctrine which I could never digest. For so all *Generation*, will become *Creation*; For if it be the *Form* which makes this *Matter* to be *This*, then cannot one Form succeed another in the same Matter: because if the *Form precedent* gave it its Individuation, and made it to be *this*, and not *other* matter; when this Form is abolished, the Matter which is joyned with the *succedent Form* will not be *This*, but *Other* matter: If *This* Form make it to be *This* Matter, then *Another* Form will make it to be *Other* Matter. And if so, then is both *Matter* and *Form* produced *de novo*; which must needs be *Creation*, because it is not made of any thing *præ-existent*, nothing remaining of what before was.)

Hee proceeds thus, *If the Form of this Activity (Actus) be not the Reasonable Workings; then must it be either of a baser alloy, or of a higher stamp.*

For answer, I will but demand in generall, which his Lordship judgeth to be most Excellent, the *End*, or the *Means*? That which is willed, not for its own sake, but for somewhat else, seems to be of lesse worth, then That for whose sake it is desired: And yet the *Means*, being the *Ends* Efficient, how can it be Inferiour? I say therefore, that *A primus* is the *Efficient* of *Actus secundus*; and *This* the (partiall) *End* of the other: And leave it to his Lordships consideration, whether he will esteem thee more Noble.

Hee

Hee tells us soon after, *That if we distinguish between the Act and the Power, the Act must ever be first in Order, Dignity, and Nature.*

But (under his Lordships favour) I conceive that the *Act* is first neither in *Order*, in *Dignity*, nor in *Nature*. The Cause is before the Effect, in *Excellency*, because *Causa (equivoca) est Nobilior Effecto*; for nothing can produce an Effect more noble then it selfe. ² *In Nature, Causa est prior Effecto*; For that is defined to be *Natura prius, A quo non reat essendi consequutio*; Now I demand, Whether of these two may be without the Other? The Act, or the Power? And *in Order*: For he speaks I suppose either of the Order of *Production*, or the Order of *Intention*; If he speak of the first; The Order of *Production*, is *Ordo naturæ Generantis*, and so that which is first in *Nature*, must be also first in *Order*: If he speak of the Order of *Intention*; then the *End* (if it be the Sole end) may seem to be preferred before the *means*; But this is a *Morall Excellency*, and a *Morall Order*; not a *Naturall* or *Physicall Excellency*, such as we are now speaking of. But I demand withall, Whether *Action* be the sole *End* of the Soule? that is, Whether the Soule in its *Essence* might not be produced either for its *Own Excellency* or for the Excellency of some *Other* end beside the Excellency of its *Operation* or *Actus Secundus*? And if so, then can it not be concluded That even its *Morall Excellency*, in *genere Finis*, is inferiour to the Excellency of its *Operation*.

But his Lordship admits not at all of this distinction between *actus primus* and *actus secundus*; so as that *actus primus* should be the Being or Substance, and *actus secundus* the Product. But why? They forget, saith he, that *Omnis Virtus consistit in Actione*.

Nay we Forget it not, but we Deny it. For if you speak of *Morall Virtue*, est *virtus tacuisse*, &c. but, To hold ones peace, is no Action: If he speak of *Physicall Virtue* or Excellency, of *naturall Perfection*; then doe I deny, that all *Naturall Excellency* consists in *Action*; for the Essence it selfe is *Bonum Physicum*: But if he speak of *Physicall Efficiency*, then I grant, that *Virtus Efficientis*, or *Efficientis Efficientia*, consistit in *Actione*; The *Efficacy*, or *Efficiency* of a Thing consists in its *Operation*: But what then? May not an Essence Be without Action, because it cannot Act without Action? Must its *Essence* be Action, because its *Efficacy* is Action? In ordinary Philosophy, *operatio Sequitur esse*, Operation Proceeds from the Essence, and not Constitutes it.

But, saith he; What is this their *Actus primus*? What is the Form of it? (I have said, Its Own Essence; It is It selfe its Own Form, and the

Form or Essence of the Soule: We must not enquire for the Essence of an Essence, nor for the Essence of a thing out of It selfe: *What's with them, the Form of a Reasonable Soule? Is it not Reason? (Yes it is) And this Reason it not Potentia Ratiocinandi, But Ratio: (he meaneth, I suppose Ratiocinatio, rather then Ratio; for Ratio and Potentia ratiocinandi are all one:)* For if you distinguish between the *Act* and the *Power* the *Act* must ever be first, in Order, Dignity, and Nature: (But this I grant not.) So then, what is the Form of this primus Actus? is it not some Act? (Yes, but not an Action, or Operation.) If it be, then must it exist, else you allow it but a bare Notionall Being; And if it exist, must it not be that which you call actus secundus? I answer, It is *Actus*, (*aliquid actu*) but not an Action; It *Exists* also, and yet is not *Actus Secundus*, but the *Form* from whence *actus secundus* flows.

He proceeds; If it be not an Act (or action) then is it nothing else but a Power or Faculty depending upon somewhat else (*viz. upon the Soule;*) and if this be the nature of the First, what shall the second Being (which is its Effect, and so Lower) be but a Notion. (Yet he said even now, that the Act is before the Power in Order, Dignity, and Nature: and yet the Act is the Power's Effect: How then doth he now affirm, that the Effect is somewhat Lower then the First Being?) I answer, It is not an Action; neither yet is it a Distinct (dependent) Faculty, (if we make the Soule and the Faculty to be the same;) but the Soules Essence. But yet though we should admit Reason to be a distinct Faculty, (as some doe) and so, not to be the Soules *actus primus*, but *actus efficiens*: Yet doth it not follow that the Operation must be onely a Notion. Heaviness is not the Stones Essence, but an *accidentall Form*, a Power or Faculty of Gravitation; yet is not its Descent onely Imaginary but Real. Heat in water is not its Essence, but a separable Accident; yet its Calcification, its Heating or Scalding, is not meerly Notionall, but Real. So might it be here: there may be (notwithstanding this Argument) a Faculty or Accidentall Form in the Soule, which may be an *Actus Primus* in respect of its Operations, (though not *actus primus*, which is the Soules Essence,) from whence those Operations, or *Actus Secundus*, may proceed, which yet might be Real, and not Imaginary.

If he had (as he speaks) set that distinction of Substance and Accident; (which he seems to challenge as an aged Imposture) upon the Rack; I would willingly have examined its forc'd confession.

In the mean time, I see not from what ground he can strongly conclude,

clude, That this *Activity* (as he speaks,) this *Actus primus*, consists in *Action*; or That *It* and *actus secundus* are the same; and both One with *Truth*.

You will ask me, What distinction therefore will I allow between *actus primus* and *secundus*; between the *Agent* and its *Action*? I answer, The One is *Res*, the Other is *Modus*; and so the distinction is *Modall*: Neither more nor lesse distinction will I admit of. And so doing, I dissent not from the Opinion of others: For (as I remember) *Suarez* (not to instance in others) makes *Action* to be a *Modus*; And though he make a *Transient Action* to be *Modus Patientis*, (in which I dissent not to him;) yet an *Immanent Act* (such as are *Rational Operations*) is with Him, *Modus Agentis*.

CHAP. XI.

Whether Time and Place be onely Imaginary.

IN the next Chapter, we are called to consider of the nature of *Time* and *Place*: which his Lordship occasionally falls upon, by reason of an Objection, That lays so strong a siege to his Opinion, that I doubt his Lordships Answer will hardly raise it. It ariseth from hence;

There as in the Soule various *Operations* and *Workings*, distinct in *Time*, and distinct in *Place*: which Distinction, though it may have an externall denomination in respect of *Time* and *Place*; yet ariseth not from thence, but is Internall or Intrinsicall to the *Operations* themselves; *This Operation* is not the *Other*, and the *Other* is not *This*: And this distinction would remain though the distinct *Operations* were performed in the same *Time*, in the same *Place*: *Cæsar* and *Pompey* were not the same man, though Contemporary. The Water which to day runs down a River, is not the same water with that which yesterday ran in the same *Place*, the same Channell. Two *Angels*, though coexistent at the same *Time* in the same *Place*, the same part of the Ayr, are not yet the same *Angel*. Thus Nutrition, and Volition, or Intellection, though at the same *Time*, performed by the same Soule resident in the same Body, are yet distinct Acts. And on the contrary, a man remains the same man to Day, that he was Yesterday; at This place, that he was at Another place; though both *Time* and *Place* be altered.

Now there being in the Soule various *Actings*, distinct both in *Time* and *Place* (though they receive not their distinction from either, are there not then so many severall Soules, (viz. if the Operations be the Soules Essence?) This is the Objection.

His Lordship supposing all the Difference between these Acts to arise from *Time* and *Place*, thinks that if he prove Time and Place to be *Nothing*, then these Acts will not be Distinct, but *the same*; and so may constitute the same Soule.

But, whether *Place* and *Time* be any thing or *nothing*, whether they alter any thing or *nothing* in this point; Yet sure we are that *This Man* is not the *Other Man*. *This Soule* not *Another Soule*, *This Action* is not the *Other Action*: And so the difficulty remains as hard; there will be *various* Operations still.

He brings severall *Simile's* to illustrate it. *Complexion Lineaments, Harmony*, though they be in themselves *Diverse*, yet they make up *One* pleasing Being, which we call *Beauty*. *A Flame* arising from divers *Thorns* is but *One Flame*. *A Stream* supplied from severall *Springs*, is but *One Stream*. I may adde, *Many Members* make up *One Body*; *Many Creatures* *One World*. (Yet still *One Member* is not the *Other*; The water received from *One Spring*, is not the same water which came from the *Other Spring*, though both runne in the same *Channell*.)

But will he say, *So is it in our case*? That (in the same manner) *severall Acts* doe constitute *One Soule*? Are these *Actions* its *Integrall Parts*, as the *Members* are of the *Body*; and severall *Waters* of *One Stream*? &c. Are they a *Piece of the Whole* and make up the *totum Compositum*? Then is the *Soule* Divisible; Then doth it lose some part of it selfe, and becomes maimed at the cessation of every *Action*.

But he makes not the *Soule* perhaps to be constituted of these *Actions*, as so many *Integrall Parts*; But, saith he, *The Soule is One Act*, distinguished to our Notion by severall apparitions.

If so, then his *Simile's* drawn from *Integrall Parts* constituting the whole *Compositum*, will not hold.

But (secondly) I deny that all these *Operations* are but *one Action* in various *Shapes*. They are all *Actions* of the same *Soule*, but they are not all the same *Action*. The *Soule*, If you will may be called, *One Soule* under *Various Shapes*; But these *Various Shapes* cannot be said to be *One Shape*. Like as *Wax* fashioned successively in severall *Moulds*, is the same *Wax* in severall *Figures*; but that these are all the same *Figure*, we cannot say. *Actions* performed by the same *Soule*, are all *Modi* of the same *Thing*, of the same *Soule*; but they are not all the same *Modus*. This is not the *Other*.

And this we may hold, whatever become of *Time* and *Place* for this *Distinction* ariseth not from Them. *A man* is the same *Man* to day, that

he was Yesterday, though the *Time* be not the same. He is the same Man at *Tork*, that he was at *London*, though the *Place* be not the same. *Time* and *Place* doe neither make the *Same* to be *Two*, nor *Two* to be the *Same*; *One* to be *Two*, nor *Two* to be *One*: Yet what hinders but that Things and Actions may have an Intrinsicall Difference one from another.

These various Beings, therefore, not being Differenced by these Circumstances of *Time* and *Place*, (though Different in both,) It is lesse materiall for me to enquire What they are? or Whether they be *some thing* or *nothing*? Only I desire to know, wherein the strength of that Argument consists, which is by us so often urged against *Papists* and *Lutherans*, concerning their *Transubstantiation*, and *Consubstantiation*; viz. How *Christs* body can be at the *Same Time* in *Severall Places*? For, that it might be *successively* in all these *Places* at *severall Times*, we deny not: Now, if at *Severall Times* it may be in *divers Places*; why may it not be so, at the *Same Time*, if *Time* and *Place* be *Nothing*? Again, *Severall Places* at the *same Time* may contain *severall Bodies* (v.g. *Bread*, and *Christs Body*;) now why may not the *Same place* containe them, if *Place* be *nothing*? Why not *Together*, as well as *Successively*, if *Time* be *nothing*?

All actions, saith he are *Nothing* if *Time* be *Anything*; Because the *Time* allotted for every Action, be it never so short, may be divided into *severall parts*, *many subdivisions of Time*. True. But is there not the same Reason of *Actions* that is of *Time*? are not they divisible into as many parts, whereof every parcell answers to a portion of that *Time*? There is the same reason in every *Continuum*, be it *Magnitude*, *Distance*, *Time*, *Place*, *Duration*, *Motion*, *Action*, or whatever: They are all equally divisible in *semper divisibilia*. If it be *Actio Instantanea*, it is dispatched in an *Instant*, not in *Time*: If it be *Actus Continuus*, it is capable of as many divisions as is that *Time* in which it is performed.

This not being well weighed saith he, hath raised that Question, [How God should see *All things*?] If in their *Existences*, then they are *Coeternal* with him: If only in their *Causes*, then are they not *Present*. Which difficulty, he supposeth, is dissolved, by making *Time* to be *Nothing*, and *All things* to be *existent*, in their *Beings*, with God from all *Eternity*. (Which of how dangerous a consequence it may prove his Lordship is not aware.)

That God before the worlds Creation, did co-exist to this Instant, I doe confidently affirm; Yet, that all things present, did exist before they were produced, I cannot assent; which I doubt not but to recon-

cile, (if I were now discussing that question *ex professo*, and not glancing at it *in transitu*) allowing notwithstanding to Time and Place, their due reality; not making Temporall and Locall difference to be only Imaginary.

As likewise, How *Permanency* in God may consist with *Succession* in the Creature; and How Acts (of *Creation, Preservation, Redemption, Decree, the Execution of that Decree*) may be *Eternall*, as they proceed from God, though in the Creature *recipiuntur in Tempore*. In *Place* we make no scruple of it, to affirm that *anima est tota in toto & tota in qualibet parte*, that the *Whole Soule* may be present to one Point, or part of the Body, without ceasing to be *Wholly* present to another part; (Or, if possibly in the Soul, and Created Spirituall substances, it may be questioned; yet doubtlesse, in God himselfe, it must needs be granted, that he is *Ubique Totus*;) Now, if it be not repugnant to be coexistent to one Point of *Place*, without ceasing to coexist to another point though *Distant*; Why not to one Point of *Time*, without ceasing to be present to another, though *Successive*?

The next Objection, Concerning the nature of *Evill*, is of lesse force against his Tenet. For, That *Good and Evill may coexist in One entire Act*; That there may be some Degrees of Goodnesse in an Action, and yet not that Perfection of Goodnesse, that ought to be; may as well be granted, as That *the Twilight hath not [So much] Lights, and [So much] positive darknesse, but that it hath not so [Much] Lights as the Midday*. But yet in the mean time it may be doubted, whether the Nature of *Evill* be merely *Privative*. It is true indeed, The nature of (*Moral*) *Evill* is a *Non-conformity* (or *Difformity* rather) to Gods Law: But why may not this *non-conformity* arise *ex presentia non debiti*, as well as *ex absentia debiti*, or *ex defectu debiti inesse*? May not a Line disagree from its measure, by being too Long, as well as by being too Short? The not distinguishing between *bonum Metaphysicum*, and *bonum Morale*, may perhaps have caused some error in this assertion. But I stand now to decide it: You shall find more of it in the next chapter.

But that which is assumed as a ground of this Assertion, is farre more improbable then the Assertion it selfe. *viz. That Contradictions may be simul, semel, & eodem respectu, in the same Subject.*

What necessity his Lordship had to embrace this opinion of *Anaxagoras, Democritus &c.* (as he saith,) against *Aristotle*; I do not discern. Neither can I see, wherein this co-existence of Contradictions doth appear. For the Presence of an *Inferiour* Degree, and the Negation of a
Farther

Farther Degree, are no Contradictions, because they are not *ad idem*. And such a Coexistence *Aristotle* and his followers will not deny; Else how can they speak of *Qualitates Remissæ*? Nay more, They will grant an *Inferiour Degree*, to consist, not only with the Negation of a Farther Degree, but even with the Presence of its *Contrary*; For they deny not but that there may be *Contrary* qualities in the same Subject in *Remissis gradibus*, (as Heat and Cold in warm water, though not in *gradibus Intensis*.)

But if *Anaxagoras*, or any other, will contend, That perfect Contradictions may it and together, That the Presence of an inferiour degree, may stand with the Absence or Negation of the Same degree; It will be in vain to dispute against it. For when I have proved it to be False, they will grant it is so, and affirm withall, That notwithstanding its Falseness, yet may it also be True, because Contradictions are not Inconsistent. (Another adversary perhaps would deale more sharply with his Lordship upon this point: I passe it.)

He proceedsto shew by divers similitudes, How the same thing may take divers shapes in our Apprehension; And consequently, that the severall Apparitions of Truth do not forthwith evince the Variety of Truth. All which we deny not, For otherwise we cannot acknowledge that there is any *distinctio Rationis*; Rationall distinctions being no other but *inadequati conceptus ejusdem rei*. That there is therefore a *Rational Distinction*, we deny not; But that there is Only a Rationall Distinction, and not also a *Reall distinction*; this is that we deny. Some things we acknowledge to be only *Ratione distincta*, but Other things we contend to have a *Reall distinction*. Which must be overthrown before he can conclude, that all the actions of reason which seem severall, are but one, a fixt intire Unity.

He toucheth lastly, upon *Copernicus* his Opinion, Which, he saith, hath been confuted these many yeares by the three leading Senses. (And yet his margent saith, that sense is confuted by Him.) For we [See] the circumvolutions of the Heavens: we [Feel] our selves upon a stable Foundation; We [Heare] not from the Volutations of the Earth such a black Cant as her heavy rowlings would rumble forth.

But (not to dispute the truth of *Copernicus* his Opinion) I thinke I may affirm that Neither of these Testimonies of Sense do any way contradict his Assertion. For, first, I deny that we [See] the Revolution of the Heavens. We discern indeed, (and that Truly,) that the Starres at severall times have severall Positions in respect of our Horizon; (and this

is all:) But whether this *diversity of Position* arise from the *Motion* of the One, or the Other, or Both, our Sight determines not; Affirming only That there is such a diverse Posture.² Our sense of [*Feeling*] assures us of thus much, That the Earth is such a Foundation as upon which we rest; and, that we remain in the same Posture in respect of the Earth and the Air circumstant; Which may be as well if all jointly *Move* together, as if all jointly *Stand still*. A man in a Ship under Hatches upon a smooth water, supposeth himselfe to sit fast upon his Seat, (and he doth so;) and he seeth all things about him to remain at the same Distance, in the same Posture, discerning no alteration: Yet this hinders not but that He and They may be joyntly moved Together, without being thrown from off his seat, upon which he may sit as firm as if he were on shore. And³ for the sense of [*Hearing*], I see no reason, why it should be more blamed for not hearing the sound of the *Earths Volutation*; then for not hearing the *Pythagorian Harmony*. If the vast *Celestiall Spheres*, whose almost every Starre doth farre exceed the Terrestriall Globe, be whirled about with such a silent motion, as that the quickest Eare cannot discern it; Why may not the *Earth*, a farre lesser body, passe as quietly, without such a dismall *Cant*, such an hideous Noise, as his Lordship doth suppose? For Noise doth not arise meerly from *Motion*; but from the *Crossing* or *Thwarting* of severall motions, from the *Clashing* and *Collision* of one Body against another, by reason that the One (*standing*) interrupts the Other in its *Motion*, or Both moving according to *severall motions* do mutually hinder each others progresse: Whereas, if all moved the *same Way*, with the *same Speed*, (as is supposed in the Motion of the Earth, and the things adjoyning) there would be no such Clashing, or Interruption of one another, and (consequently) no *Noise*.

The *Senses* Testimony therefore doth not contradict the Opinion of *Copernicus*. The *Eye* tells us, that the Starres and We are at severall times in severall Positures, but, whether it proceed from Their motion or from Ours, it affirmeth not. Our *Feeling* informs us, that we are not tossed from Place to Place, that is, from one part of the *Earths Superficies* to another, but remain upon the same part of its Surface: But whether we jointly move together, or jointly rest immovable, it determines not. The *Eare* can tell us, That it hears no *Noise*, (for how can it since there is none?) But it doth not say, There is no *Motion*. These Witnesses therefore can testifie nothing in this cause; Except we should *suborn* them, and put that into their Mouths, which is not within

within their Knowledge, Or falsify the Records, by supposing them to say That, which they say not.

CHAP. XII.

Concerning Falshood in the Soules operations. Whether it cease to Be, when it ceaseth to Act Truth.

IN the twelfth Chapter, he comes to another Objection *If Actings of Truth, be Truth*, (that is, if Rationall Operations be the Soule, the Soules Essence) *then when the Soule Acteth not Truth, it ceaseth to Be: and so when it entertaineth or pronounceth a False Position, the Soule is no more is selfe.*

This Objection I conceive to have two branches; For the Soule may cease to *act Truth*, either by *Not acting at all*, or by *acting Falsly*. For whether it *act Not*, or *act Falsly*, it ceaseth to *act Truth*; and therefore (if *acting of Truth* be its Essence) it ceaseth to *Be*.

His first Answer may be equally applied to both; That, *granting the Soule when it acts upon Falshood, to be as when it acteth not, and so is not; Yet shall we advance nothing, till we prove the Succession of Moments to be Reall and not Imaginary.* Where he presupposeth, that when it *Acteth not*, then it *Is not*; and, though the same be granted in a *Falsse* acting, yet neither That, nor This, will prove of any force, since *Succession of Moments* is onely *Imaginary*.

The ground of this Reply, I conceive to be this; If there be not any *Reall* Succession, If there be no *primum* and *posterius* Indeed, but be onely *supposed* so to be by our Imagination; Then any *One Act* of the Soule, is able to give it a co-existenceto all Eternity: (according to what he affirmed in the former Chapter.) For of this *One Act*, being *Reall*, it cannot be affirmed, That it *Was* but *Is not*, or it *Is* but hath *not-been*; but if it *at all Be*, it must *Be alwayes*; Because, if *Succession* be onely *Imaginary*, then to *Be* and to *Have been* is all one; then there was not a time when it *Was not*, neither will there be a time when it *Shall Not be*.

But if the Issue of the Question depend upon this, Whether Succession be *Reall*, or *Imaginary*; I doubt not but this might be soon decided.

Therefore First, I ask, Whether there be not the same reason for *Succession* in Time, that is for *Extension* in Place? Whether there may be *Partes extra Partem*, *Punctum extra Punctum*, though not *Momentum*

extra Momentum; or there be the same reason of *Both*, and *Both* be *Imaginary*? If there be in *Both* the same reason, (which I suppose he will affirm;) Then must every *Being* have a *Coexistence* to all *Places*, as well as a *Coexistence* to all *Times*; It must have an *Ubiquity* as well as a *Perpetuity*. Then is it in vain to dispute Whether *Christ's Body* be Really present in the *Sacrament*, Whether *Peter* were ever at *Rome*, &c. If every *Body*, every *Thing*, be every where. For if *difference of Place* be nothing, then that which hath a *reall existence* in any place, hath a *reall existence* in all places; because *This* place and all other places have only an *Imaginary* Difference, and are *indeed* all one.

Secondly, If *one action* give the *Soule* a *Coexistence* to all *Eternity*, then what doth the *Second* and *Subsequent Acts* produce? do they give it a *new Being*, a *new Eternity*?

Ans. You will say (I suppose) that there is not a *Second Act*, an *Other Act*, but all *Acts* are *One Act*: And this *One act*, which appears to our imagination to be *First* and *Second*, &c. gives the *Soule One Essence*, *One Eternity*.

Repl. If so, then what is the difference between an *Act* of *Sinning*, and a *Course* of *Sinning*? What is the difference between the *Once* committing of a *sinful Act*, and the *Ofte* Reiterating of it? Between *David's One Act* of *Adultery*, and the *lascivious persons Constant Practise*? Why are we exhorted to *Cease from evil*; if every *Act* be *Eternall*, and whatsoever succeeds can be but the *Same*? *He that stole, let him steal no more*: To what end serves this counsell, if there be no other *Act* feasible, but what *Is already*, and *That* to remain for ever?

Ans. 2. if you would say, That the same *Act* is again *Reiterated*: *Rep.* Ask, if the *Iteration* be somewhat more than the *first Commission*? If not, then to commit it *Once*, and to *Iterate* it *often*, is all *One*: If it be somewhat more, then is it either a *Reall addition*, or *Imaginary*: If *Imaginary*, then are we where we were before; If it be *Reall*, then why may there not be a *reall act* distinct from the former, as well as a *reall Commission* (of the same *act*) distinct from the former? Thus you see if *Time* be *Nothing*, If *Succession* be only *Imaginary*; then is it all one to commit *Many finnes*, and to commit *One Sinne*.

Thirdly, if *Succession* and *Difference of Moments* be only *Imaginary*, if all *Duration* be *Eternall*, all *Simultaneous*; Then what is the difference between the *long life* of the *Aged*, and the *few days* of him that dyeth in his *Youth*? For the *Reall Existence* of *One* as well as the *Other* is equally *Eternall*; Since the *Length* and the *Shortness* of *Time*

is but Imaginary, all Duration being indeed Simultaneous. Thus the youngest Child (if he do but Think so) hath lived as long as the most Aged.

Again, 4. If Succession and Difference of Time be only imaginary; Then why do I not *Now* know, that which I shall know *To-morrow*? What hinders but that every man should be *præscius futuri*? I shall *Know* it to-morrow, because I shall *See* it; but why should I not *Now* both *Know* it and *See* it as well as to-morrow, since it is *Now* as really present as it will be *Then*? Why do we dispute concerning matters of Fact; as whether *Peter* were at *Rome*, and the like? Can we not see whether he be there or not? For if he *were* there, then he *Is* there: since Then and Now are all one: And if he *Be* there, why do not I *see* him there? For I am as really there as he is: For if I be any where, then am I *There*, since *There* and *Here* are all one; Time and Place making only an *Imaginary* (and not *Reall*) difference.

Ans. If you say, Things that seem to be *Future*, are even *Now* as really *Present* as they shall be *Hereafter*, but they *appear* not to be present, and therefore are not now *Known* and *Seen*, (like Colours in the dark;) But when they shall receive a new Luster, they shall both *Appear* to be, and be *Seen* to be.

Rep. I reply, If they *shall* appear, then they *Do* appear; because Then and Now are all one. Again, If there be *Apparet* and *Apparuit*, why not *Est* and *Erit*? If there be a *prims* and *posterius* in *Appearing* why not in *Being*? Or I ask, whether *Appearing* and *not-Appearing* be a *Reall* or onely *Imaginary* difference? If a *Reall* difference, then will there be somewhat *Reall Then*, which is not *Now*; and consequently all Reality will not be Simultaneous, there will be somewhat *Reall afterwards* which *before* was not: If *Appearing*, be onely *Imaginary*; what shall I have to help my knowledge *Then*, which I have not *Now*?

Ans. 2. If you say, Things *Future* are both now *Present*, & we *Know* them so to be, but do not *Seem* to know them, or *Seem*, not to know them:

Repl. Then I reply as before, If we Shall *Seem* to know them, we *Do* *Seem* to know them; because Then and Now are all one.

So that if Succession of *Time* be only *Imaginary*; Then do we already know, whatsoever we shall know, (whereas *Christ* himselfe *Increased* in wisdom, *Luk.* 2.) And the *Fore-Knowledge* of things to come, would not be such a *πικνισμός*, as might distinguish between the *True* and *False* Gods.

And thus (if I mistake not) I have sufficiently shewed (though much more might have been added) that there is a *Reall* Succession, a *Reall* Priority of Duration, and not onely *Imaginary*. And therefore (notwithstanding his first answer) the Soule must really cease to *Be*, when it ceaseth to *Work*, or to work *Truth*; if these *Workings* of truth be the Soules *Essence*: And the soule must be (during that Cessation, or Error) as truly *Non Ens*, as before its first Production; for the precedent and subsequent workings cannot (*Then*) give it an Existence, as not (*Then*) being.

His second answer, to the Objection propounded in the beginning of this Chapter, toucheth not at all the first Branch of it, wherein it is objected, That if particular *Actings* of *Truth*, be *Truth*, or the Soules *Essence*, How is it that the Understanding should not cease to *Be*, when it ceaseth to *Work*; (for this in his first Answer he seemed to grant:) But it is applyed to the second Branch of it, viz. That if particular *Actings* of *Truth* be *Truth*, or the Soules *Essence*, then the Soule entertaining a *Falseness* should be no more it selfe. To which he answers, By denying that the Soule doth at all act upon *Falseness*: and that upon this ground, Because *Falseness* is not a *Reall Being* upon which the Soule can work. For its nature being *Privative*, and no *Reall Being*, how can the Soule or *Truth* work upon *Nothing*?

I might answer here, That it is not requisite to the Soules Act, that its Object should have a *Reall being*: (As appears by the Soules apprehending *Ens rationis*; which Apprehension is a *positive Act*, and yet hath no *Reall Object*.) For the Object of Intellection, is not *Reall*, but *Cognoscibile*. And therefore, That *Falseness* wanteth a *reall being*, is not enough to shew, that the Understanding cannot work upon it.

And this (in effect) he granteth soon after. For, it being Objected, that the Soule while it pronounceth a *Falseness*, doth really act, (*verbi agere*; He replies, That there are in this *Action* two things, a *Thinking*, and a *So-thinking*. To think is a *positive Action*, a good *Action*, But the formalis ratio of *So-thinking* lyeth in *Thinking* an *Error*, which is *Nothing*; and so a *Not-thinking*. When (*mistaking*) a man catcheth at a shadow; In catching he doth truly *Act*; But to Catch a Shadow, is to catch nothing; Now to catch nothing, and not to catch; to act nothing, and not to act, is all one. So to Think is *Reall*, but to Think *Amisse* is *Nothing*, and all one with *Not-thinking*.

He grants therefore, that the Soule pronouncing or Understanding a *Falseness*, or thinking *Amisse*, doth really *Think*, really *Act*: Now I ask, while it doth really Think, *What* doth it think? *What* doth it

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it Act? (or *Upon what* rather? Certainly it must either be *Falshood* or *No hing*: (For what else it should be, neither doth his Lordship shew, nor can I imagine) If it Act upon *Falshood*, the false position; then may *Falshood* be the Object of a *Reall act*; If it act upon *Nothing*, then what hinders, but that *Falshood*, although it be *Nothing*, may yet be the Object of this Act?

Object. But he will say, If the Soule do act upon *Falshood*, then must it become *Falshood*, that is, a *Vanity*, a *Ly*, a *Nothing*: For I conceive (aith he) the *Agent is selfe*, together with the *Subject acted upon* (the Object) to be One in the Act.

Ans^r. But this supposition must I deny; For if so, Then when the Soule *acteth upon* God (by Knowing, Loving, &c) then doth it become God: And if so, why doth his Lordship (at the end of his Preamble) blame those for *mounting too high*, who, *confounding the Creator with the Creature, make her to be God*?

But for the better clearing of this whole discourse, concerning *Falshood* and *Error* in the Soules working; I shall desire you to take notice of a Distinction, which all Know, and yet but few Think of, when they have occasion to use it. The non attendency whereof, hath produced much Obscurity, much Errour, and inextricable perplexities concerning this and the like Subjects. It is, to distinguish between *Verum Metaphysicum*, and *Verum Logicum*; between *Bonum Metaphysicum*, and *Bonum Morale*: To distinguish, I say, *Metaphysicall* Truth and Goodnesse, from *Morall* and *Logicall* Goodnesse and Truth: To distinguish the Truth of *Being* from the Truth of a *Proposition*; the Goodnesse of *Being*, from the Goodnesse of an *Action*.

Now this being premised, let us examine the truth of some Tenents which are almost generally received by all.

1 The nature of *Evill*, say they, is *Privative*, not *Positive*; *Evill is Nothing*. And why? Because *Ens & Bonum convertuntur*, and therefore *Malum* must needs be *Non-Ens*; now *Non-Ens* is *Nothing*.

Be it so; *Evill is Nothing*. But what *Evill* do they mean? *Evill* in *Metaphysicks*, or *Evill* in *Ethicks*? *Goodnesse*, in *Metaphysicks*, is no other than *Entity*, (for none ever acknowledged a greater distinction between *Ens & Bonum* then a distinction of Reason,) and therefore *Malum* (in *Metaphysicks*) must be *Non Ens*. But will they say that *Morall Evill* is so too? If they do, then must they say also, that *bonum Morale* is convertible with *Ens*; (otherwise their Argument will not hold:) that All Being is *Honesty*, or *Morall Goodnesse*; and all *Morall Goodnesse*

nelle is *Being* or *Entity*. I ask therefore, whether morall Goodnesse, or Honesty, be the Essence, the Entity of a Stone? If not, then is not every Being, *Bonum Morale*. I ask again, Whether *Silence* be not *Morally Good*, at such a time as when a man ought to hold his peace? Yet to be *Silent*, or *not to speak*, hath no Metaphysicall goodnesse, no goodnesse of *Being*, for it is a meer Negation. There may be therefore *Morall goodnesse*, where there is no *Metaphysicall goodnesse*, no positive Being; and there may be *Metaphysicall goodnesse*, goodnesse of Being, without *Morall goodnesse* or Goodnesse of Honesty. Now if *Malum Metaphysicum*, a Negation, a *Non-Ens*, may be *Bonum Morale*, what shall be the *Malum Morale* opposite to this *Bonum*? shall that be also a *Non-Ens*? If it be, then how can it be contrary to the other? Since that Nothing cannot be opposite to Nothing, but Something to Something, or Something to Nothing.

I say therefore, that *Metaphysicall Evil*, is merely Privative, as being opposite to the Goodnesse of Being; and it is no other but *Non-Entity*. But *Morall Evil* is every way as Positive as is Morall Good.

For what is the nature of *Morall Good*, or *Evill*? is it not, a *Conformity*, or a *Difformity* to a Morall Precept? Then the Goodnesse or Evil of it is not in the *Being* of the Action, but in the *so Being*; It lies not in the Positive or Absolute Entity of the Action, but in the Relative nature. Morall Goodnesse therefore, and Morall Evil, have not an Absolute Essence, but a Relative; An *Agreeing*, or *Disagreeing*; a Likeness, or Unlikenesse, to its Rule. Now if *Likenesse* be a Reall Relation; why may not *Unlikenesse* be also a relation Reall? If *Simile* be Reall, why not *Dissimile*? If the One be Positive, why not the Other?

Objeſt. They will say perhaps, That the nature of Morall Evil, is not a *Difformity* but a *non-Conformity*, to its Rule; not to be (positively) *Unlike*, but only *Not to be Like*.

Anſw. If so, then *not to be* is a Sinne; for *not to Be*, includes *not to be Like*, or *not to be Obedient*. If the blessed Angels had never been Created, they had been *eo ipſo* Sinfull: For if they had never Been, they must of necessity *Not be Obedient*; (though not *Disobedient*;) For how can they be *Obedient*, if not at all *Being*?

A Stone must then be Sinfull, when it doth *not-understand* the Nature of God, as a man doth and ought to do; For though it be not *Disobedient* to the precept of Knowledge, (because this precept was not made to a Stone but to Man,) Yet you cannot say that it is *Obedient*, and there-

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fore must of necessity be *not-Ob dient*, or *not-be Obedient*; wherefore if a bare *not-obedience*, or a *not conformity* to the command be a Sinne, then doth a Stone Sinne. *Scire Deum* is morally Good, and therefore (if morall Evill be only an Absence of Good) since there is not in a Stone this *Scire Deum*, how can it be but that a Stone must sinne?

God commanded *Moses* to go down into *Egypt*, &c. and *Aaron* to offer Sacrifice: Doe I Sinne therefore when I doe not-obey this command made to them? How is it possible that I can obey the command for *Moses* his Journey, or *Aaron's* sacrificing; for *My* going is not *Moses* his going, nor is *my* sacrificing, *Aaron's* Sacrificing; Yet doe I not sinne in *not-obeying*.

When *Moses* made the *Brazen Serpent*, he did not (in that) obey the precept of going into *Egypt*, (for to go into *Egypt*, and to make the Serpent, is not the same.) Yet was it not Sinfull to make the Brazen Serpent, though it were not an Obedience to that Command, for neither was it a Disobedience; for that Precept, did neither injoyne nor forbid it.

Thus every Action, though never so Good, will be a Sinne; For there is in the most perfect Act, a *not-Obeying* of many precepts, (yea of all precepts, except that which injoyne this Action,) though there be not perhaps a *Disobedience* of any.

The nature of Sinne therefore, or Morall Evill, is not barely a *Not-Obeying*, but a *Disobeying*; It is not a *Not-Conformity*, but a *Difformity*, a Crossing or Thwarting of some Command. Therefore the Stone sins not, because there is no *Disobedience* in its *not-Knowing*, because it was not Commanded; *Moses* his making the brazen Serpent, was not a Breach of his former Injunction, although not an Obeying of it; for in his Commission to go into *Egypt*, his making the brazen Serpent was neither Forbidden nor Commanded. The Act of one Morall Virtue, is not an offence against the rest; for it is no Breach of their Rules, though it be not an Observance of them: It is *Prater*, but not *Contra*.

Ans. 2. But if I should say on the contrary, That the nature of Morall Good, were not a *Conformity*, or positive Likeness; but only a *not-Difformity*, a *not-Disagreeing*, or not crossing its Rule; Might not this be said with as good probability as the other? You would think it strange perhaps, that *Evill* should be Positive, and *Good* Negative: But (if I mistake not) there is more truth in this, then is in the other. For a bare *not-agreeing* doth not make an action *Sinfull*, but a *not-disagreeing* doth make it *Lawfull*, and so Morally Good; For where there is no

Law, there is no Sinne. If I walk for my refreshing in one part of the Garden to day, and in another to morrow; or in that other to day, & in this to morrow; I sinne not in either: Not because I have a *Command* to walk in this first, or in the other part first: But because neither is *Forbidden*, therefore is neither *Unlawfull*. I ask therefore, whether the Lawfullnesse of this Action, in walking first in this part of the garden and not in the other part, doe depend upon its *Conformity* to some Rule, or its *not-disagreeing* from any? Now, what is the *Lawfullnesse* of an Action, but its *Morall Goodnesse*?

Ans. 3 Yet Thirdly, I affirm not the nature of morall Good or Evil to be *Negative*, but both equally *Positive*; If by *Good*, you understand, That which *Ought* to be, not, That which *May* be. And therefore I make three sorts of Morall Beings; *Bonum, Malum, Indifferent*. Good, which *must* be done; Indifferent, which *may* be done; Evil, which *may-not* be done. The first, Commanded; the last, Forbidden; the other, of a middle nature, neither Commanded, nor Forbidden; which being Indifferent, is often called *Good*, but never *Evill*. The first consists, in a *Conformity* to its Rule; the last, in a *Difformity*; the other in a bare *not-disagreeing*. The first and last are of a *Positive* nature; the other of a *Negative*. (And yet sometimes this *Positivenessse*, whether in Good or Evil, is rather *Positivum Logicum* (the *Prædicat* of a *Positive* or *Affirmative* Proposition,) then *Positivum Reale*. For an *Omission, Negative actus*, may be Good or Evil: which having in it selfe no reall Being, cannot be the Subject of a reall Relation.)

Yet doth not this contradict their Opinion who affirm, That *natura alio Indifferens in individuo*. For by Good and Evil, they mean *Licium & Illicitum*, Lawfull and Unlawfull; including under the name of *Good*, or *Lawfull*, not only that which *Ought* to be done, but whatsoever *May* be done; as when (in civill matters) we say, it is *Lawfull* for me to give such a portion of my Estate to such a Man, not because the Law of the Kingdom *Injoins* me so to doe; but because it doth not *Inhibite* me. And thus *Licium* will be a *Negative* term, and *Illicitum* a *Positive*, (though by the Grammaticall Notation it might seem contrary;) for *Illicitum* affirms, that there is a Law to the Contrary; *Licium* denies only that there is such a Law to Forbid it, but whether there be any to Command it, it affirms not.

And thus much concerning the nature of Evil. (Wherein if I may seem prolix, it being but a Digression in this place: Yet because I was called to it in the former chapter, where his Lordship gave me occasion

to handle it; I thought it more fit to referre the discussing of it to this place, where I meet with more questions of the like nature.)

2. Now, as it is in *Good* and *Evil*, so also in *Truth* and *Falshood*. *Falshood*, saith he, is a *Vanity*, a *Lye*, a *Nothing*. And why so? Because *Ens* & *Verum* convertuntur, and therefore *Falsum* must be non-*Ens*.

To this I say, as to the former; Truth of *Being*, or *Metaphysicall* Truth, is Positive, and of the same extent or latitude with *Entity*, or *Being*. And this *Truth* I have formerly said to be *Cognoscibility*, making *Verum* in this *Metaphysicall* acceptation to be all one with *Intelligibile*.

I affirm also, that *Ens* & *Verum* (or *Intelligibile*) convertuntur. And (consequently) according to the manner of *Being*, must be the manner of *Intellection*. That which hath a *reall* Being (as *Ens Reale*) may be *Known* to Be; that which hath an *apparent*, or *supposed* Being, may be *Supposed* to Be.

I affirm likewise, that *Falshood* in this sense cannot be *understood*, or that the *Soule* cannot act upon (*Metaphysicall*) *Falshood*: For how can that be *Known*, which is not *Cognoscible*; or *Understood*, which is not *Intelligible*?

But, When I affirm, that *Verum* and *Ens* are *Convertible*; I restrain it not to *Reall Entity*; For there may be *Esse Cognitum*, where there is not *Esse Reale*: But I proportion its *Cognoscibility* to its *Being*; and therefore if it have not a *Reall* Being, but only *Imaginary*; it may be *Supposed*, but cannot be *Known*, to be.

Neither yet doe I So proportion the reality of *Intellection*, to the reality of the Object, as if when there is no *Reall* Object, there could be no *Reall* Act: For it is *Cognoscibile* that is convertible with *Ens*, and hath its reality proportionable to the reality of *Being*; not *Cognoscitivum*. The Understanding, whether it *Know* to be, or *Suppose* to be, doth yet *Really* Act; And his Lordship also granteth, that when the Understanding doth act *Amisse*, it doth yet *Really* Act: *The Opining, or Thinking*, (saith he) is a *good* Act. But where the Object is not *Reall*, there the *no Cognosce*, cannot be *Reall*; for how can a *reall* Relation be founded in a *Non-Entity*? Yet the *no Cognoscere* is *Reall*; for the Reality of It, depends not upon the reality of the Object, but upon the reality of the Act. That therefore which is so understood, is the *Supposed* Object of a *Reall* Act.

But now *Logicall Truth*, the Truth of a *Proposition*, which is opposed to *Falshood*, to *Error*, hath nothing to do with the *Reality* either of

the *Object* or of the *Act*; For a *True Proposition* may be framed concerning an *Imaginary Object* (as when we affirm a *Chimera* to be *Ens Rationis*, or only *Imaginary*:) And an *Act* Metaphysically True (a *Reall act*) may be Logically False.

Logicall *Truth* and *Falshood* (like as *Morall Good* and *Evill*) have not an *Absolute Being*, but *Relative*. They consist not in the *Being* or *Not-Being* of the *Act*; (For when the Understanding doth act *Falsly* it doth *verè Agere*, though not *agere Verè*; it is *verè Actus*, though not *Verus Actus*:) but in the *Agreeing*, or *Disagreeing* with the *Object*. For when the Intellect doth Understand, it frames an *Idea*, a picture, or representation of the Thing understood; which *Picture*, or *Idea*, is a *Reall Picture*, (it hath the *Truth of Being*) whether it have the *Truth of Representation* or not; that is, whether it be *Like* or *Unlike*, whether it *Agree* or *Disagree*, with the copy or object which it represents. A *Picture* in a *Painters Shop* is truly a *Picture*, it hath *reall Colours* and *Lineaments*; But perhaps it is a *False Picture*, it represents not that *Visage* by which it was drawn. When the Understanding conceives an *Ens rationis*, the *Idea* or *Conceptus* is not this *Imaginary Being*, (for this *Conception* is as *Reall* as the *Conception* of a *Reall Ent*,) But the *supposed Object* of this *Conception*; there being indeed no such thing as this *Conceptus* doth represent. When a *Painter* describes in a *Table* some *Antick Shapes* or strange *Chimara's*; his *Description*, his *Draught*, is not a *Fiction*, but as *Reall* as the true *Pourtraiture* of a living *Man*: But that which by this description is represented, *that* is the *Fiction*, there being no such *Antick Forms*, no such *Chimara's*, as he expresseth. When the Understanding draws a *Reall Picture*, a *reall Idea* or *Conceptus*, without a *Copy*, without a *Pattern*; it is *Ens rationis*: When, endeavouring to imitate a *Copy*, to represent the nature of things, the *Truth of Being*; it yet misseth of it, not making its *Picture* agreeable to its *Pattern*; this is a *False Apprehension*. And this is the difference between *Ens rationis*, and *Error Intellectus*: Both in the mean time being *reall Acts*.

The *Logicall Truth* and *Falshood* of a *Conception* or *Proposition*, are but *Relations* of *Likeness* or *Unlikeness*, *Conformity* or *Disformity*, in the *Act* to its *Object*; and are both founded in the *Reality* of the *Action*, or its *Truth of Being*: And are both equally *Reall*, equally *Positive*. For *Falshood* is not a meer *not-Conformity*, or *not-expressing* of things existent; But a *Disformity*, a *Crossing* or *Thwarting* of them. For else, when a man ceaseth to Think or Speak of this or that *Truth*, he thereby

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therby *Erres*, and *Lyes*: For when he Thinks not *at all*, he cannot think *Conformably*; when he Speaks not *at all*, he cannot speak *Conformably*, either to the Existence of Things, or to his own Opinion of them. Yea every Proposition, every Thought will have so many Falshoods in it, as there be other Truths which it doth not expresse: For if the not-expressing of a Truth, be Falshood: then to affirm that the Sunne shines, is a Falshood, because it doth not expresse the Fires hear, or the Charcoals burning: And thus that Proposition which expresseth not every Truth, is a False Proposition; yea contains Infinite Falshoods, opposite to the Infinite number of True Propositions possible.

Object. If you say (to avoid this) that it is not the not-expressing of *One* Truth, the not-conformity to *One* Existence, that makes a Proposition False; but the not-expressing of *Any* Truth: whereas the Conformity to, and the Expressing of any Truth, makes the Proposition or Conception True:

Ans. I answer first, that this is contrary to the generall Proposition, which affirms, that *Perfectio oritur ex Integritate, Imperfectio verò ex Particulari defectu*: Which is applyed to severall kinds of Imperfection; That *Action* is Good, whose *every* Circumstance is rightly ordered; That *Proposition* True, whose *every* Branch doth agree with the Thing, &c. Whereas *One* Bad circumstance, *One* false branch makes the *Action* bad, the *Proposition* False. The contrary to which must have been affirmed, if the expressing of *One* Truth, make the Proposition True; and the concurrent not-expressing, or not-Conformity to *All* Truths be requisite to make it False.

2. Again, If there be requisite a not-expressing of *Any* Truth to make it False; then must this (and the like propositions) be True, if I affirm *Virgil & Homer* to be Greek Poets, If I affirm a *Stone* to be a *Reasonable Creature*: For it expresseth *One* Truth, viz. that it is a *Creature* although it be not *Reasonable*, (as likewise the *One* was a Greek Poet, though not the other:) and the not-expressing of a further Truth, doth not hinder its expressing of this. Then must that Action be Good whose *One* Circumstance is Good; If the Intention be right, though the Formality of the Action be never so unlawfull, yet will not the Act be Blamable.

Logicall Falshood therefore is as positive, as *Logicall Truth*; the one consisting in a positive Conformity, the other in a positive Difformity to the Things. Yea, of the two, the nature of *Truth* is rather Negative, the nature of *Falshood*. For a *not-conformity* makes not a Proposition False; but the *not-difformity* makes it True. For that is a True proposition that is not Opposite to any Truth, though it do not Expresse *All* Truths.

Neither can there be a *Medium* between *Truth* and *Falshood*, as there is between *Good* and *Evill*; For though there may be an *Indifferent Action*, which is neither *Good* (positively) nor *Evill*; yet is there not an *Indifferent Proposition* which is neither *True* nor *False*. *Truth* and *Falshood* in Propositions, are opposed as *Lawfulnessse* and *Unlawfulnessse* in Actions; (whereof *Lawfulnessse*, as I have said, is *Negative*;) rather then as *Good* and *Evill*, *Laudabile* & *Vituperabile*.

Yet if we desire a *Medium*, I can shew you one; But then it must not be *Actus*, but *Negatio Actus*. And that is, in *Abstraction*; when the Understanding conceives of one Thing, without considering of another; for then it doth neither *Affirm*, nor *Deny*, and so that *Conception* is (thus farre) neither *True* nor *False*; as likewise the *Proposition* expressing this Thought. When I conceive of the *Ayr*, not regarding whether it be *Light* or *Dark*; of a *Man* not considering whether he be *Learned* or *Ignorant*: This *Abstracting*, or considering the *Ayr* without considering *Light* in it; considering *Aristotle* to have been a *Man*, not considering withall that he was *Learned*; is neither *True* nor *False*: According to that, *Abstrahentis non est Mendacium*: whereas if I affirm the *Ayr* (in the day time) to be without *Light*, or *Aristotle* without *Learning*; the proposition is *False*.

Falshood and *Truth* therefore being *Relations*, equally *Reall*, equally *Positive*: the Understanding may be said as well to *Act Falshood*, as to *act Truth*, while it produceth that *Absolute Act*, in which these *Relations* are founded. Otherwise, what will be the difference between *Ignorance* and *Errour*, between *Silence* and a *Lye*?

3. There is yet another Question, to which by his Lord^{ship}. I am invited; The same (saith he) may be said of *Pain*; which he conceiveth cannot all upon the *Soule*, nor the *Soule* upon it; because it is but a *bare Privation*. And therefore subscribes to the Opinion of Dr. TWISSE, (whom if Anagrams may be credited, you may stile WISEST;) that it is better to be in perpetuall *Pain*, then not to be at all; Because if *Pain* be a *bare Privation*, then is *Any Being* more desirable, then for fear of a *Privation* (a *Nothing*) to become no *Being*. His ground you may easily perceive; Because if *Misery* be but a *Privation of Happinessse*; then is it better to have the *Goodnesse of Being*, without the *Goodnesse of Happinessse*, then to want both the one and the other.

But I cannot with his Lordship (saying always the deserved respect due to that Reverend Divine) subscribe to the Opinion of Dr. Twisse in this particular. For (beside that thus *Pana Damni*, and *pana Sensus* will

will be all One) I conceive *Pain* to be as reall as *Pleasure*. Motion hath been accounted by all (if I mistake not) to be Positive, and Rest (*quies*) to be only Privative, *Negatio Motus*. Now in my Opinion, *Ease*, and *Pain* or Torment, are opposite in the same manner that *Rest* and *Motion*. And so I conceive *Pain* or Torment (whether you speak of *dolor Corporis*, or *dolor Animi*; the Griefe of mind, or bodily Pain) to be Reall; the Negation whereof is called *Ease*; and its Contrary, *Pleasure* or *Delight*.

Neither doth it at all trouble me, that *Ens & Bonum convertuntur*; that all reall Entity, hath a reall Goodnesse, or the goodnesse of Being: For nothing hinders but that *Bonum Metaphysicum*, may be *Malum Physicum*; that which is *Reall* may notwithstanding be *Inconvenient*; that which is, *in se Bonum*, may not be *Bonum huic*, whether you speak of *bonum Jucundum* or *bonum Utile*.

Goodnesse of Being (Metaphysicall goodnesse) is but a common Subject capable either of (Physicall) Good or Evill; (like as the same Reall Action may be Morally Good or Evill.) And according as the Physicall Good, or Evill (annexed to Being Metaphysically Good) doth exceed, so is that Being *Desirable*, or not *Desirable*. Otherwise, How could it be better for that man (which betrayed our Saviour) that he had never been born?

I urge not the judgement of *Sense* in this particular; because his Lordship appeals from *Sense* to Reason: I shall therefore examine what Reason can alledge, why credit should not be given to the judgement of *Sense*. For, having a Judgement confessed in the Court of *Sense*; I must suppose, it to be in force, till such time as I see it revoked by Reason: And when Reason hath reversed it, I will grant the former Sentence to be Voyd.

Object. You will say *Being*, though Miserable, hath some Goodnesse: whereas *Not-Being* hath none; and therefore *Being*, though with *Misery*, is more desirable.

Ans. I reply, *Misery* hath much Evill, *not-Being* hath none: Therefore *Misery* is more to be Shunned then *not to Be*.

But if this satisfie not; I desire to know whether there be not the same strength of Reason in This Argument, that is in Theirs. viz: A Sinfull Act hath in it the Goodnesse of *Being*; and its Sinfullnesse is only a Privation of further Goodnesse, the goodnesse of Conformity to Gods Law. Therefore, it is better to Sinne then not to Act; to commit a Sinne then not to commit it: For if I Sinne, I produce some Good; because

it is a reall Action, and so hath the Goodnesse of Being; But in *not-acting*, not-committing, I produce *no* Goodnesse at all. Therefore it is better to Sinne, then not to Sinne: because *Acting*, though Sinfull, hath *Some* good, but *Not-acting* hath *None*.

Now if this Argument do not hold good to prove it *Better to Sinne* (be the Sinne as great as can be possible) *then not to Act, not to Sinne*: Then must I needs think that their Argument, being exactly in the same form, is of as little force, to prove *Misery* (though never so great) *to be better then not-Being*.

But let us heare his Lordship plead at *Reasons Barre*, for the revoking that Sentence which hath past in the Court of *Sense*. *Reason* telleth us (saith he) that *Paine must be Something, or Nothing*: If *Nothing*, then it is but a *Privation*; If *Something*, then must it be *Good or Evil*; If *Good*, it cannot hurt us; If *Evill*, it is either a *Nominall Evill*, or *Reall*; if *Named an Evill* and is not, it will not be disputed; but if it be a *Reall Evill*, then is it *Nothing*, for *Evill is only a Privation of Good*.

I answer to this discourse; That *Paine is Something*, It is *Evill*, It is a *Reall Evill*, (*Malum Physicum*.) And this *Reall Evill* is also *Positive*, and not a bare *Privation of Good*: For I conceive not a Stone to be in *Pain*, though it have not *Pleasure*, (*bonum Jucundum*;) nor to be *Grieved*, though it do not *Rejoyce*.

There is one great rubbe that yet remaine against what I have said, concerning these three last mentioned *Questions*; which I have referred to the End, that so once mentioning might suffice, without particular repetition in the discussing of each *Question*. And it is this.

If *Falshood and Evill*, whether *Morall* or *Physicall*, have a *Being*, (if it be *Reall*) then must we with the *Manichees* make two *Sources of Being*; or else *God must be the Author of it*, which none will affirm.

For answer to this, I intend not *ex professo* to handle at large that question, *Whether*, and *In what Sense*, *God* may be called the *Author of Sinne*, of *Evill*, of *Falshood*. For, if I durst to encounter that difficulty, which hath troubled able *Divines*; yet would it be too tedious to insert here, especially when I have already transgressed with over much prolixity. Only thus.

All *Relations*, you know, have their *Originall*, not from any peculiar *Act* whereby they are produced, distinct from that *Act* by which is produced that in which they are grounded; But arise and flow from that *Absolute Being*, upon which they depend, *per nudam Resultantiam*, by a *Resultation* from it, without a new intermediate *Act*. The Father doth

doth not by One act beget his *Sonne*, and by Another act (He, or his *Sonne*) produce *Filiation*: But the *termini relationis* being once produced, the *Relation* doth unavoidably follow: Two white things being produced, it is impossible (*etiam per divinam potentiam*) but that they must (in this) be Like.

Now Faithhood and Truth, Good and Evil, being (as I have said) Relations; and consequently having no other Production, but their Resistance from their Foundation; I leave it to others to judge, How farre God doth concur with the operation of the Creature in producing that *Act*, which is Good or Evil, True or False; and How farre the Efficient of this Act may be affirmed the Cause of that *Relation* which doth result from it.

CHAP. XIII.

The Consequents of this Assertion, that All things are one Truth. Whether usefull in Practicalls.

I Have now done with his Lordships Thesis layd downe in the full extent in the severall branches of it. The Chapters ensuing are but a declaration of the Consequents, the *Usefullnesse* of this Position. Which, saith he, if we consider, viz. That all things are but one *Emanation from divine power*; It would make our lives more cheerful, more Christian, both in the *Practicall* and *Theoreticall* part.

That all things are but one *Emanation*, if he speak of *numm per aggregationem*, I grant; and so I suppose will all else. God alone hath his Being of Himselfe, and gives Being to all his Creatures: *τὸ γὰρ αὐτοῦ τίς ἐστιν ἰσχύς*. And whatsoever Being they have, it is only a communication of that Being which he hath in him selfe. But that the Parts of this One *Aggregatum* are not Really distinct from each other; hath not yet been so clearly proved as to convince mee.

His Arguments, if they prove any thing, will prove, That God cannot produce Creatures really distinct. For if it be enough to prove, All things that now are to be really the same, Because the Fountain of them all is God; the thing Communicated, their own Essence; and the Recipient, Themselves; (because the Essence produced, receiveth of God *τὸ ἔσσε*;) Then is it impossible for God to produce any thing that shall not be the same with these: For whatsoever can be possibly produced, If God be the *Author* of it, Then must Hee be the Fountain, and *ipse* the Recipient, receiving from God *τὸ ἔσσε*.

This being premised, I ask, Whether this *One Emanation* which his Lordship seeks to establish, be Really distinct from God or no? If not, then must not his Lordship blame those that *confound the Creator with the Creature, making It to be God*. But if this one Emanation be distinct Really, If this Fountain have sent forth One Stream really distinct from It selfe, What hinders but that it may send forth More Streams? Hath God (like *Isaack*) but One Blessing? Or Can he produce more but *Will not*? If he Can; then is it Possible that *Two Emanations*, Two Creatures, may be really distinct, though receiving their Essence from the same Fountain. And if Any Creatures may be possibly distinct from other, Why not These Creatures that now are? there being no more to be alledged for their Unity, then for the Unity of all Possible. Gods. *αὐτοῦ αὐτῶς οὐσία*, his Power also, and the Emanation of it, is So Uniform, as that it is equivalent to an Infinite Variety.

He proceeds to this purpose. *In the Practick part of our Lives* (saith he) *If we knew that all things were One, with what Cheerfullness, what Courage, should we undertake any Action, any Difficulty; Knowing The distinction of Misery and Happynesse, to have no Being but in the Brain; That Misery is Nothing and cannot hurt us, That every thing is Good, and Good to mee, Because I and It are Beings and so Good, And these two Goods falling under no other difference but of Degrees, Good and Good must needs agree, that which is Good is Good to Mee: Yea how void of Envy at anothers good, and of thoughts of Revenging Injuries; Since I have a Propriety, a Possession of that which is Anothers, hee and I being One; Injuries are Nothing and cannot hurt; Good things, though anothers, doe serve me.*

That all things are one; That the difference between Happynesse and Misery is only in the Brain; That Misery, That Injuries, are Nothing and cannot hurt; That whatsoever is Good must be Good to Mee; and (which is the ground of it) That Good and Good, Ens & Ens, admit of no difference but of Degrees: I have already denied. I will only adde, That by this discourse you prove the Devills as happy as the blessed Angels: And if it be a Good Consequent of this Position. That it will make us not be afraid of Misery and Danger: I am sure it is as Bad a Consequent, That it will make us not afraid of Sinning. The Devills are Beings, and therefore Good; Every thing that is, is Good, and Good to them, For both They and It being Good, and admitting of no difference but of Degrees, Good and Good cannot but agree, and so, be Good to them: The Happynesse of the blessed Angells doth serve Them, since (as his Lordship
(speaks)

speaks) it is not onely *ἀγασθῆναι*, but *ἰσθῆναι*. They have a Propriety in it: Their own Misery and Torment is nothing, and cannot hurt them; And (which is the onely difference which you can imagine) if they Think otherwise (I use still his Lordships expression) *this must be a Lye, and cannot hurt*. And if this be Hell; who will be afraid to Sinne?

My judgement cannot assent to make the Torments of the damned, onely Imaginary; To make Hell a Fables. Yea to affirm, That it is Good to sinne, Because the Act of sinning is a Reall Good; and its Evil, only Imaginary, a Lye, and cannot hurt.

CHAP. XIV.

Whether Knowledge and Sciences receive benefit from this Assertion.

HE proceeds to shew the Usefulness of Unity in Theory; and complains, that *Learning is broken into so many Sciences*: wishing that it were all like the Chain fastened to Jupiters Throne, All of a piece. And indeed I wish as heartily as his Lordship, (whether All things be One Emanation, or Many) that Comenius his designe, (of which his Lordship speaks) of reducing all into one, might proceed: Of reducing, I say, all Knowledge into a Body, all Sciences into one System; (for This is it Comenius designs; he never fancied his Lordships Unity.) And great pity it is, that so worthy a design is not prosecuted at a publike charge, that such a shining Light should be extinct for want of Oyl; if there may be hopes of effecting it.

He shews what a Multitude of Inquiries we must needs make for the perfecting of Knowledge, whilst we acknowledge a distinction in Things; which labour might be much contracted, *If we could be content to see all things to be but One, bearing onely different Shapes*. But though this were allowed; Yet must we then, either look at all things with a Confused Eye; or else shall be as much troubled in taking notice of Different Shapes, as we are now in observing Different Things.

He reckons up many doubts, as not yet determined, concerning the Existence of Beings; What things there are, and What they are; *Quænam sunt, & Qualia (vel Quid) sunt*. But I see not how his doctrine, of Unity in all things, will resolve any of these. For granting all things to be One, Yet how shall I know, whether there be an Unicorn, a Phoenix, a Mermaid, or Ebur Fossile? Whether the Philosophers Stone, or a

Perpetuall Motion, be possible? Whether *Distannum* be a Sovereign Balm? Whether *Tobacco* be hot or cold? What are the degrees of Heat or Cold in this or that Simple? If then this Opinion serve no way to inform us concerning these Questions wherein we doubt; How can he commend this opinion, as Usefull, from the manifestation of our Ignorance in these particulars? If he would exhort us, not to enquire; this he may doe though they may be Many; If he would have us search, whether or no there be these severall Shapes, How doth their common Unity help forward the Enquiry? You see (saith he) in what a Maze you are Meandred, if you admit of any Division. I wish we could see how to he'p it, by allowing his Unity.

Yet notwithstanding their multitude) he accounts the knowledge of Existences, and the Being of things, to be Necessary; although those things are all of one Nature, variegated only in our apprehension. (But for ought I see, it is as little labour for us to find, that there are so many Things, as for his Lordship to find out so many Shapes.) But to enquire the Causes of these Beings, is (in his Lordships opinion) to become Majestaticke, for prying into those *Arcana Imperii*.

In my judgement, there may be as great a Vanity and Emptinesse in the curious enquiry after the Being of Things, as in the too nice search of their Causes. Vain Philosophy may be as well in the Histori-call as in the Discursive part. A modest inquiry both into the Beings, and into the Causes of Things, is both Lawfull and Commendable; a nice Curiosity is blamable in Either: It will prove but Vanity, if not Vexation; Weaving a Spiders Web, if not Hatching a Cockatrices Egg. *Telas quasdam doctrina pariunt, tenuitate filii operisque Admirabiles, sed quoad usum Frivolas & inanes.* Bacon. Like a Razor of too keen an edge; As *Seneca* speaks of *Chrysippus*, *Magnum maherale virum, sed cujus acumen nimis Tenue retunditur, & in se saepe replicatur: etiam cum agere aliquid videtur, Pungit, non Perforat.*

CHAP. XV.

Whether confusion in the knowledge of Causes be redressed by this Unity.

OF Causes he tells us) there are Two lye open to our view, The Universall Efficient of all things, God; and the *Materia prima*, that common Essence; Other Causes (saith he) are better known by Name then

then in the Natures of them; (as Efficient, Final, Materiall, Formal, &c.)

We are ignorant, I grant, in the particular causes of divers things; and therefore when we have no other but those two Generals, we must rest there. But if the other appear and Shew themselves; we need not shut our Eyes for fear of Seeing them. It is not like to cost us so dear as *Ovid's*, or *Alcon's* sight, or as those that saw *Medusa's* Head.

Till *Numeri Platonici* (saith he) cease to be a Proverb, in vain shall any undertake to teach him How and Whence it is, that the various Rowlings of the Tongue should send forth so many articulate Voices, and so many severall Languages.

We say already, That the different Articulation of Sounds, arise from the diverse Figuration of the Organs. If his *Numeri Platonici* can give us a better account, I would be glad to heare it.

Till then, he will give no credence to any who promiseth an account of the Effusion of the Sea; whether from the Moon, &c.

That *Numeri Platonici* will furnish us with a better reason; I will then beleeve, when I see it. In the mean time I see nothing to hinder us from an Enquiry after a Physicall cause. And I doubt his Lordship will have a hard task to give a reason in *Numbers*, why the Sea ebbs and flows.

CHAP. XVI.

Whether divisions in other parts of Learning be remedied by it.

NEXT he shews us many doubts in *Morall Philosophy*, as well as those precedent in *Naturall Philosophy*. But I doe not see that his Lordships Position will help to clear any one of them whatsoever.

Whether the *Understanding* and the *Will* be Really the same, or distinct, is nether *Materiall* nor *Determinable*, in *Morall Philosophy*: It belongs only to *Naturall Philosophy*, viz. to that part of *Physicks* that treats de *Animâ*.

How the *Will* may sometimes omit the prosecution of the *Understanding's* direction; I have already shewed, without making the *Will* an *Understanding*.

He glanceth at *Aristotle's* maintaining the Eternity of the World against *Hermes*, *Orpheus*, *Anaxagoras*, &c. For my own part, I would

be thankfull to him, that would solidly demonstrate the *Worlds Creation* from principles in *Nature*, and make it appear from Naturall Light, that the World could not have been from Eternity. For though I deny not, but that there may be in *Nature*, *Demonstrative* Arguments; yet I confesse, I have not as yet seen those (and yet I have examined many) that have given me so full satisfaction as I desire concerning an *absolute Impossibility*; but that I have seen (at least seemed to see) some just exception.

But if his Lordships Opinion be True, I shall have more cause to doubt then I have formerly had. For if *all things did exist in their Beginnings with God, ab omni aeterno*; and their Temporall Existence be onely Imaginary, to our apprehension: (as his Lordship affirms in his 11. Chapter, pag. 99.) I cannot imagine any hinderance at all, Why that which did *really exist from all Eternity*, might not be *without a beginning*; Why that which Was *ab aeterno*, might not (though it did not) *ab aeterno* Appear to be, and be Apprehended. I will not therefore blame *Aristotle* for maintaining the Worlds Eternity as a disputable Probleme, till I see some Light which might have convinced him, whilst he enjoyed not the benefit of Revealed Light; at least, till this opinion of his Lordship be rejected.

In the next place, I grant to his Lordship that there are doubts also in *Metaphysicks*, in *Logick*, in *Mathematicks*. But I perceive not how this opinion dissolves them.

There be doubts also in *Divinity*, (though I do not see how this doth clear them.) *Whether Faith, or Repentance be precedent: Whether Faith be a particular application of Christ to my selfe: or only a bare spiritual believe, that Christ is the Sonne of God.*

I assent not, to place (the Saving Act of) *Faith*, either with Mr. Cotton, (as his Lordship cites him) in the *laying hold of*, or assenting to that *Promise*, That, *Hee that beleeveth that Christ is the Sonne of God, shall be saved*; Nor yet in a *Particular application of Christ to my selfe* in Assurance, or a beleeving that Christ is mine: (For though these also be acts of *Saving Faith*, yet they are not the *Saving Act* of Faith.) But I choose rather to place it in an act of the *Will*, rather then in either of these fore-named acts of the *Understanding*. It is an *Accepting of Christ offered*, rather then an *Assenting to a Proposition affirmed*. To as many as [*Received*] him, &c. that is, to them that *Beleeve in his name*, *Joh. 1.* God makes an offer of Christ to all, (else should not Reprobates be condemned for not accepting

ceiving of him ; as neither the Devils are, because he was not offered to them) *Whoever Will, let him come, and Take of the water of Life freely* Rev. 22. 17. Whereupon the Believing Soule replies, *I will*, and so Takes him. When a Guilt is Offered to mee ; That which makes it to be *Mine*, is my *Acceptation*, my Taking it ; Not the Knowing that it is Offered ; nor the Knowing that it is *Mine* ; For the one of these precedeth, the other followeth, the appropriating it to my selfe.

If you call this *Taking* of Christ, (or consenting that Christ shall be my Saviour, a *Depending*, a *Resting*, or *Relying* upon Christ for Salvation ; (if you speak of an Act of the Will :) It is all One. For, Taking of Christ to be my Saviour, and Committing my selfe to Christ to be Saved, is the same : Both of them being but a *Consenting* to this Covenant. *I will be your God, and you shall be my people ; I will be thy Father, and Thou shalt be my Sonne.*

And if you make this the *Saving* act of Faith ; then will *Repentance* (so farre as it is distinct from Faith) be a Consequent of it. *Confidence* also or *Assurance* that Christ is mine ariseth from it : For Christ must first be Ours, before we can Know him so to be.

Then also that, *Whether Faith be a believing that I am Saved ;* (he meanes, *in statu salutis*.) or a *depending upon God for Salvation*, (to be put into such a Condition of Salvation,) will be easily resolved, and *Belarmin's Dilemma* soon answered. *viz. If Believe be to Believe that I am saved, (that Christ is mine,) then was I saved without Faith : If it be, to believe that God will give me Grace to be saved, then do I believe before I have Grace, before I have Faith.* I say, It is easily answered, by making the *Saving* act of Faith, an *Acceptance* or *Taking* of Christ : For although the Guilt be mine, before I *Know*, or am *Assured*, that it is mine ; Yet is not the Guilt mine, before my *Accepting* of it, but by my *Acceptance* it becomes *Mine*.

If (with Mr. Cotton) we should make *Faith* to *save* us, only *Declarative* (which we must by no means admit ;) Then, Why is it said, that we are saved by *Faith*, and not by *Works* ? Why do we allow, that *Faith* doth *concurrere efficaciter ad salutem*, but deny the same to *Works* ? Seeing that *Good Works* do save us *Declarative*, as well as *Faith*.

That we are saved, not only in the eternall Decree without faith, but even in the Execution, is strange Divinity. For if without *Faith*, then without *Christ* ; for Christ is no further *Ours*, then apprehended by Faith. As for the *Eternall Decree* (of Election, he meanes,) it is true, we are not, through Faith, *Elected* to Salvation ; but we are *Elected*, to Salvation through

through Faith. Faith is not the Cause of the Decree, but Faith is decreed to be the Cause of Salvation.

To that Question, *whether there be a prescript Form of Church-Government*, I shall say nothing; For it being a Question maintained both wayes, I will not oppose either of them, unlesse I had leisure, to confirm what I say, to prosecute what I affirm. Only to his Argument I may lay an exception. *Church-government*, (which he presumeth to be enjoined in the second Commandement,) is not of the nature of *Morall Precepts*, because not of Perpetuall Continuance: (For such a *prescript Form*, as by which the Church since Christ should be governed, had not its beginning till since Christ: And therefore not commanded in the second Commandement any otherwise then by Consequence; (as particular temporary duties are.) However, it is like, *Church Government* is not more expressly commanded in the second Commandement, then *Civill Government* in the fift; and yet none ever inferred from thence, a *prescript Form* of *Civill Government*. If he ask therefore, *Do they leave us any latitude in any other Commandements?* I say, Yes: and I instance in That. He must search for a *Prescription*, in the Evangelists, and Apostles writings, if he would find it, not in the second Commandement.

(Only, by the way, I wish his Lordship would do us the favour, from his doctrine of *Unity*, (which he makes the Salve to cure all Controversies,) to demonstrate to us, Whether there be a *Prescript Form*, and What it is. And I should then judge his Opinion well worth embracing, though for nothing else. Wherein yet I shall wish him to beware, that he say not of this as of the division of Quantity, pag. 42. that *all must at last be reduced to an Unity*; Nor, as pag. 98. that it is *divisibile in infinitum*. Lest we establish *Episcopacy*. (which himselfe likes not;) or become *Independent*; which others like as ill.)

The distinction between *Scientia simplicis Intelligentia*, and *Scientia Personis*, if it be taken only for *distinctio rationis* (and I suppose none ever tooke it otherwise) may well enough be admitted. By the One, God knows the Nature of All things Possible: By the Other he Sees, that These things Are. The Object of the One, is *All things Possible*, all things Intelligible: the Object of the Other is only, *Things Existent*, either past, present, or to come

But (saith his Lordship) *If Gods Power, and Will be all one; If God be per se Able and not Potentia; Then all things that ever Shall be, Were ab eterno under a Decree; and so what God Could doe, he Did doe, and Can*

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Can doe no more. (Hee had said before, pag. 99. That all things did exist [in their Beings] *ab omni aeterno*; And are they now but under a Decree?) But for answer,

I grant, that God cannot doe, what he hath not decreed; for then were his Decree either Void, or Imperfect: And, supposing such a Decree, the Power of God is limited by his Will. But a Conditionall, and Hypotheticall Impossibility, doth not inferre an *Absolute* Impossibility And therefore we affirm, that *Deus Potest ea quae non Vult*. He Can doe More then he Will, (*in sensu diviso*, not in *sensu Composito*.) God is able (saith Christ) of these Stones to raise up children unto Abraham; Yet he doth not. Knowest thou not that I can pray to my Father, and he will send me more then twelve Legions of Angels? But neither did Christ pray, nor the Father send them. The God which we serve is [Able] to deliver us (saith the three men in Daniell;) yet they were not certain that he Would doe it.

And if *Media Scientia*, (wherby God is supposed to know an Hypotheticall Proposition; as That the men of Keilah would deliver up David, if he staid there) had no other hinderance but this; It might well enough be admitted.

CHAP. 17.

Concerning Curiosity in the search of Causes. With
a Close of all.

AND now he returns again to his former complaint, of too much curiosity in the search of Causes. There is (he grants) a secondary intermediate Being, which we may call a Cause; which doth precede and produce another: The Observation of which, saith he, is very fitting, so that we search, and puzzle not our selves with the grounds and reasons of this precedency. As, to observe, That Fire, applied to combustible matter, will burn it: Without inquiring How the Fire doth work upon the Wood, &c.

He would have us therefore observe What is the Cause of this Effect, and What is the Effect of this Cause; without any curious search How this Cause comes to produce such an Effect. There is no General Rule, can be prescribed in this case; Sometimes it is needlesse to inquire so much as, By what Cause this or that was produced: Sometimes again it is usefull to Know, not only *What* did produce it, but also *How* it did produce it. Thus farre I allow, Curiosity in searching

also *How* it did produce it. Thus farre I allow, Curiosity in searching Trifles, hinders the finding of more solid and profitable Truths; for (as he speaks) *Intus existens prohibet alienum.*

What his Lordship hath, concerning the *Holynesse of Time and Place*, I assent to; That *they are not capable of any other Sanctification, then a holynesse of Separation*, a Relative Holynesse: And the contrary Opinion is disclaimed, by him on whom his Lordship assents it.

That the Heart also should be always in such a holy frame, as that it befit for a Sabbaths employment, fit for a *Sacrament*; I hold for an undoubted Truth. Yet are we not always to be employed in such services of Gods Worship; For even *Adam* in Paradise had a Particular calling, besides his Generall calling; and the exercise thereof, being done in obedience to Gods command, was no doubt pleasing and acceptable to God. Nor can I assent that *All things are Ordinances*, though in All things we should acknowledge God.

The rest of the Chapter is but a Recapitulation of his Position, and its Consequents; which needs no further consideration, besides what I have already given you in the Examination of those severall Particulars. I need not make answer to the Conclusion, having already delivered my judgement concerning the Premises. But leave it to another to passe Censure.

And thus, (Sir) I have finished that Task, which at your request I have undertaken: Which, beyond my expectation, is grown into a farre larger body then I intended. You expect not Accurateneffe, in that which is drawn up in so short a time: Nor the Judgement of Authors in these Points; for that was not the task imposed, to give you account of Others opinions, but of mine own. I have therefore spared the labour of turning over any other books, save his Lordships own; nor have made any farther use of any, then as my present memory did supply. I may seem too prolix perhaps in some Digressions, prosecuting somewhat largely occasionall questions, lighted on by the way: But if I have discovered any Truth, though with some breach of Method; If (with *Samson*) I can impart to my friends some Honey, though I Rep a little out of the way to fetch it; If, (as he found that Honey in the conquered Lion, which yet was not of it, but only accidentally there, so) I in the examining the main question, have withall cleared

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some doubts, which though not directly contained in it, were yet occasioned by it; I hope a small error in Methode will be passed over.

Sir, I am sorry it so falls out, that the first occasion, wherein I should have to doe with so Noble a Lord, should be by way of Encounter. But being partly injoynd by your request, which is to me a Command, (whom therefore it concerns, to excuse my presumption to his Lordship;) and having also so fair an Invitation in Mr. Sadlers Epistle prefixed to his Lordships Treatise; as being that, then which *nothing could be more gratefull to this Noble Lord*; I have adventured to commit this, with my selfe, to be at your service.


J. W.





A Postscript.

SIR,



Sent you (a while since) certain Animadversions upon my Lord *Brook's* Treatise concerning the Nature of *Truth*. Which (briefly) tend to this purpose.

By Truth, or Light, his Lordship understands, that Light whereby the Soule and Understanding is able to See or Understand: Which can be no other then the Light of Reason. Which he considereth first in It selfe, then in its Operations: that is Truth in the Fountain, this in the Streams; (that the Spring, this the Off-spring.)

Propositio 1. Arg. 1. Chap. 1.

Which Truth or Light (of Reason) he contends to be the same with the Understanding, Because the Understanding in Man is that Ray of the Divine Nature, enlivening the Creature, or making it Rationall, whereby it is conformed to the Creator, who is the Primitive Light, or Fountain of Knowledge. Now that which doth thus enform *Animal Rationale*, enlivening it, or making it Rationall, is *Reason*; And therefore Reason (which he calls *Truth*) is the same with the Understanding.

But this (if I mistake not) none will deny; for Reason and the Understanding-faculty are all one, *Ratio* and *facultas Ratiocinandi* is the same. 'Tis true, they say sometimes, that Reason is in the Understanding, or that the Understanding is indued with Reason: But then by *Understanding*, they doe not mean, the Understanding-Faculty, but the Soule it selfe *quatenus intelligens*. And so this proposition, *Intellectus est Subiectum Rationis*, is the same with this *Anima intelligens est Subiectum Intellectus*. *Anima*, *Intellectus*, and *Ratio*, are not Three.

Arg.

Arg. 2. Chap. 2, 3 4.

His second Argument to prove it is drawn from hence, That there is required to the constitution of every Being, an Essence received, a Fountain imparting, and a Channel receiving. The which Channel or Recipient must be the same with the Essence received; because every thing is the Recipient of its own Essence; nothing can receive the Essence of a Stone, but by being a Stone, for to be Stone, and to have the Essence of a Stone, is all one. Therefore the Understanding being the Recipient of Truth, must needs be Truth, that is, Reason.

Propositio 2. Chap. 5.

Which Truth, or Reason, Whether it be in the Understanding, or be the Understanding; yet it cannot make the Soule to be Rationall, unless it be also in the Soule: For how can Reason make the Soule Reasonable, if it be not in It, but in somewhat else. And if it be in the Soule, then must it be the Soule: Because to be in the Soule, and to be the Soule is all one; every thing being its own Recipient. Thus Truth, or Light (of Reason) will be the same with the Understanding; And both That and This the same with the Soule.

But I hope his Lordship will not deny, but that there is another kind of *Receiving*, beside that Receiving that he speaks of. (They tell us in Logick of *esse modi habendi*; and there are as many manners of Receiving, as there are of Having.) To receive the Essence of a Man, and to be a Man, is all one; To have the Essence of Money, and to be Money, is all one; But yet, I hope, a Man may receive Money, without being coined, and made Money. To receive the Essence of Water, and to be made Water; to receive the Essence of a Vessell, and to be a Vessell, is all one; yet a Vessell may contain Water, without being made Water. Thus a Substance may receive an Accident, a Subject may receive a Form, without being made that Accident, that Form. Thus *datur Animæ esse Animam datur Rationi esse Rationem*, (each being its own Recipient:) But withall *datur Anima Habere Rationem*, though the Soule be not Reason, nor Reason (in this sense) its own Recipient.

If there be any strength in this Argument, it lies in this, That if Reason (or Truth) be only in the Soule as an Accident, and not the Soules Essence, then it cannot make an Essentiall Difference between the Rationall and Irrationall Soule.

And

And to this we must answer, (if we maintain Reason, and the rest of the Faculties, to be distinct from the Soul) That it is not the Faculties, it is not Reason, that makes the Essentiall Difference; but the Substance or Essence of the Soule from whence these Faculties proceed as Essentiall Consequents. Like as it is not Heat, and Cold, and the rest of the *prima Qualitates*, which make the Essentiall difference between one Element and another; but that Essence or Form, from whence these Qualities doe proceed.

Corollarium. 1. Chap. 6.

From hence he proceeds to a further Corollary, That not only the Soule, but All things else, are also the same with Truth. But why so? Because every thing is its own Recipient? If it be; it doth not follow that every thing is the Recipient of Truth. If every thing be the Recipient of its own Essence, must therefore this Essence needs be Truth? If his Lordship had well considered, that Truth, as he hath formerly spoken of it, is but the same with that which others call Reason; he would scarce have made this Consequence, unless he could think to perswade us, that all things whatsoever are Reasonable Creatures. There is therefore too great an *hiatus*, to make this proposition, a Corollary of the former.

But indeed his Lordship is by this time fallen off from his former acceptance of Truth. For having (as he supposeth) proved Reason to be the Soules Essence, the Soules Entity; he begins to take that word (which formerly signified *Reason*,) to signify *Entity*, or Being: So that *Truth* now, must be the same with *Entitas*. And the Emphasis of this last assertion lies in this, not that the Essence of all things is Truth, or Entity, (for that were no great news,) but that the Essence of all things is this *One Truth*: meaning, that all Entity is Homogeneall and of the same nature.

He was proving before, that Truth or Reason was the *same thing* with the Soule: He hence infers, not that all things are the *same thing*; (for I cannot understand him to speak so harshly, as that one drop of water were the same drop with another drop of water, though Homogeneall; that the Soule of *Peter* is the Soule of *Judas*, though of the same Species;) but that they are *alike things*, or things of the *same nature*.

The Consequence, (that all things must be of the same Species, because the Soule and its Faculties are the same Thing) will not hold.

The

The thing it selfe, hath only this ground (so farre as I can discover,) Because all Being proceeding from God, who is in his actions Uniform, must therefore be Alike: For the same Agent, acting in the same Manner, cannot but produce like Effects. But this Uniformity in God is Equivalent to an infinite Variety; and God can by one act in it selfe simple, produce effects variously distinct. And if his Lordship grant, that this Uniformity hinders not but that God may produce various Shapes, I see not why he may not produce various *Species*.

Corollarium. 2. Chap. 7.

But from hence he draws a further consequent. He is not contented to say, that the nature of all things is One, but that it is *Unity*. And be it as great an *hiatus* as the former. The Essence of all Soules is One and the same; but that this One Essence is Unity, I have not formerly heard, nor doe yet beleve. And I am so farre from thinking that *Unity* is the Essence of All things, that I esteeme it selfe to be Nothing. *Unity*, is but a Negative term, a Negation. *Unus* indeed, as it is opposite to *Nullus*, is positive, and is the same with *Nonnullus*, or *Aliquis*: But *Unus*, or *Unicus* as it is opposed to Multitude, (and so we now take it) is Negative. Else, where is the fault in this Syllogisme? *Quod est in Angliâ, est in Europâ; Sed Rex Unicus est in Angliâ; Ergo Rex Unicus (vel tantum Unus) est in Europâ.*

Propositio. 3. Chap. 8. 9.

He returns next, to his former discourse; And what he had said of the Light of *Reason*, he saith also of the Light of *Knowledge*, both Habitually and Actually. Hee allows not that Habits, either Infused or Acquisite, are any thing new brought into the Soule, but only former principles enlightened: And therefore rejecting *Aristotle's vas tabula*, he embraceth *Plato's Reminiscencia*, Which may be thus expressed; He supposeth the Soule to be as a Table, wherein be many rare lineaments, and lively colours described, but hanging in the dark they appeare not till such time as they be illustrated by some advenient Light; which Light doth not bring with it any new colours, or more lineaments, but only illustrateth those that were formerly there but appeared not: Whereas *Aristotle* rightly supposeth it as a Table prepared, void of any, yet capable of all; Or rather as a Glasse, which having of it selfe none of those Colours, is yet fit to receive and reflect all those Rays or visible Species, which from the adjacent Objects fall upon it.

And

And indeed, as for Historicall Knowledge, I suppose, his Lordship himselfe, if he well consider of it, will not affirm that to have any Idea's originally in the Soule: It being utterly impossible by discourse to find out a by-past History, without Historicall Relation. And if there may be new Idea's of Historicall truths imprinted in the Soule which were not there before, why not also of Discursive Knowledge.

But his Lordship stays not here, dissenting from us in the Nature of Habits, whether they be new Idea's, or the illustration of former Idea's, but in effect, he takes away all Habits wholly. Telling us, that we Seem only by frequent acts to help the Soule, and create new Habits, but that indeed all actings are but new discoveries.

Now this is not to establish *Plato's Reminiscencia*; but to take away all Memory whatsoever. How can we be said to remember? how is one said to be learned, another ignorant? what is the benefit of study, and of experience? if former acts doe not at all help future acts, but only seem so to doe, How comes it to passe, that wee are able out of our own memories to furnish our selves with Historicall truths formerly heard or read, without a second relation, which at the first wee could not doe? if our former acts doe not at all help latter acts, but all things be new discoveries,

Proposition. 4. Chap. 10.

And what hath been said of Naturall and Habituell light of Reason and Habituell Knowledge, he now affirms of Actuall Knowledge. The severall Operations of the Soule, in apprehensions, affirmations, negations, &c. the severall Actings of Truth, are also the Soule's Essence. And why? but because the Soule is *Actus primus*, and therefore its Essence must be *Action*; This Action likewise must Exist; which what else can it be but Rationall workings? and so the same with *Actus Secundus*.

But his Lordship is much mistaken to think that *actus primus* is Latine for *Action*. *Actus* is of as large an extent as *Potentia*: Now there is *potentia ad Esse*, and *potentia ad Formam*, as well as *potentia ad Operari*. When *Ens in potentia* becomes *Ens Actus*, when that which was possible, is actually produced; its own Essence or Being is that *Actus*, which makes it *Ens Actus*, which was before *Ens in Potentia*: and this we call *actus Emittivus*, and it is better translated *Actuality*, then either *Action*, or *Activity*. Again the Matter is capable of this or that Form, which we call *potentia ad Formam* (*substantialem*;) whereby it

is *potentiâ tale* (in *generè substantiâ*;) as *materia putris* is in *potentiâ ad formam vermis*: Now when this Form whereof it is capable is actually introduced, that which was before *potentiâ tale*, becoms now *actus tale* (in *generè substantiâ*;) and this Form is called *actus Substantialis*, (but not *Actio Substantialis*,) or *actus primus*; and (thus) the Soule is *Actus*. Again, a Substance of this or that *Species*, constituted by this or that form, is capable of this or that Accident, and is therefore *potentiâ talis, accidentaliter*; or in *potentiâ ad hanc formam accidentalem*; as Water is *potentiâ calida*, when Heat is produced, it becoms *Actus calida*, and the Heat is this *Actus* whereby it is *actus talis*; and it is *actus primus accidentalis*, (though perhaps some would call it *actus secundus*: Yet none call it *Actio*.) This *actus accidentalis*, or *forma accidentalis*, if it be Operative, stands in a double relation; to its Subject, and so it is *actus informans*; and to its Operation, and so it is *actus operativus* (but not *Operatio*) and belongs either to the first, or the second *species* of Quality, it is either a Habit or a Faculty; this, if you please, you may call *Activus*, though not *Actio*. Now a Subject inducd with this *actus operativus* is in *potentiâ ad operandum*: When this power is reduced into act, it is *actus operans*; and this *actus* whereby it doth *actus operari*, is properly *Actus secundus, Actio*, or *Operatio*, and belongs to the Predicament of *Actio*. But such an *Actus* the Soule is not, and therefore its Operations cannot be its Essence.

Objection. 2. Chap. 11.

But now least by making the Soules Operations to be the Soules Essence, he should make so many Soules as there be Acts; (which is indeed a good Consequence;) he is put upon another invention, to make all these operations to be but One; the second action is but the same with the former: (So that with him, one sinfull Act is all one with a continued Course of sinning.) And therefore tells us, that actions performed in distinct Times and Places are not therefore distinct actions, because Time and Place are Nothing, but meerly imaginary.

But this plaister is not large enough to cover the sore; For, it is true indeed, different actions may receive an externall denomination from difference in Time and Place, but they receive not their difference from hence, but from themselves: Time and Place can neither make different things to be the same, nor the same to be different. A man is the same to day that he was yesterday, the same at London that he was at York; yet both Time and Place be different: Againe, two Angels be-

ing at the same time coexistent in the same place are not therefore the same Angel. So that whether time and place be any thing or nothing, yet this Man is not the other Man, this Action is not the other Action.

But if difference of Time and Place be only imaginary; then why do we deny to the Papists, that Christs Body is corporeally present in the Sacrament? since if it be any where, it must be every where, all places being indeed the same, admitting onely of an imaginary difference. Why doe we cry down the *Lutheran* Consubstantiation, as absurd? for if severall bodies may be in severall places, then may they be in the same place, if difference of Place be only imaginary: If the same body may be at severall times in severall places, why not at the same time? since difference of Time is only imaginary.

Object. 2. Chap. 12.

There is another Objection as strong as this former: If Acting Truth be the Soules Essence, then what becomes of the Soule when it doth either not Act, or act Falsely?

To the first he applies his former remedy; Any one act is able to give the Soule a Being at all times; for succession of moments being onely imaginary, that which at all is, must be alwayes, and whatsoever hath at all a Being, is indeed coexistent to all Eternity; succession, beginning, and ending being onely imaginary: (So that a Childe that is new born, had lived as long as the most aged, if he could but think so.

And as for the other, he denies that the Soul can at all act Falshood, because Falshood is onely Privative, it is Nothing; now to act nothing and not to act is all one.

Which he affirms likewise of Evill, and of Pain; And tells us, with *Dr. Twisse*, that it is better to be Miserable, then not to be: Which is grounded upon this, that Evill is only a privation of Good, and therefore to have the goodnesse Being without the goodnesse of Happinesse, is better then to want both the one and the other.

But withall I wish them to consider, whether the same Argument do not prove, that it was better for *David* to commit adultery, then not to commit it; For the substance of the act, in its Physicall Essence, was positive, and therefore Good; the fault was only the want of a further good, to wit, the goodnesse of conformity to Gods will; now to produce

duce the goodnesse of an Act; without the goodnesse of Conformity, is better then to produce neither the one nor the other.

Corollaria. Chap. 13. &c.

This is his Lordships Opinion. Which he commendsto us as usefull to make our Christian life more cheerefull both in the Theoreticall and Practick part. For if we knew, that Allthings are one, what need we feare either difficulty or danger? knowing, That Misery is nothing and cannot hurt us, and hath no Being but only in the the Brain; That whatsoever is, is Good, and good to Me, Because both I and It are Beings, and so Good; And these two Goods falling under no other difference but of degrees, Good and Good must needs agree, that which is Good is Good to Me. Yea, how void of Envy at anothers good, and thoughts of Revenging injuries? since that I have a Propriety, a Possession, in that which is anothers, hee and I being One: Injuries are nothing and cannot hurt; Good things, though anothers, doe serve me.

But to this Good Consequent of his Lordships Tener, I can oppose another every way as Bad: For as it would make us not afraid of Misery, so withall, not afraid to Sinne. It proposeth such an Impunity to Sinning, as that it makes the Devils as happy as the blessed Angels. For thus we might argue; The Devils are Beings, and therefore Good, because *Ens & Bonum convertuntur*: Every thing that is, is Good, and Good to I hem; for both They and It being good, and Good admitting of no other difference but of degrees, Good and Good must needs agree, and so be good to them: The happinesse of the Angels doth serve Them, since (as his Lordship speaks) it is not onely *ex parte*, but *id est*, They have a propriety in it; all things being One. Their own Misery and Torment is nothing, and cannot hurt: And (which is the only difference can be imagined) if they Think otherwise, (I use still his Lordships expression) this must be a Lye, and cannot hurt. And if this be Hell, who will be afraid to Sinne?

My judgement cannot assent, to make the Torments of the damned only Imaginary, to make Hell a Fancy; yea, to affirm, that it is good to Sinne, because the act of sinne is really Good, and the Evill of it is onely Imaginary, a Vanity, a Nothing, and cannot hurt.

As for the Theoreticall part; it is confessed, that there be many doubts in Naturall Philosophy, concerning the Being, the Nature, the

Causes of things; There be doubts also in Morall Philosophy, in Metaphysicks, in Mathematicks, in Divinity: But intelling us this, his Lordship advanceth nothing for the commendation of his new invention; except he could shew us how this Tenet will resolve them.


And thus Sir, I have given you a short account of the chief things in his Lordships Treatise, and my Reply, so farre as concerns the state of the main Question controverted: Wherein you may take a brieve Survey of what is there more largely prosecuted. Which may give some Light for the better discovering the principall intent of his Lordships Tenet; and may be a guide in your perusing the larger Discourse that you loose not your selfe in the prolixity of the prosecution, and the variety of digressions. When I first undertook the Taske, I intended no more in all, then some such brieve notes as these, to satisfie your desire: But being once entred I have not alwayes the command of my own pen; variety of matter carrying me beyond my intended bounds. The faults if you will be pleased to pardon, and to accept the rest, I shall commit the whole to be as I am, that is

TOWNS TO COMMANDE,

April. 10. 1641.

J. W.

FINIS.



Dum hæc quæ præcedunt sub prælo erant, subiit animum cogitatio ea quæ sequuntur prioribus subjungendi; (Theses nimirum aliquot aliquando in Academiâ habitas:) partim quòd subiecto sint non adeò dispari; partim quòd, ut ut puerilia, ejusmodi tamen sint quæ non ab omnibus attendantur. Non tanti (fateor) sunt, ut in lucem prodeant; nec (forsan) tantilli tamen, ut nemini placeant. Sicui displicent, excuset ut puerilia; sicui placeant, fruatur.

Propositio



*Propositio Singularis in dispositione syllogistica semper
habet vim Universalis.*

Nihil infelicius est iis ineniis (si Scaligero credamus) quæ mordicus sentiunt, majores nostros nihil ignorasse; quæque pertinaciter teneant errores, quos si qui commiseret, si viverent, emendarent. Χα-
μῆτις γὰρ ὅστις ἀνδραπειν ὄντα μὴ διαμαρτάνειν ἐν σπουδαίᾳ, τὸ μὲν ὅλως ἀγνο-
εῖν, τὸ δὲ ἁπλῶς κρινέσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀμειψιστοῦ γινώσκειν. Unde mihi nunquam absurdum visum est, a communi sententia cum ratione dissentire.

Propositio Singularis, apud Logicos, vel pro Particulari, vel pro no-
vâ quadam specie semper habita est: cum mihi tamen ad Universalium
classe pertinere luce meridiana clarius semper visum est.

Cujus in examine pro lemmate habeatur; Formalem rationem pro-
positionis constare in compositione prædicati cum subiecto: Quod sta-
tuit Smiglecius, disp. 12. qu. 7. (quæ compositio sive nexus præcipue
in copulâ attenditur.) Ex vario igitur modo compositionis, horum ex-
tremorum, alius arque alius propositionis modus oritur. Ubi itaque
compositio seu nexus prædicati cum subiecto Verè fit, & ut se res habet,
propositio Vera est; ubi nexus seu applicatio Falsè fit, et Falsa est pro-
positio, sint partes h. e. termini simplices, sive veræ, sive falsæ: Unde
hæc propositio [Hircocervus est quoddam constatum ex hirco & cervo]
vera est, licet uterque terminus falsus, falsitate scilicet simplicium termi-
norum, h. e. Non-ens, sive Ens rationis; ens enim & verum convertuntur:
illa verò [lapis est homo] falsa est, licet termini veri veritate simplicis
apprehensionis, quia falsò applicantur. Item, quum Necessarius est ne-
xus terminorum, propositio Necessaria est; sint licet termini entia con-
tingentia: & sic in reliquis affectionibus propositionis.

Quum autem compositio sive nexus terminorum, in quâ constet for-
malis ratio propositionis in Vinculo atter datur, hinc sequitur, affectio-
nes propositionis judicandas esse, non ratione terminorum, sed potius
respectu vinculi. Unde axioma affirmatum a Ramo definitur, cujus
vinculum affirmatur; Negatum, cujus vinculum negatur; sive termini
sint affirmati sive negati, parum interest. Hæc propositio igitur [omne
non rationale est non homo] est propositio affirmativa, licet extremum
utrumque sit negans. Hæc verò [lapis non est homo] est propositio ne-
gans, ex terminis utrisque affirmativis. Idem dicendum est de propositi-
one Simplici, & Compositâ; ad vinculum scilicet attendendum esse. Un-
de Gutherlethus hanc propositionem [animal est vel homo vel brutum]

axioma simplex esse statuit, non disjunctivum, cum uno verbi vinculo contineatur; licet posterior terminus sit disjunctus; Hanc verò propositionem [omne animal vel est homo vel est brutum] credo illum inter inter axiomata composita numeraturum.

Hinc colligo. Ut alias propositionis affectiones, ita etiam Universalitatem & Particularitatem sumendas esse, non a terminis, sed a terminorum compositione & nexu. Affectiones enim formam sequuntur, non materiam. Malè igitur a plerisque Logicis distribuitur axioma, seu propositio, in Universalem, cujus subjectum est Universale; Particularem, cujus subjectum est particulare; & Singularem, cujus subjectum est singulare: cum distributio petenda esset a modo compositionis, quod est Formale in propositione, non a quantitate terminorum, h. e. a parte materiali. Propositio ergo Universalis, est in quâ applicatio prædicati ad subjectum est universalis; Particularis, in quâ applicatio est particularis: nec alias species agnosco.

Quid autem velim per prædicationem vel applicationem universalem & particularem, melius ex græcâ Aristotelis appellatione, quam ex latinâ Interpretum, elucescet. Quod enim nobis est Universale & Particulare, illud Aristoteli est, *ὑπερβαλον* & *ὑποβαλον*, de toto, & parte, sive secundum partem, h. e. de subjecto vel toto, vel secundum partem; non autem *ὑπερβαλον* & *ὑποβαλον*, de omnibus & quibusdam. Quare non mirus rectè interpretaretur Totalis & Partialis prædicatio, quàm Universalis & Particularis; nisi quòd mos aliter obtinuerit.

Universalis ergo prædicatio est quando prædicatum dicitur *ὑπερβαλον* de toto subjecto, (totum intelligo prædicationis, sive totam ejus latitudinem & ambitum prædicandi.) quando scilicet prædicatum totaliter attribuitur subjecto, non partialiter cum restrictione ad aliquam subjecti partem, seu ad peculiare quiddam intra subjecti ambitum comprehensum, tunc nimirum quando de quocunque dicitur subjectum, de eodem dicatur etiam & prædicatum. Igitur hæc propositio [omnis homo est animal] est universalis, quia nihil continetur sub ambitu *Hominis*, seu de nullo dicitur *Homo*, quin et de eodem dicatur *Animal*; Hæc autem [aliquis homo est doctus] particularis, quia non de totâ hominis specie dicitur, sed *ὑποβαλον*, secundum partem aliquam, h. e. de aliquo individuo sub eâ specie. Non autem ideo universalis est prior propositio quia nota *Omnis* præfigitur, & posterior particularis quia ei præponitur *Aliquis*, (uti, nonnulli, ex tyronibus præcipuè, arbitrantur.) Non enim propositio ideo universalis est, quia notam habet universalitatis, sed quia universalis est, ideo nota præponitur, ut agnoscat Dounamus. Nota

igitur

igitur universalitatis designat aliquando universalem propositionem, non autem facit. Idem dic de notâ particularitatis.

Iam verò, ut ad præsentem controversiam accedamus; In propositione Singulari necesse est ut prædicatio sit καὶ ὅλου, de toto, cum subiectum singulare αἶμαρ sit & individuum in partes; (subjectivas intelligo, loquimur enim de toto prædicationis, non integrali;) Impossibile enim est ut aliquid χῆ μέρους secundum partem dicatur, de illo quod αἶμαρ est & partes nullas habet. Necesse igitur est, ut quicquid de individuo dicitur, sive subiecto singulari, dicatur de toto; & per consequens propositio singularis semper erit καὶ ὅλου.

Atque hoc ipsum est quod vult Aristoteles; & qualiter Aristotelem exponunt, detorquent non interpretantur. Audiamus igitur Aristotelis mentem de propositione universali, sive, quod idem est, de dicto χῆ πάντες καὶ χῆ μὴδὲν, de omni & de nullo: τὸ δ' ὅλον ἔστι ὅτερον ἑτέρου, καὶ τὸ χῆ πάντος κατηργεῖσθαι δάπτειν δαίτην ταύτην οὐκ ὀκνῶν. λέγουμεν δὲ τὸ χῆ πάντος; ἀναιρεῖσθαι, ὅταν μὴδὲν ἢ τὸ ὑποκειμένον λαβὼν καὶ τὸ δάπτειν ἢ λεχθέντι. καὶ τὸ χῆ μὴδὲν ὁσαύτως. Quid disertius dici posset pro causâ nostrâ? Tunc demum κατὰ πάντος (non κατὰ πάντων) de omni sive de toto dicitur aliquid, quando nihil subiecti accipere licet, de quo alterum h. e. prædicatum non dicitur. Assumo; In propositione singulari affirmante, nihil subiecti sumere licet, de quo prædicatum non dicatur. Concludo igitur; Propositio singularis affirmans, est κατὰ πάντος. (Eodemque modo propositio singularis negans erit κατὰ μὴδὲν.) v. g. Si dixeris [Socrates est doctus] quæro, quidnam illud est intra ambitum Socratis. de quo non dicatur *Doctus*? Si nihil, igitur erit κατὰ πάντος per Aristotelis definitionem: At verò cum *Socrates* de uno solo homine dicatur, & de illo etiam dicatur *doctus*, nihil aliud *Socratis* superest, de quo negetur, ut patet.

Idem licet concludere ex ipsius Rami definitione; cum definiat Axioma Speciale (quod postea subdividit in particulare, & proprium) esse, quando consequens non omni antecedenti attribuitur. Sed quàm bene convenit hæc definitio axiomati Proprio, quod tamen illi est altera species axiomatis Specialis? Si in axiomate proprio consequens non omni antecedenti attribuitur, ostendat quæso, cui non: si autem hoc ostendi non possit (ut quidem non potest) quâ ratione dicat non omni attribui non video, cum non omniis & quidam non idem valere, ex regulis æquipollentiæ certissimum est. Vel igitur ostendat Ramus axioma proprium affirmans *Alieni* non attribui, velego illi negabo, non omni attribui, & per consequens definitionem axiomatis specialis non convenire

venire axiomati proprio; Mala igitur definitio illa sit necesse est, quando definitio generis non convenit utrique specie. Imò verò, si rem expendamus, inveniemus alteram speciem, sc. axioma Particulare, quod contradistinctur axiomati proprio, ejusdem prorsus esse latitudinis cum genere, sive axioma speciali. Nam axioma speciale est, quando consequens non omni antecedenti attribuitur; Particulare, quando consequens particulariter antecedenti attribuitur. Tantum igitur distat axioma speciale & particulare, (h. e. genus & species) quantum non omni & particulariter: quod quantillum sit, ex Gurbertletho discas, qui explicaturus quid velit Ramus per *particulariter*, expressis verbis confundit; *particulariter*, inquit, *h. e. non omni*. Patet igitur, quam leviter agant Ramus & dum genus a specie illis vocabulis distinguant inter quæ ne ipsi quidem ullam agnoscunt differentiam.

Sed ad Aristotelem revertor: Qui duos tantum agnoscit modos prædicandi, de toto, & de parte, $\kappa\alpha\theta\omicron\lambda\upsilon\ \xi\ \chi\tau\iota\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omicron\varsigma$, universalem & particularem. Nec quidem potuit plures admittere: Quicquid enim de altero dicitur necessarium est ut vel de illo toto vel de ipsius parte aliqua dicatur; Quicquid etiam ab altero removetur, vel a toto vel a parte tantum removeatur necesse est. Nec enim possibile est medium invenire, quod de altero dicatur, nec tamen de toto, neque secundum partem. Pro certo igitur & indubitato principio ponatur, Omnem propositionem (categoricam intelligo) quæcunque demum ipsa sit, vel universalem esse, vel particularem; h. e. vel $\kappa\alpha\theta\omicron\lambda\upsilon$, vel $\chi\tau\iota\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omicron\varsigma$.

Atque hinc patet, perperam fecisse Ramum, ipsiusque sequaces, dum præter syllogismum generalem & specialem, proprium adjunxerint. Quæ enim propositiones proprias seu singulares non potuerunt particularium regulis coercere, commenti sunt novam quandam syllogismi speciem aliis antea inæcognitam, quam Proprium appellant: & axiomata propria, quæ illi inter specialia numerabant, a reliquis specialibus discrepare videntes, ab omni syllogismorum specie antea notâ abhorretere arbitrati sunt; nescientes interim, saltem non advertentes, iisdem quibus generalia regulis contineri.

Patet etiam, quid judicandum sit de quadruplici propositionis divisione, in Universalem, Particularem, Indefinitam, & Singularem; nimirum, species sine necessitate multiplicari; cum singularis semper reducenda sit ad universalem, indefinita verò nunc ad hanc, nunc ad particularem. Atque hoc secundum mentem Aristotelis, qui quadrariam illam divisionem nusquam (ni fallor) tradidit. Nominat, fateor, indefinitam propositionem, præter prædictas duas species, universalem & parti-

particularem, non autem ac si quid esset ab utrisque distinctum, sed quòd ex ipsis propositionis verbis vix satis constet, ad utram duarum reducenda sit (cùm signum indicem non habeat appositum,) & pro subiectâ materiâ nunc ad hanc nunc ad illam referenda sit, semper tamen ad alterutram. De singulari verò propositione ne verbum habet; nec opus est, cùm semper reducenda sit ad universalem; perperam verò a Logicis plerisque intruditur quasi nova species, omnino contra rationem, mentemque Aristotelis.

Atque hæcenus probata est thesis nostra a priori, & quidem demonstrativè; Subiectam & argumenta a posteriori nonnulla. ut lucidiùs appareat veritas. Sed præmonendum est, eorum aliqua universaliter concludere de omni propositione singulari: alia verò particulariter, ita tamen ut quod illic concluditur de unâ, potuit de qualibet; atque hæc inductione factâ idem valerent ac si concluderent universaliter: alia denique ducta esse ab ejusmodi proprietatibus quæ solis universalibus conveniunt non autem omnibus, unde nec omnibus singularibus; quæ licet vi suâ probent tantùm aliquas singulares universalium vim habere, cùm tamen hoc concessio pauci sint qui reliquum negarent cùm nulla sufficiens ratio assignari possit cur quædam sint universales non autem aliz, valebunt & hæc argumenta non multò minus quàm si essent universalia.

Primò igitur. Major in primâ & secundâ figurâ semper est καθ' ἑαυτῆς, (ut a pluribus antehac demonstratum est,) at aliquando est singularis; ergo aliqua saltem singularis est καθ' ἑαυτῆς. Vel sic; Quæcunque propositio potest esse major in primâ vel secundâ figurâ, ea est καθ' ἑαυτῆς. Sed quælibet propositio singularis potest esse major & in primâ & in secundâ figura. Ergo. &c. In'to in primâ, in *Barbara*.

Bar. Augustus fuit Imperator.

ba. Octavius fuit Augustus. Ergo

ra. Octavius fuit Imperator.

In secundâ, in *Camestres*.

Cam. Virgilius fuit Romanus.

es. Homerus non fuit Romanus.

em. Homerus ergo non fuit Virgilius.

Et idem fieri posset in quibuscunque modis utriusque figuræ: imò in quocunque modo cujuscunque figuræ assumptâ quacunque propositione singulari in locum universalis; ut experienti videre erit cui libet.

Secundò, Ex puris particularibus nihil concluditur, at ex puris singularibus

gularibus aliquid concluditur : Ergo Singularis non est particularis, & per consequens, est univēsalis, cum antea probatum sit nullam posse fieri prædicatione : quin erit vel καθόλου vel κατὰ μέρος. Major in confisso est. Minor exemplis supra adductis probata est.

Non solum autem ex singularibus puris concluditur aliquid, sed ex mixtis singulari cum particulari, non minus quam ex universali & particulari : sed (ut illic) semper concluditur particulariter, cum particularis propositio sit debilior pars. v. g.

Da- Virgilius fuit doctus.

ri- Aliquis poeta fuit Virgilius.

i. Ergo, Aliquis poeta fuit doctus.

Item,

Fef- Virgilius non fuit Græcus.

ti- Aliquis poeta fuit Græcus. Ergo

no- Aliquis poeta non fuit Virgilius.

Ubi notandum obiter, hos syllogismos & hujusmodi alios, constantes ex singulari & particulari in præmissis, ad nullos Rami modos reduci posse, cum tamen consequentia & satis firma sit & perspicua; nostrā tamen hypothesi positā faciliē ad Aristotelis modos reducuntur. (In tertiā figurā non insto; cum enim in tertiā figurā idem sit subiectum in utraq̃ue præmissarum, fieri non potest ut altera sit propositio singularis, altera particularis, quoniam de subiecto singulari non potest prædicari particulariter.)

Tertiō, Tres ponuntur gradus necessitatis, κατὰ πάντας, καὶ αὐτὸν, καὶ καθόλου πάντας. Confessum est etiam apud omnes, superiorem gradum necessitatis semper etiam includere inferiorem; unde propositio καὶ αὐτὸν est etiam propositio κατὰ πάντας, propositio verò καὶ καθόλου πάντας est & καὶ αὐτὸν & κατὰ πάντας. At propositio singularis sæpe est καὶ αὐτὸν ergo & κατὰ πάντας. v. g. [Socrates est animal, Plato est substantia, Bucephalus est equus;] sunt propositiones essentielles in primo modo dicendi per se: sunt ergo κατὰ πάντας.

Quartō, Omne genus prædicatur universaliter de suis speciebus, (ut & essentialiter;) at Individuum (saltem secundum Ramum) est species; ergo de individuo prædicatur genus universaliter. Aut; si non sit species, tamen ut se habet genus ad speciem ita species ad individuum; at genus prædicatur universaliter & καθόλου de suā specie; ergo & species de individuo. Potest ergo individuum universalis propositionis esse subiectum.

Quintō, probatur ex regulis conversionum. [Socrates non est equus] est propositio negans, eaque vel universalis, ut nos dicimus, vel particularis

particularis, ut alii: non autem particularis; Ergo &c. Probatur minor. Quia propositio particularis negans convertitur tantummodo per contrapositionem; at hæc propositio convertitur, primò conversione simplici, [nullus equus est Socratis,] secundò per accidens [aliquis equus non est Socrates.] Utroque hoc modo convertitur universalis negans, (eaeque sola,) neutro verò particularis negans: est ergo hæc propositio non particularis sed universalis. Patet etiam ulterius ex hac ipsa conversione; convertitur enim singularis negans in universalem, at in conversione nunquam augetur quantitas, saepe minuitur. Iterum, [Socrates non est Plato] convertitur [Plato non est Socrates,] at particularis negans non convertitur nisi per contrapositionem.

Secundò, Ex regulis reductionum. Propono enim hunc syllogismum;

Ces. Qui interfecit Hectorem non supervixit bello Trojano.

a. Omnes Graeci reduces supervivere bello Trojano. Ergo

re. Nullus Graecorum reducum interfecit Hectorem.

Dico hunc syllogismum esse in *Cesare* majori universali, duplici ratione. Primò, si major esset particularis, conclusio esset particularis, (quia semper sequitur debiliorem partem;) at non est; Ergo. Secundò, per modum reductionis, reducitur enim ad *Celarent* per simplicem conversionem majoris; sic

Ce. Nullus qui supervixit bello Trojano fuit interfector Hectoris.

a. Omnes Graeci reduces supervivere bello Trojano. Ergo

re. Nullus Graecorum reducum fuit interfector Hectoris.

Hic syllogismus si esset ex majori particulari, non esset in ullo modo; nec usquam apud Ramum invenietur huiusmodi syllogismus, (cum tamen & verissimus sit & utilissimus,) Imò nec (posita illorum hypothesis, scil. quòd sit particularis) reduci posset ad alium modum. Alium accipe,

Ces. Author Epistolæ ad Hebræos non fuit auditor Christi, *Heb.* 2. 3.

a. Omnes duodecim selecti fuerunt auditores Christi, Ergo

re. Nullus ex duodecim selectis fuit Author epistolæ ad Hebræos.

Impossibile autem est in ullo ex Rami modis per hoc medium probare hanc conclusionem.

Septimò, Hunc syllogismum propono,

Omnes magnanimi sunt fortes.

Thersites non est fortis. Ergo

Thersites non est magnanimus.

Hic syllogismus vel est in *Camestres* ex minore & conclusione universalibus, vel in *Baroco* ex iisdem particularibus. Sed non esse in *Baroco*,

fic

sic probatur. Syllogismus in *Baroco* non potest reduci nisi reductione per impossibile; at hic syllogismus reduciur ad *Celarent* reductione ostensivâ, eo modo quo *Camestres*, scil. transpositis præmissis, & minore conclusionisque simpliciter conversis, hoc modo,

Ce- Nullus fortis est Therfites.

la- Omnes magnanimi sunt fortes. Ergo

rent. Nullus magnanimus est Therfites.

Erat igitur in *Camestres* ex minore & conclusione universalibus, non in *Baroco* ex iis particularibus. Infinitus essem si singulis infigerem quæ hac in redici possent: Unico argumento concludo.

Octavo igitur & ultimo, Propositio singularis nec fortioorem nec debiliores vim habet quàm universalis; ergo eandem & æqualem. Non fortioorem, quia ex præmissis universali & singulari aliquando concluditur singulariter, quod non esset si universalis esset debiliore, quia conclusio semper sequitur debiliores partem. Ut in hoc & similibus innumeris.

Cam- Omnes magnanimi sunt fortes.

es- Therfites non est fortis. Ergo

tres. Therfites non est magnanimus.

Nec debiliores habet, quia ex singulari & universali, aliquando concluditur universaliter, (quod non esset si singularis esset pars debiliore:) ut in hoc syllogismo, & aliis,

Ces- Interfectus Hectoris non supervixit bello Trojano.

a- Omnes Græci reduces supervixere bello Trojano. Ergo

re. Nullus Græcorum reducum fuit interfectus Hectoris.

Cum igitur nec fortiores, nec debiliores vim habeat Singularis quàm Universalis, sequitur necessariò Propositionem singularem eadem vim in dispositione syllogistice semper habere quàm habitum universalis. Quod erat demonstrandum.

Corollaria, & Objectiones.

Hinc sequitur primò, Propositionem singularem affirmantem & negantem opponi immediatè, hoc est, contradictoriè. Nam sublatâ universalitate affirmantis ponitur negans καὶ ὅτι, quoniam prædicatio partialis non potest esse de eo quod est ἀπορρο.

Sequitur secundò, Propositionem universalem affirmantem converti conversione simplici, & particularem affirmantem convertibilem in propositionem καθόλου, quoties prædicatum convertendæ est individuum.

Posita

Posito, enim prædicato in loco subjecti, quicquid de individuo subjecto dicitur, dicitur καθόλου.

Sequitur tertio, Conclusionem in tertiâ figurâ esse καθόλου (contrâ quàm docent Logici,) quoties minor terminus syllogismi, h. e. prædicatum minoris, est individuum. Quia prædicatum minoris in tertiâ figurâ est subjectum conclusionis, quod cum sit individuum, de eo quicquid dicitur, dicitur universaliter.

Obijciat forsân aliquis; An igitur [Socrates est doctus] perinde est ac [omnis homo est doctus?] Non est. At, inquit, quidni? cum utraque propositio sit universalis. Rectè. Sed replico; An [omnis homo est rationalis] idem valet ac [omne animal est rationale?]. Negabit credo. At, inquam, quare? annon utraque est universalis? Est certè. Conjicio quid responsurus est; utraque propositio est quidem universalis, non tamen æquipollent, quia in alterâ rationalitas universaliter attribuitur homini, & rectè, in alterâ verò universaliter attribuitur animali, sed malè. Pariter ego, non (inquam) perinde est *Socratem* doctum dicere & *omnem hominem*; subjectis enim differunt, quamvis utraque propositio sit universalis. *Doctus* universaliter prædicatur de *Socrate* non de *homine*.

Urget, Dici universaliter, est dici de multis. Fateor, in prædicatione simplicium terminorum, non in prædicatione propositionis. Aliud est *dici de multis*, in tractatu de Prædicabilibus, aliud *dictum de omni*, in tractatu de Propositione. At nunc agitur non de quantitate simplicium terminorum, sed de quantitate propositionis, & terminorum nexu. Universale, seu vox communis, potest esse subjectum propositionis particularis; & Individuum pariter, seu vox singularis, subjectum propositionis universalis.

Fatendum tamen est, Propositionem singularem leviculam aliquam discrepantiam habere ab aliis universalibus (ut in collariis videre est) non tamen talem quæ illas ex universalium numero eximat. Tria sunt, nec scio plura, (& plerique forsân ne hæc attenderent,) quæ discrepantiæ speciem exhibent: ubique tamen provenit a materiâ propositioni substratâ, potius quàm a formali propositionis dispositione; nusquam tollitur illud in quo formale propositionis universalis consistit, quod hoc est, ut nihil inveniatur intra subjecti ambitum de quo non dicatur prædicatum. Exp. ndam singula.

Primum hoc est Universalis propositio affirmans & negans opponuntur contrariè: earum utraq; potest esse falsa, harum non ita. Siquis hinc argueret, propositionem singularem, vim universalis non habere,

Respondeo

Respondeo primò, Eodem argumento probari posse non esse particularem; quia neque propositio particularis affirmata & negata opponuntur contradiçtoriè, sed subcontrariè, & earum utraque potest esse vera, harum non ita. Sicuti Ramus videatur satis cavisse, dum syllogismum proprium diversam speciem constituit tam a generali quam speciali: Regeo, 1. ad hominem. Malè pro Ramo arguitur ex his quæ ipse pronugishabet, & ex Logicâ suâ exulare fecit: ille enim de Oppositione, Equipollentiâ, & Conversione propositionum nihil habet, ut nec de Reductione syllogismorum: 2. Novum prædicandi modum facere non potest, cum impossibile sit aliquid de alio dici, quod tamen nec de toto nec secundum partem dicatur. Ut supra fusiùs explicavimus.

Respondeo secundò, Non singularibus tantum hoc accidit, sed & aliis universalibus quibusdam. Nam 1. in materiâ necessariâ & impossibili, ex negatione & affirmatione universali, altera semper vera est altera falsa. Unde regula illa, quod contrariarum in materiâ contingenti utraque potest esse falsa. 2. Idem accidit in propositionibus factis per *Omnes* collectivum; quas tamen universales esse, nemo quem scio negavit. (Possent tamen, fateor, eadem ratione quâ negant singulares; sunt enim reverâ universales, cum prædicatum non nisi uni antecedenti attribuitur.) Hujusmodi namque propositiones [Omnes apostoli sunt duodecim, & Omnes apostoli non sunt duodecim] item [Omnes planetæ sunt septem, & Omnes planetæ non sunt septem,] non minùs sunt contradiçtoriæ, quàm [Virgilius est poeta, & Virgilius non est poeta.] Si igitur illas pro universalibus agnoscant, cur non & singulares.

Respondeo tertio. Ratio hujus contradiçtionis inter propositionem singularem affirmantem & negantem, pendet ex necessitate materiæ, potius quàm ex ipsâ propositionis naturâ & formâ. Quoties enim subiectum universalis propositionis est divisionis capax (ut in distributivis, & de materiâ contingenti,) & prædicatum sigillatim applicatur subiecti partibus, affirmans & negans universaliter, non opponuntur immediate & contradiçtoriè, quia licet aliquid de Toto non rectè affirmetur, de parte forsan affirmari poterit, ergo nec de toto negabitur: Ubi verò materiæ necessitas particulare prædicationem omnino prohibet, & necessariò requirit ut quod de illo subiecto dicitur dicatur de eo toto, ut in materiâ necessariâ & impossibili, & in universali collectivâ, ut & in propositione singulari, ibi prædicatum vel de toto dicitur, vel de toto negatur, cum de parte dici de parte verò negari non posset propter *anulâ* & indivisibilitatem subiecti.

Respondeo

Respondeo quare. Consequitur hoc ex nostrâ thesi, non oppugnat. Si enim quicquid de individuo dicitur dicatur $\kappa\alpha\theta\omicron\lambda\upsilon$, impossibile est ut secus esset quin affirmatio & negatio sint opposita immediata, particularis enim intermedia eo ipso excluditur.

Nec aliunde patet ratio hujus oppositionis immediatæ, quàm ex hoc fundamento. Vel enim semper $\kappa\alpha\theta\omicron\lambda\upsilon$ prædicatur (prout nos asserimus) vel semper $\chi\tau\iota\ \mu\acute{\iota}\rho\omicron\varsigma$, vel aliquando de toto aliquando secundum partem. Si semper de parte, licet de unâ parte dicatur, quid impedit quin de aliâ negetur, ita ut & affirmatio & negatio sint simul veræ? cùm affirmatio particularis quoad unam partem non impediat negationem partialem quoad aliam partem. Si aliquando $\kappa\alpha\theta\omicron\lambda\upsilon$ aliquando $\chi\tau\iota\ \mu\acute{\iota}\rho\omicron\varsigma$, (prout Aristoteli doctrina videtur innuere, qui quoties una præmissarum propria est eam pro particulari habent, non autem si utraque sit propria;) Si sic, inquam, (quamvis gratis dictum sit, nec ulla appareat ratio cur hæc & non illa sit universalis, imò cur eadem promiscuè nunc sit universalis nunc particularis,) oppositio nec sic esset immediata: licet enim affirmatio $\kappa\alpha\theta\omicron\lambda\upsilon$ falsâ sit, posset tamen quoad aliquam partem (si aliquando partialiter prædicetur) vera esse, unde nec negatio $\chi\tau\iota\ \mu\acute{\iota}\rho\omicron\varsigma$ vera; possent ergo & negatio & affirmatio simul esse falsæ, & non contradictoriè oppositæ. Necessè est igitur ut, si opponantur immediate, ideo sit quia singularis propositio semper est $\kappa\alpha\theta\omicron\lambda\upsilon$, unde vel de toto dicitur vel de toto negabitur. Confirmat igitur thesin nostram, non oppugnat, quod videbatur primâ fronte debilitare. Et hoc telo percussio eâdem operâ repercutientur & reliqua.

Secundum sequitur. Propositio particularis affirmans converti aliquando potest in singularem. Unde singularis videri posset non majorem habere quantitatem quàm habet particularis, quia in conversione non augenda est quantitas. v. g. [Aliquis homo est Socrates] ergo [Socrates est homo.]

Respondeo. Vi conversionis, sequitur [Hominem] dici de [Socrate:] necessitate materiæ, dicitur $\kappa\alpha\theta\omicron\lambda\upsilon$, quoniam de $\alpha\tau\omicron\mu\omicron\varsigma$ nihil prædicatur $\chi\tau\iota\ \mu\acute{\iota}\rho\omicron\varsigma$. Hinc sequitur, necessitate consequentis, Convertens $\kappa\alpha\theta\omicron\lambda\upsilon$ Convertæ $\chi\tau\iota\ \mu\acute{\iota}\rho\omicron\varsigma$.

Idem fieri necessè est, quoties propositio singularis affirmans convertenda est in singularem. v. g. [Virgilius est Maro] ergo [Maro est Virgilius.] Quæ conversio non est ex particulari in particularem (ut plurimi autumant,) nec ex universali in particularem, sed ex universali in universalem. Ubi, necessitate consequentiæ sequitur, *Virgilium* de *Marone* dici, necessitate verò consequentis, sequitur dici catholicè.

Respondeo.

Respondet. 2. Eadem esse difficultas, si pro particulari haberetur: Nam singularis negans convertitur in universalem negantem; v. g. [Socrates non est brutum] ergo [nullum brutum est Socrates;] quare, si prior esset particularis, in conversione augenda esset quantitas.

Singularis igitur negans convertitur simpliciter (ad modum Universalium) nunc in singularem, nunc in universalem. v. g. [Socrates non est Plato] ergo [Plato non est Socrates:] Item [Socrates non est brutum] ergo [nullum brutum est Socrates:] sicut è contrà [nullum brutum est Socrates] ergo [Socrates non est brutum.] Sin essent hæc propositiones negantes particulares, non essent convertendæ nisi per contrapositionem.

Respondco. 3. Non in singulares tantum, sed & in alias universales aliquando convertitur particularis. v. g. [aliquot homines sunt omnes Apostoli] ergo [omnes Apostoli sunt homines] vel [omnes Apostoli sunt aliquot homines.]

Hactenus vidimus, quomodo singulares differant a reliquis universalibus in affectionibus propositionis, Oppositione, scilicet, & Conversione; & istius differentiae rationem reddi non posse, nisi ex nostra thesi: propugnat igitur thesin nostram, non adversatur. Utut autem maximè nobis adversaretur, Ramistas tamen nequaquam adjuvat, (quos habeo ⁱⁿ ^{me} ^{opponentes}; reliqui tacitè adversantur dum in paradigmatis modorum propositiones singulares ponunt pro particularibus;) Ramistæ namque Oppositionem, Conversionem, &c. Nihil curant: Si igitur in reliquis, de quibus ipsi agunt, cum universalibus convenirent satis est cur ipsi saltem nostram thesin admittant.

Tertium sic est. Propositio universalis non concluditur in tertiâ figurâ, (h. e. secundum Ramum, in syllogismo simplici contracto;) at propositio singularis hic concluditur.

Sed neque hoc Ramistis opitulatur magis quàm priora, Illi enim rem negant, nec admittunt conclusionem Propriam in syllogismo contracto: Qui definitur a Ramo, Quando argumentum pro exemplo ita subijcitur particulari quæstioni, ut utramque partem antecedens, & assumptione affirmatum intelligatur; (si ergo quæstio semper sit particularis, certè nunquam Propria secundum illos:) Explicat hoc Donnatus; Quæstio, inquit, debet esse particularis, non generalis, aut propria; Item, rationem reddens cur syllogismus proprius esse dicitur ex utràque prope à non autem ex omnibus propriis, hanc assignat, Quia in contracto syllogismo conclusio semper particularis est, etiam quum utraque pars antecedentis est propria. Hoc igitur a Ramistis non urgen-

muni dici prædicatum, nondum constat an ea prædicatio universalis sit an particularis, quoniam utriusque capax est.

Dari vero conclusiones singulares in tertiâ figurâ certissimum est (licet vix quisquam hoc adverterit.)

Ba- Da- Maro est poeta.

ras- rap- Maro est Virgilius. Ergo

ra. ii. Virgilius est poeta.

Item,

Ce- Fe- Maro non fuit Ovidius.

las- lap- Maro fuit Virgilius. Ergo

zen. ten. Virgilius non fuit Ovidius.

Etiâ quum neutra præmissarum sit singularis. v. g.

Ce- Fe- Nullum brutum est Socrates.

lip- ris- Aliquod brutum est Bucephalus.

en. on. Bucephalus ergo non est Socrates.

Item,

Ba- Da- Omne brutum est animal.

tp- ris- Aliquod brutum est Bucephalus. Ergo

a. i. Bucephalus est animal.

(Ubi, si major esset particularis, nihil concluderet, esset enim ex puris particularibus.) Hoc toties fiet quoties prædicatum minoris est Individuum. Consequentia horum syllogismorum ex se satis patent: Quod si non, possent (si opus esset) ad primam figuram reducendo demonstrari. Sed neque hoc officit nostræ assertioni; Nam

Respondeo, (ut prius.) Vi consequentiæ sequitur de [Bucephalo] prædicari [Animal] affirmativè [Socratem] negativè, &c. necessitate consequentis prædicantur $\alpha\beta\beta\acute{o}\lambda\alpha$, quoniam subjectum est $\alpha\tau\tau\iota\mu\iota\tau$.

2 Sed & in aliis quibusdam universalibus eadem est difficultas. v. g. de septem planetis,

Hi septem sunt stellæ erraticæ. Sed

Hi septem sunt omnes planetæ. Ergo

Omnes planetæ sunt stellæ erraticæ.

Triplex igitur hæc differentia in propositione singulari ab aliis universalibus, neutiquam enervat assertionem nostram, nec debilitat quicquam, (nisi propositionem singularem ideo diceremus universalem non omnino esse, quia semper est,) sed supponit & confirmat. In singulis enim instantiis, posito (vi consequentiæ) de tali subjecto fieri prædicationem, supposito interim quicquid de hoc subjecto dicitur dici $\alpha\delta\delta\acute{\iota}\alpha\lambda\alpha$, infertur huiusmodi prædicatio universalis: Quod ubi subjectum est vox communis secus accidit, posito enim de subjecto com-

Propositio ergo categorica, vel est $\kappa\alpha\theta\acute{\iota}\lambda\upsilon$, vel $\chi\tau\iota\ \mu\acute{\iota}\sigma\theta\varsigma$. Hæc $\chi\tau\iota\ \mu\acute{\iota}\sigma\theta\varsigma$ quæ non de subiecto toto dicitur sed quoad partem aliquam subiecti-
væ: Illa $\kappa\alpha\theta\acute{\iota}\lambda\upsilon$, quæ de subiecto dicitur quoad totam ipsius latitudinem
prædicandi. h. e. de partibus singulis subiectivis. Cujus subiectum si
sit vox communis & multis applicabilis, iis omnibus applicatur etiam
prædicatum, prout in plerisque universalibus; si vox sic singularis &
unitantum applicabilis, huic uni & prædicatum applicatur; prout in
singularibus, & in propositionibus per *Omne* collectivum; (non enim
eodem modo dicitur [omnes planetæ sunt septem] & [omnes planetæ
sunt stellæ.] alterum enim collectivè dicitur, alterum distributivè: *Om-
nes* distributivè idem est ac *Singuli*; *Omnes* collectivè est singulorum
collectio, at singulorum collectio est singularis, estque totum (non uni-
versale, sed) integrale; planetæ sunt septem, at planetarum $\iota\sigma\tau\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ unica
est: *Omne* distributivum est syncategorematicum, *Omne* collectivum est
categorematicum, estque pars subiecti; Unde non rectè concluditur,
[Omnes planetæ sunt septem, Sol & Luna sunt planetæ, Ergo, Sol &
Luna sunt septem,] nisi assumeretur [Sol & Luna sunt omnes planetæ]
non enim [Planeta] sed [omnes Planeta] est subiectum majoris, essetque
prædicatum minoris, sumitur enim collectivè.) Sive autem de singulis
quibus attribuitur subiectum universale, sive de uno cui attribuitur sub-
iectum singulare, dicatur prædicatum, utrobique tamen nihil subiecti
accipere licet de quo non dicitur prædicatum, quod secundum Aristote-
lem est formalis ratio propositionis universalis; quare & propositio
de subiecto singulari est prædicatio $\kappa\alpha\theta\acute{\iota}\lambda\upsilon$, sive Dictum de Omni.
Quod erat demonstrandum.

Quantitas non differt realiter a re quantâ.

AD quæstionis resolutionem, necessarium est de Distinctio-
nibus in genere, aliquid præmittere. Distinctio ergo est vel
Realis, Rationis, vel Modalis. Realis, quando extrema
differunt ut res & res, sine aliquâ intrinsicâ dependentiâ
unius ad aliud; unde statuuntur vulgò per divinam potentiam posse
mutuò separari. Modalis, quando differunt quidem ex parte rei, ita
tamen ut alterum includat essentialē respectum seu connexionem ad
alterum; unde non possunt separatione mutuâ (h. e. ut utrumque se-
paratum existat) separari; estque inter rem & modum, vel (secundariò)
inter modos ejusdem rei, (modi tamen plerumque separari possunt mu-
tuò, ab invicem, non a subiectis.) Distinctio Rationis, quando unum
aliquod a parte rei, concipitur ab intellectu ut diversum; estque vel ra-
tionis

tionis ratiocinantis, vel ratiocinatur; hæc fit per inadæquatos conceptus ejusdem rei, & fundamentum aliquid habet in re; illa verò quando quid intelligitur sub diversis conceptibus sine fundamento in re.

Per rem quantam, intelligo Materiam, quæ est adæquatum subiectum quantitatis, cui primò inhiæret, sic Thomas. 1. q. 3. a. 2. Forma nempe substantialis non est per se subiectum quantitatis, neque extenditur aut dividitur per se, sed ad extensionem & divisionem materiæ, non secus ac existentia, & præsentia localis, aut situs, alique modi, ut & accidentia absoluta, Calor, color, &c. (unde vel est modus substantialis, vel in hoc saltem imitatur naturam modorum. Siquis mallet totum Compositum dici subiectum quantitatis, mihi non nocet.

Assertio prima, Quantitas non differt a substantiâ quantâ plus quàm modaliter. Probatur ex naturâ Modi, quam assignat Suarez. disp. 7. sect. 1. num. 17. Ubi supponit "in rebus creatis præter entitates earum quasi substantiales & radicales (ut appellat) inveniri quosdam modos reales, quæ & sunt aliquid positivum, & afficiunt ipsas entitates per seipsos, dando illis aliquid, quod est extra existentiam totam ut individuum & existentem; hi tamen modi sunt ejusmodi entitatis ut non addant propriam entitatem novam, sed solum modificant præexistentem: & sect. 1. n. 10. "tam essenziale est, inquit, modo esse actu affixum & modificantem rem cuius est modus ut repugnet de potentia absolutâ conservari sine illâ re, seu aliter quàm actu modificando illam. E contra verò, quæ realiter differunt ut res & res, possunt saltem per divinam potentiam separari, ut n. 22. & seq: Unde sic disputo, Quæ non possunt per divinam potentiam separari separationem mutuâ, ea non differunt realiter; Sed quantitas & substantia quantâ &c. Ergo. Major patet ex supra dictis. Minor probatur; Repugnat enim, quantitatem separatam a re quantâ existere, propter intrinsecam dependentiam quantitatis a materiâ; si enim essentia quantitatis consistat in mensurabilitate, si in divisibilitate, si in extensione & positione partium extra partes, semper tamen manet necessaria connectio cum partibus materialibus; quomodo enim erit pars extra partem, ubi partes nullæ sunt? quomodo mensurabitur aliquid aut dividetur ubi nulla extensio, nullæ partes? quomodo dabitur figuratio & situatio seu partium positio ubi partes non sunt. Dices, dantur partes quantitativæ, licet non materiales. Sed contra, vel partes extensæ sunt partes materiales, vel materia non est quanta: si per quantitatem materia est quanta, erit quantitas extensio partium materialium, quod quæ fieri potest ubi non est materia? Iterum, figura

& situs necessario conjunguntur; hinc Suarez d. 52. s. 2. n. 10. "Figura ut sic non est positio (seu situs) sed illa dispositio totius in ordine ad locum secundum talem ordinem partium ex qua sequitur talis figura; (quis non hic videt partes figuratas & situatas easdem esse?) si ergo figura sequitur ad situm, non erit ubi non est situs, situs autem cum sit modus substantiæ non potest esse ubi non est substantia, & per consequens nec figura, ergo nec quantitas, quæ sine figurâ non est. Dices, quidni quantitas possit esse sine figurâ? h. e. res sine modo? Respondeo, potest esse quantitas sine qualibet figura, non sine omni; sicut & corpus potest esse sine quolibet particulari Ubi, non tamen ita quin sit Alicubi; nec tamē ubicatio definit esse modum; Possunt ergo modi quilibet in actu exercito abesse a re modificatâ, non semper in actu signato, nempe quoties formaliter resultant ex ipsâ naturâ rei positâ: datâ verò tali extensione & dispositione partium per quantitatem resultat talis figuratio v. g. tribus lineis taliter dispositis, resultat protinus figura triangularis.

Argumentum secundum. Quorum modi non differunt realiter ea nec ipsa differunt realiter; At modus substantiæ & modus quantitatatis non differunt realiter; Ergo nec ipsæ. Majorem suppledit Suarez, d. 7. s. 1. n. 25. ubi statuit duos modos ejusdem rei differre modaliter, duos autem modos diversarum rerum differre realiter; "Modi, inquit, in re distincti, ut sunt præsentia localis v. g. & subsistentia humanitatis. aut comparantur tantum ut sunt in eadem re, & sic distinguuntur solum modaliter, qui quum ex se non habent propriam entitatem, etiam ex se non habent unde plus quam modaliter distinguuntur, neque ex re quam afficiunt plus distinguuntur, quia supponimus esse eandem, non habent ergo majorem distinctionem quam modalem, & confirmatur, quia unusquisque eorum habet identitatem aliquam cum illa re quam afficit, ergo in illâ & per illâ habent aliquam identitatem inter se, ergo retinent solum distinctionem modalem; at verò si inter se comparantur modi afficientes res diversas, sive illi modi sint ejusdem rationis ut duæ subsistentiæ duorum hominum, sive diversarum rationum ut sessio unius & subsistentia alterius, sic distinctio est realis, non ratione ipsorum, sed rerum in quibus sunt, nam unusquisque habet identitatem aliquam cum re quam afficit, & illæ res distinguuntur inter se realiter, ergo & modi ratione illarum. Hæc ille. Realis igitur identitas modorum arguit realem identitatem rerum modificatarum. Ad Minorem devenio, quod modus quantitatatis non differt realiter a modo substantiæ; inсто in Figurâ & Situ. Figura enim est modus quantitatis, & situs modus substantiæ, nec tamen differunt realiter. Quod figu-

ra sit modus quantitatis, in confesso est apud omnes; Sic Smiglecus,
 "Figura non est terminus quantitatis, sed terminorum quantitatis
 "dispositio. quid hoc aliud quàm modus? Scheiblerus in Metaph.
 "Figura, inquit, est qualitas modificans quantitatis terminos, unde
 "ei non convenit quantitas, ei consequenter nec figura, quæ modus
 "illius est, convenire potest. Scaliger etiam ait, "Figuram non esse
 "quantitatem, sed in quantitate. Suarez item disp. 7. l. 2. n. 10. Est
 "ergo figura modus quantitatis. Situm esse in eodẽ substantiæ non minùs
 "patet. Smigl. "Situs est dispositio partium corporis in loco; quid hoc
 "aliud quàm modus? Scheiblerus, "Existimo, inquit, situm non signi-
 "ficare peculiarem entitatem, sed significare modum quandam in eà
 "re quæ denominatur, neque enim apparet indicium unde sumatur
 "realis distinctio; Unde definit situm, "accidens secundum quod
 "corpus habet ordinem suarum partium in Ubi. Suarez, "relinqui-
 "tur, inquit, ut dicamus situm seu positionem esse aliquem intrinse-
 "cum modum corporis situati a quo sic denominatur sedens aut jaciens
 "aut aliquid simile. Est ergo situs modus substantiæ. Figuram verò
 "& situm non differre realiter patet; nam eadem partium dispositio quæ
 "in ordine ad totum dicitur figura, in ordine ad locum dicitur situs;
 "quod cum sit tantum respectus rationis, non sufficit ad distinctionem
 "realem, imò vix rationis ratiocinata. Hinc Smiglecus, "est situs, in-
 "quit, figura quædam corporis prout existit in loco, eademque figura
 "ut respicit corpus in seipso est figura corporis pertinens ad qualita-
 "tem, ut verò est figura corporis in ordine ad locum seu figura positio-
 "nis partium corporis in loco, ita pertinet ad prædicamentum situs.
 "Nec aliter Suarez; quum enim inter species situs enumerasset aspe-
 "rum & læve, "hinc, inquit, videtur sequi etiam curvum &
 "rectum, prout præcisè oriuntur ex positione partium in loco pertinere
 "ad prædicamentum situs, quia etiam illæ differentię dicunt quan-
 "dam dispositionem totius consurgentem ex positione partium, quod,
 "inquit, admittere non est magnum inconveniens, nam revera statio
 "& sessio ratione rectitudinis & curvatis maximè differunt, non
 "quòd ipsa figura ut sic sit positio (seu situs) & pertineat ad hoc præ-
 "dicamentum, sed illa dispositio totius in ordine ad locum secundum
 "talem ordinem partium, ex quâ sequitur talis figura. Figura ergo &
 "situs, quorum illa quantitatis, hic substantiæ modus est, non magis
 "differunt quàm ratione; quare nec eorum subjecta.

Argumentum tertium. Entia realiter distincta non possunt fundare
 eundem modum; sed Substantia & quantitas fundant eundem mo-
 dum.

dum. Ergo. Praecedens argumentum processit de subjectis adæquatis, quoddam duo modi in diversis subjectis realiter differant, hoc procedit de subjectis partialibus & inadæquatis, quoddam duo entia realiter distincta non possint esse subiecta partialia ejusdem modi; sed substantia & quantitas sunt subiecta partialia ejusdem numero modi. Ergo. Majorem ponit Suarez, d. 7. s. 2. n. 16. Pater etiam: sic enim idem realiter differret a seipso: nam situs v. g. si fundatur in substantiâ simul & quantitate, cum utrisque identificatur, quæ si realiter distinguantur, ea, quæ cum his sunt realiter eadem, realiter inter se differunt, & situs, si utrisque idem, a seipso differret: Dices, unio formæ cum materiâ est modus, fundatur tamen in utroque extremo quæ realiter differunt, nam materia & forma uniuntur, quare & idem modus in rebus realiter distinctis. Respondeo, unio qua uniuntur materia & forma non simplex est, sed duplex, una in materiâ per quam ipsa unitur formæ, alia in formâ per quam ipsa unitur materiæ. Sicut in relationibus, v. g. Socrates & Plato sunt similes (puta in albedine) non tamen per eandem similitudinem sed per diversam, relatum enim & correlatum referuntur ad invicem per relationes diversas; nec enim relatio patris ad filium eadem est cum relatione filii ad patrem; & licet in relationibus ejusdem nominis res non sit adeò perspicua, ratio tamen eadem est, habent enim distincta fundamenta; sic similitudo Socratis ad Platonem fundatur in albedine Socratis, similitudo Platonis ad Socratem in albedine Platonis, quæ fundamenta cum sint realiter distincta, ita & relationes quæ cum fundamentis identificantur: ut autem Socrates & Plato sunt similes per duas realiter distinctas similitudines, ita materia & forma uniuntur per duas realiter distinctas uniones (si saltem ipsæ materia & forma realiter distinguantur.)

Minor sequitur, In substantiâ simul & quantitate fundatur idem modus. Quod enim fundatur in substantiâ quatenus quæ sit, & resultat ex ipsâ quantitate, illud fundatur in substantiâ simul & quantitate; Sed sic figura, & situs. Ergo. Quod Figura sit modus quantitatis, supra ostensum est; Quod non ultimatum fundetur in quantitate quin & substantiam modifiet, patet ex ipsâ descriptione quam habet Suarez, disp. 42. s. 3. n. 15. quod sit, "modus quidam resultans ex corpore ex terminatione magnitudinis; est ergo modus in corpore resultans ex quantitate, substantiâ pariter & quantitatē modifians. Nec enim negari potest, ipsum corpus, ejusque partes substantiales & entitativas (quas vocant) eandem figurationem & eosdem terminos habere quos habet quantitas. Idem de Situ dicendum est. Quod situs sit modus sub-

stan-

stantiæ ita notum est ut nihil magis; quod autem non in substantiâ parâ fundetur, sed in substantiâ quantâ, æquè pater. Smiglecus, "restringitur (inquit) situs ad corpus; ad situationem enim requiruntur extensio, & multitudo partium materialium, at extensio & materialitas non reperiuntur nisi in materialibus. Duo nempe requirit ad situationem, extensionem, quæ est a quantitate, & partes materiales, a substantiâ; fundatur ergo situs in substantiâ simul & quantitate. Pariter Suarez. disp. 51. eadem ratione negat situm substantiis incorporeis, nempe quia partes non habent sed sint totæ in toto & totæ in qualibet partes. Figura igitur quæ est modus quantitatis, & situs, qui est modus substantiæ, non fundantur vel in substantiâ solâ, vel in solâ quantitate, sed in substantiâ simul & quantitate, seu in substantiâ quantâ; Cum autem idem modus non fundetur in diversis realiter subjectis ne quidem partialibus sequitur, substantiam & quantitatem non esse realiter diversa. Nec dicendum est, unum esse situm substantiæ, alterum quantitatibus: si corpus enim tueretur a proprio situ sine quantitate (idem valet de extensione, positione partium extra partes, & reliquis officiis quantitatis) quid opus est aliâ situatione à quantitate? imò substantia esset quantâ sine quantitate, situs enim ponit partes extra partes in toto, quod est formale quantitatis. Confirmari posset ulteriùs ex eo quod figura sit modus quantitatis, situs verò modus substantiæ, figura autem & situs non differant realiter, nedum modaliter, & quidem vix ratione ratiocinatâ; idem ergo modus in substantiâ fundatur simul & quantitate; Sed de his supra. Atque hætenus Assertio prima.

Assertio secunda. Probabile est neque modaliter differre substantiam a quantitate, sed tantum ratione ratiocinatâ. Ad distinctionem rationis ratiocinatæ requiritur distinctio conceptuum cum unitate & indistinctione a parte rei: Hinc Suarez, d. 7. s. 2. n. 28. "ut distinctio (inquit) iudicetur rationis & non rei, satis est ut præter distinctionem conceptuum nullum inveniatur signum ad distinctionem modalem aut realem cognoscendam, nam cum distinctiones non multiplicandæ sint sine causâ, & sola distinctio conceptuum non sufficiat ad inferendam maiorem distinctionem, quodcumque cum illâ distinctione conceptuum non adiungitur aliud signum majoris distinctionis, iudicanda semper est distinctio rationis & non rei: hinc infert, "quodcumque constat aliqua, quæ in re unita & conjuncta sunt, ita esse in conceptibus objectivis distincta, ut in re & individuo sint prorsus inseparabilia, tam mutuo quam non mutuo, tum magnum & fere certum est argumentum non distingui actu in re sed ratione ratiocinatâ. Hæc

ille. Cum ergo in materiâ & quantitate nullum appareat signum realis aut quidem modalis distinctionis, separationis mutue vel non mutue, tam ex potentiâ ordinariâ quàm absolutâ, cum quantitativa extensio formaliter resultet ex partibus entitativi; probabile est, non differre plus quàm ratione. Atque hoc concedit Suarez pænè, nisi quod mysterium Eucharistiæ impediret, dist. 7. s. 2. n. 10. per mysterium (inquit) Eucharistiæ certius nobis constat, quantitatem esse rem distinctam a materiâ, quàm per cognitionem naturalem constare potuiss. set. Videmus ergo unde Jesuitarum pertinacia de reali quantitatis distinctione, ne scilicet periret mysterium Transubstantiationis; quod illi de fide tenent, nos pari confidentiâ negamus. Adjungam argumentum ipsius Suarez, quo probat ille durationem non distingui ex parte rei ab existentia rei durantis, dist. 59. s. 1. n. 8. "quia existentia inseparabilis est a parte rei a duratione, & e contrario duratio ab existentia, & in unaquaque re utraque est æquè variabilis vel invariabilis, ut si existentia sit omnino necessaria, etiam duratio; si illa corruptibilis vel incorruptibilis, hæc similiter; si altera permanens, etiam altera; si una successiva, etiam altera; ergo a parte rei non distinguitur. Hæc ille, de existentia & duratione. Pariter ego de substantia & quantitate, ubi materia ibi quantitas & contra, si materia non existat sine quantitate (ut fatetur ipse, d. 7. s. 2. n. 11.) nec etiam quantitas sine materiâ (quicquid ille contrâ garriat in Transubstantiatione,) si materia ingenerabilis & incorruptibilis sic quantitas, si in augmentatione acquiritur aut in diminutione deperditur aliquid materiæ sic & quantitatis, si in rarefactione & condensatione manet eadem materia sic & eadem quantitas, si in his motibus variantur termini materiæ sic & quantitatis, denique cum sint æquè separabiles aut inseparabiles, æquè variabiles & invariabiles, nullum apparet indicium cur plus quàm ratione ratiocinat) distinguantur. Concludo igitur, quod materia & quantitas non distinguuntur inter se realiter, ut res & res, & (probabiliter) neque modaliter, sed tantum ratione ratiocinat), hæc ut inadæquatè conceptus ejusdem rei.

Alia præ manibus erant quæ putassem annexuisse; sed editio posthuma, esto & abortiva.

FINIS.

Ont

RO

SWEET

A paper, f
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On the sad Losse of the truly
Honourable
ROBERT Lord BROOK;

An Elegie,

To his Vertuous and Noble Lady.

SWEET LADY,

*Can your weeping Eye behold
A paper, sadly offer'd, where 'tis told,
Your Lord is Dead? And so Vntimely too?
Treble to You, to Vs a double woe.
'Tis Sad to Say; Sadder to you to Heare:
Vnhappy he, must be the Messenger.*

*Yet since you Know so True, so Sad a Woe,
Give leave to let you know, we know it too.
We first your Losse, and then your Griefe bemoane;
(Some Ease, in Sadnesse, not to weep Alone:)
Our Tears (ambitious) make their sad addresse;
(We'd bear a part, that You might weep the lesse.)
Give leave, we pray, to joyne in Tears with You,
(Yet weep we shall, whether with leave, or no:)
And make this paper blest to kisse your hand,
From him who's prest,*

MADAME,

At Your Command,

JOHN WALLIS.



AN
ELEGIE
On the much Lamented Death
of the Right Honorable
ROBERT Lord BROOK.



Right I have seen what was desir'd by all:
How glad would I, or not compose at all,
Or in another stile; and not reherse
Heroick Worth in Elegeick Verse.
Or else, might I, and they to whom as dear,
Weep him Alive that's Dead, though every teare
Were teares of Bloud, how willing would we poure
A farre more precious, then *Love's* Golden, Shower
On this Sad Object, on this Bloudy sight,
And with our teares or Guild, or wash him White.
But Now (unhappy) cannot but complain,
With sad bemoaning tears, (though tears in vain)
What's past recall, and we, though no redresse
Can be expected, must not hold our peace.

But

An Elegie.

But how (alas!) should I begin to speak;
(Where all Hyperbole's will seem too weak
To equalize) in Measures to expresse
What knows no other measure but Excesse?
Or who can Bound over-abounding Tears,
Within the streightnesse of an even Verse?

If then perhaps I hardly weep in Rhime;
If not in Consort; (Tears can keep no Time)
If no melodious Harmony be shewn;
Think but, 'Tis Hard, to put a Teare in Tune.
(Yet harder, not to Weep.—) Imperfect Tones
Serve well enough to signifie our Groanes.
A Long, a Large, are all the Notes we know;
(Minim and Sembrief Rests are long enow)
Our Accents tuned to the Highest Key;
(And yet our Sighs deeper then *Gam-ut* be:)
Nor curious are to make the *Consort* sweet,
That all keep equall *Time*, that *Closes* meet;
None tunes his Voyce unto anothers String;
(This Verse was made to Weep, and not to Sing)
All weep a *Part*, but no *Accord* can keep,
(Save onely thus, That all agree to weep;)
Oft weep a *Sharp*, when our sad Thoughts be *Flat*;
If *Discords* oft appear, yet wonder not;
Some Harmony may Disproportion give,
Discordant Accents shew *Concent* in Grief.

Then weep we must. That Heart is too too hard,
That in a publike Sadnesse would be spar'd.
Publike, I say, yet more then Common, Grief;
(Else might a Common Cordiall yeeld relief,)
'Tis not a Lady mourns, not I, alone,
I'am but Speaker of a Kingdoms mone:

An Elegie.

A Kingdomes publike losse it is; all those
Have lost in Him, that had but ought to loose.
Yea those (as yet) that count his Losse a Gain,
Will (after) say, 'Twas pittie *Brook* was slain.

Such Meeknesse lodg'd in a so Noble Breast;
Such Candour mixt with such Heroïcknesse;
His Thoughts so Low joyn'd with Deserts so High;
Practise of Truth as well as Theory;
Not quick (as some) to Bid and slow to Act,
Praising to others what themselves detrect;
His thoughts the same with what he did pretend;
A Course direct as well as upright End;
An Active Vigour with Integrity,
Strait Aims pursu'd not with an Oblique Eye:
Should I or this or more dilate, yet lesse
Is said in Words, then what our Tears expresse.

How gladly would my pen persist to tell,
How willing would my pleased Fancie dwell
On this so sweet a subject, as to say
How Good he was, how well deserving He;
His Learning, Wisdome, Worth, and Piety,
Worthy how long to live, how late to dye;
To speak his Praise, of his Deserts to boast:
But that 'tis sad to think, All this is lost.
Counting His Worth, we count our Losses too;
That we Admire, This doth encrease our Woe.
All this, and more then this, is lost in One,
All this is lost when Noble *Brook* is gone.

Might sad intreating Tears at any hand
Availle with Death, or who doth Death command,
To spare his Life; what foulds of these had been,
To purchase it, long since bestow'd on him:

For

An Elegie.

For those which now lament him caught away,
With more advantage might obtaine his stay.
Or might some Others death have Him excus'd,
There were, no doubt, who would not have refus'd
To rescue him, and purchase by their Death,
That He (more worthy) might have longer breath.
But no entreaties can (though ne're so just)
Either Reprieve or Ransome him: But must
Himselfe, arrested, (None by Proxy Dies)
Apppeare in Person: Death accepts no price.
If naked Death alone, who can withstand?
Much more appearing with an Armed hand.

But is there left us no return from death?
Doth not each breath we breathe breathe out our breath,
Which yet the next recalls? Not so in all:
This last expiring breath is past recall.

Which if a Single Losse, the losse were lesse;
(Though Great) but when it forwards the successe
Of our contrived woe; What shall we say?
May He be more bewail'd that's caught away,
Or we that stay behinde, reserv'd to see
The sadder sequel of that Tragedy?
He shall not see (whatever we may doe)
A Glorious Kingdomes sad approaching Woe.
He shall not see, nor seeing shall bemone
An (once-renowned) Land soone overthrown:
This shall not now perplex his resting Eye,
Blest with a better sight than Misery.

But what remaineth Us we cannot see;
The safer he, the neerer danger wee:
And what approaching danger might descry;
In losing his, the Kingdome lost an Eye.

An Elegie.

An Eye so deare, had we but known its price,
It had beene ransom'd, though with both our Eyes.
How glad might we (a happy change 't had beene)
Weep out our owne, could we but weep his in.
But weep we may; yet Teares will nought avails:
Who grants no Quarter, will accept no Baile.
Nor can distinguish by our different teares,
'Twixt Poore and Noble; all in death are peeres.

Then why complaine? could we or lesse expect,
Or think for Him Death would decline his tract?
Is't not determin'd, all must here agree?

Then sure He must, as well as others, die.

'Tis true, he must: But must he die so soone?
Before his Strength, before his Work be done?
If so; must one so meane effect his end?
Shall *Hector* die not by *Achilles* hand?
If die he must; if so untimely too;
Is Noble Bloud spilt by we know not who?

Then weep we may; not that we think't unfit,
(Not envy Heaven to Him, or Him to it)
That he, of whom the Earth unworthy was,
Should be advanc't to a more Happy place:
But that we want his help, or to compose
Our sad distracted times, or quell our foes.
When those pull down that ought to underprop;
When Forraign starvelings come to eat Us up.
When Popish Armies (more then one) in fight,
Do for the Protestant Religion fight,
(To take it from us;) when (a viperous brood)
Who sometimes suckt our Breasts, now suck our Bloud,
(Be it a poison'd draught;) and thus requite,
For what they have, and what expect they might.

Like

An Elegie.

Like her that once (be their successe as bad)
A precious Hen (though undeserved) had,
That laid a Golden Egge each day but once,
Willing (so greedy) to have all at once
By a compendious way, she kild her Hen,
Thinking to finde those precious Eggs within:
As was her Gain, let their Successe be such;
So disappointed; not, prevaile so much.

The readiest way, they thought, by which they might
Effect their Plot, was to put out our Sight:
A tender Eye must be the mark design'd:
'Twas (sure) they meant to make Religion Blind.
No marvell then: They thought (as well they might)
The way to Darknesse was to quench the Light.
A Moat, perhaps, they might pretend to see,
Which only to remove, their care should be;
And, first concluding, he might see amisse,
They only meant to work a cure by this.
But if a Beam they could as soone descry,
They might have seen, theirs was the Evill Eye:
(Which if't offend they may pluck out) not His,
Which saw aright, though saw what was amisse.
Truth is, indeed, they thought it saw too much,
And therefore pluckt it out, their rage was such:
Loth to be seen they were, and could not brook,
Their deeds of darknesse he should over-look:
But take his Eye from Him, and Him from Us,
Their ends the better to accomplish thus.

But must we Die? And Unrevenged too?
By Such a Hand? Such miscreants work our Woe?
Let me die first, and not survive to see,
Before I die, sad Englands obsequy.

'Tis

An Elegie.

'Tis Death to Think; 'tis Worse then death to See;
To bear a Part, is the least death of Three.

This to prevent, who saw too much before,
He clos'd his Eyes, willing to see no more,
Yet first bewail'd our woe with Tears of Bloud,
(A sad presage) 'twas the last thing he did.

Anagram.

GREVILIUS.

VERGILIUS.

And if * VERGILIUS, why not MARO too?
Our AMOR sure he was, we Lov'd him so.

** Sic scribendum contendit Politianus, cum alia.*

FINIS.

23

THE PRISONERS REPORT:

A true Relation of the cruell usage of the
Prisoners in OXFORD.

Together with the strange deliverance of about
fourtie men out of the Dungeon in Bridewell in
Oxford, March the 5. and 6.

Written by *Edward Wixley* Master of Arts, and Minister,
who was himself a prisoner in the Castle, and after-
wards in the same Dungeon.

PROV. *The tender mercies of the wicked are cruel.*

It is this 20. day of March, 1642. ordered by the Committee of the
House of Commons in Parliament concerning Printing, that this Book
intituled (the Prisoners Report) be printed. *March 23.*

JOHN WHITE.

1642



After 14. weeks imprisonment in Oxford, whete I was so cru-
elly handled by *William Smith*, Provost Marshall Generall
of His Majesties Army (as he styles himself) that nothing but
death was expected by me; At last by Gods providence, I and
many others were miraculously delivered, *March 6. 1642.*
at Even; for which, while I live, will I praise the Lord, and hope shall learn
hence to trust in the Almighty in the greatest difficulties, that in the re-
mainder of my life I shall meet with, having found this promise (I will)
never leave thee nor forsake thee) verified in mine own person, even when
my conditio[n] was almost as desperate as *Daniels* in the Lyons den.

After my escape, at the forementioned time, out of a dungeon, neer as
loathsome as *Jeremies* was, I passed over the Bulwarks on the North side
of the Citie about 9. of the clock the same night, accompanied onely with

A

a young

a young man named *Thomas White*. We made what haste we could to the river *Charroll*, intending (had we been pursued) to swim over it; but finding the coast clear, we kept the bank about a mile, and then leaving it, took the North Pole for our guide; and (that we might avoid the danger of His Majesties Scouts) declined all high wayes, and villages, crossed over plowed lands, inclosed pastures, high hedges, and deep mierre ditches, till we came into the open fields. Having journeyed thus all night the morning light began to appear, and discovered unto us, that we were not full ten miles from *Oxford*, though; I think, had we gone in a direct line, we might have been twentie.

My body was much weakened by my long restraint, wet I was in my feet, weary, hungrie and thirstie, but 'twas no time to linger now, nor any secure place was there for refreshment: on I must. Well after a 40. miles circuit, my companion and I with joyfull hearts arrived at *Aylesbury* in *Buckinghamshire*, where we met with two more of our fellow-prisoners, and were all of us courteously received, and beyond our expectation relieved by the worthe Commanders, and other Gentlemen of that garrison, whose favour and bounty I shall ever acknowledge with a thankfull heart.

I was requested by some of those worthy Gentlemen to set down briefly the usage of the prisoners in *Oxford*, 'twas my duty to satisfie their desires, and I have done it as succinctly as I could, leaving the full prosecution and farther enlargement of so sad a story to him, who shall hereafter write a second book of *Martyrs*. The Reader shall find nothing here, but what I either saw, or saw, or else received by information from those, who have drawn their proofs from their own wofull experience.

The persons imprisoned I shall reduce to these 3. heads. 1. Gentlemen, under which title I comprehend Parliament men, Commanders, and the Officers in the Parliaments Army. 2. Ministers. 3. Common Souldiers, such I mean, as did bear arms, or else such Yeomen and men of inferiour qualitie, who were taken prisoners to fill up the number, though so farre from making opposition, that they were onely following their Country affairs, and husbandry in the fields.

1. Gentlemen.

1. The Gentlemen whom I found in the Castle, when I was first imprisoned, were these; Captain *Wingate*, a member of the House of Commons, he was kept close prisoner in a little roome, and not suffered so much as to take the aire for his healths sake, by which means he grew very sickly; Captain *Walton* a member of the House of Commons, Captain *Scroope*, Captain *Lidcor*, Captain *Austin*, Captain *Catesby*, Captain *Vivers*, and Cap-

tain

rain *Lilburne*, all close prisoners, their friends not permitted to speak with them; yea some of their wives were denied access. Captain *Lilburne* was put in irons, Capt. *Scraps* and Captain *Walton* being chamber-fellows, had their bed taken from them by that barbarous *Smith*, who threatened to tie their necks and heels together. Some had their libertie sometimes to walk in the Castle court (a little stinking yard, and the onely place, that the prisoners had to ease nature, *Smith* not permitting any, no not with a keeper, to go to any other upon that necessitie) and those were Sir *William Essex* Knight, Cap. *Flemming*, Capt. *Primrose* a Scotchman, Capt. *Hastwood*, Cap. *Scotchforth*, and Mr. *Ingram*, who made an escape, Lieut. *Dingley*, Lieut. *Fuller*, Lieut. *Lindsey* a Scot, Lieut. *Cotterell*, Ensigne *Adams*, Mr. *Moody*, and Mr. *Ellis* both of the liveguard to his Excellency the Earl of *Essex*.

When *Marleborough* was taken were brought in Mr. *John Franklin* Esquire, a Member of the House of Commons, Lieut. Col. *Ramsay*, and a Serjeant Major (whose name I remember not) both Scotchmen, M. *Brown*, and young Cap. *Franklin*. About the same time were brought in Captain *Hamilton*, and Captain *Forbes* both Scotchmen.

After the taking of *Cyrencester*, Mr. *George* a Member of the House of Commons, Lieut. Col. *Carr* a Scot, whose valour was much spoken of for his once or twice repulsing P. *Rupert's* forces, when they had entred the Town, with many other Captains and countrey gentlemen were imprisoned in the same Castle: most of these (nay that worthy Commander himself Mr. *Carr* did not escape) were, when they were taken, stripped of their clothes, and put into old filthy rags: most of them also, when they were with us, were constrained for a time to quarter on the bare boards: how long they continued so I know not, for within 4. or 5. dayes after I my self was cast into a dungeon, and saw them no more.

How inhumanly the monster *Smith* deals with these worthy Gentlemen their own Petition to His Majestie with the Articles exhibited, or at least that were to be exhibited against the said *Smith*, will in due time demonstrate. I must crave pardon, if I have, or shall fail in the caco-graphie of the names of men, or places.

2. Ministers

2. The Ministers who were prisoners in the Castle were these, M. *Herviers* of Banbury, who was (when I was put into the Dungeon) close prisoner, on whom some vile persons cast many base calumnies, &c. most false aspersions; but when upon examination his innocency appeared, he might have been released upon the taking of a new Protestation, which was in many things (as I conceive) quite contrary to that which was framed by the Parliament, and sent into all parts of the Kingdom. which new Pro-

restation he refusing was still detained. Doctor *Clayton*, what he was charged with I could never (though I were sometimes his chamber-fellow) understand from him. Mr. *Gregory* of Cyreneister, and Mr. *Stamvil*, a neighbour Minister of his, who in their passage towards *Oxford*, were not onely despihtfully, but most fordidly abused. The terms of Coblers, Tinkers, and Tub-preachers put upon them: yea these Atheisticall wretches asked them in derision, Where is now your God? Mr. *Stamvils* lodging, when he first came to us, was on an old Mat on the ground. There was but one Minister more, namely my self, the meanest I confesse of all the rest.

The Lords residing at *Oxford* issued forth a kind of Proclamation (I know not what fitter name to give it) to secure those of the adjacent villages, who following their lawfull occasions should repair to *Oxford*: business of importance brought me thither, which when I had dispatched I went to the Inne for my horse, but 'twas taken away by one Cap. *Whitley*, who seized on it, because he was informed, that I was a round-head (a great crime you see is laid to my charge) when I demanded my horse of *Whitley*, he committed me, and in my passage towards prison I and the Officer with me met *Smith* the Marshall, who carried me before the Lord chief Justice *Heath*, who upon examination of the matter seemed angry with the Officer, that contrary unto the late published Order I should be so injuriously dealt with, told me that I should not be wronged, and gave me many good words, wherein he was fruitfull, but proved at last very barren in his actions. I took my leave of his Lordship, and departed, presuming, that I was not onely a freeman, but conceiving also a probability of getting my horse again: but I was no sooner gone from my Lords presence, but the Catch-powle *Smith* laid hands on me again, and sent me to the Castle. From whence I twice petitioned Sir *Robert Heath*, that either some charge might be made good against me, or else that he would be pleased to grant me my libertie. But because I rejected the new Protestation, (for he was made acquainted with it) he also rejected my Petitions, so imposing a necessity of taking that Protestation, which doth (if we respect the letter it self) give liberty to accept, or refuse it.

After a fortnights imprisonment, *Smith* tells me, that there is no charge against me, and if I will take the Protestation, and pay my fees, I shall be released. When I had read the Protestation, I gave *Smith* a fair answer, hoping to obtain my freedom without yielding to his conditions; but the man grew cholericke, and tormented me to answer directly whether I would take it, or not. I told him plainly, I could not. Upon this he cursed me bitterly, and put me out of my chamber, so that for a fortnight I was

forced

forced to make the boards my bed. many times was I solicited by *Smith*, but seeing he could not preuaile, after about ten weekes imprisonment in the Castle, and after he had soundly beaten me with his cane. he put me in the dungeon at *Bridewel*, &c how it was with me ther you shall heare anon.

And by the way I cannot but make known the unkindnesse of *Dr. Radcliffe*, Principall of *Brazen-nose* Colledge, & his iniustice towards me I was his Curate in the Countrey, after I was by the maliciousnesse of some people driven from a small Livings which I had in *Oxford*: how I was oppressed by the base calumnies and violent dealings of those men, will appeare hereafter. Nine weekes was I in prison, and yet would not the Doctour, though resident in *Oxford*, in all this time send after me, to inquire, whether I were living or dead: here is his unkindnesse. And when after so long a season, I had gotten an opportunity of writing (paper and Inke being before kept from me) and desired of him that money (which was justly due to me for my paines in his Cure) he returned me this answer, that he would not pay me one penny; there was his iniustice: and when I was in the dungeon, he gave out menialling speeches (as I am informed by persons of credit) that when *Smith* had done tormenting me, he himselfe would begin: and I may adde in this he shewed his crueltie: but I leavt him to his bagges of gold and silver, though perhaps the Souldiers will not.

3. Common Souldiers.

3. Whom you are to understand by common Souldiers, I have expressed before. I found not many of these in the Castle at my first entrance. But after nine or ten dayes space, there were nine score persons brought from *Marleborough*; wet and very dirtie, who, after their coards were taken off, were put up into an high Tower, and lodged upon the boards: the roomes were so stuffed with them, that they could not lie downe one by another; I went to comfort them, and to pray with them; as oft as I could get leave; and by that meanes was a more frequent spectator of their miseries, then other men; at last I was threatned, that if I did not forbear, I should be shut up into the same place with them. On these poore soules, did the Viper *Smith* exercise his more then savage crueltie. He allowed them but five farthings a day, so that many of them grew very sicke; all very weake. *Smith* was often solicited to shew more mercy: but his answer was still; Hang them damned rogues, villaine traitors, the Devill take them, they are too well used; nay, when some of them were ready to expire, and he acquainted therewith; nay, when some were brought and laid before his face; yet would not this inhumane wretch suffer any thing to be administred to them for their recovery, so that they died.

Most of these men being pinched with hunger and thirst were brought even to the gates of death, and now there began to be a great cry amongst them

them for bread, and water; but *Smith*, and his officers denied them both, though a river ran under the Castle-wales. When some of them were brought forth for examination, and other ends, they dranke the water wherein most of the gentlemen had washed their hands; they dranke the raine water in the Castle court, and (as I have ben credibly informed) some of them have dranke their owne pisse. By this meanes *Smith* presumed, that he had made them pliable, and like soft wax fit to receive any impression, and therefore tells them, that so many of them, as would take the protestation, and pay their fees should be released; Many yeilded, and with great charge purchased their libertie, of some of these poore men *Smith* received above twenty pounds a man for their fees; they that refused were put up again in their old miew, & now the tyger *Smith* began to rage against them worse then ever, & after a season, when they were extreame hungry, sent this message to them, that as many as would take the protestation should have a pennie worth of cheese every day, and shortly after their liberties; Many poore soules imbraced the offer, and protested, but within three daies their cheese was denied them, and their libertie too, unless they would pay large fees, or serve under one of his majesties Capt: or be *Smiths* servants. Most of these some way or other obtained their freedome, but some still held out, and utterly refused the protestation, to the greatest part of whom God hath since given a gracious deliverance.

The same (or rather the infamy) of *Smithes* cruelly began to fly through towne and countrey; Monie was sent to the poore prisoners from their friends and other charitably persons, but sometimes they fared little the better for it, for if *Smith* knew it, he would take it from them, it was an usuall thing with him to picke mens pockets; It may bee, it had ben formerly his trade. If they bought meate, his servants; if they found it would eate it from them. Many of the proore prisoners were wounded; and one Mr. *Betresse* an honest Chirurgeon of the towne doing his best to cure them, was requited with *Smithes* crueltie, who twice imprisoned him, who having after much importunity and paiment of large fees procured his libertie, durst not visite his Patients any more, so that their wounds ranke and festered, and some of them dyed.

This bloody persecutor *Smith*, more cruell then those in *Queene Maries* dayes (for he hath been the death of many a man, and I am perswaded, that had not there beene secret wayes to convey food to them, that many scores of these *Marleborough* men had perished for want of it) hath beaten many, wounded some, exercised cruelty towards all; some hath he tyed neck and heeles together for the space of 44. howers not suffering them to have one bit of bread, or drop of water, some have beene tyed after that manner three Weekes without intermision having onely e

nough to keepe life and soule together : and all this, ^{neither} because, they called for bread, and water, or for that, they refused the Protestation, and at last those poore soules, that refused, were conveyed from the Castle to Bridwell, and there put some of them into a dungeon, and the rest (for the dungeon would not receive all) into a little base cold roome on the top of the house.

Not long after their departure, *Smith* in his fury calls me to him, strikes me on the face, head, and armes with his Cane, and then after many a bitter Curse, and blasphemous Oath (and yet this bloody Atheist would be thought to be one, that defends the Protestant Religion) calls mee Rogue, and Traytor, and charges mee with dissuading the Prisoners from taking the Protestation; would not suffer me to answer for my self, but presently causes me to be bound with a Coard, and so carryed through the Market-place (it was on the Market-day) and commanded them, that guarded me, to tell the people, that I was a Turke-Preacher, and then to clap me into the dungeon at Bridwell; they executed their commands with great exterie. The dungeon was full of people, so that being straightned for want of roome, I was driven to sit all night for 3. weekes together on the bottom of the Dungeon staires, it stanke greivously, no lodging was there, but the bare ground, no house of office but the same place (in some places of it a man might have gon almost over his shooes in pisse.) Our fare was onely water, and a pennie worth of bread once in 24. houres. sometimes penie halfe penie, and for 4. or 5. daies 2. penie-worth. Monie we had some of us, but nothing could we buy for it, the master of the Bridewell was put in prison for relieving us, two keepers set ouer us, and charged on paine of death not to permit any person to speake with us, we had no place for the easement of nature but that where wee were in, both night & day, also sick persons were forced in the same place to empty their stomaks, so that the stinck of the place was enough to poison us.

The Cyrencester men (for some of them were brought out of the churches thither) that were imprisoned over us, dyed daily, many among our selves grew extreame sicke, and we all feared the plague. We petitioned *Smith* to be removed to some other place, or at least that the sicke men might; he denied both. We petitioned again, that the sicke men might have nourishment convenient for their weake estates, he answered us, that they should have nothing but bread and water, and if in case they dyed, should be cast on a dunghill; we saw nothing but death before our eyes, whereupon some of our companie went to worke with their knives, and in time with those weake instruments, and a little peice of timber, that was leiscarelessly amongst us, made a hole through the dungeon-wall

(t was a thicke wall built with soft freestone, and therefore the more secable) out of which most of us issued, that were in health, leaving behind us 5 sicke persons nigh unto death. Those also that were in the little chamber on the top of the house, being formerly acquainted with the whole business, opened their dore, and whilst the keepers were sleeping, or otherwise negligent, got to the hole, where we received our bread, and water, cut it or tore it wider, I know not whether (for I was gone some houres before) came into the dungeon, & so through the same place that we did.

Many footsteps of Gods immediate providence might be seen before, and in the very act of our deliverance. Some of our Company gat out the Lords day late at night; I, my self, and some others durst not goe forth then, fearing the watch. The hole, which was towards a Bakers yard, was open Munday all day, only a stone set against it, and yet not discerned, when in the Evening I and some 4 more had gotten out, and durst not, because the streets were full of people, presently leape over the Bakers Wall, on a suddain one in the same yard came with a Candle behind us, whom we thought to have been our Keeper, and therefore hastily leaped altogether into the streete, and yet were not taken notice of by those that passed to, and fro in it, neither was the hole discerned by the fellow with the Candle, though he were close by it, but the rest of our company afterwards escaped out.

Wee, who have thus seen the salvation of God, may say with thankful hearts: God is the Lord by whom we escaped death, the Lord looeth the prisoners; blessed be our strong Rock, and praysed be the God of our salvation.

Postscript.

By way of *Postscript*, I must acquaint you with some things Omitted.

1. *Oxford* men were barbarously dealt with, before their coming to *Oxford*, and in their passage to it: most of them were stripped of their Cloathes, some of their very shirts, so that many amongst them, were almost naked, they were driven like Horses in the Cart-waies; and when they came to *Oxford*, wet and dirie, as they were, almost up to the middle, were put in Churches, where many of them were starved by *Smith*, who wold not permit their wives or sisters to com at them, & many their flesh eyes rotting from their bones dyed for want of *Chirurgeons*. I beleeve also, that many of those, that were Ransomed, will scarce ever recover their former strength again, so cruelly were they handled by this Serpent *Smith*, but I hope that some one or other will fully set out to the view of all the World their sufferings, and *Smithes* unparalled Cruelty.

2. There are 2. *Smiths*, both Marshalls of his Majesties Army: one of them Provost Marshall generall, a flaxen-haired man, and this is the *Smith* mentioned in this Discourse. The other Marshall of the Horse, a tall big fellow, and has been formerly (as some say) a Fencer, a man of a bloody minde also.

3. *Smithes* Fees for a Gentleman are 20. shillings, for a Minister (but I must intreat him to forbear me awhile) ten shillings, and for a Common Souldier 4. shillings a day, so long as they continue under him.

FINIS.

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